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Over 100 Hedge Fund Managers Apply For PPIP

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The Treasury announced today that they received over 100 applications from fund managers who want to participate in the Public Private Investment Program (PPIP).  There have been a number of questions regarding the structure of investment vehicles under the PPIP.  In addition to the Treasury release from earlier today, I have included below some additional information on the PPIP that might be useful to hedge fund managers who are thinking of participating in this program in the future.

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Treasury Announces Receipt of Applications to Become Fund Managers under Public Private Investment Program

Washington, DC — The Treasury Department today announced the receipt of more than 100 unique applications from potential fund managers interested in participating in the Legacy Securities portion of the Public Private Investment Program (PPIP).  A variety of institutions applied, including traditional fixed income, real estate, and alternative asset managers.

Successful applicants must demonstrate a capacity to raise private capital and manage funds in a manner consistent with Treasury’s goal of protecting taxpayers.   Treasury will also evaluate the applicant’s depth of experience investing in eligible assets. Finally, the applicant must be headquartered in the United States.

Treasury expects to inform applicants of their preliminary qualification around May 15, 2009. Once a fund receives preliminary qualification, it can begin raising the expected minimum of $500 million in private capital that will serve as the investment that, pending further approval, will be matched with taxpayer funds.  As we have stated previously, Treasury anticipates opening the program to smaller fund managers in the future, which may result in a lower minimum private capital raising requirement.

Since announcing the program details on March 23, Treasury has encouraged small, veteran, minority and women owned private asset managers to partner with other private asset managers. On April 6, Treasury extended the deadline for fund manager applications to provide more time to facilitate these types of partnerships. We are pleased to see a number of creative partnership proposals among the applications we are currently evaluating.

Today’s announcement is the latest milestone in making operational the PPIP for legacy loans and securities, a key part of the Administration’s efforts to repair balance sheets throughout our financial system and ensure that credit is available to the households and businesses, large and small, that will help drive us toward recovery.

For further information on the PPIP, please visit:

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Public-Private Investment Program

Updated: April 6, 2009

To address the challenge of legacy assets, Treasury – in conjunction with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve – has announced the Public-Private Investment Program as part of its efforts to repair balance sheets throughout our financial system and ensure that credit is available to the households and businesses, large and small, that will help drive us toward recovery.

Three Basic Principles: Using $75 to $100 billion in TARP capital and capital from private investors, the Public-Private Investment Program will generate $500 billion in purchasing power to buy legacy assets – with the potential to expand to $1 trillion over time. The Public-Private Investment Program will be designed around three basic principles:

  • Maximizing the Impact of Each Taxpayer Dollar: First, by using government financing in partnership with the FDIC and Federal Reserve and co-investment with private sector investors, substantial purchasing power will be created, making the most of taxpayer resources.
  • Shared Risk and Profits With Private Sector Participants: Second, the Public-Private Investment Program ensures that private sector participants invest alongside the taxpayer, with the private sector investors standing t o lose their entire investment in a downside scenario and the taxpayer sharing in profitable returns.
  • Private Sector Price Discovery: Third, to reduce the likelihood that the government will overpay for these assets, private sector investors competing with one another will establish the price of the loans and securities purchased under the program.

The Merits of This Approach: This approach is superior to the alternatives of either hoping for banks to gradually work these assets off their books or of the government purchasing the assets directly. Simply hoping for banks to work legacy assets off over time risks prolonging a financial crisis, as in the case of the Japanese experience. But if the government acts alone in directly purchasing legacy assets, taxpayers will take on all the risk of such purchases – along with the additional risk that taxpayers will overpay if government employees are setting the price for those assets.

Two Components for Two Types of Assets: The Public-Private Investment Program has two parts, addressing both the legacy loans and legacy securities clogging the balance sheets of financial firms:

  • Legacy Loans: The overhang of troubled legacy loans stuck on bank balance sheets has made it difficult for banks to access private markets for new capital and limited their ability to lend.
  • Legacy Securities: Secondary markets have become highly illiquid, and are trading at prices below where they would be in normally functioning markets. These securities are held by banks as well as insurance companies, pension funds, mutual funds, and funds held in individual retirement accounts.

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PPIP Whitepaper

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Legacy Securities Termsheet

Fund Structure

Treasury and a vehicle controlled by the applicable Fund Manager through which private investors will invest in a Fund (each, a “Private Vehicle”) will be the sole investors in a Fund. Additional detail with respect to Fund Structure can be found under “Fund Structure Detail” below.

Pre-Qualification of Fund Managers

Private asset managers wishing to participate in this program should submit the application found at http://www.financialstability.gov/ to Treasury as part of the selection process. Fund Managers will be pre-qualified based upon criteria that are anticipated to include:

  • Demonstrated capacity to raise at least $500 million of private capital.
  • Demonstrated experience investing in Eligible Assets, including through performance track records.A minimum of $10 billion (market value) of Eligible Assets under management.
  • Demonstrated operational capacity to manage the Funds in a manner consistent with Treasury’s stated Investment Objective while also protecting taxpayers.
  • Headquarters in the United States.

Other criteria are identified in the application. Treasury will consider suggestions from Fund Managers to raise equity capital from retail investors.

3 year lock up period

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Q&A on the Program

Legacy Securities FAQs

How are Legacy TALF and the Legacy Securities PPIP related?

Legacy TALF and the Legacy Securities PPIP are separate programs. Legacy TALF will be a Federal Reserve lending program with its own set of terms, conditions and eligibility requirements. Legacy TALF will be made widely available to investors (who meet Federal Reserve eligibility standards) regardless of whether or not they participate in the Legacy Securities PPIP. Pre-qualified Fund Managers in the Legacy Securities PPIP may choose to utilize leverage pursuant to the Legacy TALF program, when it becomes operational and subject to its terms and conditions. For the avoidance of doubt, a qualified investor utilizing Legacy TALF will do so on the same terms and conditions as a Legacy Securities PPIP investor utilizing Legacy TALF.

Will Treasury require pre-qualified Fund Managers to raise a minimum level of private capital?

Yes. In the initial group, pre-qualified Fund Managers will be expected to raise at least $500 million of private capital. However, as discussed above, Treasury currently anticipates opening the program to smaller Fund Managers in the future which may result in a lower minimum private capital raising requirement.

Will Treasury provide a public list of all pre-qualified Fund Managers?

Yes. Treasury expects to provide a public list including only the pre-qualified Fund Managers.

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Please contact us if you have a question on this issue or if you would like to start a hedge fund.  If you would like more information, please see our articles on starting a hedge fund.

SEC Chairman Discusses Potential New IA Custody Rules

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Hedge Fund Advisors May be Impacted

Yesterday SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro discussed many new SEC initiatives in a speech given to the Society of American Business Editors and Writers.  One of the new initiatives involves those advisors who have “custody” of client assets.  With respect to such advisors, Shapiro said:

I anticipate that this proposal will include a consideration of “surprise” examinations by a certified public accountant, and a requirement that investment advisers undergo third-party compliance audits.

The tone of the speech was that of a new gunslinger who has come into town to clean up – in addition to the new custody provisions, she discussed regulatory reform and giving SEC examiners more room to initiate investigations.  Many of the ideas expressed in the speech may be worrisome to investment advisors and investors because the initiatives are likely to add significantly to the operating costs of hedge fund managers who are registered as investment advisors.  Additionally, registered managers may face increase inquiries into their business by nosy SEC examiners which will not go over well within the industry.

Below I have reprinted what I thought were important or interesting parts of the speech; the full text can be found here.

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Speech by SEC Chairman:
Address to the Society of American Business Editors and Writers

by

Chairman Mary L. Schapiro
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
SABEW Annual Conference 2009
Denver, Colorado
April 27, 2009

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Policies/Rules:

Enforcement has been the most visible program at the SEC in recent history. But the financial crisis teaches us that there are policy and regulatory gaps that the SEC must also address.

Again, if investors are to have confidence in the ratings assigned to securities, that corporate boards are working on behalf of stockholders, that investment advisers are not running Ponzi schemes, that money market funds won’t break the buck, then the SEC needs to be pushing forward a real agenda of reform.

Let me just highlight a few of these:

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Custody:

In response to major investment scams — such as Madoff — and a rash of Ponzi schemes, we will be considering two proposals as part of a package of initiatives designed to better assure the safekeeping of investor assets.

In short order, the Commission will consider a proposal to strengthen the controls applicable to investment advisers with custody of client funds and securities. I anticipate that this proposal will include a consideration of “surprise” examinations by a certified public accountant, and a requirement that investment advisers undergo third-party compliance audits.

Also, as part of this package, I have asked the staff to draft a Commission requirement that a senior officer from broker-dealers and investment advisers with custody certify that controls are in place to protect investor assets.

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Reforming the Landscape:

As a result, there is significant debate about regulatory reform — not about whether it should happen, but about what form it will take. You might say the train has left the station, but no one quite knows for sure where it will come to stop.

Whatever form it takes, I support the view that there is a need for system-wide consideration of risks to the financial system and to create mechanisms to reduce and avert such systemic risks.

But, at the same time, I believe that any reform must not — and cannot — compromise the quality of our capital markets or the protection of investors.

If we cannot show investors that we are looking out for their interests as much as the interests of the financial institutions — then we will have little success in restoring confidence.

Investors need to see that we are going after those who engage in wrongdoing. They need to see that we are forcing companies to be truthful and transparent in their reporting. They need to see that we are limiting risk in areas where substantial risk is not what they’re buying. And, they need to see that we’re rooting out fraud.

In short, they need an agency that’s there for them — and primarily them. They need an independent agency that exists not just to protect Wall Street, but to protect Main Street.

By offering that to investors, we can help to restore confidence.

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In addition, I have streamlined our enforcement procedures by no longer requiring full Commission approval to launch an investigation. And, I’ve eliminated the need for full Commission approval before negotiating a settlement with a corporate defendant.

Before these directives, enforcement attorneys will tell you that they worried about red lights at every turn — now they see green.

Additionally, I brought on a consulting firm to assess and revamp the way we handle the nearly 1 million tips and complaints we get each year. Because we do not have unlimited resources we cannot pursue every lead — we get about 2,000 every day. But we can do a better job ensuring that each tip lands on the right desk and that the person reviewing it has the necessary skills.

Further, we are looking at improving our training programs and hiring new skill sets — from financial analysis to experts in complex trading strategies. It’s all an effort to keep pace with the fraudsters and the ever-changing financial concoctions of the day.

For me, the progress cannot be fast enough.

When I review the pipeline of cases I see how much we are confronting.

  • We have approximately 150 active hedge fund investigations, some of which include possible Ponzi schemes, misappropriations, and performance smoothing.
  • We have about two dozen active municipal securities investigations possibly involving offering frauds; arbitrage-driven fraud; public corruption; and price transparency.
  • And, we have more than 50 current investigations involving Credit Default Swaps, Collateralized Debt Obligations and other derivatives-related investments.

… and that’s just a small slice.

Please contact us if you have a question on this issue or if you would like to start a hedge fund.  If you would like more information, please see our articles on starting a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Hedge Fund Due Diligence Firm Drops Ball, Receives Fine

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In what represents an unbelievable screw-up, professed hedge fund due diligence firm Hennessee Group was charged by the SEC with not performing the due diligence it supposedly provided to hedge fund investors who used their services.  According to the SEC Administrative Order, Henessee did not perform certain key elements of the due diligence process which they advertised to potential clients.  Because of the lack of due diligence, Henessee recommended investing into the fraudulent Bayou hedge fund.

A few of the more interesting parts of the release include the following:

From February 2003 through August 2005, approximately forty clients of Hennessee Group invested a total of over $56 million in the Bayou funds after receiving Hennessee Group’s recommendations. Most of those monies were lost and dissipated by Bayou’s principals, who defrauded their investors by fabricating Bayou’s performance in client account statements, periodic newsletters, and year-end financial statements that included a phony audit opinion fabricated by one of Bayou’s principals.

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Hennessee Group and Gradante, in their capacities as investment advisers, owed fiduciary duties to their clients to perform the services that they represented they would provide and to disclose all material departures from the representations that they made to their clients. Despite their representations about their services, with regard to the Bayou Funds and the funds’ management, Hennessee Group and Gradante did not perform two of the five elements of the due diligence evaluation that they had represented to their clients they would undertake. In addition, Hennessee Group and Gradante failed to adequately respond to information that they received that suggested that the identity of Bayou’s outside auditor was in doubt and that there existed a potential conflict of interest between one of Bayou’s principals and its purported outside auditor.

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With regard to Bayou, Hennessee Group, at Gradante’s direction, failed to perform two elements of the due diligence evaluation that Hennessee Group had told its clients and prospective clients that it would do: (1) a portfolio/trading analysis; and (2) a verification of Bayou’s relationship with its purported independent auditor. By not conducting the entire due diligence evaluation that it had advertised, and by failing to disclose to clients that its evaluation of Bayou deviated from its prior representations, Hennessee Group and Gradante rendered the prior representations about the due diligence process materially misleading and breached their fiduciary duties to Hennessee Group’s clients.

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In the fall of 2002, Bayou refused to provide Hennessee Group with the prime brokerage reports that Hennessee Group had requested. However, instead of insisting that Bayou provide the reports as a condition of potentially being recommended, Hennessee Group proceeded to the next phases of due diligence. Gradante decided that a portfolio/trading analysis was irrelevant for a day-trading fund like Bayou, which stated in marketing materials that it held securities positions for brief periods of time and converted positions to cash prior to each day’s market closing.

As a result, Hennessee Group did not obtain or evaluate any quantitative information about Bayou’s portfolio characteristics, investment and trading strategies, or risk management discipline. Instead of confirming Bayou’s results and processes through an analysis of Bayou’s historical trading data to determine whether the fund was, in fact, executing its purported “high-velocity” day-trading strategy and utilizing appropriate risk management techniques, Gradante and Hennessee Group relied entirely on Bayou’s uncorroborated representations and purported rates of return that Bayou had provided during its initial information-gathering phases.

Hennessee Group never told the clients to whom it recommended Bayou that it had not conducted a portfolio/trading analysis on the funds. By failing to disclose this information in connection with its recommendation of Bayou, Hennessee Group left those clients with the misleading impression that it had conducted a portfolio, trading, and risk management evaluation of Bayou and that Bayou had satisfied Hennessee Group’s purported standards. In so doing, Hennessee Group and Gradante breached their fiduciary duties to Hennessee Group’s clients.

I have written a number of posts about proper hedge fund due diligence and am always surprised how haphazardly investments are made into some hedge funds.  Over the past six to eight months I have also been surprised that so many sophisticated and savvy investors would be duped by frauds like Madoff… but I guess if those gatekeepers who are paid to help investors research managers are asleep at the wheel we can’t really expect much more from investors.

Please contact us if you have a question on this issue or if you would like to start a hedge fund.  If you would like more information, please see our articles on starting a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

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SEC Charges Investment Adviser That Recommended Bayou Hedge Funds to Clients

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2009-86

Washington, D.C., April 22, 2009 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged New York-based investment adviser Hennessee Group LLC and its principal Charles J. Gradante with securities law violations for failing to perform their advertised review and analysis before recommending that their clients invest in the Bayou hedge funds that were later discovered to be a fraud.

In a settled administrative proceeding, the Commission issued an order finding that Hennessee Group and Gradante did not perform key elements of the due diligence that they had represented they would conduct prior to recommending investments in the Bayou hedge funds. The SEC also finds that they failed to conduct a reasonable investigation into red flags concerning Bayou. Hennessee Group and Gradante routinely represented to clients and prospective clients that they would not recommend investments in hedge funds that did not satisfy all phases of their due diligence evaluation.

“Forewarned is forearmed — investment advisers must make good on their promises or face the consequences of vigorous SEC enforcement action,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.

“As the Commission found, these investment advisers failed to honor the representations they made to their clients and did not disclose these material departures from their advertised services,” said Antonia Chion, Associate Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “The advice that clients receive from hedge fund consultants is especially critical when the hedge funds are neither regulated nor transparent.”

According to the Commission’s order, approximately 40 clients invested millions of dollars in the Bayou hedge funds from February 2003 through August 2005 after the Hennessee Group recommended those investments. Most of the money was lost through trading or dissipated by Bayou’s principals, who defrauded their investors by fabricating Bayou’s performance in client account statements and year-end financial statements. The SEC charged the managers of the Bayou hedge funds with fraud in 2005.

The Commission’s order finds that Hennessee Group and Gradante failed to conduct the portfolio and trading analysis that it had advertised to clients. Instead of analyzing Bayou’s results and processes through a review of Bayou’s historical trading methods to determine whether the fund was, in fact, successfully executing its purported day-trading strategy, Hennessee Group and Gradante decided not to perform any analysis after Bayou refused to produce its trading data. They relied entirely on Bayou’s uncorroborated representations about its strategy and its purported rates of return.

The Commission’s order also finds that despite conflicting reports from Bayou about the identity of their independent auditor, Hennessee Group and Gradante failed to verify Bayou’s relationship with its auditor. In fact, the accounting firm that purportedly conducted Bayou’s annual audit was a non-existent entity fabricated by one of Bayou’s principals, who was identified in publicly available state accountancy board records as the registered agent for the bogus accounting firm.

According to the Commission’s order, Hennessee Group and Gradante also failed to respond to red flags concerning Bayou that came to their attention while they were monitoring Bayou on behalf of their clients. In particular, they failed to inquire or investigate when Bayou provided contradictory responses regarding the identity of its auditor or to adequately inquire about a rumor that one of Bayou’s principals was affiliated with Bayou’s purported outside auditing firm.

The Commission’s order finds that Hennessee Group and Gradante violated Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act. The order requires Hennessee Group and Gradante to pay $814,644.12 in disgorgement and penalties, and to cease and desist from committing or causing further violations. The parties also are required to adopt policies to ensure adequate disclosures in the future and to provide copies of the Commission’s Order to all current and prospective clients for a period of two years.

Hennessee Group and Gradante consented to the entry of the Commission’s order without admitting or denying the findings.
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For more information, contact:
Antonia Chion
Associate Director, SEC’s Division of Enforcement
(202) 551-4842
Yuri B. Zelinsky
Assistant Director, SEC’s Division of Enforcement
(202) 551-4769

Revising the Hedge Fund Compensation Structure

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Syndicated Post on Hedge Fund Fees

I have recently come across a very good blog called Ten Seconds Into the Future by Bryan Goh of First Avenue Partners, a hedge fund seeder.  Bryan’s posts are very insightful and I recommend all managers take a look at his writings.  The post below discusses some possible ways which hedge fund fees may be designed in the future – this is an especially good topic as I am often asked for suggestions on alternative fee structures.

Please feel free to comment below or contact me if you have any questions or would like more information on starting a hedge fund.

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Hedge Fund Fees. Suggestions for the Future

I have argued before that hedge fund fees were poorly designed, and in that article had suggested a possible design for performance fees. Here I provide more detail into what I think is a practical solution which addresses some but not all of the problems with current fee structures.

Management fees:

This is the simpler issue to deal with. First of all, one has to question what is the purpose of management fees. In traditional long only mutual funds, management fees are the compensation for the manager for managing the fund. With the rise of absolute return funds, and their performance fees, management fees were no longer intended to be the primary compensation for managing of assets. The industry generally represents that management fees are compensation for overheads and the costs of running the asset management business.

If this is in fact the case, then the current flat percentage of assets management fee does not do as represented. The costs and overheads of running an asset management business are not linear in the size of assets under management. There are economies of scale. By charging a flat percentage of assets under management, these economies of scale accrue to the investment manager and not to the investor.

If management fees are indeed intended to cover overheads and costs, then a sliding scale is closer to the intended purpose. One can envisage management fees being charged as follows: 2% of assets as long as assets under management in the fund are under a certain amount, 1.5% when assets rise to a certain level, and 1% whenever assets are over a certain amount. This is just an example of course and there are other ways management fees can be designed to reflect the represented purpose.

A further finessing of management fees which is useful is to waive management fees for side pocketed investments. This encourages the manager to think carefully about side pocketing any assets. Certainly investors would not appreciate management fees being charged on assets that have been ‘gated’ or suspended.

Performance Fees:

Hedge funds fees typically include a profit share by the manager. This can range from 15% to 30% but for the vast majority of funds is 20% of profits. Pre-2005 there were a significant minority of funds which had a hurdle rate (strictly positive). That is, performance fees were only applied once the fund’s returns were higher than some positive return. In the later years, this practice had mostly disappeared as demand outstripped supply and hedge fund managers were able to increase their prices. Almost all hedge funds still operate a ‘High Watermark’ by which is meant that the investor pays fees only if the fund’s NAV is above the previous high. Should the fund’s value fall, performance fees are not collected until the previous high NAV is exceeded again.

This all sounds fair except that there are timing issues. Fees are accrued and at some point crystallized. This usually happens annually. A situation can arise therefore where performance fees are paid out at the end of the year or quarter, the NAV falls thereafter. Even if there is a recovery but the high watermark is not re-attained, fees paid out are not reclaimed.

A simple solution is as follows:

  • Fees are accrued semi-annually.
  • 50% of the performance fee is paid out semi-annually.
  • 50% of the performance fee is retained in Escrow (not to be invested in the fund.)
  • Each retained performance fee vests and is paid out 30 months later (for example, the delay can be made equal to the lock up for example).
  • All retained fees in Escrow are subject to negative performance fees = 20% of loss from the NAV of last performance fee calculation period.
  • When redemptions are paid in full, fees held back are released to the manager.

This design has the following features:

  • The investor pays performance fees on the net performance for their holding period, unless the performance is negative over the entire holding period. Unfortunately the manager cannot be expected to pay a negative performance fee over the entire holding period if the performance turned out to be negative over the holding period.
  • The manager is incentivized to make money over the long term instead of making money only in a given year.
  • The manager has 50% of their performance fee at risk on a rolling basis. On a cumulative basis, the manager may have a whole year’s performance fee at risk.
  • It has the same kind of incentive as a private equity clawback fee structure.
  • The above fee structure can be adjusted for the length of the holdback. The longer the holdback, the more performance fee is at risk.
  • A manager who is confident in generating returns over the length of their lock up should not object to such a fee schedule.
  • It incentivizes a manager to force redeem investors if they do not expect to be able to make money.

The Future:

Customers are the ultimate regulator of an industry, so it is investors who ultimately regulate the hedge fund industry. As long as investors are small and numerous, there may not be the aggregation of bargaining power to negotiate with fund managers. The huge concentration of assets under control in the fund of funds industry afforded funds of funds the opportunity to negotiate, not harshly but fairly with hedge fund managers. Not just on fees but on liquidity terms, transparency and controls. This was an opportunity that was missed. The battering taken by funds of funds in 2008 has greatly impaired their powers. We can only hope that investors find some way of communicating their needs to fund managers. And we can only hope that fund managers are enlightened enough to see that investors are not deliberately antagonistic, although it may seem so today.

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Other related hedge fund law blog articles:

Hedge Funds Care LA Event

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3rd Annual Los Angeles Benefit

4/30/2009 – Los Angeles

The Hedge Funds Care Los Angeles Committee cordially invites you to their 3rd Annual Benefit.

Thursday, April 30, 2009

5:00 PM

W Los Angeles
930 Hilgard Avenue
Los Angeles, CA 90024

For more information, please contact Dan Butchko at [email protected] or 212-991-9600 ext. 336.

The Invitation:

You’re Invited!

The Hedge Funds Care Lose Angeles Committee
cordially invites you to their 3rd Annual Benefit…

Good Times in Trying Times
Thursday, April 30th, 2009
The Backyard at The W Hotel, Westwood
930 Hilgard Avenue | Los Angeles 90024
5:00pm – 8:00pm
Business Attire

Join us to help support Los Angeles’ children in need.  Times are challending for many, especially for those who rely on agencies that prevent and treat child abuse.  Please open your hearts and enjoy an evening of reaching out to your peers while reaching out to the children.

Non-hoseted Valet Parking Available Onsite

* Appetizers
* Cocktails
* Silent Auction
* Raffle
* And Much More!

Los Angeles Committee 2009

Michael Smith,
Co-Chair

Michelle White,
Co-Chair

Brett Alpert
Cresta Archuletta
Erin Brodie
Conrad Gorospe
Kathleen Kenney
Mary Beth Salter
Yaela Shamburg
Steve Smith
Mason Snyder
Kristine Stromeyer
Rita Swann
Mark Trousdale

CFTC Uncovers More Frauds and Ponzi Schemes

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This week alone the Commodities Futures Trading Commission issued 5 separate press releases regarding various frauds and ponzi schemes.   As we have noted many times before investors should make sure they conduct adequate due diligence into their managers.  It also goes without saying, but managers should not engage in fraudulent conduct, make misrepresentations to investors, lie to investors or regulators, or do anything that is contrary to what is stated in the investment program offering documents.  Four of the press releases are reprinted below.

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Release: 5646-09
For Release: April 9, 2009

New York Court Enters Order Imposing a $240,000 Fine and Other Sanctions against New York State Resident Michael Vitebsky in a Foreign Currency Scam

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced today that it obtained $240,000 in sanctions and a permanent injunction in a consent order against Michael Vitebsky, a resident of New York State, in connection with his participation in an illegal foreign currency (forex) boiler room operation and for violating the anti-fraud provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act. The order also imposes permanent trading and registration bans on Vitebsky.

Vitebsky is obligated to pay the $240,000 civil monetary penalty upon satisfaction of a $220,000 forfeiture obligation entered in a parallel criminal proceeding, U.S. v. Vitebsky, E.D.N.Y. Docket No. 04 Cr. 0419.

The order was entered by Judge Leo I. Glasser of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York and stems from a CFTC complaint filed in 2003 (see CFTC News Release, 4852-03, October 16, 2003). The order enters findings of fact that Vitebsky and others participated in a scheme in which Vitebsky used A.S. Templeton Group, Inc., a company of which he was the president and treasurer, to fraudulently solicit funds from customers for forex transactions.
According to the order, Vitebsky helped divert customer funds for unauthorized purposes and willfully made false representations to customers regarding the profitability of their accounts.

The CFTC would like to thank the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York for their assistance.

The following CFTC staff members are responsible for this case: Sheila Marhamati, Philip Rix, Steven Ringer, Lenel Hickson, Jr., and Vincent McGonagle.

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Release: 5645-09
For Release: April 9, 2009

CFTC Charges Austin, Texas Resident Steven Leigh Shakespeare and His Company, Guardian Futures, Inc., With Fraud and Unauthorized Trading

WASHINGTON, DC — The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced today that it charged Steven Leigh Shakespeare, and his company, Guardian Futures, Inc., both of Austin, Texas, with fraud and unauthorized trading of customer accounts, resulting in combined customer trading losses of at least $196,000.

The CFTC complaint, filed on April 8, 2009, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, alleges that Shakespeare engaged in a series of unauthorized transactions and fraudulent acts in the accounts of Plains Grain Company, Inc. and Evans Grain Marketing LLC. The complaint charges that Shakespeare, throughout the course of the unauthorized transactions, made misrepresentations and omitted material facts to customers and to Alaron Trading Corporation, the futures commission merchant to whom Shakespeare had introduced the customer accounts.

On the same day the complaint was filed, the court entered a statutory restraining order preserving books and records and providing the CFTC immediate access to such books and records.

In its continuing litigation, the CFTC seeks restitution to customers, disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains, civil monetary penalties, a permanent injunction, and trading prohibitions, among other sanctions.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the office of the United States Attorney for the Western District of Texas.

The following CFTC Division of Enforcement staff are responsible for this case: Timothy J. Mulreany, David Reed, Michael Amakor, Paul Hayeck, and Joan Manley.

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Release: 5644-09
For Release: April 9, 2009

William D. Perkins of St. George, Utah Ordered to Pay More Than $2 Million in Sanctions in CFTC Ponzi Scheme Action

Universe Capital Appreciation Commodity Pool, Operated by Perkins, Part of Larger CFTC Action that Has Resulted in More than $45 Million in Judgments

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced that it obtained a federal court order against William D. Perkins of St. George, Utah and Tax Accounting Office (TAO), Perkins’ private bookkeeping service, for more than $2 million in an anti-fraud action brought by the CFTC in 2006. The CFTC action alleged that Perkins fraudulently solicited $3.4 million from investors in a commodity pool he operated under the name Universe Capital Appreciation LLC. (See CFTC Release 5240-06 October 5, 2006.)

The opinion and order were entered on March 25, 2009, by U.S. District Judge Robert B. Kugler of the District of New Jersey.

Specifically, the order requires Perkins to repay $1.6 million to investors and a civil monetary penalty of $354,462, and prohibits Perkins from engaging in any business activities related to commodity futures or options trading. The court also ordered relief defendant TAO to repay $76,000 of investor money in which TAO had no legitimate interest.

In the opinion, Judge Kugler found that Perkins was reckless to solicit funds for his commodity pool without making a reasonable inquiry into the validity of representations that third parties made regarding the performance of the “superfund”, especially where Perkins had personal experience in three previous failed high yield investment schemes with one of the parties in which they had lost over $2 million of participant funds.

The CFTC complaint alleged that Perkins touted Universe Capital Appreciation LLC as a way for investors with less than $100,000 to participate in a so-called “superfund” that Perkins claimed was making “astonishing” profits of approximately 100 percent annually trading financial futures contracts. In fact, the CFTC complaint alleged that the “superfund” was itself a massive fraud that was the subject of other CFTC actions resulting in over $45 million in judgments. (See CFTC Press Releases 5447-08 February 7, 2008 and 5357-07, July 23, 2007.)

The following Division of Enforcement staff members are responsible for this case: Elizabeth M. Streit, Joy McCormack, Venice Bickham, Scott R. Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard Wagner.

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Release: 5642-09
For Release: April 7, 2009

Federal Court Issues Preliminary Injunction Against Two Nevada Corporations in $20 Million Commodity Pool Ponzi Scheme Operated by Tennessee Resident, Dennis Bolze

Court Freezes Assets of Centurion Asset Management and Advanced Trading Services; Bolze Is Arrested

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced today that on April 1, 2009, a federal court judge in Knoxville, Tennessee issued a preliminary injunction against defendant Centurion Asset Management, Inc. (Centurion) and relief defendant Advanced Trading Services, Inc. (ATS), both located in Las Vegas, Nevada.

Judge Thomas A. Varlan issued the order that freezes the assets of Centurion and ATS and prohibits Centurion from further violations of the Commodity Exchange Act, as charged. The court determined that the preliminary injunction was necessary to protect the public from further loss and damage and to enable the CFTC to fulfill its statutory duties.

The order stems from a CFTC complaint filed on March 3, 2009, charging Dennis Bolze of Gatlinburg, Tennessee, and Centurion, with fraud and misappropriation in operating a $20 million commodity pool Ponzi scheme. (See CFTC v. Bolze, et. al., No. 09 C 88 [E.D. Tenn. 2009] and CFTC Press Release 5634-09, March 12, 2009).

As alleged, Bolze and Centurion operated a Ponzi scheme for at least six years that defrauded more than 100 investors and caused approximately $20 million in investor losses. ATS was charged as a relief defendant for receiving funds from defendants to which it was not entitled. Bolze and Centurion told investors that they were pooling and investing customer money in S&P 500 and NASDAQ 100 stock index commodity futures, but instead misappropriated most of the funds, according to the complaint.

Bolze Arrested on March 12

On March 12, 2009, Bolze was arrested in Pennsylvania by federal authorities in connection with a related criminal complaint. However, Bolze was in the custody of the U.S. Marshal’s Service at the time of the March 31 hearing. As a result, Judge Varlan’s preliminary injunctive order did not address the CFTC’s charges against him.

In the continuing litigation, the CFTC is seeking permanent injunctive relief, return of funds to defrauded participants, repayment of ill-gotten gains, civil penalties, and other equitable relief.

The following CFTC Division of Enforcement staff are responsible for this case: Jon J. Kramer, Diane M. Romaniuk, Michael Tallarico, Mary Beth Spear, Ava M. Gould, Scott R. Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard B. Wagner.

Hedge Fund Carried Interest Tax Increase?

3 Replies

Legislation Introduced to Eliminate Carried Interest “Loophole”

As we are all well aware, the partnership structure of hedge funds allows the management companies of these funds to receive an “allocation” of the fund’s income.  Under general partnership taxation principles, this allocation is taxed to the management company (and the other investors in the hedge fund) according to the characteristic of that income (at the partnership level).  That is, if the income was long-term capital gain at the partnership level, such income would be allocated to all partners (including the management company) and would retain such characterization.  Long-term capital gains are currently taxed at 15% (as compared to a 35% tax rate for most ordinary income).

Last week Representative Sander Levin reintroduced legislation to tax the carried interest at ordinary tax rates.  The tax would only apply to the managers of partnerships to the extent that such managers did not have an underlying investment in the fund.  I will not introduce any political opinions regarding such a tax, but I will note that I take issue with the way that the press and lawmakers define the issue.  The most glaring omission in all of these reports is that the carried interest (or performance allocation) is only taxed at long-term capital gains rates if there are underlying long-term capital gains.  These articles (including the press release reprinted below) insinuate that all allocations made to a manager will be subject to long-term capital gains rates.  Not all income to hedge funds is long term capital gain – in fact, many hedge funds have no long-term capital gains at all because their programs focus on short term or intermediate term trades.

We have discussed this issue a number of times before and believe that the best way for this issue to be addressed is through the political process and we hope that all lawmakers involved take a considered and academic approach when crafting any future tax legislation (see Hedge Fund Taxes may Increase Under Obama).

The press release below is from the office of Representative Sander Levin and provides a sort of question and answer regarding the proposed legislation.  I am interested to read your comments on this issue below.

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For Immediate Release
April 3, 2009

FOR MORE INFORMATION:
Hilarie Chambers
Office: 202.225.4961

Levin Reintroduces Carried Interest Tax Reform Legislation

Bill to Tax Fund Managers’ Compensation at Same Rates as All Americans

(Washington D.C.)- Rep. Sander Levin today reintroduced legislation to tax carried interest compensation at the same ordinary income tax rates paid by other Americans.  Currently, the managers of private investment partnerships are able to receive compensation for these services at the much lower capital gains tax rate rather that the ordinary income tax rate by virtue of their fund’s partnership structure.

“This is a basic issue of fairness,” said Rep. Levin. “Fund managers are receiving compensation for managing their investors’ money.  They should not pay the 15% capital gains rate on their compensation when millions of other hard-working Americans, many of whose income is performance-based, pay ordinary rates of up to 35%.  The President’s budget recognizes that this is unfair.  The House of Representatives has recognized that it is unfair, and this year I hope we can act to change the law.”

The legislation clarifies that any income received from a partnership, capital or otherwise, in compensation for services provided by the employee is subject to ordinary tax rates.  As a result, the managers of investment partnerships who receive a carried interest as compensation will pay regular income tax rates rather than capital gains rates on that compensation.  The capital gains rate will continue to apply to the extent that the managers’ income represents a reasonable return on capital they have actually invested themselves in the partnership.

“This proposal is not about taxing investment, it’s about ensuring that all compensation is treated equally for tax purposes.  Anyone who actually invests money in these funds will continue to receive capital gains treatment, including the managers.  So there is no reason to expect that the amount of capital available for these kinds of investments will be reduced,” concluded Levin.

Levin introduced similar legislation in the 110th Congress, which was subsequently included in several tax packages approved by the Ways & Means Committee and the House of Representatives.  A similar proposal is also included in President Obama’s FY 2010 budget request.

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Levin Carried Interest Legislation – H.R. 1935

H.R. 1935 would treat the “carried interest” compensation received by investment fund managers as ordinary income rather than capital gains.  In exchange for providing the service of managing their investors’ assets, fund managers often they receive a portion of the fund’s profits, or carried interest, usually 20 percent.  H.R. 1935 clarifies that this income is subject to ordinary income tax rates rather than the much lower capital gains rate.

Carried Interest: The Basics

Why is Congress concerned about this issue?

Many investment funds are structured as partnerships in which investors become limited partners and the funds’ managers are the general partner.  The managers often take a considerable portion of their compensation for managing the funds’ investments as a share of the funds’ profits using a mechanism called “carried interest.”  Partnership profits are taxed not to the partnership; instead partners are taxed on allocations of partnership income, and the nature of that income (capital or ordinary) “flows-through” to the partners.  As a result, the investment managers are able to have income for performance of services taxed at the 15% capital gains rate.  Essentially they are able to pay a lower tax rate on income from their work than other Americans simply because of the structure of their firm.

What does the legislation do?

It clarifies that any income received from a partnership, capital or otherwise, in compensation for services is ordinary income for tax purposes.  As a result, the managers of investment partnerships who receive a carried interest as compensation will pay regular income tax rates rather than capital gains rates on that compensation.  The capital gains rate will continue to apply to the extent that the managers’ income represents a reasonable return on capital they have actually invested in the partnership.

What kinds of investment firms will be affected?

This is part of a broad consideration of tax fairness.  The principle at work is that compensation for services should be treated as ordinary income and taxed accordingly, regardless of its source.  Any investment management firm that takes a share of an investment fund’s profits as its compensation (i.e. in the form of carried interest), will be affected.  This will apply to any investment management firm without regard to the type of assets, whether they are financial assets or real estate.  The test is the form of compensation, not the type of assets the firm is managing, its investment strategy, or the amount of compensation involved.

What is the effective date of the legislation?

This legislation is designed to create a structure under which this income should be taxed.  Decisions on the effective date will be made as part of the legislative process.

Carried Interest: Myths vs. Facts

Myth: This is a tax increase on investment that will hurt economic growth.

Fact: Investors are not affected by this legislation at all.

Any person or institution who invests money in a fund whose managers receive a carried interest will continue to pay the capital gains rate on their profits.  In fact, the bill explicitly protects the investments that fund managers make themselves.  To the extent they have put their own money in the fund, managers still get capital gains treatment, but to the extent they are being compensated for managing the fund, they will have to pay ordinary income tax rates like other service providers.   Since investors are not affected, there is no reason to believe that the amount of capital available for these kinds of investments will be reduced at all.

Myth: Taxing carried interest is just about raising revenue.

Fact: Fairness requires treating all taxpayers who provide services the same.

This proposal would raise revenue, but it is not just an offset.  Congress has a responsibility ensure that our tax code is fair, that it makes sense.  A broad spectrum of experts, including the Chairman of the Cato Institute and senior economic advisors to the last three Republican Presidents, agree that carried interest really represents a performance based fee that investors are paying to fund managers and that it should be taxed accordingly.  Allowing some service providers to pay the 15 percent capital gains rate on their income when everyone else has to pay up to 35 percent risks undermining people’s confidence in our voluntary tax system.

Myth: Fund Managers are just like entrepreneurs who get founder’s stock in their company, so they too should be taxed at the capital gains rate.

Fact: Fund Managers are fundamentally different than the founder of a company.

When someone starts an enterprise, he or she actually owns that business.  Sometimes that business becomes enormously valuable, but quite often it fails altogether and the entrepreneur loses her business. When an investment partnership purchases an asset, be it a stake in a small start-up company, a large corporation that wants to go private, a portfolio of securities, or a piece of real estate, the partnership does truly own those assets.  The general partner or fund manager though is really only an “owner” to the extent he or she has contributed capital to the partnership.  The carried interest the general partner receives for managing the fund’s assets is a right to a portion of the fund’s profit, not to the fund’s actual assets: the manager has no downside risk.  If the fund fails completely and all of the partnership’s assets are lost, the limited partners have lost their money.  The manager has lost the time and energy he has put into the running the fund, and the potential to share in the profits, but he is not actually out of pocket.

Myth: Fund managers deserve capital gains treatment because a carried interest is risky.

Fact: Many other forms of compensation are risky, and they are all ordinary income.

When a company gives its CEO stock options, it is trying to give her an incentive to increase the company’s share price, to growth the value of shareholders’ investment.  If the CEO does a good job and the share price goes up, she pays ordinary income tax rates when she exercises those options.  Real estate agents only make money if they actually sell a house, no matter how hard they work.  Authors receive a portion of their book’s profits.  Waiters get tips based on the quality of the service they provide.  All of these people pay ordinary income tax rates on their compensation.  Only private equity and other fund managers get to pay capital gains rates on their compensation.

Myth: Taxing carried interest will hurt the pension funds that invest in these funds.

Fact: This has nothing to do with pension funds and their returns will not be affected.

One pension trustee, who also happens to be a hedge fund manager, called the idea that this debate is about workers’ pensions “ludicrous.”  As tax-exempt investors, pension fund certainly will not be affected directly, and the assumption that fund managers can charge higher fees than they do today as a result of their having to pay ordinary income rates is extremely questionable. In fact, an attorney representing the hedge fund industry testified before the Ways & Means Committee that investors would be unlikely to accept increased fees.  The National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems has said that its members do not believe this legislation will affect them.

Myth: This change to the taxation of carried interest will harm every “mom and pop” partnership in America.

Fact: The change would only affect those partnerships where service income is being improperly converted to capital gains.

This legislation would have no effect whatsoever on the vast majority of partnerships that are engaged in ongoing businesses and whose profits are already being properly taxed an ordinary income tax rates.  It does apply to investment fund partnerships where the investors in the fund choose to compensate the people managing their assets through a carried interest.  In practice, this means hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds and real estate partnerships.  The reality is that the fund managers and general partners who would be asked to pay ordinary income tax rates on their compensation are a very small, very well-paid group of professionals.  It is also important to note that the bill does not discriminate among partnerships based on the kind of assets they purchase.

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Other related hedge fund tax articles:

CPOs and CTAs Now Submit Disclosure Documents Electronically

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NFAs Electronic Filing System Went Live Yesterday

The NFAs new electronic filing system for CPO and CTA disclosure documents went live yesterday.  All NFA members are required to use the electronic system for filing their disclosure documents.   While I have not yet used the new system, it is expected to be a big improvement over the previous system which relied on emails to an anonymous system.  The NFA says that this new system should help both the NFA and the Member Firm by speeding up and streamlining the disclosure document approval process.

I will provide an update on whether this system does in fact make the process more efficient.  Also, I will provide updates on how this system works with the new forex registration requirements.  It is expected that forex CPOs and forex CTAs will also use this same electronic submission process for their forex disclosure documents.

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Notice I-09-09

March 26, 2009

Using NFA’s Electronic Disclosure Document Filing System becomes mandatory for CPOs and CTAs
Effective April 6, 2009, CPOs and CTAs filing a disclosure document with NFA for review will be required to submit the filing through NFA’s Electronic Disclosure Document Filing System. NFA will not accept any disclosure document filings through any other mode (i.e., email, fax, or regular mail) after this date. CPOs and CTAs are encouraged to begin using the new system prior to the effective date to make the transition as smooth as possible.

This new system will benefit NFA’s CPO and CTA Members by creating a more efficient document review process. Electronic filing will allow NFA to identify issues sooner in the review process. Firms will also be able to track the status of their submissions online, in real-time, and will have instantaneous access to NFA’s comment and acceptance letters. Additionally, all correspondence, including filed disclosure documents and NFA’s comment or acceptance letters, will be archived in the system, creating an electronic file cabinet that will be easily accessible to CPOs and CTAs at any time.

To use the new electronic system, a security manager entering the system for the first time must designate himself as a disclosure document user in NFA’s Online Registration System (“ORS”). The security manager can also designate additional users to file disclosure documents through the system. Filers can access the system at https://www.nfa.futures.org/appentry/Redirect.aspx?app=DDOC. Once in the system, filers will be required to enter certain information specific to the filing and to upload the filing in either a PDF or Word format.

NFA also has prepared a web seminar to assist users with the new system. This online seminar is entitled “How to File CPO and CTA Disclosure Documents Electronically with NFA” and is available at: http://video.webcasts.com/events/pmny001/viewer/index.jsp?eventid=29268.
If you have any questions about the new filing system, please contact Susan Koprowski at [email protected] or (312) 781-1288 or Mary McHenry at [email protected] or (312) 781-1420.

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Other articles related to the CPO and CTA disclosure document filing process:

Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act of 2009

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Congressional Bill Proposed in House

In January we gave significant attention to the Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009 and we did not focus at all on a similar bill introduced in the House of Representatives.   The Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act of 2009, introduced on January 27, would change the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to require those managers with more than $30 million in assets to register as investment advisors with the SEC (for background, please see 203(b)(3) exemption).  The Hedge Fund Transparency Act takes a decidedly different route to regulation – it would require hedge fund managers, under the Investment Company Act of 1940 , to register as investment advisors and it would also require hedge funds to submit certain information to the SEC.

The fate of both of these bills is currently in question.  It seems as though Congress and the SEC are waiting for President Obama and Treasury Secretary Geithner to develop a plan for a comprehensive regulatory system.  While we remain in this holding pattern it seems likely that any regulatory changes are months and months away.

The full text of the Registration Act are reprinted below along with a press release announcing the proposed measure.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

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Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act of 2009 (Introduced in House)

HR 711 IH

111th CONGRESS

1st Session

H. R. 711

To amend the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to remove the registration exception for certain investment advisors with less than 15 clients.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

January 27, 2009

Mr. CAPUANO (for himself and Mr. CASTLE) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Financial Services

A BILL

To amend the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to remove the registration exception for certain investment advisors with less than 15 clients.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Act of 2009′.

SEC. 2. REMOVAL OF THE PRIVATE ADVISOR EXEMPTION.

Section 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-3) is amended by striking subsection (b)(3).

Source

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PRESS RELEASE

Capuano, Castle Bill Would Improve Oversight of Hedge Funds

Requires money managers to register with SEC

January 27, 2009

Washington, DC — Today, Reps. Mike Castle (R-DE) and Mike Capuano (D-MA), introduced bipartisan legislation that is intended to close a loophole created in the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, which exempts hedge fund managers from registering with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) if they have less than 15 clients. The Hedge Fund Managers Registration Act, would require anyone who manages hedge funds to register with the SEC, and therefore improves federal oversight of these investments.

“This measure would require all hedge fund managers to register with the SEC so that their actions on behalf of investors are transparent,” said Rep. Capuano. “I have long advocated this simple step as a way to better understand how hedge fund managers are operating, and how they are investing the resources of their clients. In addition to providing us with basic census information on hedge funds, this measure can be used to detect and deter fraudulent practices and risky behavior before it’s too late.”

“Hedge funds are a $1.5 trillion industry that account for roughly 30 percent of U.S. stock trading, but also have tremendous presence in other areas of our markets. Without greater attention and oversight to protect investors from fraud, hedge funds pose systemic risk to our economy,” said Rep. Castle, senior member on the House Financial Services Committee. “As we work to help regain our economic health, I believe we can and should scrutinize money managers more carefully and begin to reclaim some order in equity markets. I am hopeful that this legislation will work as a tool to help protect investors from becoming victims. This is the first in a series of reforms I intend to strongly advocate in the coming months.”

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Contact: Alison M. Mills (617) 621-6208
Contact: Stephanie Fitzpatrick (202) 225-4165 (Rep. Castle)

MFA Releases Sound Practices Guide for Hedge Funds

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Guide Focuses on Hedge Fund Risk Management and Other Operational Issues

Unfortunately the new world of hedge fund investing and hedge fund due diligence has become more complicated and hedge fund management companies now need to increase their focus on operational and business issues.  While many managers are happy to attend to their trading strategies and risk management procedures, the managers who will be able to grow their AUM most successfully in the coming years are those managers who focus on many of the business and operational issues which investors are now wholly concerned with.  The updated 2009 Sound Practices guide by the Managed Funds Association (press release below) provides an outline of the major issues which managers should address with respect to their businesses.

Overview of Sound Practices Guide

The Sound Practices guide is similar to the President’s Working Group report Hedge Fund Best Practices, but also includes more information for managers.  I skimmed through the Sound Practices guide (it is 277 pages) and found that much of the information is extremely useful.  One of the overarching themes of the guide is that it does not ask managers to take the “one size fits all” approach, but asks managers to individually assess whether or not a certain practice is appropriate for their particular business.

I found the section dealing with the disclosures and hedge fund offering documents particular good.  As a reminder to hedge fund managers, offering documents should be updated at least annually, or more frequently if there are material changes in the fund’s investment program, structure or management company.  Additionally, any changes to offering documents should be communicated to all existing investors (either by sending out a new PPM or through another type of disclosure).

Other sections I was particularly interested in were: (i) the section dealing with investor letters and communications, (ii) side letters and parallel separately managed accounts (which are becoming more popular), (iii) valuation and policies, (iv) risk management, (v) due diligence, (vi) AML.  A due diligence guide for hedge fund investors was also included, but I felt like this was a pretty weak DD questionnaire – managers are likely to receive much more detailed requests for information.

Recommendation for Hedge Fund Managers

I recommend that hedge fund managers who are immediately seeking capital from institutions and high net worth investors read through this Sound Practices guide and take notes.  Managers should reach each practice and asses whether it applies to their fund operations and, if so, how such a practice should be implemented.  Managers may want to highlight certain items and ask their attorney what they should do.  These sound practices will help managers to create strong businesses which are able to grow over the long run.

[http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com]

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Managed Funds Association Takes Steps to Restore Investor Confidence with Enhanced Best Practices & Investor Due Diligence Recommendations

WASHINGTON, Mar 31, 2009 — Managed Funds Association (MFA) today took steps to restore investor confidence in the markets with the release of its newly enhanced Sound Practices for Hedge Fund Managers, including a due diligence questionnaire for investors to use as they consider whom to trust with their investments.

The 2009 edition of Sound Practices, MFA’s fifth version of its pioneering guidance that was first published in 2000, incorporates the recommendations provided in the final President’s Working Group’s (PWG) Best Practices for the Hedge Fund Industry Report of the Asset Managers’ Committee plus additional guidance that goes above and beyond the scope of those recommendations.

Richard H. Baker, MFA President and CEO, said, “The hedge fund industry has a strong role in helping to restore financial stability and investor confidence, and to hasten economic recovery. While policy makers consider sweeping regulatory reforms in the U.S. and abroad, and economic leaders gather for the G-20 in London, on April 2, the hedge fund industry is taking steps to restore investor trust through the promotion of sound business practices and tools for investors to use as they conduct ongoing due diligence of money managers.”

Sound Practices is the cornerstone of the Association’s initiative to collaborate with international organizations with the goal of establishing uniform global principles and guidance. MFA, the PWG Asset Managers’ Committee and the Alternative Investment Management Association (AIMA) have committed to providing the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) with a set of unified principles of best practices before April 30, 2009.

“The hedge fund industry recognizes its responsibilities as liquidity providers and risk dispersers in the markets, and continues to take the lead in its approach to disclosure and investor protection as well as active market disciplines such as risk management and valuation which contribute to market soundness and investor protection. This latest edition of MFA’s seminal Sound Practices concludes many months of diligent work by leading hedge fund managers, service providers and MFA staff to provide updates and revisions for voluntary adoption by hedge fund managers.

“MFA has a decade-long tradition of robust Sound Practices. Today, more than ever before, investors will benefit from our due diligence questionnaire as they undertake robust diligence when considering an investment in a hedge fund. Investors can also benefit from reviewing the recommendations in Sound Practices as they consider operational, governance and other matters as part of their diligence when making an investment.” added Baker.

The 2009 edition of Sound Practices provides comprehensive updates in every area of guidance including recommendations for disclosure and responsibilities to investors; valuation policies and procedures; risk management; trading and business operations; compliance, conflicts of interest, and business practices; anti-money laundering; and business continuity and disaster recovery practices.

Major Revisions

Sound Practices is a dynamic blueprint written by the industry, for the industry, to provide peer-to-peer guidance to:

  • Strengthen business practices of the hedge fund industry through a strong framework of internal policies and practices;
  • Encourage individualized assessment and application of recommendations on one size does not fit all; and
  • Enhance market discipline in the global financial marketplace.

The revised edition includes substantially updated and expanded guidance in seven areas:

  • Disclosure and Investor Protection: Establishes practices intended to assist a hedge fund in fulfilling its responsibilities to its investors;
  • Valuation: Establishes a framework, governance and policies and procedures for valuations of assets;
  • Risk Management: Establishes an overall approach to risk monitoring, measurement and management. Also describes types of risk and recommendations on management thereof;
  • Trading and Business Operations: Establishes policies and procedures for management of trading operations including relationships with counterparties, use of service providers, accounting, technology, best execution and soft dollar arrangements;
  • Compliance, Conflicts and Business Practices: Establishes guidance for the adoption of a culture of compliance including a code of ethics, compliance manual, record keeping, conflicts of interest, training/education of personnel and more;
  • Anti-Money Laundering: Updates MFA’s seminal AML guidance; and
  • Business Continuity/Disaster Recovery: Establishes general principles, contingency planning, crisis management and disaster recovery.

Baker noted that, “Ultimately, each hedge fund manager must determine whether and how to tailor these Sound Practices to its individual business. We believe that the strong business practices in Sound Practices are an important complement to a smart regulatory framework and that strong business practices and robust investor diligence are critical to addressing investor protection concerns.”

For a copy of Sound Practices please visit: www.managedfunds.org

About Managed Funds Association

MFA is the voice of the global alternative investment industry. Its members are professionals in hedge funds, funds of funds and managed futures funds, as well as industry service providers. Established in 1991, MFA is the primary source of information for policy makers and the media and the leading advocate for sound business practices and industry growth. MFA members include the vast majority of the largest hedge fund groups in the world who manage a substantial portion of the approximately $1.5 trillion invested in absolute return strategies. MFA is headquartered in Washington, D.C., with an office in New York. For more information, please visit: www.managedfunds.org

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