Tag Archives: hedge fund registration

Hedge Fund Registration Quick Facts

Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009 Overview

This article provides an overview of the major provisions of the Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009.  There are two major things that the HFTA does: (1) increases regulation of hedge funds under the Investment Company Act and (2) requires hedge funds to adopt anti-money laundering programs.

Changes under the Investment Company Act

The HFTA replaces Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act  with a new Section 6(a)(6).  Section 3(c)(7) is replaced by new Section 6(a)(6).  These new sections, which are functionally equivalent to Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7) respectively, will exempt hedge funds from the mutual fund regulations that are found in the Investment Company Act, provided that the hedge funds comply with the provisions of Section 6(g).

Section 6(g) applies to hedge funds with assets under management (AUM) of $50 million or more.  Those hedge funds which have less than $50 million of AUM will not be subject to Section 6(g).  Section 6(g) requires:

1.  The hedge fund manager to register with the SEC.  (HFLB note: I believe the statute is not clearly written.  It seems that the hedge fund itself would be required to register with the SEC which does not make sense.)

2.  Maintain certain books and records as required by the SEC.  This requirements is likely to look like the current books and records rule of the Investment Advisors Act (Rule 204-2), for more background please see article on Investment Advisor Compliance Information.

3.  Cooperate with the SEC with regard to any request for information or examination.

4.  File the following information with the SEC on a no less than annual basis:

a.  The name and current address of each investor in the fund.

b.  The name and current address of the primary accountant and broker of the fund.

c.  An overview of the fund’s ownership structure.

d.  An overview of the fund’s affiliations, if any, with financial institutions.

e.  A statement of the fund’s terms (i.e. minimum investment).

f.  Other information including the total number of investors and the current value of the fund’s assets.

The SEC is charged with issuing forms and guidance on the implementation of the above.  Such forms and guidance must be issued within 180 days from the enactment of the HFTA.

New AML Requirements

The HFTA requires the Secretary of the Treasury (in consultations with the Chairman of the SEC and the Chairman of the CFTC) to establish AML requirements for hedge funds.  The bill sets aggressive timelines for drafting and implementation of the rules.

Hedge Fund Transparency Act Analysis

In the current politically charged environment it is not surprising that a hedge fund regulation law is being contemplated.  What is interesting, however, is the way that Grassley and Levin have chosen to regulate hedge funds.  The prior hedge fund registration rule, promulgated by the SEC, was enacted under the Investment Advisors Act – in essence requiring hedge fund managers (and not the hedge fund itself) to register as Investment Advisors with the SEC.  The Hedge Fund Transparency Act does not follow this path – instead, it regulates hedge funds under the Investment Company Act by modifying the current exemptions which hedge funds enjoy under the act.  In essence the changes subject hedge funds to a kind of light version of the mutual fund regulations.  In this way Congress is going past previous registration by regulating the hedge fund vehicle, as well as the hedge fund management company through the registration requirement.

While it is no surprise that regulation and registration has reached the hedge fund industry, one aspect of the bill is surprising.  The act would require hedge funds to disclose the names and addresses of each investor in the fund.  These names and addresses would be made available to the general public through an electronic searchable format to be developed by the SEC.  Hedge fund investors are notoriously protective of their privacy and I cannot imagine that there will not be pushback by the hedge fund industry on this point.

Another consequence of investment advisor registration is that hedge fund managers (if not currently regulated by the state in which their business resides) may be subject to certain state investment advisory rules including a “notice” filing requirement.  Depending on the nature of the management company’s business, some employees may need to register as investment advisor representatives at the state level which generally requires an employee to have passed the Series 65 exam.  We will keep you updated on this possibility as we learn more about the HFTA over time.

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Please contact us if you have any questions releted to this post or registering your management company as an investment advisor with the SEC.  Other related posts include:

Hedge Fund Transparency Act Text

Below is the actual text of the Hedge Fund Transparency Act.  (For the bill with page and line numbers please see: Hedge Fund Transparency Act (pdf)).

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111TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION
S.

To require hedge funds to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. GRASSLEY (for himself and Mr. LEVIN) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on

A BILL

To require hedge funds to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Hedge Fund Transparency Act”.

SEC. 2. HEDGE FUND REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS.

(a) DEFINITION OF INVESTMENT COMPANY.—Section 3(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)) is amended—(1) by striking paragraph (1); (2) by striking paragraph (7); (3) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (6) as paragraphs (1) through (5), respectively; and (4) by redesignating paragraphs (8) through (14) as paragraphs (6) through (12), respectively.

(b) ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS.—Section 6 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-6) is amended—(1) in subsection (a), by adding at the end the following:

“(6)(A) Subject to subsection (g), any issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more than 100 persons, and which is not making and does not presently propose to make a public offering of its securities.

“(B) For purposes of this paragraph and paragraph (7), beneficial ownership—

“(i) by a company shall be deemed to be beneficial ownership by one person, except that, if the company owns 10 percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the issuer, and is or, but for the exemption provided for in this paragraph or paragraph (7), would be an investment company, the beneficial ownership shall be deemed to be that of the holders of the outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) of such company; and

“(ii) by any person who acquires securities or interests in securities of an issuer described in this paragraph shall be deemed to be beneficial ownership by the person from whom such transfer was made, pursuant to such rules and regulations as the Commission shall prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of this title, where the transfer was caused by legal separation, divorce, death, or any other involuntary event.

“(7)(A) Subject to subsection (g), any issuer, the outstanding securities of which are owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of the acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers, and which is not making and does not at that time propose to make a public offering of such securities. Securities that are owned by persons who received the securities from a qualified purchaser as a gift or bequest, or in a case in which the transfer was caused by legal separation, divorce, death, or any other involuntary event, shall be deemed to be owned by a qualified purchaser, subject to such rules, regulations, and orders as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

“(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), an issuer is exempt under this paragraph if—”(i) in addition to qualified purchasers, outstanding securities of that issuer are beneficially owned by not more than 100 persons who are not qualified purchasers, if—”(I) such persons acquired any portion of the securities of such issuer on or before September 1, 1996; and “(II) at the time at which such persons initially acquired the securities of such issuer, the issuer was exempt under paragraph (6); and “(ii) prior to availing itself of the exemption provided by this paragraph—

“(I) such issuer has disclosed to each beneficial owner that future investors will be limited to qualified purchasers, and that ownership in such issuer is no longer limited to not more than 100 persons; and

“(II) concurrently with or after such disclosure, such issuer has provided each beneficial owner with a reasonable opportunity to redeem any part or all of their interests in the issuer, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary between the issuer and such persons, for the proportionate share of that person of the net assets of the issuer.

“(C) Each person that elects to redeem under subparagraph (B)(ii)(II) shall receive an amount in cash equal to the proportionate share of that person of the net assets of the issuer, unless the issuer elects to provide such person with the option of receiving, and such person agrees to receive, all or a portion of the share of that person in assets of the issuer. If the issuer elects to provide such persons with such an opportunity, disclosure concerning such opportunity shall be made in the disclosure required by subparagraph (B)(ii)(I).

“(D) An issuer that is exempt under this paragraph shall nonetheless be deemed to be an investment company for purposes of the limitations set forth in subparagraphs (A)(i) and (B)(i) of section 12(d)(1) (15 U.S.C. 80a-12(d)(1)(A)(i) and (B)(i)) relating to the purchase or other acquisition by such issuer of any security issued by any registered investment company and the sale of any security issued by any registered open-end investment company to any such issuer.

“(E) For purposes of determining compliance with this paragraph and paragraph (6), an issuer that is otherwise exempt under this paragraph and an issuer that is otherwise exempt under paragraph (6) shall not be treated by the Commission as being a single issuer for purposes of determining whether the outstanding securities of the issuer exempt under paragraph (6) are beneficially owned by not more than 100 persons, or whether the outstanding securities of the issuer exempt under this paragraph are owned by persons that are not qualified purchasers. Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to establish that a person is a bona fide qualified purchaser for purposes of this paragraph or a bona fide beneficial owner for purposes of paragraph (6).”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(g) LIMITATION ON EXEMPTIONS FOR LARGE INVESTMENT COMPANIES.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—An investment company with assets, or assets under management, of not less than $50,000,000 is exempt under subsection (a)(6) or (a)(7) only if that company—

“(A) registers with the Commission;
“(B) files an information form with the Commission under paragraph (2);
“(C) maintains such books and records as the Commission may require; and
“(D) cooperates with any request for information or examination by the Commission.

“(2) INFORMATION FORM.—The information form required under paragraph (1) shall be filed at such time and in such manner as the Commission shall require, and shall—

‘(A) be filed electronically;
“(B) be filed not less frequently than once every 12 months;
“(C) include—
“(i) the name and current address of—
“(I) each natural person who is a beneficial owner of the investment company;
“(II) any company with an ownership interest in the investment company; and
“(III) the primary accountant and primary broker used by the investment company;
“(ii) an explanation of the structure of ownership interests in the investment company;
“(iii) information on any affliation that the investment company has with another financial institution;
“(iv) a statement of any minimum investment commitment required of a limited partner, member, or other investor;
“(v) the total number of any limited partners, members, or other investors; and
“(vi) the current value of—
“(I) the assets of the investment company; and
“(II) any assets under management by the investment company; and

“(D) be made available by the Commission to the public at no cost and in an electronic, searchable format.”.

SEC. 3. IMPLEMENTING GUIDANCE AND RULES.

(a) FORMS AND GUIDANCE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission shall issue such forms and guidance as are necessary to carry out this Act.

(b) RULES.—The Securities and Exchange Commission may make a rule to carry out this Act.

8 SEC. 4. ANTI–MONEY LAUNDERING OBLIGATIONS.

(a) PURPOSE.—It is the purpose of this section to safeguard against the financing of terrorist organizations and money laundering.

(b) IN GENERAL.—An investment company that relies on paragraph (6) or (7) of section 6(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-6(a)(6) and (7)), as amended by this Act, as the basis for an exemption under that Act shall establish an anti-money laundering program and shall report suspicious transactions under subsections (g) and (h) of section 5318 of title 31, United States Code.

(c) RULEMAKING.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, shall, by rule, establish the policies, procedures, and controls necessary to carry out subsection (b).

(2) CONTENTS.—The rule required by paragraph (1)—

(A) shall require that each investment company that receives an exemption under paragraph (6) or (7) of section 6(a) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-6(a)(6) and (7)), as amended by this Act, shall—

(i) use risk–based due diligence policies, procedures, and controls that are reasonably designed to ascertain the indentity of and evaluate any foreign person (including, where appropriate, the nominal and beneficial owner or beneficiary of a foreign corporation, partnership, trust, or other foreign entity) that supplies or plans to supply funds to be invested with the advice or assistance of such investment company; and

(ii) be subject to section 5318(k)(2) of title 31, United States Code; and (B) may incorporate elements of the proposed rule for unregistered investment companies published in the Federal Register on September 26, 2002 (67 Fed. Reg. 60617) (relating to anti–money laundering programs).

(3) PUBLICATION DATE.—The Secretary of the Treasury, shall—

(A) propose the rule required by this subsection not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this Act; and

(B) issue the rule required by this subsection in final form not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (b) shall take effect 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, whether or not a final rule is issued under subsection (c), and the failure to issue such rule shall in no way affect the enforceability of this section.

SEC. 5. TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS.

(a) SECURITIES ACT OF 1933.—Section 3(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 77c(a)) is amended—(1) in paragraph (2)—(A) by striking “section 3(c)(3)” and inserting “section 3(c)(2)”; and (B) by striking “section 3(c)(14)” and inserting “section 3(c)(12)”; (2) in paragraph (4), by striking “section 3(c)(10)(B)” and inserting “section 3(c)(8)(B)”; and (3) in paragraph (13), by striking “section (3)(c)(14)” and inserting “section 3(c)(12)”.

(b) SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934.—The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.) is amended—

(1) in section 3(a) (15 U.S.C. 78c(a))—(A) in paragraph (12)(A)—(i) in clause (iii), by striking “section 3(c)(3)” and inserting “section 3(c)(2)”; (ii) in clause (v), by striking “section 3(c)(10)(B)” and inserting “section 3(c)(8)(B)”; and (iii) in clause (vi), by striking “section 3(c)(14)” and inserting “section 3(c)(12)”; (B) in paragraph (12)(C), by striking “section 3(c)(14)” and inserting “section 3(c)(12)”; and (C) in paragraph (54)(A)—(i) in clause (ii), by striking “exclusion from the definition of investment company pursuant to section 3(c)(7)” and inserting “exemption under section 6(a)(7)”; and (ii) in clause (vii), by striking “section 3(c)(2)” and inserting “section 3(c)(1)”; (2) in section 3(g) (15 U.S.C. 78c(g)) by striking “section 3(c)(14)” each place that term appears and inserting “section 3(c)(12)”; and (3) in section 12(g)(2) (15 U.S.C. 78l(g)(2))—(A) in subparagraph (D), by striking “section 3(c)(10)(B)” and inserting “section 3(c)(8)(B)”; and (B) in subparagraph (H), by striking “section 3(c)(14)” and inserting “section 3(c)(12)”.

(c) INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940.—The Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in section 2(a)(51) (15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(51))—(A) in subparagraph (A)(i), by striking “excepted under section 3(c)(7)” and inserting “exempt under section 6(a)(7)”; and (B) in subparagraph (C)—(i) by striking “that, but for the exceptions provided for in paragraph (1) or (7) of section 3(c), would be an investment company (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as an ‘excepted investment company’)” and inserting “that is exempt under paragraph (6) or (7) of section 6(a) (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as an ‘exempt investment company’)”; (ii) by striking “section 3(c)(1)(A)” and inserting “section 6(a)(6)(B)(i)”; and (iii) by striking “excepted” each place that term appears and inserting “any exempt”;

(2) in section 6 (15 U.S.C. 80a-6)—(A) in subsection (a)—(i) in paragraph (2), by striking “section 3(c)(1)” and inserting “section 6(a)(6)”; and (ii) in paragraph (5)(A)(iv), by striking “that would be an investment company except for the exclusions from the definition of the term ‘investment company’ under paragraph (1) or (7) of section 3(c)” and inserting “that is exempt under paragraph (6) or (7) of section 6(a)”; and (B) in subsection (f), by striking “excluded from the definition of an investment company by section 3(c)(1)” and inserting “exempt under section 6(a)(6)”;

(3) in section 7(e) (15 U.S.C. 80a-7(e)), by striking “section 3(c)(10)(B)” and inserting “section 3(c)(8)(B)”; and

(4) in section 30 (15 U.S.C. 80a-29) in each of subsections (i) and (j), by striking “section 3(c)(14)” each place that term appears and inserting “section 3(c)(12)”.

(d) INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940.—The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-1 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in section 203(b) (15 U.S.C. 80b-3(b))—(A) in paragraph (4) by striking “section 3(c)(10)” each place that term appears and inserting “section 3(c)(8)”; and (B) in paragraph (5), by striking “section 3(c)(14)” and inserting “section 3(c)(12)”; and (2) in section 205(b) (15 U.S.C. 80b-5(b))— (A) in paragraph (2)(B), by striking “section 3(c)(11)” and inserting “section 3(c)(9)”; and (B) in paragraph (4), by striking “excepted from the definition of an investment company under section 3(c)(7)” and inserting “exempt under section 6(a)(7)”.

(e) INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986.—Section 851(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to the definition of regulated investment company) is amended by striking “section 3(c)(3)” and inserting “section 3(c)(2)”.

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Hedge Fund Registration Bill Announced

Senators Grassley and Levin Introduced Bill Requiring Hedge Fund Registration

A new bill called the Hedge Fund Transparency Act was introduced today by Senators Chuck Grassley and Carl Levin.  A press release from Grassley’s website explains the bill.

More to be forthcoming…

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For Immediate Release
January 29, 2009

Grassley and Levin introduce hedge fund transparency bill

WASHINGTON – Senators Chuck Grassley and Carl Levin introduced legislation today to close a loophole in securities law that allows hedge funds to operate under a cloak of secrecy.

The Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009 would clarify current law to remove any doubt that the Securities and Exchange Commission has the authority to require hedge funds to register, so the government knows who they are and what they’re doing. It would close the loophole previously used by hedge funds to escape the definition of an “investment company” under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Hedge funds that want to avoid the requirements of the Investment Company Act would be exempt only if they file basic disclosure forms and cooperate with requests for information from the Securities and Exchange Commission.

“There wasn’t much of an appetite for this sort of legislation before the financial crisis. I hope attitudes have changed and that Congress takes up this important legislation without delay,” Grassley said. “A major cause of the current crisis is a lack of transparency. The wizards on Wall Street figured out a million clever ways to avoid the transparency sought by the securities regulations adopted during the 1930s. Instead of the free flow of reliable information that markets need to function properly, today we have confusion and uncertainty fueling an economic crisis.” The bill introduced today is a version of legislation filed in two years ago by Grassley (S.1402) but never considered by Congress.

“Hedge funds control massive sums of money, and although they can cause serious damage to investors, other financial firms, and to the entire U.S. financial market, they are largely unregulated,” said Levin. “If the events of the last year have taught us anything, it’s that we need to regulate firms that are big enough to destabilize our economy if they fail. It’s time to subject financial heavyweights like hedge funds to federal regulation and oversight to protect our investors, markets, and financial system.”

Grassley said that Levin made an important addition to the transparency legislation in making clear that hedge funds have the same obligations under our money laundering statutes as other financial institutions. The bill introduced today would require hedge funds to establish anti-money laundering programs and report suspicious transactions.

The senators said their legislation is needed because of a 2006 decision by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals which overturned a regulation imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission requiring hedge funds to register. The court said the Securities and Exchange Commission was going beyond its statutory authority and effectively ended all mandatory registration of hedge funds with the Securities and Exchange Commission unless and until Congress takes action.

A summary of the legislation introduced today and floor statements by Grassley and Levin are below. The text of the bill is posted here. The bill will be referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009

Background: This bill is a revised version of S. 1402, which Sen. Grassley introduced in the 110th Congress. While the previous bill amended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, this bill amends the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”). However, the purpose is the same: to make it clear that the Securities and Exchange Commission has the authority to require hedge fund registration. This version also adds a provision authored by Sen. Levin to require hedge funds to establish anti-money laundering programs and report suspicious transactions.

Hedge Fund Registration Requirements

Definition of an Investment Company: Hedge Funds typically avoid regulatory requirements by claiming the exceptions to the definition of an investment company contained in §3(c)(1) or §3(c)(7) of the ICA. This bill would remove those exceptions to the definition, transforming them to exemptions by moving the provisions, without substantive change, to new sections §6(a)(6) and §6(a)(7) of the ICA.

Requirements for Exemptions: An investment company that satisfies either §6(a)(6) or §6(a)(7) will be exempted from the normal registration and filing requirements of the ICA.  Instead, a company that meets the criteria in §6(a)(6) or §6(a)(7) but has assets under management of $50,000,000 or more, must meet several requirements in order to maintain its exemption. These requirements include:

1.     Registering with the SEC.

2.     Maintaining books and records that the SEC may require.

3.     Cooperating with any request by the SEC for information or examination.

4.     Filing an information form with the SEC electronically, at least once a year. This form must be made freely available to the public in an electronic, searchable format. The form must include:

a.      The name and current address of each individual who is a beneficial owner of the investment company.

b.     The name and current address of any company with an ownership interest in the investment company.

c.      An explanation of the structure of ownership interests in the investment company.

d.     Information on any affiliation with another financial institution.

e.      The name and current address of the investment company’s primary accountant and primary broker.

f.      A statement of any minimum investment commitment required of a limited partner, member, or investor.

g.     The total number of any limited partners, members, or other investors.

h.     The current value of the assets of the company and the assets under management by the company.

Timeframe and Rulemaking Authority: The SEC must issue forms and guidance to carry out this Act within 180 days after its enactment. The SEC also has the authority to make a rule to carry out this Act.

Anti-Money Laundering Obligations: An investment company exempt under §6(a)(6) or §6(a)(7) must establish an anti-money laundering program and report suspicious transactions under 31 U.S.C.A 5318(g) and (h). The Treasury Secretary must establish a rule within 180 days of the enactment of the Act setting forth minimum requirements for the anti-money laundering programs. The rule must require exempted investment companies to “use risk-based due diligence policies, procedures, and controls that are reasonably designed to ascertain the identity of and evaluate any foreign person that supplies funds or plans to supply funds to be invested with the advice or assistance of such investment company.” The rule must also require exempted investment companies to comply with the same requirements as other financial institutions for producing records requested by a federal regulator under 31 U.S.C. 5318(k)(2).

Floor Statement of Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa

Thursday, January 29, 2009

Mr. President, three years ago, I started conducting oversight of the SEC. That oversight began in response to a whistleblower that came to my office complaining that SEC supervisors were impeding an investigation into a major hedge fund. Soon afterward, I came to this floor to introduce an important piece of legislation based on what I learned from my oversight. The bill was aimed at closing a loophole in our securities laws that allows hedge funds to operate under a cloak of secrecy. Unfortunately, that bill, S. 1402, was never taken-up by the Banking Committee in the last Congress.

In light of the current instability in our financial system, I think it is critical for the Senate to deal with this issue in the near future. Therefore, I am pleased that Senator Levin and I worked together to produce an even better version of the bill for the 111th Congress, which we are introducing today.

This new bill, the Hedge Fund Transparency Act, does everything the previous version did and a bit more. Like the previous version, it clarifies current law to remove any doubt that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to require hedge funds to register, so the government knows who they are and what they’re doing. It removes the loophole previously used by hedge funds to escape the definition of an “investment company” under the Investment Company Act of 1940.

Under this legislation, hedge funds that want to avoid the stringent requirements of the Investment Company Act will only be exempt if: one, they file basic disclosure forms and two, cooperate with requests for information from the Securities and Exchange Commission.

I want to thank Senator Levin for not only co-sponsoring this legislation, but also contributing a key addition to this new version of the bill. In addition to requiring basic disclosure, this version also makes it clear that hedge funds have the same obligations under our money laundering statutes as other financial institutions. They must report suspicious transactions and establish anti-money laundering programs.

One major cause of the current crisis is a lack of transparency. Markets need a free flow of reliable information to function properly. Transparency was the focus of our system of securities regulations adopted in the 1930’s. Unfortunately, over time, the wizards on Wall Street figured out a million clever ways to avoid transparency. The result is the confusion and uncertainty fueling the crisis we see today.

This bill is an important step toward renewing the commitment to transparency on Wall Street. Unfortunately, there was not much of an appetite for this sort of common sense legislation when I first introduced it before the financial crisis erupted. Hopefully, attitudes have changed given all that has happened since the collapse of Bear Stearns last March.

Hedge funds are pooled investment companies that manage billions of dollars for groups of wealthy investors in total secrecy. Hedge funds affect regular investors. They affect the markets as a whole. My oversight of the SEC convinces me that the Commission needs much more information about the activities of hedge funds in order to protect the markets. Any group of organizations that can wield hundreds of billions of dollars in market power every day should be transparent and disclose basic information about their operations to the agency that Americans rely on as their watchdog for our nations’ financial markets.

As I explained when I first introduced this bill, the SEC already attempted to oversee the hedge fund industry by regulation. Congress needs to act now because of a decision by a federal appeals court. In 2006, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned an SEC administrative rule requiring the registration of hedge funds. That decision effectively ended all registration of hedge funds with the SEC, unless and until Congress takes action.

The Hedge Fund Transparency Act would respond to that court decision by: 1. including hedge funds in the definition of an investment company and 2. Bringing much needed transparency to this super secretive industry.

The Hedge Fund Transparency Act is a first step in ensuring that the SEC has clear authority to do what it already tried to do. Congress must act to ensure that our laws are kept up to date as new types of investments appear.

Unfortunately, this legislation hasn’t had many friends. These funds don’t want people to know what they do or who participates in them. They have fought hard to keep it that way. Well, I think that’s all the more reason to shed some sunlight on them to see what they’re up to.

I urge my colleagues to co-sponsor and support this legislation, as we work to protect all investors, large and small.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Floor Statement of Senator Carl Levin of Michigan (as prepared)

Thursday, January 29, 2009

Mr. President, history has proven time and again that markets are not self-policing. Today’s financial crisis is due in part to the government’s failure to regulate key market participants, including hedge funds that have become unregulated financial heavyweights in the U.S. economy. That’s why I am joining today with my colleague Senator Grassley to introduce The Hedge Fund Transparency Act.

Hedge funds sound complicated, but they are simply private investment funds in which the investors have agreed to pool their money under the control of an investment manager. What distinguishes them from other investment funds is that hedge funds are typically open only to “qualified purchasers,” an SEC term referring to institutional investors like pension funds and wealthy individuals with assets over a specified minimum amount. In addition, most hedge funds have one hundred or fewer beneficial owners. By limiting the number of their beneficial owners and accepting funds only from investors of means, hedge funds have been able to qualify for the statutory exclusions provided in Sections 80a-3(c)(1) and (7) of the Investment Company Act, and avoid the obligation to comply with that law’s statutory and regulatory requirements. In short, hedge funds have been able to operate outside the reach of the SEC.

The primary argument for allowing these funds to operate outside SEC regulation and oversight is that, because their investors are generally more experienced than the general public, they need fewer government protections and their investment funds should be permitted to take greater risks than investment funds open to the investing public which needs greater SEC protection. Indeed, the ability of hedge funds to take on more risk is the reason that many individuals and institutions choose to invest in them. These investors accept more risk because that might lead to bigger rewards.

The compensation system employed by most hedge funds encourages that risk taking. Typically, investors agree to pay hedge fund investment managers a management fee of 2 percent of the fund’s total assets, plus 20 percent of the fund’s profits. The hedge fund managers profit enormously if the fund does well, but due to the guaranteed management fee, get a hefty payment even when the fund underperforms or fails. The analysis up to now has been that if wealthy people want to take big risks with their money, all else being equal, they should be allowed to do so without the safeguards normally required for the general public. So what’s the problem with allowing their investment funds to operate outside federal regulation and oversight?

The problem is that hedge funds have gotten so big and are so entrenched in U.S. financial markets, that their actions can now significantly impact market prices, damage other market participants, and can even endanger the U.S. financial system and economy as a whole.

The systemic risks posed by hedge funds first became obvious ten years ago, in 1998. Back then, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a hedge fund that, at its peak, had more than $125 billion in assets under management and, due to massive borrowing, a total market position of roughly $1.3 trillion. When it began to falter, the Federal Reserve worried that it might unload its assets in a rush, drive down prices, and end up damaging not only other firms, but U.S. markets as a whole. To prevent a financial meltdown, the Federal Reserve worked with the private sector to engineer a rescue package.

That was just over a decade ago. Since then, according to a recent report issued by the Congressional Research Service, the hedge fund industry has expanded roughly tenfold. In 2006, the SEC testified that hedge funds represented 5 percent of all U.S. assets under management, and 30 percent of all equity trading volume in the United States. By 2007, an estimated 8,000 hedge funds were managing assets totaling roughly $1.5 trillion. The most current estimate is that 10,000 hedge funds are managing approximately $1.8 trillion in assets, after suffering losses over the last year of over $1 trillion.

In addition, over the last ten years, billions of dollars being managed by hedge funds have been provided by pension plans. A 2007 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the amount of money that defined-benefit pension plans have invested in hedge funds has risen from about $3.2 billion in 2000, to more than $50 billion in 2006. That total is probably much higher now. And while most individual pension plans invest only a small slice of their money in hedge funds, a few go farther. For example, according to the GAO report, as of September 2006, the Missouri State Employees Retirement System had invested over 30 percent of its assets in hedge funds. Universities and charities have also directed significant assets to hedge funds. The result is that hedge fund losses threaten every economic sector in America, from the wealthy to the working class relying on pensions to our institutions of higher learning to our non-profit charities.

A third key development is that, over the last ten years, some of the largest U.S. banks and securities firms have set up their own hedge funds and used them to invest not only client funds, but also their own cash. In some cases, these hedge funds have commingled client and institutional funds and linked the fate of both to high-risk investment strategies. These hedge fund affiliates are typically owned by the same holding companies that own federally insured banks or federally regulated broker-dealers.

Because of their ownership, size and reach, their clientele, and the high-risk nature of their investments, the failure of a hedge fund today can imperil not only its direct investors, but also the financial institutions that own them, lent them money, or did business with them. From there, the effects can ripple through the markets and impact the entire economy.

Take, for example, the June 2007 collapse of two offshore hedge funds established by Bear Stearns. Those two hedge funds were not particularly large, but were heavily invested in complex financial instruments tied to subprime mortgages. When the housing market weakened and mortgage-backed securities lost value, it wasn’t just the hedge funds that suffered losses. It was also a number of large financial institutions which had lent them money or entered into business transactions with them, including its parent company, Bear Stearns.

As Bear Stearns began reporting losses and market confidence in the firm began dropping, the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department helped broker a deal allowing JPMorgan Chase to purchase the company. As part of that deal, the government agreed to take over $30 billion in troubled assets off the books of Bear Stearns, hiring an asset manager and putting taxpayers on the hook for them financially.

But the problems didn’t stop there. Another financial institution, Merrill Lynch, had invested in the Bear Stearns hedge funds and also suffered losses. Those losses, when added to others, so damaged the company’s bottom line that, despite a promise of $10 billion in new capital from the Troubled Asset Relief Program or TARP, Merrill Lynch was viewed by the market as teetering on the brink of collapse.  With the government’s encouragement, Bank of America stepped in and bought the company. As the extent of the Merrill Lynch losses became apparent, Bank of America itself began to lose market confidence. To counteract the Merrill Lynch losses, Bank of America wound up taking billions more taxpayer dollars under the TARP Program.

In the meantime, two managers of the Bear Stearns hedge funds were arrested on charges of conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud. Their cases have yet to go to trial. But prosecutors allege that as the hedge funds were losing value, their managers were telling investors a very different story. “[B]elieve it or not,” one of the financiers allegedly wrote in an e-mail to a colleague, “I’ve been able to convince people to add more money.”

The two Bear Stearns hedge funds offer a sobering set of facts, but they represent only a small part of the story. Other hedge funds are contracting or folding as clients demand their money back. To meet client demands, hedge funds are selling lots of assets, further weakening stock and bond prices. As one leading hedge fund owner, George Soros, testified before Congress in November: “It has to be recognized that hedge funds were … an integral part of the bubble which now has burst.”

Add on top of all that the Madoff scandal, and you’ve got to ask how anyone in their right mind could believe that the current regulatory exemption for hedge funds makes sense.

Four years ago, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tried on its own to beef up its regulation of hedge funds. In December 2004, the SEC issued a rule requiring hedge funds to register under the Investment Advisers Act, comply with the related regulations, and file a public disclosure form with basic information. The rule took effect on February 1, 2006, and by June 2006, over 2,500 hedge fund advisers had registered with the Commission. However, on June 23, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the SEC rule on the basis that it was not compatible with the Investment Advisers Act. Despite the SEC’s asserting in the case reasons why hedge funds necessitated greater federal regulation and oversight, no further effort was made by either the SEC or the Congress to step into the breach.

As SEC Commissioner Luis Aguillar stated in a speech on January 9, 2009, the SEC “currently lacks tools in the hedge fund arena to provide effective oversight and supervision.”

It is time for Congress to step into the breach and establish clear authority for federal regulation and oversight of hedge funds.

That is the backdrop for the introduction of the Grassley-Levin Hedge Fund Transparency Act. The purpose of this bill is to institute a reasonable and practical regulatory regime for hedge funds.

The bill contains four basic requirements to make hedge funds subject to SEC regulation and oversight. It requires them to register with the SEC, to file an annual disclosure form with basic information that will be made publicly available, to maintain books and records required by the SEC, and to cooperate with any SEC information request or examination.

The information to be made available to the public must include, at a minimum, the names of the companies and natural individuals who are the beneficial owners of the hedge fund and an explanation of the ownership structure; the names of any financial institutions with which the hedge fund is affiliated; the minimum investment commitment required from an investor; the total number of investors in the fund; the name of the fund’s primary accountant and broker; and the current value of the fund’s assets and assets under management. This information is similar to what was required in the disclosure form under the SEC’s 2004 regulatory effort. The bill also authorizes the SEC to require additional information it deems appropriate.

In addition, the bill directs Treasury to issue a final rule requiring hedge funds to establish anti-money laundering programs and, in particular, to guard against allowing suspect offshore funds into the U.S. financial system. The Bush Administration issued a proposed anti-money laundering rule for hedge funds seven years ago, in 2002, but never finalized it. A 2006 investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which I chair, showed how two hedge funds brought millions of dollars in suspect funds into the United States, without any U.S. controls or reporting obligations, and called on a bipartisan basis for the proposed hedge fund anti-money laundering regulations to be finalized, but no action was taken. Hedge funds are the last major U.S. financial players without anti-money laundering obligations, and it is time for this unacceptable regulatory gap to be eliminated.

Our bill imposes a set of basic disclosure obligations on hedge funds and makes it clear they are subject to full SEC oversight while, at the same time, exempting them from many of the obligations that the Investment Company Act imposes on other types of investment companies, such as mutual funds that are open for investment by all members of the public. The bill imposes a more limited set of obligations on hedge funds in recognition of the fact that hedge funds do not open their doors to all members of the public, but limit themselves to investors of means. The bill also, however, gives the SEC the authority it needs to impose additional regulatory obligations and exercise the level of oversight it sees fit over hedge funds to protect investors, other financial institutions, and the U.S. financial system as a whole.

The bill imposes these requirements on all entities that rely on Sections 80a-3(c)(1) or (7) to avoid compliance with the full set of the Investment Company Act requirements. A wide variety of entities invoke those sections to avoid those requirements and SEC oversight, and they refer to themselves by a wide variety of terms – hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capitalists, small investment banks, and so forth. Rather than attempt a futile exercise of trying to define the specific set of companies covered by the bill and thereby invite future claims by parties that they are outside the definitions and thus outside the SEC’s authority, the bill applies to any investment company that has at least $50 million in assets or assets under its management and relies on Sections 80a-3(1) or (7) to avoid compliance with the full set of Investment Company Act requirements. Instead, those companies under the bill have to comply with a reduced set of obligations, which include filing an annual public disclosure form, maintaining books and records specified by the SEC, and cooperating with any SEC information request or examination.

Finally, our bill makes an important technical change. It moves paragraphs (c)(1) and (7) – the two paragraphs that hedge companies use to avoid complying with the full set of Investment Act Company requirements — from Section 80a-3 to Section 80a-6 of the Investment Company Act. While our bill preserves both paragraphs and makes no substantive changes to them, it moves them from the part of the bill that defines “investment company” to the part of the bill that exempts certain investment companies from the Investment Company Act’s full set of requirements.

The bill makes this technical change to make it clear that hedge funds really are investment companies, and they are not excluded from the coverage of the Investment Company Act. Instead, they are being given an exemption from many of that law’s requirements, because they are investment companies which have voluntarily limited themselves to one hundred or fewer beneficial owners and to accepting funds only from investors of means. Under current law, the two paragraphs allow hedge funds to claim they are excluded from the Investment Company Act – they are not investment companies at all and are outside the SEC’s reach. Under our bill, the hedge funds would qualify as investment companies – which they plainly are — but would qualify for exemptions from many of the Act’s requirements by meeting certain criteria.

It is time to bring hedge funds under the federal regulatory umbrella. With their massive investments, entanglements with U.S. banks, securities firms, pension funds, and other large investors, and their potential impact on market equilibrium, we cannot afford to allow these financial heavyweights to continue to operate free of government regulation and oversight.

When asked at a recent hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee whether hedge funds should be regulated, two expert witnesses gave the exact same one-word answer: “Yes.” One law professor, after noting that disclosure requirements don’t apply to hedge funds, told the Committee: “[I]f you asked a regulator what … role did hedge funds play in the current financial crisis, I think they would look at you like a deer in the headlights, because we just don’t know.” It is essential that federal financial regulators know what hedge funds are doing and that they have the authority to prevent missteps and misconduct.

The “Hedge Fund Transparency Act” will protect investors, and it will help protect our financial system. I hope our colleagues will join us in support of this bill and its inclusion in the regulatory reform efforts that Congress will be undertaking later this year.

Professor Coffee Testimony at Senate Madoff Hearing

Yesterday the Senate Banking Committee held a hearing on the Madoff scandal.  Those present included: Senator Christopher J. Dodd; Professor John C. Coffee, Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School; Dr. Henry A. Backe, Orthopedic Surgeon; Ms. Lori Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; Ms. Linda Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; Mr. Stephen Luparello, Interim Chief Executive Officer, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority; and Mr. Stephen Harbeck, President and CEO, Securities Investor Protection Corporation.

We have reprinted below the testimony of John Coffee.  For other testimony, please see:

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Thomsen Testimony at Senate Madoff Hearing

Yesterday the Senate Banking Committee held a hearing on the Madoff scandal.  Those present included: Senator Christopher J. Dodd; Professor John C. Coffee, Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School; Dr. Henry A. Backe, Orthopedic Surgeon; Ms. Lori Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; Ms. Linda Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; Mr. Stephen Luparello, Interim Chief Executive Officer, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority; and Mr. Stephen Harbeck, President and CEO, Securities Investor Protection Corporation.

We have reprinted below the testimony of Linda Thomsen.  For other testimony, please see:

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Hedge Fund Registration Becoming More Likely

SEC Commissioner Calls for Hedge Fund Registration in Two Recent Speeches

In two separate speeches this year SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar has called for hedge fund registration.  Commissioner Aguilar, appointed to the Commission last year, asked Congress to pass legislation amending the Investment Advisors Act to give the SEC authority to regulate hedge funds or hedge fund advisors.  Aguilar believes that increased regulation will provide the SEC with more information about funds and will also give the SEC the necessary tools to identify and potentially prevent misconduct prior to investor losses.  Continue reading

Geithner Testimony – Consider Regulation of Hedge Funds

Nominee Calls for More Financial Regulations

Treasury Secretary nominee Timothy Geithner testified before the Senate Finance Committee on January 21, 2009.  In prepared remarks Geithner hints at a desire to increase regulation of the financial markets:

I believe that markets are central to innovation and to growth, but that markets alone cannot solve all problems. Well-designed financial regulations with strong enforcement are absolutely critical to protecting the integrity of our economy.

During the testimony Geithner faced pointed questions regarding tax policies and the failure of the current regulatory regime to effectively police the financial markets.  Many times he stated that increased regulation may be necessary to protect all participants within the financial markets.  Specifically with regard to hedge funds, in his answer to a question posed by Senator Grassley, Geithner stated “I believe that we should consider requiring registration of hedge funds.” Continue reading

Hedge Funds, Congress and Madoff

The Madoff scandal, which caught the SEC and savy institutional investors flat-footed, is increasing the pressure for more oversight and regulation within investment management and hedge fund industries.   It is expected that Congress will be busy with this and other matters regarding regulation of the capital markets.  In fact, Senator Chuck Grassley from Iowa recently announced his intention to require hedge fund registration at the SEC level.

In addition to Grassley, two more members of Congress are calling on greater oversight in the wake of the Madoff scandal.  Specifically Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski from Pennsylvania and Congressman Spencer Bachus from Alabama are calling on the House Financial Services Committee to hold hearings on the Madoff scanal.  I have reprinted the two notices below.  We will continue to provide information on possible hedge fund registration as it comes forward.  Related hedge fund law and registration articles include: Continue reading

SEC Hedge Fund Registration Exemption – Section 203(b)(3) and Rule 203(b)(3)-1

Exemption from the Registration Provisions of the Investment Advisors Act

We have discussed the SEC hedge fund registration exemption many times before, but we have not addressed it directly.For most management companies with a single hedge fund client, registration is actually a relatively easy and straightforward process.  Once hedge fund managers are registered as investment advisors with the SEC there are certain recordkeeping requirements for the hedge fund manager, but the requirements are not onerous (for more information, please see ).

Notwithstanding the above, many managers will choose to remain unregistered for a variety of different reasons and those managers will typically rely on the hedge fund registration exemption found in Section 203(b)(3) of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.  The exemption and the rule underlying the exemption is detailed in full below. Continue reading

Withdrawing from Investment Advisor Registration – the Form ADV-W

For many different reasons a hedge fund manager will decide to de-register as an investment advisor.  The manager may no longer be required to be registered or a manager may have registered simply for marketing purposes and has found that it is too much of a hassle (and cost) to be registered.   In such instances a hedge fund manager can withdrawal from registration by filing Form ADV-W through the IARD (Investment Advisor Registration Depository) system.   The process for de-registering is substantially the same whether the manager is registered with the SEC or with the state securities commission.  This article will discuss (i) issues with de-registration for the hedge fund manager and (ii) detail the process of deregistering.  Continue reading