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Hedge Fund Regulation IT Solutions

Technology Solutions for Registered Hedge Fund Managers

http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com

It is the final quarter of this year’s political season and it has become clear that the earlier clamor for hedge fund registration has been overshadowed by larger political issues – namely health care legislation and the cap and trade bill. Recent events, however, have shown that the registration issue is not dead and the venture capital industry has been able to potentially secure an exemption from the registration provisions. Even though we don’t know where regulation will take us in the next 6 to 18 months, it is likely that many hedge fund managers will need to institute compliance and IT programs as a result of forthcoming laws and regulations.

The article below, submitted by Meyer Ben-Reuven, CEO of Chelsea Technologies, details some issues which managers will need to be ready to handle once legislation and regulations go into effect. State registered investment advisors should take note as they may already be required (under state law) to maintain such compliance programs.

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How is President Obama’s New Hedge Fund Regulation Plan affecting you?
By Meyer Ben-Reuven, CEO Chelsea Technologies

The challenging question Hedge Fund Managers should ask themselves is what should they be doing to be compliant with President Obama’s Hedge Fund Regulation Plan? There are many questions and many tasks to accomplish, but most important is to understand the main points of the plan, what needs to be done and what are the costs associated. In this paper I present you with a summary of the President’s plan and what a Chief Compliance Officer needs to face in conjunction with the IT department to be compliant with regulations. Costs are important, but I will keep them away from this paper.

Obama’s New Hedge Fund Regulation Plan

In June 2009, President Obama presented a proposal for new regulations that affect Hedge Funds and fund managers. The most important part of this new regulation will be to require Hedge Fund, Private Equity, and VC Fund Managers to register with the SEC as investment advisors.

Although it is a proposal, all fund managers will have to start thinking about the re-registration and the process to keep the fund compliant.

The plan’s 5 main goals are:

Promote robust supervision and regulation of financial firms.
Establish comprehensive supervision and regulation of financial markets.
Propose comprehensive regulation of all OTC derivatives.
Protect customers and investors from financial abuse.
Raise international regulatory standards and improve international cooperation.

The idea is to require advisers to report financial information on their fund and its management and thus have the ability to assess whether the fund poses a threat to the stability of the financial system and at the same time strengthen investor protection.

The specific goals regarding hedge funds are as follows:

Data collection
SEC should conduct regular, periodic examinations of hedge funds
Reporting AUM and other fund metrics to the SEC
SEC would have ability to assess whether the fund or fund family is so large, highly leveraged, or interconnected that it poses a threat to financial stability

How will IT Departments have to help keep the funds within regulation rules?

As of February 2006, Hedge Fund Advisors were obliged to comply with SEC Rule 203(b)(3)-2 requiring registration under the Investment Advisor Act. Under these rules, the Hedge Funds were advised to retain all internal and external email and IM business communications. In June 2006, the Goldstein ruling against the SEC pushed several funds to de-register. With the failure of the financial system since the end of 2007, the new administration has been poised to regulate the industry more than ever.

What needs to be done?

Take a look at all the ways communications are conducted in the fund
What are the devices used to communicate
Always be on the lookout for new technologies

Afterwards, insure you have control over the different communication methods. As stated, all electronic communication in and out of the fund has to be retained for future review. This means that if it cannot be controlled and retained, it must be prohibited.

All internal rules have to be specified in IT policies and procedures, otherwise no one can be held accountable.

The following is how data needs to be archived for SEC purpose audits:

Incoming/Outgoing Data must be kept in its original form
Data has to be easily retrievable and searchable
Data has to have a date and time stamp
Data has to be retained in the main office for first 2 years
Data has to be retained for 5 years
Data has to be put into tamper proof media (meaning non-rewritable and non-erasable)
Data has to be stored in a secondary backup location (preferably away from the same grid)
Be able to produce data promptly (within hours)
Be able to provide data in its original format in either view or print form
Implement annual review of the system

It is highly recommended that data be tested for integrity including testing retrieval and searching, as well as accuracy. The test should be conducted on a yearly basis, but better if on a more frequent basis.
Although the IT department is in charge of conducting the process, it is ultimately the Chief Compliance Officer who is responsible for this area. The Chief Compliance Officer needs to dictate the test frequency as well as to advise everyone in the firm about the policies and make sure everyone understands the consequences of failure to comply.

All these internal policies have to be in writing and any violations have to be documented and fixed. The regular testing and reviews have to be documented and be ready for presentation in case of an audit.

NOTE: TAPE BACKUP IS NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR MESSAGE ARCHIVING

What are the different communication venues that exist and can be controlled and thus archived?

Email and IM from Exchange
Email and IM from Bloomberg and Reuters
Blackberry archiving of Pin-to-Pin , SMS, Call Detail logs
E-Faxes
Blogs
Chat Rooms
Message Boards
Twitter
Facebook
LinkedIn

Since all of the above require certain technologies and software for archiving and retaining, you have to make an effort to comply with the regulations or otherwise prohibit the usage of such technologies in the work place.

How do you implement compliance?

There are two schools of thought to achieve compliance:

Build an in-house system
Use a third party system

The in-house system is more complex and often requires a larger upfront investment to build and maintain. Keep in mind you will have to have the following:

Servers, storage, and software
Backup Servers, storage, and software in a location out of the main location grid
Replication system
Maintain both the main and backup location

The responsibility and costs can escalate, but depending on the size of the firm, it might be the most cost efficient.

The third party systems, which have built an infrastructure that is scalable, keep on growing as more clients join their list. The time to implement is a fraction of building an in-house system. Depending on the third party provider, there are several ways of getting the data:

Have the data arrive to the email server and from there delivered to the third party provider
Have the data arrive to the third party provider and then to the email server

Both methods of delivery have issues of their own. The first method requires you to be diligent about monitoring the email flow and ensure data is routed to the archiving provider – the responsibility is shifted completely to you. The second method, where the provider requires the email to be routed through their system before it arrives to your server, usually poses a different challenge where emails might get delayed at the provider.

If you decide on any of the above systems, you should try to utilize an external anti-spam solution to keep your storage usage to a minimum as well as to make sure that non-account emails do not reach your email server. These measures will keep all spam from being part of your retention data.

References and information used from the following sources: Global Relay, Zantaz, LiveOffice, NextPage, Hedge Fund Law Blog

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Bart Mallon, Esq. of Cole-Frieman & Mallon LLP runs Hedge Fund Law Blog. Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund. If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund or if you are a current hedge fund manager with questions about ERISA, please contact us or call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-868-5345. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Hedge Funds with $25MM of AUM to Register Under Commissioner Aguilar’s Plan

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SEC Commissioner Aguilar Proposes Registration For Funds with as little as $25MM of AUM

Just today I had an opportunity to review the transcript of a speech by SEC Commissioner Aguilar in which he advocates that funds with as little as $25MM of AUM should register with the SEC. Such a low threshold for registration is troubling in a number of ways. Most importantly is the impact registration would have on the SEC immediately and in the future. As we have seen most vividly over the past year, the SEC is overextended and underfunded. The SEC’s ability to adequately deal with the 9,000 to 12,000 hedge funds which would come under its jurisdicition is suspect. Registration aside, how will an agency which was not able to sniff out a Bernie Madoff be able to oversee such a large industry without making it cost prohibitive for funds to operate? The money required to oversee these funds is likely to be substantial and will probably not be coming from Congress which means the cost of such a regulatory and oversight system will likely fall onto the managers themselves and then of course to the investors.

As we talk about regulation of the hedge fund industry, there is also the question of regulatory resources. Any future registration of hedge fund advisers and/or hedge funds will require that the SEC receive increased resources to provide effective oversight. We will need to hire staff and implementing new technology to effectively deal with a large and complex industry. To that end, I have previously called for Congress to pass legislation establishing the SEC as a self-funded agency, similar to the way other financial regulators are funded — such as the Federal Reserve Bank, the FDIC, OTS and OCC. This would help to solve the problem.

To the extent that funds are registering and reporting to the SEC, I encourage Congress to couple the authority increasing the SEC’s jurisdiction with the appropriate self-funding mechanism to allow us to provide effective oversight.

This is not to say I am not against reasonable, reasoned and fiscally responsible oversight and regulation. I believe that systemic stability is critically important for the long term viability of the hedge fund industry as well as the capital markets. In this vein, I think that Aguilar’s statement below represents the type of structures which would contribute to increased stability while minimizing regulation where it is not necessary.

Perhaps a tiered approach to registration, based on a fund’s potential to affect the market, would make sense. At the lowest tier would be small funds. These funds could be subject to a simple recordkeeping requirement as to positions and transactions, kept in a standardized format, to permit the SEC to efficiently oversee their activities. As funds grow in size, different standards may be appropriate.

While I do not agree with many of the points regarding regulation the Commissioner discussed in the speech reprinted below, I do believe that the Commissioner does a good job at identifying issues which should be discussed publicly as regulators and industry participants move towards creating a reasonable regulatory regime.

Please feel free to include your comments below.

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Speech by SEC Commissioner:
Hedge Fund Regulation on the Horizon — Don’t Shoot the Messenger
by

Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Spring 2009 Hedgeworld Fund Services Conference
New York, New York

June 18, 2009

Thank you for that kind introduction. I am pleased to be here with you at the Spring 2009 Hedgeworld Fund Services Conference. This conference is timely given the current discussion regarding potential regulation of the hedge fund industry. Let me say at the outset, as is customary, my remarks today are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my fellow Commissioners or of the Commission staff.

My experience with the securities industry began in the late 1970’s. After three years with the SEC, I’ve spent the bulk of my 30 years as a lawyer focusing on the capital markets. Most of those years where in private practices in large law firms, although I spent most of the 90’s and the early part of this decade as General Counsel and Head of Compliance of a large global asset manager. While I’ve spent much of my professional career involved in capital formation though public and private offerings, a substantial portion has been spent working in the investment management industry, and I have worked with hedge funds.

As we all know, there has been much speculation about the impact of hedge fund activity on the broader capital markets. For example, there are questions about whether hedge funds may have contributed to the market turmoil and how hedge funds may have contributed to the demise of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and others. Additionally, it is also not clear whether the lack of oversight of the industry resulted in large amounts of risk to the market through the use of short sales and derivatives, such as credit default swaps.

This year’s conference takes place at a key moment in the history of hedge funds. While hedge funds have remained largely unregulated, this seems to be coming to an end. All over the world, legislators, regulators, investor groups, industry representatives and others are loudly calling for the industry to be regulated.

In the United States, the calls for regulation are motivated by concerns that market integrity has been harmed and that systemic risk arose as a result of the exemptions and exclusions from the federal securities laws that permitted a private market to thrive in ways that may have harmed the public markets. In fact, the market turmoil clearly demonstrated that the private fund market does impact the broader capital markets. This does not mean that all fund activity must be equally regulated, but hedge funds, especially large ones, are thought to require greater regulatory oversight.

My goal with my remarks today is to:

First, lay out a current state of affairs regarding the hedge fund industry;
Second, describe the calls for regulation of the industry; and
Third, discuss key considerations that need to be assessed as hedge fund regulation moves forward.

Multiple Voices Calling For Regulation

The hedge fund industry looks very different today than from where it started. Since the first hedge fund was organized by Alfred Jones in 1949 with $100,000, the industry has exponentially grown both in number of funds and in number of assets under management. In recent years, this growth has been fueled in part by institutional investors, such as endowments, foundations, insurance companies, and pension plans. To give you an idea of the growth, it is believed that the industry managed around $38 billion in 1990, $625 billion in 2002, and reached $1.9 trillion at the end of 2007, although that the number decreased to $1.3 trillion at the end of 2008. It is still incredible growth from the $100,000 start.

The industry’s growth, and the concerns over the impact of hedge funds on the marketplace, has created a renewed call for regulation in the U.S. and abroad. For example, the European Commission recently proposed to regulate the managers of hedge funds and all private equity funds with 100 million euros in assets under management. The proposed regulations would require extensive disclosure of risk management procedures and other aspects of fund governance.

In the U. S., a few years ago the SEC unsuccessfully attempted to regulate hedge funds. More recently, in March of this year, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner testified about his plan to more tightly oversee hedge funds. In addition, there recently have been at least a half-dozen bills introduced in Congress requiring regulation of the hedge fund industry. Just this past Tuesday, Senator Jack Reed introduced a bill that would require that advisers to hedge funds, and to certain other investment pools, to register with the SEC. And yesterday, of course, the Obama Administration released a draft white paper that, among other things, proposes that advisers to large hedge funds register with the SEC, and that very large advisers be subject to additional federal supervision by the Federal Reserve Board.

What are the concerns underlying the call for government oversight? I will tell you what we are hearing. The concerns touch on the classic financial regulatory interests: such as market integrity concerns, systemic risk concerns, and investor protection concerns. This state of affairs is what you would expect when markets are inextricably integrated and the impact of hedge funds is significant, but their actions and their risks are opaque. Simply stated, regulators, legislators and the public have little credible information as to who is out there and what they are doing.

Market Integrity Concerns

Let’s start with the SEC’s responsibility to maintain fair and orderly markets. One of the concerns about hedge funds involves how hedge fund operations impact upon the fairness and the integrity of the broader market. The lack of transparency and oversight over hedge funds gives rise to a number of concerns — for example, market integrity concerns about the nature and extent of counterparty risk, concerns about whether hedge funds engage in insider trading, and questions about how hedge funds drive the demand for derivatives, such as CDSs, as well as how they impact the demand for securitized products.

As a predicate for discussion, let’s be clear about the significant market activity of hedge funds. For example, hedge funds reportedly account for more than 85% of the distressed debt market, and more than 80% of certain derivatives markets. Moreover, although hedge funds represent just 5% of all U.S. assets under management, they account for about 30% of all U.S. equity trading volume. In 2006, there were estimates that hedge funds were responsible for as much as half of the daily trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange.

Because hedge funds are not subject to leverage or diversification requirements, hedge fund managers can more easily take concentrated positions that can impact the market. For example, an entire fund or even multiple funds advised by the same hedge fund manager can be invested in a single position.

In addition, hedge funds are major players in the capital markets for reasons other than trading activity. As this audience knows well, hedge funds have significant business relationships with the largest regulated commercial and investment banks — and act as trading counterparties for a wide range of OTC derivatives and other financing transactions.

Counterparty Risk Concerns

Clearly, for all these reasons and others, hedge funds are significant players in the capital markets. As significant players, hedge funds are one source of counterparty risk, and this risk can be amplified by their leverage and opacity.

Today, commercial banks and prime brokers are called upon to bear and manage the credit and counterparty risks that hedge fund leverage creates. Up until now, it has been assumed that market discipline would effectively prevent hedge funds from detrimentally impacting the capital markets or from posing systemic risk. A January 2008 GAO Report, however, identified several concerns with that theory.[1] For example, the report noted that hedge funds use multiple prime brokers and questioned whether any single prime broker has a complete picture of a hedge fund client’s total leverage. Accordingly, the stress tests and other tools that a prime broker uses to monitor a given counterparty’s risk profile only incorporate the positions known to that particular prime broker. Thus, no single prime broker has the whole picture.

The GAO Report also stated that some counterparties may lack the capacity to assess risk exposures because of the complex financial instruments and secret investment strategies that some hedge funds use.

Unfortunately, the GAO Report also indicates that counterparties facing these structural limitations may have also actively relaxed credit standards in order to attract and retain hedge fund clients in response to fierce competition.

In each of these instances, the risks of hedge funds are being externalized to the regulated market — prime brokers, banks, and their shareholders each were asked to bear the costs of managing hedge fund risks. A concrete example you may remember was when two Bear Stearns-sponsored hedge funds collapsed in 2007. Merrill Lynch, one of the prime brokers, had to absorb an enormous loss because it could only sell the funds’ collateral for a fraction of its purported value.

It’s been obvious that the regulatory oversight of hedge funds has not matched their level of market activity. This difference has led to other concerns affecting market integrity.

Risks of Insider Trading Create Market Wide Concerns

For example, in addition to concerns about counterparty risk, there have also been concerns about hedge funds engaging in insider trading. Clearly, there has been an increase in the number of insider trading cases brought by the Commission that have involved hedge funds. Admittedly, it is incredibly difficult for the Commission to assess the frequency of insider trading because of the opacity of hedge funds and the investments they make, especially in OTC derivatives. Moreover, when you couple this with the fragmented nature of the securities markets and the broad potential for hedge funds to obtain inside information, it is a tough oversight situation indeed. Hedge funds who participate in private placements, talk with trading desks, and maintain connections with the street are, in many cases, in a position to obtain inside information and to use it in a way that traditional surveillance may not detect. This potential for insider trading has been well publicized and public investors are concerned about the possible effects on market fairness and integrity.

Hedge Funds And The Demand For CDS and Securitized Products

Additionally, hedge funds were significant players in the exponential growth in the now much maligned credit default swaps market. As the market to create CDSs grew, there were funds that bought these instruments for reasons that made sense. For example, in 2005 there were hedge funds who noticed that the U.S. housing market was weakening and they bought CDS instruments on the protection buyer side. A logical move.

On the other hand, it is well known that the credit risk reflected by CDSs is equal to multiples of the actual credit risk of the underlying bond market. How did that happen? Many CDSs were heralded as hedging tools — they were supposed to transfer risk to parties that could bear it from parties that could not. Now we see only too clearly that this was not the case. Instead, many CDSs actually created risk, rather than hedged risk. Hedge funds that sought to create profits from leveraged risk may have played a crucial role driving the growth in these products.

Systemic Risks

The concerns about hedge funds and market integrity often go hand in hand with concerns about systemic risk. In their current form, hedge funds pose a systemic risk threat to our financial system in several ways. First, hedge funds have such significant assets under management that some fear that the loss of one or more large firms could potentially reverberate throughout the capital markets. In addition, if a counterparty fails to effectively withstand a hedge fund loss, then the failure of the counterparty could itself threaten market stability.

There is also the issue that can occur when several hedge funds take the same position, whether through coordination or simply through similar trading strategies. These funds can have a large impact on the market when they adjust their positions en masse.

Thus, the concerns that the lack of oversight over the hedge fund industry may present to market integrity and to systemic risks seem to be well founded.

Investor Protection

In addition to concerns about market integrity, the SEC is also responsible for investor protection. Given the increase in complaints from hedge fund investors this has taken on a more immediate importance.

One of the underlying principles behind the idea that hedge funds could operate with little to no regulatory requirements was that interests in the funds were only sold in private offerings to wealthy investors. These investors were thought to be sufficiently “sophisticated” to protect their interests, and to be able to engage in effective arms-length negotiation in order to achieve fair and equitable terms.

I firmly believe that truly sophisticated investors in private deals should be held accountable to the terms that they knowingly negotiate — and if an investment were to go bad, they should bear the loss.

However, with the recent market turmoil and the ongoing economic upheaval that has caused trillions in wealth to vanish, millions of jobs to disappear and the liquidation of over 1,500 hedge funds, serious concerns have been raised about whether these wealthy and sophisticated investors are truly able to protect their interests. There seems to be evidence that these “sophisticated investors” may not have fully appreciated the risks they were taking. Perhaps it may make sense for the definitions of who qualifies as “sophisticated” under our rules to be reconsidered. For example, maybe the criteria for sophistication should focus on more relevant attributes — such as focusing on actual investment experience.

In any case, recent events have challenged the assumption that investors and market discipline can be relied upon to control the risks of hedge funds. And this is not surprising. First, these investors are typically passive and there is no legal obligation for hedge fund investors to monitor hedge fund activity. Second, even if investors wanted to actively monitor the investment, the nature of hedge fund activity and the information available may not currently support such a role.

Valuation and Performance

For example, it may be impossible for an investor to know the actual value of a hedge fund’s portfolio. Hedge funds are not subject to reporting requirements and because many instruments held by a hedge fund are illiquid or opaquely-priced OTC products, any information that is reported could be hard to evaluate.

Related to the concern of how a fund values its assets, is a hedge fund’s performance information — another hard to evaluate metric for investors. Without regulation, the only performance information that hedge funds provide is voluntary.

This quote by Harry Liem, a pension consultant, seems to sum it up when he said “It’s like someone walking into a casino and saying ‘I want everyone to come forward and tell me how much you have won or lost.’ Probably only the winners will come forward . . .”[2]

Not Being Able to Redeem

There is also the issue of investors not being able to redeem their investments from a fund. In recent times, due to the large amount of redemption requests and the current lack of an ability to raise cash, there are hedge fund managers who have put up gates and have restricted investors’ ability to redeem their monies. Although gates can benefit investors by giving the manager more time to sell off portfolio positions, for some investors it appeared to be a surprise.

On top of that, several hedge fund managers froze funds but continued to charge management fees on money that investors cannot access. Orin Kramer, a hedge fund manager, described the situation by stating: “It’s like telling someone at a hotel that they can’t check out and then charging them for the privilege of staying.”[3]

Let me be clear. I’m not saying that these situations are per se illegal. To the extent that sophisticated and qualified investors agreed to provisions providing for gates and the ongoing charge of management fees, one could say that investors walked into these agreements with open eyes.

However, because for the most part hedge funds are not registered with the SEC, we are not able to adequately oversee how they are operating. Moreover, this lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess whether the relationship between an investor and the hedge funds adviser, is functioning in the manner that underlie the presumptions that led to the exemptions.

Some recent reports do tend to show that investors are beginning to take their own initiatives, and give some indication that what investors may be willing to agree to in the future may be different. For example, a recent memo from CalPERS stated that it would no longer partner with managers whose fee structures result in a clear misalignment of interest between managers and investors. Moreover, more investors are now asking that hedge funds run assets in “managed accounts,” where their money is held separately and the holdings are transparent.

As you may expect based on concerns including ones I have mentioned, hedge fund investors have been calling the Commission in unprecedented numbers

Increased Cases Involving Hedge Funds

In fact, the Commission has more investigations involving hedge funds than ever before, and the number of cases actually brought also is increasing. In the first 4 months of 2009, the Commission filed 25 cases related to hedge funds. In contrast, we brought 19 cases in all of 2008, 24 in all of 2007, and 16 in 2006. Our cases cover the waterfront, charging everything from offering fraud and insider trading, to misrepresentations about performance and to misrepresentations about the actual due diligence undertaken. We are also seeing more cases involving conflicts of interest and outright theft of assets

Nature of Regulation

I have just laid out for you some of the concerns that are generally driving the calls for greater regulation and oversight of the hedge fund industry. Maybe even more important, it appears that some of the assumptions justifying the industry’s exclusion from regulation and oversight may be on faulty ground. As a result, it seems certain that regulation of the hedge fund industry is coming. But here is the harder question — what should it look like?

There are a number of questions as to exactly how, and to what extent, hedge funds may have contributed to the economic crisis and how they contributed to the overall systemic risk of the financial markets. To that end, I applaud Congress and President Obama for providing for an independent, bi-partisan Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. By investigating and analyzing what happened, we can better assess whether the regulatory proposals should move forward.

Since coming to the Commission, I have been a vocal advocate for the Commission’s mission to protect investors, provide for fair and orderly markets, and promote capital formation. All aspects of this mission guide my thoughts as we consider the appropriate framework to regulate hedge funds.

Because of the size, complexity and market-wide impact of the hedge funds industry, potential regulation would need to be both comprehensive and flexible. Something not always easy to achieve.

I believe that the SEC must be an active participant in this process. Please remember that the SEC has been overseeing industry participants — such as, investment companies, investment advisers and broker-dealers — for over 69 years. The Commission staff has unsurpassed expertise in this area. Congress should take advantage of this expertise by providing the Commission with a broad mandate to oversee hedge funds. The Commission could then scale its regulation in a flexible manner to deal with the regulatory concerns of market integrity, investor protection, and, in coordination with other regulators, systemic risk.

Working with hedge fund advisers and with hedge fund investors, I am confident that we can find an appropriate balance.

As you know, there has been a general discussion over whether hedge fund advisers and/or hedge funds should register. In my mind, hedge funds advisers with over $25 million in assets should register with the Commission, but that may not be enough. Many hedge fund advisers are currently registered with the SEC but we still lack a complete picture of what is going on in the industry. Some have suggested that hedge funds should also register. Others have suggested that it may be appropriate to apply limited concepts from within the Investment Company Act of 1940 to hedge funds — what some have called a “40 Act-lite” regime.

Perhaps a tiered approach to registration, based on a fund’s potential to affect the market, would make sense. At the lowest tier would be small funds. These funds could be subject to a simple recordkeeping requirement as to positions and transactions, kept in a standardized format, to permit the SEC to efficiently oversee their activities. As funds grow in size, different standards may be appropriate.

For funds that could significantly affect the market, it may be appropriate to require more than recordkeeping. For example, it may be appropriate to think through whether some of the risk limitation concepts built into the Investment Company Act make sense to apply to these hedge funds — such as imposing limits on leverage.

Of course, these are only a few suggestions. Many others have been made — and others will follow — as the discussion turns from “whether to regulate” to “how to regulate.” The nature of the business of hedge funds is trading, and this necessarily requires interaction with the public marketplace — and the larger the investment fund, the greater the potential impact on the overall capital markets. When the hedge industry has the ability to significantly impact the market or other market participants, the public interest needs to be protected. A lesson of this economic crisis is that the U.S. regulatory interest in hedge funds arises because of the impact of the funds on the financial market, regardless of the sophistication of its investors or the number of investors.

When discussing “how to regulate,” it is clear to me that regulation is more than the bare requirements of registering and reporting — it should also include inspection authority. To have a chance to prevent problems before they occur, the SEC has to be able to inspect all hedge fund advisers, and the funds that they manage, and otherwise engage in oversight through surveillance systems. The public expects nothing less.

Greater Resources to SEC to Provide Effective Oversight

As we talk about regulation of the hedge fund industry, there is also the question of regulatory resources. Any future registration of hedge fund advisers and/or hedge funds will require that the SEC receive increased resources to provide effective oversight. We will need to hire staff and implementing new technology to effectively deal with a large and complex industry. To that end, I have previously called for Congress to pass legislation establishing the SEC as a self-funded agency, similar to the way other financial regulators are funded — such as the Federal Reserve Bank, the FDIC, OTS and OCC. This would help to solve the problem.

To the extent that funds are registering and reporting to the SEC, I encourage Congress to couple the authority increasing the SEC’s jurisdiction with the appropriate self-funding mechanism to allow us to provide effective oversight.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I am confident that regulation of the hedge fund industry can be done right — in a way that balances the needs of the industry with the needs of investors and the needs of the market. And if it is, it will be a good thing for all of us. The Congressional Oversight Panel’s Special Report on Regulatory Reform4 said it best with the following summary:

“By limiting the opportunities for deception and allowing for the necessary trust to develop between interconnected parties, regulation can enhance the vitality of the markets. Historically, new regulation has served that role.
For example, as the money manager Martin Whitman has observed, far from stifling the markets, the new regulations of the Investment Company Act enabled the targeted industry to flourish:

“’Without strict regulation, I doubt that our industry could have grown as it has grown, and also be as prosperous as it is for money managers. Because of the existence of strict regulation, the outside investor knows that money managers can be trusted. Without that trust, the industry likely would not have grown the way it had grown.’”[5]

The lack of transparency, potential imbalance of power between investors and managers, and impact on the entire capital market are driving the calls to regulate the hedge fund industry. The hedge fund industry has a lot to offer in determining how these calls are answered. Addressing these issues in an intelligent and rational manner is important, and ultimately will result in a stronger and more vibrant hedge fund industry. I welcome the ongoing discussion.

Thank you for inviting me here today.

Endnotes

[1] GAO Report: Regulators and Market Participants Are Taking Steps to Strengthen Market Discipline, but Continued Attention is Needed. January 2008. pg 27.

[2] Why people love to hate those risky hedge funds; An investment option that only the super rich can afford, by Naomi Rovnick. South China Morning Post Ltd. March 1, 2009.

[3] Hedge Funds, Unhinged by Louise Story. New York Times. January 18, 2009.

[4] Congressional Oversight Panel’s Special Report on Regulatory Reform: Modernizing the American Financial Regulatory System: Recommendations for Improving Oversight, Protecting Consumers, and Ensuring Stability. January 2009. pgs 18-19

[5] Letter from Third Avenue Funds Chairman of the Board Martin J. Whitman to Sharheolders, at 6 (Oct. 31, 2005) (online at www.thirdavenuefunds.com/ta/documents/sl/shareholderletters-05Q4.pdf).

http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061809laa.htm

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to learn how to start a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website. Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund. If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009

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As part of the new Obama financial regulation plan, which includes potentially the registration of hedge fund managers with the SEC, the Whitehouse has sent a draft to congress of the new Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 (CFPAA of 2009). The act would create a new government agency which would have some interaction with both the SEC and the CFTC. A full version of the draft can be found here: Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009. Additionally, you can find President Obama’s statement with regard to this new agency reprinted below. For more information, please also see Jim Hamilton’s website.

More posts about this new act and what it will mean to hedge funds will be forthcoming.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
EMBARGOED UNTIL 6:00 AM ET,

SATURDAY, June 20, 2009

WEEKLY ADDRESS: President Obama Highlights Tough New Consumer Protections

WASHINGTON – In his weekly address, President Barack Obama explained the necessity of his proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency. It is clear that one of the major causes of the current economic crisis was a breakdown of oversight leading to widespread abuses in the financial world. The Consumer Financial Protection Agency will have the sole job of looking out for the financial interests of ordinary Americans by banning unfair practices and enforcing the rules. This is the type of reform that will attack the causes of the current crisis and prevent further crises from taking place.

The audio and video will be available at 6:00am Saturday, June 20, 2009 at www.whitehouse.gov.

Prepared Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
June 20, 2009

As we continue to recover from an historic economic crisis, it is clear to everyone that one of its major causes was a breakdown in oversight that led to widespread abuses in the financial system. An epidemic of irresponsibility took hold from Wall Street to Washington to Main Street. And the consequences have been disastrous. Millions of Americans have seen their life savings erode; families have been devastated by job losses; businesses large and small have closed their doors.

In response, this week, my administration proposed a set of major reforms to the rules that govern our financial system; to attack the causes of this crisis and to prevent future crises from taking place; to ensure that our markets can work fairly and freely for businesses and consumers alike.

We are going to promote markets that work for those who play by the rules. We’re going to stand up for a system in which fair dealing and honest competition are the only way to win. We’re going to level the playing field for consumers. And we’re going to have the kinds of rules that encourage innovations that make our economy stronger – not those that allow insiders to exploit its weaknesses for their own gain.

And one of the most important proposals is a new oversight agency called the Consumer Financial Protection Agency. It’s charged with just one job: looking out for the interests of ordinary Americans in the financial system. This is essential, for this crisis may have started on Wall Street. But its impacts have been felt by ordinary Americans who rely on credit cards, home loans, and other financial instruments.

It is true that this crisis was caused in part by Americans who took on too much debt and took out loans they simply could not afford. But there are also millions of Americans who signed contracts they did not always understand offered by lenders who did not always tell the truth. Today, folks signing up for a mortgage, student loan, or credit card face a bewildering array of incomprehensible options. Companies compete not by offering better products, but more complicated ones – with more fine print and hidden terms. It’s no coincidence that the lack of strong consumer protections led to abuses against consumers; the lack of rules to stop deceptive lending practices led to abuses against borrowers.

This new agency will have the responsibility to change that. It will have the power to set tough new rules so that companies compete by offering innovative products that consumers actually want – and actually understand. Those ridiculous contracts – pages of fine print that no one can figure out – will be a thing of the past. You’ll be able to compare products – with descriptions in plain language – to see what is best for you. The most unfair practices will be banned. The rules will be enforced.

Some argue that these changes – and the many others we’ve called for – go too far. And I welcome a debate about how we can make sure our regulations work for businesses and consumers. But what I will not accept – what I will vigorously oppose – are those who do not argue in good faith. Those who would defend the status quo at any cost. Those who put their narrow interests ahead of the interests of ordinary Americans. We’ve already begun to see special interests mobilizing against change.

That’s not surprising. That’s Washington.

For these are interests that have benefited from a system which allowed ordinary Americans to be exploited. These interests argue against reform even as millions of people are facing the consequences of this crisis in their own lives. These interests defend business-as-usual even though we know that it was business-as-usual that allowed this crisis to take place.

Well, the American people did not send me to Washington to give in to the special interests; the American people sent me to Washington to stand up for their interests. And while I’m not spoiling for a fight, I’m ready for one. The most important thing we can do to put this era of irresponsibility in the past is to take responsibility now. That is why my administration will accept no less than real and lasting change to the way business is done – on Wall Street and in Washington. We will do what is necessary to end this crisis – and we will do what it takes to prevent this kind of crisis from ever happening again.

Thank you.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to learn how to start a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Hedge Fund Records

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Access to Records under the Delaware Uniform Limited Partnership Act

A vast majority of hedge funds are structured as limited partnerships under the Delaware Uniform Limited Partnership Act (the DULPA). The code is very flexible and allows the limited partnership agreement (LPA) to be drafted in a very manager-friendly manner. To the extent that a LPA is silent on an issue covered by the DULPA, the DULPA will control.

With regard to the record keeping requirement of hedge funds, many funds will include a default provision in the LPA which provides investors access to the records of the hedge fund upon reasonable notice to the general partner of the fund. The records that the investors will have access to are listed in Section 17-305 of the DULPA, which I have reprinted below. The requirements are fairly standard items which and should not pose an inconvenience to the general partner.

However, managers should note that by defaulting to the DULPA the manager may actually be providing investors in the fund with the potential right to access the name and contact information for other investors in the fund. DULPA Section 17-305(a)(3) provides,

Each limited partner has the right, subject to such reasonable standards … to obtain from the general partners from time to time upon reasonable demand for any purpose reasonably related to the limited partner’s interest as a limited partner a current list of the name and last known business, residence or mailing address of each partner.

Of course, under this section the investor making such a request would need to show that the request was made a purpose reasonably related to such investors interest in the fund. The manager would obviously be able to deny such a request if the investor did not present a good reason for the request. The general partner would also have other potential remedies under Section 17-305(b) and Section 17-305(e). The hedge fund offering documents could also be revised so as to restrict investors from having this right.

The full text of the section is reprinted below and can be found here.

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§ 17-305. Access to and confidentiality of information; records.

(a) Each limited partner has the right, subject to such reasonable standards (including standards governing what information and documents are to be furnished, at what time and location and at whose expense) as may be set forth in the partnership agreement or otherwise established by the general partners, to obtain from the general partners from time to time upon reasonable demand for any purpose reasonably related to the limited partner’s interest as a limited partner:

(1) True and full information regarding the status of the business and financial condition of the limited partnership;

(2) Promptly after becoming available, a copy of the limited partnership’s federal, state and local income tax returns for each year;

(3) A current list of the name and last known business, residence or mailing address of each partner;

(4) A copy of any written partnership agreement and certificate of limited partnership and all amendments thereto, together with executed copies of any written powers of attorney pursuant to which the partnership agreement and any certificate and all amendments thereto have been executed;

(5) True and full information regarding the amount of cash and a description and statement of the agreed value of any other property or services contributed by each partner and which each partner has agreed to contribute in the future, and the date on which each became a partner; and

(6) Other information regarding the affairs of the limited partnership as is just and reasonable.

(b) A general partner shall have the right to keep confidential from limited partners for such period of time as the general partner deems reasonable, any information which the general partner reasonably believes to be in the nature of trade secrets or other information the disclosure of which the general partner in good faith believes is not in the best interest of the limited partnership or could damage the limited partnership or its business or which the limited partnership is required by law or by agreement with a third party to keep confidential.

(c) A limited partnership may maintain its records in other than a written form if such form is capable of conversion into written form within a reasonable time.

(d) Any demand under this section shall be in writing and shall state the purpose of such demand.

(e) Any action to enforce any right arising under this section shall be brought in the Court of Chancery. If a general partner refuses to permit a limited partner to obtain from the general partner the information described in subsection (a)(3) of this section or does not reply to the demand that has been made within 5 business days after the demand has been made, the limited partner may apply to the Court of Chancery for an order to compel such disclosure. The Court of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not the person seeking such information is entitled to the information sought. The Court of Chancery may summarily order the general partner to permit the limited partner to obtain the information described in subsection (a)(3) of this section and to make copies or abstracts therefrom, or the Court of Chancery may summarily order the general partner to furnish to the limited partner the information described in subsection (a)(3) of this section on the condition that the limited partner first pay to the limited partnership the reasonable cost of obtaining and furnishing such information and on such other conditions as the Court of Chancery deems appropriate. When a limited partner seeks to obtain the information described in subsection (a)(3) of this section, the limited partner shall first establish (1) that the limited partner has complied with the provisions of this section respecting the form and manner of making demand for obtaining such information, and (2) that the information the limited partner seeks is reasonably related to the limited partner’s interest as a limited partner. The Court of Chancery may, in its discretion, prescribe any limitations or conditions with reference to the obtaining of information, or award such other or further relief as the Court of Chancery may deem just and proper. The Court of Chancery may order books, documents and records, pertinent extracts therefrom, or duly authenticated copies thereof, to be brought within the State of Delaware and kept in the State of Delaware upon such terms and conditions as the order may prescribe.

(f) The rights of a limited partner to obtain information as provided in this section may be restricted in an original partnership agreement or in any subsequent amendment approved or adopted by all of the partners and in compliance with any applicable requirements of the partnership agreement. The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to limit the ability to impose restrictions on the rights of a limited partner to obtain information by any other means permitted under this section.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to learn how to start a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

SEC Proposes More Onerous Custody Rules For Hedge Fund Managers

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Hedge Funds to be Subject to “Surprise Exams”

In addition to the likelihood of hedge fund registration, the SEC is now proposing to have “gatekeepers” to make sure that investment advisors are not engaged in any fraudulent behavior. When and if such a requirement is adopted, it will further burden investment advisors with more paperwork. “Surprise exams” could also be disastrous to the small investment advisory shops which would need to divert resources from trading and operations to dealing with such surprise exams. At all levels of the investment advisory spectrum this will increase costs.

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SEC Proposes Rule Amendments to Strengthen Safeguards of Investor Funds Controlled by Investment Advisers

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2009-109

Washington, D.C., May 14, 2009 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today proposed rule amendments to substantially increase protections for investors who entrust their money to investment advisers.

The SEC is seeking public comment on the proposed measures, which are intended to ensure that investment advisers who have “custody” of clients’ funds and securities are handling those assets properly. In some recent SEC enforcement actions, firms and principals have been charged with misusing clients’ money and covering up their illicit activities by distributing false account statements showing non-existent funds. The additional safeguards proposed by the SEC include a yearly “surprise exam” of investment advisers performed by an independent public accountant to verify client assets. In addition, when an adviser or an affiliate directly holds client assets, a custody control review would have to be conducted by a PCAOB-registered and inspected accountant.

“These new safeguards are designed to decrease the likelihood that an investment adviser could misappropriate a client’s assets and go undetected,” said SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro. “That’s because an independent public accountant will be looking over their shoulder on at least an annual basis.”

Andrew J. Donohue, Director of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management, added, “The amendments proposed by the Commission today would significantly strengthen controls over client assets held by registered investment advisers — especially when those assets are held directly by the adviser itself or a related person of the adviser.”

Unlike banks or broker-dealers, investment advisers generally do not have physical custody of their clients’ funds or securities. Instead, client assets are typically maintained with a broker-dealer or bank (a “qualified custodian”), but the adviser still may be deemed to have custody because the adviser has authority to withdraw their clients’ funds held by the qualified custodian. Or the qualified custodian may be affiliated with the adviser, which may give the adviser indirect access to client funds.

The SEC’s proposed rule amendments, if adopted, would promote independent custody and enable independent public accountants to act as third-party monitors.

One proposed amendment would require all registered advisers with custody of client assets to undergo an annual “surprise exam” by an independent public accountant to verify those assets exist.

Another proposed amendment would apply to investment advisers whose client assets are not held or controlled by a firm independent of the adviser. In such cases, the investment adviser will be required to obtain a written report — prepared by a PCAOB-registered and inspected accountant — that, among other things, describes the controls in place, tests the operating effectiveness of those controls, and provides the results of those tests. These reports are commonly known as SAS-70 reports. This review would have to meet PCAOB standards — providing an important level of quality control over the accountants performing the review.

The proposed measures also would include reporting requirements designed to alert the SEC staff and investors to potential problems at an adviser, and provide the Commission with important information for risk assessment purposes. An adviser would be required to disclose in public filings with the Commission, among other things, the identity of the independent public accountant that performs its “surprise exam,” and amend its filings to report if it changes accountants. The accountant would have to report the termination of its engagement with the adviser and, if applicable, any problems with the examination that led to the termination of its engagement. If the accountants find any material discrepancies during the surprise examination, they would have to report them to the Commission.

The proposed amendments also would require that all custodians holding advisory client assets directly deliver custodial statements to advisory clients rather than through the investment adviser, and that advisers opening custody accounts for clients instruct those clients to compare account statements they receive from the custodian with those received from the adviser. These additional safeguards would make it more difficult for an adviser to prepare false account statements, and more likely that clients would find discrepancies.

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Public comments on today’s proposed rule amendments must be received by the Commission within 60 days after their publication in the Federal Register.

The full text of the proposed rule amendments will be posted to the SEC Web site as soon as possible.

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-109.htm

NASAA Proposes Multi-State No-Action Request Process

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Currently each state has their own securities laws and their own interpretation of those laws. While many of the laws and regulations are based on the same set of model rules, no two states seem to take the same interpretation with regard to the rules. Enforcement is completely different as well. This presents many problems for those involved in the securities and investment management industries because of the disparate treatment under similar circumstances in different states.

NASAA is taking a step forward to try to unify the laws of the states through a multi-state no-action request process. Basically questions on the application or interpretation of state securities laws would be decided on a multi-state level instead of at just a single state(each state would have the ability to issue a distinct opinion or opt out of the discussion, see below for more details). This is good because it (1) allows all states to address an issue which may be applicable (currently or in the future) to a resident of their state and (2) it will promote discussion between the states as to how to handle certain situations. Hopefully this create a more uniform set of laws between the states which will decrease lawyer fees in the future and will increase certainty in the application of current laws and regulation.

With regard to the specific proposal we will likely respond to the NASAA with the following comments:

Section 5, number 7 – this section should be deleted unless it goes directly to an issue with the request at hand. Disclosing this information otherwise would serve no purpose with regard to the request.

Suggestion – NASAA should also create a database on their website to track all of requests as well as the rulings on the requests.

We will be covering this in greater detail over the next few weeks. Please contact us if you have questions or ideas with regard to the proposal.

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Notice of Request for Public Comment on NASAA’s Proposed Adoption of a Statement of Policy Regarding Multi-State Review of Requests for Interpretive Opinions and No-Action Letters

The NASAA Coordinated Interpretations Project Group requests comment from the public on the adoption of a new Statement of Policy Regarding Multi-State Review of Requests for Interpretative Opinions and No-Action Letters.

The comment period begins February 20, 2009 and will remain open for 30 days. Accordingly, all comments should be submitted on or before March 22, 2009. Comments should be directed by email or in writing to:

Rick A. Fleming
General Counsel
Office of the Securities Commissioner
618 S. Kansas Avenue
Topeka, Kansas 66603
[email protected]

Rex Staples
General Counsel
NASAA
750 First Street, NE, Suite 1140
Washington, DC 20002-4251
[email protected]

Background and Purpose of the Proposed Statement of Policy

Many state securities regulators have the authority issue “no-action letters” in which staff confirms that a transaction carried out under a set of assumed facts will not result in a recommendation for enforcement action. Some states also issue “interpretive opinions” in which staff provides guidance by indicating how a provision of law applies to a situation presented. These types of no-action letters and interpretive opinions are authorized by subsection 413(e) of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, as amended, and subsection 605(d) of the Uniform Securities Act (2002).

Subsection 420(b)(7) of the 1956 USA and subsection 608(c)(9) of the 2002 USA authorize the states to cooperate with each other in the development of no-action letters and interpretive opinions in order to encourage uniform interpretation of laws and maximize the effectiveness of regulation. Toward those ends, NASAA proposes this Statement of Policy.

Summary of the Proposed Statement of Policy

The proposed Statement of Policy describes the application and review process for multi-state consideration of requests for interpretive opinions and no-action letters. The proposed Statement of Policy contains the following major elements:

Section II contains definitions, including the terms “interpretive opinion” and “no-action letter.”
Section III places restrictions on the types of matters that qualify for multi-state review. For example, it prohibits requests concerning purely hypothetical situations and transactions that have already occurred.
Sections IV and V contain rules governing the content of the request letter, citation to state laws, payment of fees, etc.
Section VI describes the review process. Conference calls and a list-serve will be used to facilitate communication between states, and responses to requests for interpretive opinions and no-action letters should be generated within 60 days.
Section VII contains optional disclaimers for the states to consider using.

The full policy statement, reprinted below, can also be found here.

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STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING
MULTI-STATE REVIEW OF REQUESTS FOR
INTERPRETIVE OPINIONS AND NO-ACTION LETTERS

(Adopted ____)

I. OVERVIEW

1. This Statement of Policy of the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) describes the application and review process for multi-state consideration of requests for Interpretive Opinions and No-Action Letters.

2. The policy is intended to promote efficiency in the review of applications and produce responses to requests within 60 days.

3. This policy is intended to promote consistency in the interpretation of blue sky laws, particularly when the laws are based upon uniform or model provisions. However, the issuance of Interpretive Opinions and No-Action Letters is done solely at the discretion of each state, and each state is ultimately responsible for interpreting and enforcing its own law.

II. DEFINITIONS

1. “Interpretive Opinion” means a letter that states a conclusion regarding the applicability of a relevant provision of law to a situation presented. An Interpretive Opinion represents a judgment based solely on the fact situation as described by the applicant and an analysis of existing law and judicial, legislative, and administrative history.

2. “No-Action Letter” means a letter by which a person is advised that a transaction carried out under a set of assumed facts will not result in a recommendation by staff that an enforcement action be taken. An Interpretive Opinion often includes an assurance of “no action;” however, a No-Action Letter does not necessarily include any interpretation of law.

3. “Participating Jurisdictions” means those states that have agreed to accept applications for multi-state review of requests for Interpretive Opinions or No-Action Letters in accordance with this Statement of Policy. Authority for a multi-state review is provided in section 608(c)(9) of the Uniform Securities Act of 2002 and section 420(b)(7) of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, as amended by NASAA. All Participating Jurisdictions are listed on Form MS-ONA.

4. “Selected Jurisdictions” means the states from whom an applicant seeks an Interpretive Opinion or No-Action Letter, as indicated by the applicant on Form MS-ONA.

III. CRITERIA FOR ELIGIBILITY

1. An application for multi-state review of a request for an Interpretive Opinion or No-Action Letter shall not involve a hypothetical situation, a past transaction, or an issue that is currently subject to or in preparation for litigation.

2. An application shall not involve a matter that the applicant knows or should know is currently under investigation or subject to regulatory action.

3. An application shall not relate to an interpretation of antifraud provisions.

IV. APPLICATION PROCESS

1. To apply for multi-state review of a request for an Interpretive Opinion or No-Action Letter, the applicant shall file the following documents with each Selected Jurisdiction and the Program Administrator:

a. A copy of “Form MS-ONA – Application for Multi-State Review of Request for Interpretive Opinion or No-Action Letter.” The form is available on the NASAA web site at [insert current web address] and contact information for each state is available at [insert current web address].

b. A request letter that complies with the requirements set forth below; and

c. Any supporting materials.

2. The applicant shall submit an application fee directly to each Selected Jurisdiction in the amount indicated on Form MS-ONA.

V. CONTENT OF REQUEST LETTER

1. A request for an Interpretive Opinion or No-Action Letter shall succinctly present the issue to be considered and provide a thorough recitation of all material facts. The request shall contain the applicant’s reasoning and legal analysis, including references to applicable law and previous Interpretive Opinions or No-Action Letters that support the interpretation or relief requested. Additionally, the request should include a discussion of previous Interpretive Opinions or No-Action Letters that militate against granting the interpretation sought or relief requested and set forth the applicant’s reasoning and legal analysis distinguishing them from the facts and issues presented in the request.

2. The request should be limited to one legal issue and should be narrowly tailored to resolve the specific issue. The request should not attempt to discuss every possible situation.

3. The request must identify the persons or entities that are the subject of the request or will rely upon the response and identify the states in which such persons reside or maintain their principal places of business. The request may state that the person or entity seeks confidential treatment to the extent permitted by the open records or public records laws of the Selected Jurisdictions (e.g., state laws modeled after section 607 of the Uniform Securities Act of 2002). However, the applicant should take note that the laws of some states do not permit confidential treatment, and this Statement of Policy does not assure that any state will maintain the confidentiality of the person or entity or any other information contained in the application.

4. If a request for an Interpretive Opinion or No-Action Letter relates to a definition, exemption, or other provision that is derived from the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, the Uniform Securities Act of 2002, a NASAA model rule, or a NASAA Statement of Policy (SOP), the request letter shall include in the heading a citation to the relevant provision(s) of each applicable uniform act, model rule, or SOP.

5. The request shall set forth in tabular form, as an appendix, a specific citation to the relevant laws of each Selected Jurisdiction.

6. The request shall include a representation that any proposed transaction has not yet been consummated, that the matter is not currently subject to or in preparation for litigation, and that the applicant is not aware of any regulatory investigation involving the matter.

7. The request shall disclose whether any of the persons who are the subject of the request or will rely upon the response, or any of the persons’ predecessors, affiliates, directors, officers, general partners, beneficial owners of 10 percent or more of any class of its equity securities, any promoter presently connected with the persons in any capacity, any underwriter to be involved in a transaction described in the request, or any partner, director or officer of the underwriter:

a. Within the last five years, has filed a registration statement which is the subject of a currently effective registration stop order entered by any state securities administrator or the United States Securities and Exchange Commission;

b. within the last five years, has been convicted of any criminal offense in connection with the offer, purchase or sale of any security, or involving fraud or deceit;

c. is currently subject to any state or federal administrative enforcement order or judgment, entered within the last five years, finding fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any security; or

d. is currently subject to any order, judgment or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction, entered within the last five years, temporarily, preliminary or permanently restraining or enjoining such party from engaging in or continuing to engage in any conduct or practice involving fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

8. If the applicant has communicated with any state securities administrator concerning the transaction or subject matter that is the subject of the request, the applicant shall disclose the nature of the communication and any response received from the state. If a separate request for an Interpretive Opinion or No-Action Letter has already been filed with one or more states in connection with the same transaction or subject matter, the applicant shall (1) provide a copy of any requests that have been filed and disclose the status of each state’s response; (2) provide a copy of any response that has been issued by a state; and (3) explain the reason that it did not initially seek multi-state review.

VI. REVIEW PROCESS

1. Within 5 business days after receipt of an application, the Program Administrator will determine whether the application is eligible for multi-state review and in proper form. If the application is ineligible or deficient, the Program Administrator will notify the applicant and the Selected Jurisdictions. If the application is eligible for multi-state review, the Program Administrator will notify the applicant and Selected Jurisdictions of the deadline to review the application and issue responses in accordance with paragraph VI.3. The Program Administrator will also send a copy of the application to any other state that provides contact information in accordance with Paragraph VI.6.

2. Within 45 days after receipt of a proper application by the Program Administrator, the Program Administrator shall arrange for a conference call to discuss the application and shall provide notice of the call to all states who submit contact information in accordance with paragraph VI.6. The Program Administrator may appoint a facilitator for the conference call, and the Program Administrator or facilitator may schedule additional conference calls as needed.

3. Within 60 days after receipt of a proper application by the Program Administrator, each Selected Jurisdiction shall use its best efforts to issue its response to the applicant. The response may include an Interpretive Opinion, No-Action Letter, or letter declining to give any such assurance. Failure of a Selected Jurisdiction to issue a response does not indicate assent to the granting of the interpretation or relief requested. A copy of the response should be sent to the Program Administrator and added to an electronic library containing the Interpretive Opinions and No-Action Letters issued under this Statement of Policy.

4. The Program Administrator may seek additional information from the applicant on behalf of any Selected Jurisdiction, and the applicant shall file copies of all supplemental material with each Selected Jurisdiction and the Program Administrator. If supplemental material is requested, the review period may be extended up to 30 additional days after receipt of the supplemental material at the discretion of the Program Administrator. The Program Administrator will notify the applicant and Selected Jurisdictions of the extension and send copies of the supplemental material to states that are not Selected Jurisdictions.

5. The timelines contained herein may be postponed at the discretion of the Program Administrator in extenuating circumstances. The Program Administrator will notify the applicant and the Selected Jurisdictions of the new deadlines and the reasons for any postponement.

6. Each Participating Jurisdiction and any other state that wants to receive notices from the Program Administrator must provide and update the Program Administrator with the name, title, address, phone number, fax number, and e-mail address of one or more contact persons. The Program Administrator will maintain a list-serve or other electronic system to facilitate communication between such persons.

VII. DISCLAIMERS

1. Each Participating Jurisdiction is encouraged to use the following disclaimers in any letter issued under this policy:

a. The letter applies only to the party requesting it, and persons having similar fact situations should submit a separate request.

b. The letter is conditioned upon the specific facts set forth in the request and the accuracy of any representations that are required to be made under this Statement of Policy.

c. The conclusions are based upon current law, should not be regarded as precedent, and are not binding on any court, agency, or tribunal.

d. The letter does not preclude investors, other regulatory agencies, or other persons from asserting their rights under the law.

Hedge Fund Books and Records Requirement

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Hedge Fund Regulation May Include Rule 204-2

As we have discussed, hedge fund regulation legislation has been introduced as the Hedge Fund Transparency Act. This legislation calls for hedge funds to maintain such books and records that the SEC would require. It is likely that the books and records required by the SEC would be substantially similar to the records required for SEC-registered investment advisors. Those requirements are laid out in Rule 204-2 under the Investment Advisers Act. We have provided the full text of the rule below.

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Rule 204-2 – Books and Records to Be Maintained by Investment Advisers

a. Every investment adviser registered or required to be registered under section 203 of the Act shall make and keep true, accurate and current the following books and records relating to its investment advisory business:

1. A journal or journals, including cash receipts and disbursements, records, and any other records of original entry forming the basis of entries in any ledger.

2. General and auxiliary ledgers (or other comparable records) reflecting asset, liability, reserve, capital, income and expense accounts.

3. A memorandum of each order given by the investment adviser for the purchase or sale of any security, of any instruction received by the investment adviser concerning the purchase, sale, receipt or delivery of a particular security, and of any modification or cancellation of any such order or instruction. Such memoranda shall show the terms and conditions of the order, instruction, modification or cancellation; shall identify the person connected with the investment adviser who recommended the transaction to the client and the person who placed such order; and shall show the account for which entered, the date of entry, and the bank, broker or dealer by or through whom executed where appropriate. Orders entered pursuant to the exercise of discretionary power shall be so designated.

4. All check books, bank statements, cancelled checks and cash reconciliations of the investment adviser.

5. All bills or statements (or copies thereof), paid or unpaid, relating to the business of the investment adviser as such.

6. All trial balances, financial statements, and internal audit working papers relating to the business of such investment adviser.

7. Originals of all written communications received and copies of all written communications sent by such investment adviser relating to (i) any recommendation made or proposed to be made and any advice given or proposed to be given, (ii) any receipt, disbursement or delivery of funds or securities, or (iii) the placing or execution of any order to purchase or sell any security: Provided, however, (a) That the investment adviser shall not be required to keep any unsolicited market letters and other similar communications of general public distribution not prepared by or for the investment adviser, and (b) that if the investment adviser sends any notice, circular or other advertisement offering any report, analysis, publication or other investment advisory service to more than 10 persons, the investment adviser shall not be required to keep a record of the names and addresses of the persons to whom it was sent; except that if such notice, circular or advertisement is distributed to persons named on any list, the investment adviser shall retain with the copy of such notice, circular or advertisement a memorandum describing the list and the source thereof.

8. A list or other record of all accounts in which the investment adviser is vested with any discretionary power with respect to the funds, securities or transactions of any client.

9. All powers of attorney and other evidences of the granting of any discretionary authority by any client to the investment adviser, or copies thereof.

10. All written agreements (or copies thereof) entered into by the investment adviser with any client or otherwise relating to the business of such investment adviser as such.

11. A copy of each notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper article, investment letter, bulletin or other communication that the investment adviser circulates or distributes, directly or indirectly, to 10 or more persons (other than persons connected with such investment adviser), and if such notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper article, investment letter, bulletin or other communication recommends the purchase or sale of a specific security and does not state the reasons for such recommendation, a memorandum of the investment adviser indicating the reasons therefor.

12.

i. A copy of the investment adviser’s code of ethics adopted and implemented pursuant to Rule 204A-1 that is in effect, or at any time within the past five years was in effect;

ii. A record of any violation of the code of ethics, and of any action taken as a result of the violation; and

iii. A record of all written acknowledgments as required by Rule 204A-1(a)(5) for each person who is currently, or within the past five years was, a supervised person of the investment adviser.

13.

i. A record of each report made by an access person as required by Rule 204A-1(b), including any information provided under paragraph (b)(3)(iii) of that rule in lieu of such reports;

ii. A record of the names of persons who are currently, or within the past five years were, access persons of the investment adviser; and

iii. A record of any decision, and the reasons supporting the decision, to approve the acquisition of securities by access persons under Rule 204A-1(c), for at least five years after the end of the fiscal year in which the approval is granted.

iv. An investment adviser shall not be deemed to have violated the provisions of this paragraph (a)(13) because of his failure to record securities transactions of any advisory representative if he establishes that he instituted adequate procedures and used reasonable diligence to obtain promptly reports of all transactions required to be recorded.

14. A copy of each written statement and each amendment or revision thereof, given or sent to any client or prospective client of such investment adviser in accordance with the provisions of Rule 204-3 under the Act, and a record of the dates that each written statement, and each amendment or revision thereof, was given, or offered to be given, to any client or prospective client who subsequently becomes a client.

15. All written acknowledgments of receipt obtained from clients pursuant to Rule 206(4)-3(a)(2)(iii)(B) and copies of the disclosure documents delivered to clients by solicitors pursuant to Rule 206(4)-3.

16. All accounts, books, internal working papers, and any other records or documents that are necessary to form the basis for or demonstrate the calculation of the performance or rate of return of any or all managed accounts or securities recommendations in any notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper article, investment letter, bulletin or other communication that the investment adviser circulates or distributes, directly or indirectly, to 10 or more persons (other than persons connected with such investment adviser); provided, however, that, with respect to the performance of managed accounts, the retention of all account statements, if they reflect all debits, credits, and other transactions in a client’s account for the period of the statement, and all worksheets necessary to demonstrate the calculation of the performance or rate of return of all managed accounts shall be deemed to satisfy the requirements of this paragraph.

17.

i. A copy of the investment adviser’s policies and procedures formulated pursuant to Rule 206(4)-7(a) of this chapter that are in effect, or at any time within the past five years were in effect, and

ii. Any records documenting the investment adviser’s annual review of those policies and procedures conducted pursuant to Rule 206(4)-7(b) of this chapter.

b. If an investment adviser subject to paragraph (a) of this section has custody or possession of securities or funds of any client, the records required to be made and kept under paragraph (a) of this section shall include:

1. A journal or other record showing all purchases, sales, receipts and deliveries of securities (including certificate numbers) for such accounts and all other debits and credits to such accounts.

2. A separate ledger account for each such client showing all purchases, sales, receipts and deliveries of securities, the date and price of each purchase and sale, and all debits and credits.

3. Copies of confirmations of all transactions effected by or for the account of any such client.

4. A record for each security in which any such client has a position, which record shall show the name of each such client having any interest in such security, the amount or interest of each such client, and the location of each such security.

1. Every investment adviser subject to paragraph (a) of this section who renders any investment supervisory or management service to any client shall, with respect to the portfolio being supervised or managed and to the extent that the information is reasonably available to or obtainable by the investment adviser, make and keep true, accurate and current:

i. Records showing separately for each such client the securities purchased and sold, and the date, amount and price of each such purchase and sale.

ii. For each security in which any such client has a current position, information from which the investment adviser can promptly furnish the name of each such client, and the current amount or interest of such client.

2. Every investment adviser subject to paragraph (a) of this section that exercises voting authority with respect to client securities shall, with respect to those clients, make and retain the following:

i. Copies of all policies and procedures required by Rule 206(4)-6.

ii. A copy of each proxy statement that the investment adviser receives regarding client securities. An investment adviser may satisfy this requirement by relying on a third party to make and retain, on the investment adviser’s behalf, a copy of a proxy statement (provided that the adviser has obtained an undertaking from the third party to provide a copy of the proxy statement promptly upon request) or may rely on obtaining a copy of a proxy statement from the Commission’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system.

3. A record of each vote cast by the investment adviser on behalf of a client. An investment adviser may satisfy this requirement by relying on a third party to make and retain, on the investment adviser’s behalf, a record of the vote cast (provided that the adviser has obtained an undertaking from the third party to provide a copy of the record promptly upon request).

4. A copy of any document created by the adviser that was material to making a decision how to vote proxies on behalf of a client or that memorializes the basis for that decision.

5. A copy of each written client request for information on how the adviser voted proxies on behalf of the client, and a copy of any written response by the investment adviser to any (written or oral) client request for information on how the adviser voted proxies on behalf of the requesting client.

d. Any books or records required by this section may be maintained by the investment adviser in such manner that the identity of any client to whom such investment adviser renders investment supervisory services is indicated by numerical or alphabetical code or some similar designation.

1. All books and records required to be made under the provisions of paragraphs (a) to (c)(1)(i), inclusive, and (c)(2) of this rule (except for books and records required to be made under the provisions of paragraphs (a)(11), (a)(12)(i), (a)(12)(iii), (a)(13)(ii), (a)(13)(iii), (a)(16), and (a)(17)(i) of this section), shall be maintained and preserved in an easily accessible place for a period of not less than five years from the end of the fiscal year during which the last entry was made on such record, the first two years in an appropriate office of the investment adviser.

2. Partnership articles and any amendments thereto, articles of incorporation, charters, minute books, and stock certificate books of the investment adviser and of any predecessor, shall be maintained in the principal office of the investment adviser and preserved until at least three years after termination of the enterprise.

i. Books and records required to be made under the provisions of paragraphs (a)(11) and (a)(16) of this rule shall be maintained and preserved in an easily accessible place for a period of not less than five years, the first two years in an appropriate office of the investment adviser, from the end of the fiscal year during which the investment adviser last published or otherwise disseminated, directly or indirectly, the notice, circular, advertisement, newspaper article, investment letter, bulletin or other communication.

ii. Transition rule. If you are an investment adviser to a private fund as that term is defined in Rule 203(b)(3)-1, and you were exempt from registration under section 203(b)(3) of the Act prior to February 10, 2005, paragraph (e)(3)(i) of this section does not require you to maintain or preserve books and records that would otherwise be required to be maintained or preserved under the provisions of paragraph (a)(16) of this section to the extent those books and records pertain to the performance or rate of return of such private fund or other account you advise for any period ended prior to February 10, 2005, provided that you were not registered with the Commission as an investment adviser during such period, and provided further that you continue to preserve any books and records in your possession that pertain to the performance or rate of return of such private fund or other account for such period.

f. An investment adviser subject to paragraph (a) of this section, before ceasing to conduct or discontinuing business as an investment adviser shall arrange for and be responsible for the preservation of the books and records required to be maintained and preserved under this section for the remainder of the period specified in this section, and shall notify the Commission in writing, at its principal office, Washington, D.C. 20549, of the exact address where such books and records will be maintained during such period.

g. Micrographic and electronic storage permitted.

1. General. The records required to be maintained and preserved pursuant to this part may be maintained and preserved for the required time by an investment adviser on:

i. Micrographic media, including microfilm, microfiche, or any similar medium; or

ii. Electronic storage media, including any digital storage medium or system that meets the terms of this section.

2. General requirements. The investment adviser must:

i. Arrange and index the records in a way that permits easy location, access, and retrieval of any particular record;

ii. Provide promptly any of the following that the Commission (by its examiners or other representatives) may request:

A. A legible, true, and complete copy of the record in the medium and format in which it is stored;

B. A legible, true, and complete printout of the record; and

C. Means to access, view, and print the records; and

iii. Separately store, for the time required for preservation of the original record, a duplicate copy of the record on any medium allowed by this section.

3. Special requirements for electronic storage media. In the case of records on electronic storage media, the investment adviser must establish and maintain procedures:

i. To maintain and preserve the records, so as to reasonably safeguard them from loss, alteration, or destruction;

ii. To limit access to the records to properly authorized personnel and the Commission (including its examiners and other representatives); and

iii. To reasonably ensure that any reproduction of a non-electronic original record on electronic storage media is complete, true, and legible when retrieved.

1. Any book or other record made, kept, maintained and preserved in compliance with Rule 17a-3 and Rule 17a-4 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which is substantially the same as the book or other record required to be made, kept, maintained and preserved under this section, shall be deemed to be made, kept maintained and preserved in compliance with this section.

2. A record made and kept pursuant to any provision of paragraph (a) of this section, which contains all the information required under any other provision of paragraph (a) of this section, need not be maintained in duplicate in order to meet the requirements of the other provision of paragraph (a) of this section.

i. As used in this section the term “discretionary power” shall not include discretion as to the price at which or the time when a transaction is or is to be effected, if, before the order is given by the investment adviser, the client has directed or approved the purchase or sale of a definite amount of the particular security.

1. Except as provided in paragraph (j)(3) of this section, each non-resident investment adviser registered or applying for registration pursuant to section 203 of the Act shall keep, maintain and preserve, at a place within the United States designated in a notice from him as provided in paragraph (j)(2) of this section true, correct, complete and current copies of books and records which he is required to make, keep current, maintain or preserve pursuant to any provisions of any rule or regulation of the Commission adopted under the Act.

2. Except as provided in paragraph (j)(3) of this section, each nonresident investment adviser subject to this paragraph (j) shall furnish to the Commission a written notice specifying the address of the place within the United States where the copies of the books and records required to be kept and preserved by him pursuant to paragraph (j)(1) of this section are located. Each non-resident investment adviser registered or applying for registration when this paragraph becomes effective shall file such notice within 30 days after such rule becomes effective. Each non-resident investment adviser who files an application for registration after this paragraph becomes effective shall file such notice with such application for registration.

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (j)(1) and (2) of this section, a non-resident investment adviser need not keep or preserve within the United States copies of the books and records referred to in said paragraphs (j)(1) and (2), if:

i. Such non-resident investment adviser files with the Commission, at the time or within the period provided by paragraph (j)(2) of this section, a written undertaking, in form acceptable to the Commission and signed by a duly authorized person, to furnish to the Commission, upon demand, at its principal office in Washington, D.C., or at any Regional Office of the Commission designated in such demand, true, correct, complete and current copies of any or all of the books and records which he is required to make, keep current, maintain or preserve pursuant to any provision of any rule or regulation of the Commission adopted under the Act, or any part of such books and records which may be specified in such demand. Such undertaking shall be in substantially the following form:

The undersigned hereby undertakes to furnish at its own expense to the Securities and Exchange Commission at its principal office in Washington, D.C. or at any Regional Office of said Commission specified in a demand for copies of books and records made by or on behalf of said Commission, true, correct, complete and current copies of any or all, or any part, of the books and records which the undersigned is required to make, keep current or preserve pursuant to any provision of any rule or regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. This undertaking shall be suspended during any period when the undersigned is making, keeping current, and preserving copies of all of said books and records at a place within the United States in compliance with Rule 204-2(j) under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. This undertaking shall be binding upon the undersigned and the heirs, successors and assigns of the undersigned, and the written irrevocable consents and powers of attorney of the undersigned, its general partners and managing agents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission shall extend to and cover any action to enforce same.

and

ii. Such non-resident investment adviser furnishes to the Commission, at his own expense 14 days after written demand therefor forwarded to him by registered mail at his last address of record filed with the Commission and signed by the Secretary of the Commission or such person as the Commission may authorize to act in its behalf, true, correct, complete and current copies of any or all books and records which such investment adviser is required to make, keep current or preserve pursuant to any provision of any rule or regulation of the Commission adopted under the Act, or any part of such books and records which may be specified in said written demand. Such copies shall be furnished to the Commission at its principal office in Washington, D.C., or at any Regional Office of the Commission which may be specified in said written demand.

4. For purposes of this rule the term non-resident investment adviser shall have the meaning set out in Rule 0-2(d)(3) under the Act. [Editor’s note: There is no paragraph (d) to Rule 0-2. The term non-resident is defined in Rule 0-2(b)(2).]

k. Every investment adviser that registers under section 203 of the Act after July 8, 1997 shall be required to preserve in accordance with this section the books and records the investment adviser had been required to maintain by the State in which the investment adviser had its principal office and place of business prior to registering with the Commission.

Hedge Fund Registration Bill Announced

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Senators Grassley and Levin Introduced Bill Requiring Hedge Fund Registration

A new bill called the Hedge Fund Transparency Act was introduced today by Senators Chuck Grassley and Carl Levin. A press release from Grassley’s website explains the bill.

More to be forthcoming…

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For Immediate Release
January 29, 2009

Grassley and Levin introduce hedge fund transparency bill

WASHINGTON – Senators Chuck Grassley and Carl Levin introduced legislation today to close a loophole in securities law that allows hedge funds to operate under a cloak of secrecy.

The Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009 would clarify current law to remove any doubt that the Securities and Exchange Commission has the authority to require hedge funds to register, so the government knows who they are and what they’re doing. It would close the loophole previously used by hedge funds to escape the definition of an “investment company” under the Investment Company Act of 1940. Hedge funds that want to avoid the requirements of the Investment Company Act would be exempt only if they file basic disclosure forms and cooperate with requests for information from the Securities and Exchange Commission.

“There wasn’t much of an appetite for this sort of legislation before the financial crisis. I hope attitudes have changed and that Congress takes up this important legislation without delay,” Grassley said. “A major cause of the current crisis is a lack of transparency. The wizards on Wall Street figured out a million clever ways to avoid the transparency sought by the securities regulations adopted during the 1930s. Instead of the free flow of reliable information that markets need to function properly, today we have confusion and uncertainty fueling an economic crisis.” The bill introduced today is a version of legislation filed in two years ago by Grassley (S.1402) but never considered by Congress.

“Hedge funds control massive sums of money, and although they can cause serious damage to investors, other financial firms, and to the entire U.S. financial market, they are largely unregulated,” said Levin. “If the events of the last year have taught us anything, it’s that we need to regulate firms that are big enough to destabilize our economy if they fail. It’s time to subject financial heavyweights like hedge funds to federal regulation and oversight to protect our investors, markets, and financial system.”

Grassley said that Levin made an important addition to the transparency legislation in making clear that hedge funds have the same obligations under our money laundering statutes as other financial institutions. The bill introduced today would require hedge funds to establish anti-money laundering programs and report suspicious transactions.

The senators said their legislation is needed because of a 2006 decision by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals which overturned a regulation imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission requiring hedge funds to register. The court said the Securities and Exchange Commission was going beyond its statutory authority and effectively ended all mandatory registration of hedge funds with the Securities and Exchange Commission unless and until Congress takes action.

A summary of the legislation introduced today and floor statements by Grassley and Levin are below. The text of the bill is posted here. The bill will be referred to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.

Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009

Background: This bill is a revised version of S. 1402, which Sen. Grassley introduced in the 110th Congress. While the previous bill amended the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, this bill amends the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”). However, the purpose is the same: to make it clear that the Securities and Exchange Commission has the authority to require hedge fund registration. This version also adds a provision authored by Sen. Levin to require hedge funds to establish anti-money laundering programs and report suspicious transactions.

Hedge Fund Registration Requirements

Definition of an Investment Company: Hedge Funds typically avoid regulatory requirements by claiming the exceptions to the definition of an investment company contained in §3(c)(1) or §3(c)(7) of the ICA. This bill would remove those exceptions to the definition, transforming them to exemptions by moving the provisions, without substantive change, to new sections §6(a)(6) and §6(a)(7) of the ICA.

Requirements for Exemptions: An investment company that satisfies either §6(a)(6) or §6(a)(7) will be exempted from the normal registration and filing requirements of the ICA. Instead, a company that meets the criteria in §6(a)(6) or §6(a)(7) but has assets under management of $50,000,000 or more, must meet several requirements in order to maintain its exemption. These requirements include:

1. Registering with the SEC.

2. Maintaining books and records that the SEC may require.

3. Cooperating with any request by the SEC for information or examination.

4. Filing an information form with the SEC electronically, at least once a year. This form must be made freely available to the public in an electronic, searchable format. The form must include:

a. The name and current address of each individual who is a beneficial owner of the investment company.

b. The name and current address of any company with an ownership interest in the investment company.

c. An explanation of the structure of ownership interests in the investment company.

d. Information on any affiliation with another financial institution.

e. The name and current address of the investment company’s primary accountant and primary broker.

f. A statement of any minimum investment commitment required of a limited partner, member, or investor.

g. The total number of any limited partners, members, or other investors.

h. The current value of the assets of the company and the assets under management by the company.

Timeframe and Rulemaking Authority: The SEC must issue forms and guidance to carry out this Act within 180 days after its enactment. The SEC also has the authority to make a rule to carry out this Act.

Anti-Money Laundering Obligations: An investment company exempt under §6(a)(6) or §6(a)(7) must establish an anti-money laundering program and report suspicious transactions under 31 U.S.C.A 5318(g) and (h). The Treasury Secretary must establish a rule within 180 days of the enactment of the Act setting forth minimum requirements for the anti-money laundering programs. The rule must require exempted investment companies to “use risk-based due diligence policies, procedures, and controls that are reasonably designed to ascertain the identity of and evaluate any foreign person that supplies funds or plans to supply funds to be invested with the advice or assistance of such investment company.” The rule must also require exempted investment companies to comply with the same requirements as other financial institutions for producing records requested by a federal regulator under 31 U.S.C. 5318(k)(2).

Floor Statement of Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa

Thursday, January 29, 2009

Mr. President, three years ago, I started conducting oversight of the SEC. That oversight began in response to a whistleblower that came to my office complaining that SEC supervisors were impeding an investigation into a major hedge fund. Soon afterward, I came to this floor to introduce an important piece of legislation based on what I learned from my oversight. The bill was aimed at closing a loophole in our securities laws that allows hedge funds to operate under a cloak of secrecy. Unfortunately, that bill, S. 1402, was never taken-up by the Banking Committee in the last Congress.

In light of the current instability in our financial system, I think it is critical for the Senate to deal with this issue in the near future. Therefore, I am pleased that Senator Levin and I worked together to produce an even better version of the bill for the 111th Congress, which we are introducing today.

This new bill, the Hedge Fund Transparency Act, does everything the previous version did and a bit more. Like the previous version, it clarifies current law to remove any doubt that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has the authority to require hedge funds to register, so the government knows who they are and what they’re doing. It removes the loophole previously used by hedge funds to escape the definition of an “investment company” under the Investment Company Act of 1940.

Under this legislation, hedge funds that want to avoid the stringent requirements of the Investment Company Act will only be exempt if: one, they file basic disclosure forms and two, cooperate with requests for information from the Securities and Exchange Commission.

I want to thank Senator Levin for not only co-sponsoring this legislation, but also contributing a key addition to this new version of the bill. In addition to requiring basic disclosure, this version also makes it clear that hedge funds have the same obligations under our money laundering statutes as other financial institutions. They must report suspicious transactions and establish anti-money laundering programs.

One major cause of the current crisis is a lack of transparency. Markets need a free flow of reliable information to function properly. Transparency was the focus of our system of securities regulations adopted in the 1930’s. Unfortunately, over time, the wizards on Wall Street figured out a million clever ways to avoid transparency. The result is the confusion and uncertainty fueling the crisis we see today.

This bill is an important step toward renewing the commitment to transparency on Wall Street. Unfortunately, there was not much of an appetite for this sort of common sense legislation when I first introduced it before the financial crisis erupted. Hopefully, attitudes have changed given all that has happened since the collapse of Bear Stearns last March.

Hedge funds are pooled investment companies that manage billions of dollars for groups of wealthy investors in total secrecy. Hedge funds affect regular investors. They affect the markets as a whole. My oversight of the SEC convinces me that the Commission needs much more information about the activities of hedge funds in order to protect the markets. Any group of organizations that can wield hundreds of billions of dollars in market power every day should be transparent and disclose basic information about their operations to the agency that Americans rely on as their watchdog for our nations’ financial markets.

As I explained when I first introduced this bill, the SEC already attempted to oversee the hedge fund industry by regulation. Congress needs to act now because of a decision by a federal appeals court. In 2006, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals overturned an SEC administrative rule requiring the registration of hedge funds. That decision effectively ended all registration of hedge funds with the SEC, unless and until Congress takes action.

The Hedge Fund Transparency Act would respond to that court decision by: 1. including hedge funds in the definition of an investment company and 2. Bringing much needed transparency to this super secretive industry.

The Hedge Fund Transparency Act is a first step in ensuring that the SEC has clear authority to do what it already tried to do. Congress must act to ensure that our laws are kept up to date as new types of investments appear.

Unfortunately, this legislation hasn’t had many friends. These funds don’t want people to know what they do or who participates in them. They have fought hard to keep it that way. Well, I think that’s all the more reason to shed some sunlight on them to see what they’re up to.

I urge my colleagues to co-sponsor and support this legislation, as we work to protect all investors, large and small.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Floor Statement of Senator Carl Levin of Michigan (as prepared)

Thursday, January 29, 2009

Mr. President, history has proven time and again that markets are not self-policing. Today’s financial crisis is due in part to the government’s failure to regulate key market participants, including hedge funds that have become unregulated financial heavyweights in the U.S. economy. That’s why I am joining today with my colleague Senator Grassley to introduce The Hedge Fund Transparency Act.

Hedge funds sound complicated, but they are simply private investment funds in which the investors have agreed to pool their money under the control of an investment manager. What distinguishes them from other investment funds is that hedge funds are typically open only to “qualified purchasers,” an SEC term referring to institutional investors like pension funds and wealthy individuals with assets over a specified minimum amount. In addition, most hedge funds have one hundred or fewer beneficial owners. By limiting the number of their beneficial owners and accepting funds only from investors of means, hedge funds have been able to qualify for the statutory exclusions provided in Sections 80a-3(c)(1) and (7) of the Investment Company Act, and avoid the obligation to comply with that law’s statutory and regulatory requirements. In short, hedge funds have been able to operate outside the reach of the SEC.

The primary argument for allowing these funds to operate outside SEC regulation and oversight is that, because their investors are generally more experienced than the general public, they need fewer government protections and their investment funds should be permitted to take greater risks than investment funds open to the investing public which needs greater SEC protection. Indeed, the ability of hedge funds to take on more risk is the reason that many individuals and institutions choose to invest in them. These investors accept more risk because that might lead to bigger rewards.

The compensation system employed by most hedge funds encourages that risk taking. Typically, investors agree to pay hedge fund investment managers a management fee of 2 percent of the fund’s total assets, plus 20 percent of the fund’s profits. The hedge fund managers profit enormously if the fund does well, but due to the guaranteed management fee, get a hefty payment even when the fund underperforms or fails. The analysis up to now has been that if wealthy people want to take big risks with their money, all else being equal, they should be allowed to do so without the safeguards normally required for the general public. So what’s the problem with allowing their investment funds to operate outside federal regulation and oversight?

The problem is that hedge funds have gotten so big and are so entrenched in U.S. financial markets, that their actions can now significantly impact market prices, damage other market participants, and can even endanger the U.S. financial system and economy as a whole.

The systemic risks posed by hedge funds first became obvious ten years ago, in 1998. Back then, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a hedge fund that, at its peak, had more than $125 billion in assets under management and, due to massive borrowing, a total market position of roughly $1.3 trillion. When it began to falter, the Federal Reserve worried that it might unload its assets in a rush, drive down prices, and end up damaging not only other firms, but U.S. markets as a whole. To prevent a financial meltdown, the Federal Reserve worked with the private sector to engineer a rescue package.

That was just over a decade ago. Since then, according to a recent report issued by the Congressional Research Service, the hedge fund industry has expanded roughly tenfold. In 2006, the SEC testified that hedge funds represented 5 percent of all U.S. assets under management, and 30 percent of all equity trading volume in the United States. By 2007, an estimated 8,000 hedge funds were managing assets totaling roughly $1.5 trillion. The most current estimate is that 10,000 hedge funds are managing approximately $1.8 trillion in assets, after suffering losses over the last year of over $1 trillion.

In addition, over the last ten years, billions of dollars being managed by hedge funds have been provided by pension plans. A 2007 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the amount of money that defined-benefit pension plans have invested in hedge funds has risen from about $3.2 billion in 2000, to more than $50 billion in 2006. That total is probably much higher now. And while most individual pension plans invest only a small slice of their money in hedge funds, a few go farther. For example, according to the GAO report, as of September 2006, the Missouri State Employees Retirement System had invested over 30 percent of its assets in hedge funds. Universities and charities have also directed significant assets to hedge funds. The result is that hedge fund losses threaten every economic sector in America, from the wealthy to the working class relying on pensions to our institutions of higher learning to our non-profit charities.

A third key development is that, over the last ten years, some of the largest U.S. banks and securities firms have set up their own hedge funds and used them to invest not only client funds, but also their own cash. In some cases, these hedge funds have commingled client and institutional funds and linked the fate of both to high-risk investment strategies. These hedge fund affiliates are typically owned by the same holding companies that own federally insured banks or federally regulated broker-dealers.

Because of their ownership, size and reach, their clientele, and the high-risk nature of their investments, the failure of a hedge fund today can imperil not only its direct investors, but also the financial institutions that own them, lent them money, or did business with them. From there, the effects can ripple through the markets and impact the entire economy.

Take, for example, the June 2007 collapse of two offshore hedge funds established by Bear Stearns. Those two hedge funds were not particularly large, but were heavily invested in complex financial instruments tied to subprime mortgages. When the housing market weakened and mortgage-backed securities lost value, it wasn’t just the hedge funds that suffered losses. It was also a number of large financial institutions which had lent them money or entered into business transactions with them, including its parent company, Bear Stearns.

As Bear Stearns began reporting losses and market confidence in the firm began dropping, the Federal Reserve and Treasury Department helped broker a deal allowing JPMorgan Chase to purchase the company. As part of that deal, the government agreed to take over $30 billion in troubled assets off the books of Bear Stearns, hiring an asset manager and putting taxpayers on the hook for them financially.

But the problems didn’t stop there. Another financial institution, Merrill Lynch, had invested in the Bear Stearns hedge funds and also suffered losses. Those losses, when added to others, so damaged the company’s bottom line that, despite a promise of $10 billion in new capital from the Troubled Asset Relief Program or TARP, Merrill Lynch was viewed by the market as teetering on the brink of collapse. With the government’s encouragement, Bank of America stepped in and bought the company. As the extent of the Merrill Lynch losses became apparent, Bank of America itself began to lose market confidence. To counteract the Merrill Lynch losses, Bank of America wound up taking billions more taxpayer dollars under the TARP Program.

In the meantime, two managers of the Bear Stearns hedge funds were arrested on charges of conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud. Their cases have yet to go to trial. But prosecutors allege that as the hedge funds were losing value, their managers were telling investors a very different story. “[B]elieve it or not,” one of the financiers allegedly wrote in an e-mail to a colleague, “I’ve been able to convince people to add more money.”

The two Bear Stearns hedge funds offer a sobering set of facts, but they represent only a small part of the story. Other hedge funds are contracting or folding as clients demand their money back. To meet client demands, hedge funds are selling lots of assets, further weakening stock and bond prices. As one leading hedge fund owner, George Soros, testified before Congress in November: “It has to be recognized that hedge funds were … an integral part of the bubble which now has burst.”

Add on top of all that the Madoff scandal, and you’ve got to ask how anyone in their right mind could believe that the current regulatory exemption for hedge funds makes sense.

Four years ago, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) tried on its own to beef up its regulation of hedge funds. In December 2004, the SEC issued a rule requiring hedge funds to register under the Investment Advisers Act, comply with the related regulations, and file a public disclosure form with basic information. The rule took effect on February 1, 2006, and by June 2006, over 2,500 hedge fund advisers had registered with the Commission. However, on June 23, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the SEC rule on the basis that it was not compatible with the Investment Advisers Act. Despite the SEC’s asserting in the case reasons why hedge funds necessitated greater federal regulation and oversight, no further effort was made by either the SEC or the Congress to step into the breach.

As SEC Commissioner Luis Aguillar stated in a speech on January 9, 2009, the SEC “currently lacks tools in the hedge fund arena to provide effective oversight and supervision.”

It is time for Congress to step into the breach and establish clear authority for federal regulation and oversight of hedge funds.

That is the backdrop for the introduction of the Grassley-Levin Hedge Fund Transparency Act. The purpose of this bill is to institute a reasonable and practical regulatory regime for hedge funds.

The bill contains four basic requirements to make hedge funds subject to SEC regulation and oversight. It requires them to register with the SEC, to file an annual disclosure form with basic information that will be made publicly available, to maintain books and records required by the SEC, and to cooperate with any SEC information request or examination.

The information to be made available to the public must include, at a minimum, the names of the companies and natural individuals who are the beneficial owners of the hedge fund and an explanation of the ownership structure; the names of any financial institutions with which the hedge fund is affiliated; the minimum investment commitment required from an investor; the total number of investors in the fund; the name of the fund’s primary accountant and broker; and the current value of the fund’s assets and assets under management. This information is similar to what was required in the disclosure form under the SEC’s 2004 regulatory effort. The bill also authorizes the SEC to require additional information it deems appropriate.

In addition, the bill directs Treasury to issue a final rule requiring hedge funds to establish anti-money laundering programs and, in particular, to guard against allowing suspect offshore funds into the U.S. financial system. The Bush Administration issued a proposed anti-money laundering rule for hedge funds seven years ago, in 2002, but never finalized it. A 2006 investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, which I chair, showed how two hedge funds brought millions of dollars in suspect funds into the United States, without any U.S. controls or reporting obligations, and called on a bipartisan basis for the proposed hedge fund anti-money laundering regulations to be finalized, but no action was taken. Hedge funds are the last major U.S. financial players without anti-money laundering obligations, and it is time for this unacceptable regulatory gap to be eliminated.

Our bill imposes a set of basic disclosure obligations on hedge funds and makes it clear they are subject to full SEC oversight while, at the same time, exempting them from many of the obligations that the Investment Company Act imposes on other types of investment companies, such as mutual funds that are open for investment by all members of the public. The bill imposes a more limited set of obligations on hedge funds in recognition of the fact that hedge funds do not open their doors to all members of the public, but limit themselves to investors of means. The bill also, however, gives the SEC the authority it needs to impose additional regulatory obligations and exercise the level of oversight it sees fit over hedge funds to protect investors, other financial institutions, and the U.S. financial system as a whole.

The bill imposes these requirements on all entities that rely on Sections 80a-3(c)(1) or (7) to avoid compliance with the full set of the Investment Company Act requirements. A wide variety of entities invoke those sections to avoid those requirements and SEC oversight, and they refer to themselves by a wide variety of terms – hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capitalists, small investment banks, and so forth. Rather than attempt a futile exercise of trying to define the specific set of companies covered by the bill and thereby invite future claims by parties that they are outside the definitions and thus outside the SEC’s authority, the bill applies to any investment company that has at least $50 million in assets or assets under its management and relies on Sections 80a-3(1) or (7) to avoid compliance with the full set of Investment Company Act requirements. Instead, those companies under the bill have to comply with a reduced set of obligations, which include filing an annual public disclosure form, maintaining books and records specified by the SEC, and cooperating with any SEC information request or examination.

Finally, our bill makes an important technical change. It moves paragraphs (c)(1) and (7) – the two paragraphs that hedge companies use to avoid complying with the full set of Investment Act Company requirements — from Section 80a-3 to Section 80a-6 of the Investment Company Act. While our bill preserves both paragraphs and makes no substantive changes to them, it moves them from the part of the bill that defines “investment company” to the part of the bill that exempts certain investment companies from the Investment Company Act’s full set of requirements.

The bill makes this technical change to make it clear that hedge funds really are investment companies, and they are not excluded from the coverage of the Investment Company Act. Instead, they are being given an exemption from many of that law’s requirements, because they are investment companies which have voluntarily limited themselves to one hundred or fewer beneficial owners and to accepting funds only from investors of means. Under current law, the two paragraphs allow hedge funds to claim they are excluded from the Investment Company Act – they are not investment companies at all and are outside the SEC’s reach. Under our bill, the hedge funds would qualify as investment companies – which they plainly are — but would qualify for exemptions from many of the Act’s requirements by meeting certain criteria.

It is time to bring hedge funds under the federal regulatory umbrella. With their massive investments, entanglements with U.S. banks, securities firms, pension funds, and other large investors, and their potential impact on market equilibrium, we cannot afford to allow these financial heavyweights to continue to operate free of government regulation and oversight.

When asked at a recent hearing of the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee whether hedge funds should be regulated, two expert witnesses gave the exact same one-word answer: “Yes.” One law professor, after noting that disclosure requirements don’t apply to hedge funds, told the Committee: “[I]f you asked a regulator what … role did hedge funds play in the current financial crisis, I think they would look at you like a deer in the headlights, because we just don’t know.” It is essential that federal financial regulators know what hedge funds are doing and that they have the authority to prevent missteps and misconduct.

The “Hedge Fund Transparency Act” will protect investors, and it will help protect our financial system. I hope our colleagues will join us in support of this bill and its inclusion in the regulatory reform efforts that Congress will be undertaking later this year.

Another Ponzi Scheme

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Broken Record

I’ve said it all before. The following press release can be found here. Please see the following articles on hedge fund and investment advisor fraud.

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Hedge Funds, Congress and Madoff

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The Madoff scandal, which caught the SEC and savy institutional investors flat-footed, is increasing the pressure for more oversight and regulation within investment management and hedge fund industries. It is expected that Congress will be busy with this and other matters regarding regulation of the capital markets. In fact, Senator Chuck Grassley from Iowa recently announced his intention to require hedge fund registration at the SEC level.

In addition to Grassley, two more members of Congress are calling on greater oversight in the wake of the Madoff scandal. Specifically Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski from Pennsylvania and Congressman Spencer Bachus from Alabama are calling on the House Financial Services Committee to hold hearings on the Madoff scanal. I have reprinted the two notices below. We will continue to provide information on possible hedge fund registration as it comes forward. Related hedge fund law and registration articles include: Continue reading →