Tag Archives: SEC

Mallon P.C. Comments on Proposed Investment Adviser Custody Rule

In May we reported that the SEC was requesting comments on the new Proposed Investment Adviser Custody Rules.  The SEC’s comment period ended this past week with a flurry of activity before the submission deadline.  As we reported previously, there has been a general industry backlash against the rule because it does not provide any substantive protection for investors and creates significant additional costs for investment advisory firms – including the requirement of a surprise audit for those adviser which directly debit advisory fees from the client’s brokerage account.

Mallon P.C. participated in this discussion by submitting the following Comment on Proposed Investment Adviser Custody Rule.  Specifically we found that there would be no good reason to institute the rule as written and believe that it would harm small investment advisory firms disproportionately.  Additionally, we urged the SEC to consider alternatives to the proposed rule which would have more effective investor protections with less impact on the business aspects of the investment advisers who would be subject to the rule.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, or if you have questions about investment adviser registration with the SEC or state securities commission, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

Series 79 Exam Approved

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SEC Approves  New Exam for “Limited Representative” Investment Bankers

The long anticipated Series 79 Examination has finally received approval by the SEC, and information will now be made available to the public regarding the content of the exam, the modifications to the original licensure rules, and the scope and intent of the new rule in establishing the new “limited representative” classification among investment brokers. Information recently released to the public regarding the Series 79 is copied in full below, and can also be found here.

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Regulatory Notice 09-41 – Investment Banking Representative
SEC Approves Rule Change Creating New Limited Representative – Investment Banker Registration

Category and Series 79 Investment Banking Exam
Effective Date: November 2, 2009

Notice Type

  • Rule Amendment

Suggested Routing

  • Compliance
  • Continuing Education
  • Investment Banking
  • Legal
  • Operations
  • Registration
  • Sales
  • SeniorManagement

Key Topic(s)

  • Continuing Education
  • Investment Banking
  • Qualification Examinations
  • Registration
  • Supervision

Referenced Rules & Notices

  • NASD Rule 1022
  • NASD Rule 1032

Executive Summary

Effective November 2, 2009, amendments to NASD Rules 1022 and 1032 require individuals whose activities are limited to investment banking and principals who supervise such activities to pass the new Limited Representative – Investment Banking Qualification Examination (Series 79 Exam). Individuals who are registered as a General Securities Representative (Series 7) and engage in the member firm’s investment banking business as described in NASD Rule 1032(i)may “opt in” to the new registration category by May 3, 2010 (within six months of the effective date).

Frequently asked questions about registration as an investment banking representative are listed in Attachment A. The text of the rule change is set forth in Attachment B. Questions concerning this Notice should be directed to:

  • Philip Shaikun, Associate Vice President and Associate General Counsel, at (202) 728-8451;
  • JoeMcDonald, Director, Qualifications and Examinations, at (240) 386-5065; or
  • Tina Freilicher, Director, Psychometrics and Qualifications, at (646) 315-8752.

Background and Discussion

NASD Rule 1032(i) requires an associated person to register with FINRA as a Limited Representative – Investment Banking (Investment Banking Representative) and pass a corresponding qualification examination if such person’s activities involve:

  1. Advising on or facilitating debt or equity securities offerings through a private placement or a public offering, including but not limited to origination, underwriting, marketing, structuring, syndication, and pricing of such securities and managing the allocation and stabilization activities of such offerings, or
  2. Advising on or facilitatingmergers and acquisitions, tender offers, financial restructurings, asset sales, divestitures or other corporate reorganizations or business combination transactions, including but not limited to rendering a fairness, solvency or similar opinion.

The registration category does not cover individuals whose investment banking work is limited to public (municipal) finance or direct participation programs as defined in NASD Rule 1022(e)(2).  Moreover, individuals whose investment banking work is limited to effecting private securities offerings as defined in NASD Rule 1032(h)(1)(A)may continue to function in such capacity by registering as a Limited Representative – Private Securities Offerings and passing the corresponding Series 82 exam. Individuals whose activities require registration as an Investment Banking Representative will be required to pass the Investment Banking Representative Qualification Examination (Series 79) or obtain a waiver. FINRA has developed this exam to provide amore targeted assessment of the job functions performed by the individuals that fall within the registration category.

The exam will be required in lieu of the current General Securities Representative (Series 7) exam or equivalent exams1 by the individuals who perform the job functions described in the new registration category. Any person whose activities go beyond those of the Investment Banking Representative registration category must separately qualify and register in the appropriate category or categories of registration attendant to such activities.

Transition “Opt-In” Period

Beginning on the effective date of NASD Rule 1032(i) and ending May 3, 2010, six months following implementation of these requirements, registered individuals as well as new applicants whose job functions are described in Rule 1032(i) will be able to register as an Investment Banking Representative as follows:

  1. Currently registered representatives who have passed the Series 7 or a Series 7-equivalent exam
    Investment bankers who hold the Series 7 registration, as well as those who have passed and are registered with a “Series 7-equivalent exam”may opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration,2 provided that, as of the date they opt in, such individuals are engaged in investment banking activities covered by Rule 1032(i).3 Those individuals who choose to opt in will retain their Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent registered representative registration in addition to the investment banking registration. After May 3, 2009, any person who wishes to engage in the specified investment banking activities will be required to pass the Series 79 Exam or obtain a waiver.
  2. New Investment Banking Representative Candidates
    During the six-month transition period, FINRA will permit new Limited Representative – Investment Banking candidates to take either the Series 7 Exam, Series 7-equivalent exam (if eligible) or Series 79 Exam. Those who choose to take and pass the Series 7 Exam or Series 7-equivalent exam may then opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration.

Training Program Exception

Rule 1032 provides an exception for member firms that operate training programs in which certain new employees are exposed to the firm’s various business lines by rotating among departments, including investment banking. Specifically, Rule 1032(i) does not require an employee placed in such program to register as an Investment Banking Representative for a period of up to six months from the time the employee first engages in activities that otherwise would trigger the requirement to register as an Investment Banking Representative. This exception is available for up to two years after the employee commences the training program. Firms that wish to avail themselves of this exception are required to maintain documents evidencing the details of the training program and identifying the program participants who engage in activities that otherwise would require registration as an Investment Banking Representative and the date on which such participants commenced such activities.

Principals

The Series 79 Exam will be added to the list of representative exams that satisfy the prerequisite requirement for the General Securities Principal exam (Series 24). Note that the scope of the general securities principal’s supervisory responsibility will be determined by the representative-level exam passed. Individuals who wish to act as a general securities principal for activities requiring registration under Rule 1032(i)must obtain the Investment Banking Representative registration—either by opting in or passing the Series 79 Exam—and also pass the General Securities Principal exam. Such individuals will be limited to acting as a general securities principal for the investment banking activities covered by Rule 1032(i). Individuals who wish to function in the capacity of general principal for broader securities-related activities must take another appropriate qualification examination, such as the Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent exam, in addition to the General Securities Principal exam.

Individuals currently functioning as a general securities principal supervising investment banking activities as described in Rule 1032(i) have the same six-month period during which they may opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration. Those individuals who choose to opt in will retain their Series 7 or Series 7- equivalent registered representative registration in addition to the Investment Banking Representative registration. After the end of the opt-in period, individuals who wish function as a general securities principal overseeing investment banking activities covered by the rule change will be required to pass the Series 79 Exam to function as a general securities principal supervising investment banking activities pursuant to Rules 1022 and 1032(i).

Exam Content

The qualification exam consists of 175 multiple-choice questions. Candidates are allowed 300minutes (five hours) to take the exam. Candidates will receive an informational breakdown of their performance on each section of the exam, along with their overall score and pass/fail status at the completion of the exam session.

A content outline that provides a comprehensive guide to the topics covered on the examination and is intended to familiarize candidates with the range of subjects covered by the examination is available at the FINRA website.

Firms may wish to use the content outline to structure or prepare training material, develop lecture notes and seminar programs, and as a training aide for the candidates.
The examination questions are distributed among four major functions reflecting the overall knowledge, skills and abilities required of an investment banker. Detail on the content of each of these four major job functions, the tasks associated with the job functions and the knowledge necessary to perform the tasks is included in the text of the content outline. The allocation of test questions among the four major functions is described below:

Section                                                  Description                                          Number of Questions

1                                                     Collection, Analysis and                                              75
Evaluation of Data

2                                                      Underwriting/New Financing                                   43
Transactions, Types of Offerings
and Registration Of Securities

3                                                 Mergers and Acquisitions, Tender                               34
Offers and Financial Restructuring
Transactions

4                                           General Securities Industry Regulations                        23

Total                                                                175

The questions used in the examination will be updated to reflect the most current interpretations of the rules and regulations on which they are based. Questions on new rules will be added to the pool of questions for this examination within a reasonable time period of the effective dates of those rules. Questions on rescinded rules will be deleted promptly from the pool of questions. Candidates will be asked questions only pertaining to rules that are effective at the time they take the exam.

The test is administered as a closed-book exam. Severe penalties are imposed on candidates who cheat on FINRA-administered examinations. The proctor will provide scratch paper, an exhibits book and a basic electronic calculator to candidates. These items must be returned to the proctor at the end of the session.

The Investment Banking Representative Qualification Examination will be administered at test centers operated by Pearson VUE and Prometric professional testing center networks. Appointments to take the examinations can be scheduled through either network:

  • Pearson Professional Centers: contact Pearson VUE Registration Center at (866) 396-6273 (toll free), or (952) 681-3873 (toll number).
  • Prometric Testing Centers: contact Prometric’s National Call Center at (800) 578-6273 (toll free).

Registration Procedures

A Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer Form(FormU4) must be submitted to FINRA via Web CRD in order to register an individual as an Investment Banking Representative. For persons already registered with a firm who currently hold the Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent registration and who are opting in to the Investment Banking Representative registration category, the firm need only submit an amended FormU4 to request the Limited Representative—Investment Banking registration.

For new employees, a firm must submit a full FormU4 application to request the registration and any other documents required for registration. The exam fee is $265; the registration fee for new applicants is $85.

For new Investment Banking Representative candidates who choose to first take the Series 7 Exam or Series 7-equivalent exam during the opt-in period and then opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration, the firm must first submit a Form U4 to request the General Securities Representative or Series 7-equivalent registration.
Once the candidate has passed the Series 7 Exam or Series 7-equivalent exam, the Firm may then submit an amended FormU4 to request the Limited Representative— Investment Banking Representative registration.

Effective Date

The registration and qualification requirements for Investment Banking Representatives will become effective November 2, 2009. The six-month opt-in period will begin November 2, 2009, and end May 3, 2010.

Endnotes

1. The “Series 7 equivalent exams” and registrations are the Limited Representative— Corporate Securities (Series 62), the United Kingdom (Series 17) or Canada (Series 37/38) Modules of the Series 7.

2 The Web CRD registration position code for individuals who pass the Investment Banking Representative Series 79 Exam is “IB. ”The registration position codes for individuals who pass the Limited Representative—Corporate Securities Series 62 exam, Limited Registered Representative Series 17 exam and Canada
Modules of the Series 7 exam Series 37/38 exams are “CS,” “IE” and “CD/CN,” respectively.

3 No associated persons of a firm will be eligible to opt in unless the firm’s current Form BD indicates that the firm engages in investment banking activities.

Attachment A

FAQ About Registration as an Investment Banking Representative
General

Q 1: If I currently hold a Series 7 registration and am engaged in investment banking activities, must I take the Series 79 Exam to engage in a member firm’s investment banking business?

A 1: No, provided you opt in by May 3, 2010. Current Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent registered representatives who function in the firm’s investment banking business as described in NASD Rule 1032(i)may opt in to the Investment Banking Representative position without having to take the Series 79 Exam for a period of six months after implementation of the registration category. Such persons also will be able to retain their Series 7 or Series 7 equivalent registration.

Q 2: How do I opt in to the new investment banker registration category?

A 2: For persons registered with a firm who currently hold the Series 7 or Series 7- equivalent registration and who function in the firm’s investment banking business as described in NASD Rule 1032(i), the person’s firm need only submit an amended FormU4 to request the Limited Representative – Investment Banking registration. The submission must be made during the six-month opt in period (November 2, 2009 –May 3, 2010). The FormU4 will not reflect the new registration category until the start of the opt-in period.

Q 3: My firm has not yet developed a training program for the Series 79 Exam. Will I have to take the Series 79 Exam once it is implemented in order to get the Investment Banking Representative registration?

A 3: No, during the six-month transition period (November 2, 2009 –May 3, 2010), new Investment Banking Representative candidates who are in the process of qualifying for the new Investment Banking Representative registration category can take either the Series 79, the Series 7 or a Series 7-equivalent exam. A candidate who takes and passes the Series 7 Exam or Series 7- equivalent exam could then opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration.

Q 4: I plan on taking the Series 79 Exam to qualify for the Investment Banking Representative registration. If in the future I move into a different position
Within my firm, such as retail sales, will I need to take the Series 7 Exam?

A 4: Yes. The Series 79 Exam will qualify an Investment Banking Representative for only those activities covered under Rule 1032(i). If the representative engages in activities not covered by the Investment Banking Representative registration, such as retail or institutional sales, the representative will need to take the appropriate qualification exam, such as the Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent exam.

Q 5: I currently have a Series 7 registration. If I do not opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration during the opt-in period, but subsequently decide to become an investment banker, must I take the Series 79 Exam to get the Investment Banking Representative registration?

A 5: Yes. FINRA is providing a grace period of six months for Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent representatives who function in the member firm’s investment banking business as described in NASD Rule 1032(i) to opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration position. After May 3, 2010, persons who seek Investment Banking Representative registration will need to take and pass the Series 79 Exam, regardless of whether or not they have a Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent registration.

Q 6: I work at a small investment banking firm and engage in activities ranging From investment banking to institutional and retail sales. I have a Series 7 registration. How will this new exam and registration category affect me?

A 6: If you opt-in to the Investment Banking Representative registration position within the designated time period, you will have both the General Securities Representative and Investment Banking Representative registrations. Therefore, you would be able to engage in activities covered in both registration categories.

Q 7: I own a small investment banking firm and have employees that engage in activities ranging from investment banking to institutional and retail sales. These employees have a Series 7 registration. If I hire a new employee after the end of the opt-in period, how will this new exam and registration category affect this employee?

A 7: If the new employee engages in activities that fall into both the General Securities Representative and Investment Banking Representative registration categories, then he or she will need to take and pass both the Series 7 and Series 79 Exams.

Q 8: Will I be able to register as agent with a state after passing the Series 63 Exam if I have the Investment Banking Representative registration?

A 8: Yes (provided all of the other state requirements are met).

Q 9: Currently, for a candidate to qualify to register as agent and investment adviser with a state with the Series 66 Exam in lieu of the Series 63 and 65 Exams, the Series 7 Exam is required. Will the Series 79 Exam also allow me to qualify in those capacities with the Series 66 Exam?

A 9: No. States will continue to require the Series 7 Exam for use with the Series 66 Exam.

Test Administration

Q 10: Since the Series 79 Exam is a five-hour test, will I be allowed to take a break during the session?

A 10: The Series 79 Exam must be taken in one continuous, five-hour session. Candidates are permitted to take an unscheduled break during the exam session. However, the test clock will not stop while the candidate takes a break.

Q 11: Will I be allowed to use my own calculator during the exam session?

A 11: No. Series 79 Exam candidates are only allowed to use a basic electronic calculator provided by the testing center.

Principals

Q 12: I am currently a General Securities Principal supervising investment bankers. Do I need to opt in to the Investment Banking Representative position?

A 12: Yes. However, if you do not opt in prior to the end of the opt-in period, you will need to take and pass the Series 79 Exam in order to continue supervising Investment Banking Representatives.

Q 13: I plan on taking the Series 79 Exam. In the future, will I be able to qualify for the General Securities Principal registration category by taking and passing the Series 24 exam?

A 13: Yes, the Series 79 Exam will meet the prerequisite for taking the Series 24 Exam. However, such persons will be limited to acting as a general principal for investment banking-related activities and will need to take and pass another qualification examination, such as the Series 7 or Series 7 equivalent exam, to act as a general securities principal for broader securities-related activities.

Q 14: I am currently a General Securities Principal in a non-investment banking firm. If I do not opt in now and then move in five years to an investment banking Firm in which I will supervise investment bankers, will I need to take the Series 79 Exam?

A 14: Yes. The opt-in accommodation is available only to individuals who are currently functioning in a firm’s investment banking business. A General Securities Principal who qualifies via the Series 7 or Series 7 equivalent exam cannot act as a general principal for investment banking activities. Such person would need to take and pass the Series 79 Exam to do so.

Q 15: I currently hold a Series 7 registration and plan to opt in to the Investment Banking Representative position. If in the future I become a General Securities Principal by passing the Series 24 Exam, will I be able to supervise other securities-related activities including investment banking activities?

A 15: Yes. If you are eligible to opt in and do so, you will be able to supervise the firm’s investment banking activities upon passing the Series 24 Exam. In addition, because you also held the Series 7 position, you will be able to act as a general securities principal for broader securities-related activities.

Public Financing

Q 16: Are public finance offerings (municipals) covered on the Series 79 Exam?

A 16: No. Individuals who work on public finance offerings will continue to take the Series 7 or Series 52 Exams.

Q 17: I work on both corporate and public finance offerings. I have a Series 7 registration. How will this new exam and registration category affect me?

A 17: If you opt in to the Investment Banking Representative position by May 3, 2010, you can continue to engage in all activities without taking the Series 79 Exam.

Q 18: I plan on taking the Series 79 Exam to qualify for the Investment Banking Representative position. If in the future I want to work on public finance offerings, will I need to take the Series 7 or Series 52 Exams?

A 18: Yes. The Series 79 Exam will qualify you for only the Investment Banking
Representative position and activities covered under that registration position. If you begin to work on public finance offerings, you will need to take the Series 7 or Series 52 Exam.

Prerequisites

Q 19: Aside from satisfying the prerequisite for taking the Series 24 Exam, will the Series 79 Exam meet the prerequisite for any other exams that currently require either a Series 7 or Series 7 equivalent exam?

A 19: No. The Series 79 Exam will not fulfill the prerequisite requirement for the following exams:

Series 4 – Registered Options Principal
Series 9/10 – General Securities Sales Supervisor
Series 23 – General Securities Principal Sales Supervisor Module
Series 26 – Investment Company Products/Variable Contracts Principal
Series 39 – Direct Participation Program Principal
Series 42 – Registered Options Representative
Series 52 –Municipal Securities Principal
Series 55 – Equity Trader Limited Representative
Series 86/87 – Research Analyst/Research Principal

Continuing Education

Q 20: If I pass the Series 79 Exam and hold an Investment Banking Representative registration, will I still take the Regulatory Element S101 continuing education session?

A 20: Yes. A person holding an Investment Banking Representative registration will continue to take the Regulatory Element S101. However, in the future, FINRA is planning to modify the Regulatory Element to tailor it to certain types of job functions, such as investment banking.

Attachment B

Text of Amended Rule
New language is underlined; deletions are in brackets.

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1022. Categories of Principal Registration

(a) General Securities Principal
(1) Each person associated with a member who is included within the definition of principal in Rule 1021, and each person designated as a Chief Compliance Officer on Schedule A of Form BD, shall be required to register with the Association as a General Securities Principal and shall pass an appropriate Qualification Examination before such registration may become effective unless such person’s activities are so limited as to qualify such person for one or more of the limited categories of principal registration specified hereafter. A person whose activities in the investment banking or securities business are so limited is not, however, precluded from attempting to become qualified for registration as a General Securities Principal, and if qualified, may become so registered.

(A) Subject to paragraphs (a)(1)(B), (a)(2) and (a)(5), [E]each person seeking to register and qualify as a General Securities Principal must, prior to or concurrent with such registration, become registered, pursuant to the Rule 1030 Series, either as a General Securities Representative or [as] a Limited Representative-Corporate Securities.
(B) A person seeking to register and qualify as a General Securities Principal who will have supervisory responsibility over investment banking activities described in NASD Rule 1032(i)(1)must, prior to or concurrent with such registration, become registered as a Limited Representative– Investment Banking.
(C) A person who has been designated as a Chief Compliance Officer on Schedule A of Form BD for at least two years immediately prior to January 1, 2002, and who has not been subject within the last ten years to any statutory disqualification as defined in Section 3(a)(39) of the Act; a suspension; or the imposition of a fine of $5,000 or more for violation of any provision of any securities law or regulation, or any agreement with or rule or standard of conduct of any securities governmental agency, securities self-regulatory organization, or as imposed by any such regulatory or self-regulatory organization in connection with a disciplinary proceeding shall be required to register as a General Securities Principal, but shall be exempt from the requirement to pass the appropriate Qualification Examination. If such person has acted as a Chief Compliance Officer for a member whose business is limited to the solicitation, purchase and/or sale of “government securities,” as that term is defined in Section 3(a)(42)(A) of the Act, or the activities described in Rule 1022(d)(1)(A) or Rule 1022(e)(2), he or she shall be exempt from the requirement to pass the appropriate Qualification Examination only if he or she registers as a Government Securities Principal, or a Limited Principal pursuant to Rules 1022(d) or Rule 1022(e), as the case may be, and restricts his or her activities as required by such registration category. A Chief Compliance Officer who is subject to the Qualification Examination requirement shall be allowed a period of 90 calendar days following January 1, 2002, within which to pass the appropriate Qualification Examination for Principals.

(2) through (5) No change.
(b) through (h) No change.

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1032. Categories of Representative Registration

(a) through (h) No change.
(i) Limited Representative-Investment Banking

(1) Each person associated with a member who is included within the definition of a representative as defined in NASD Rule 1031 shall be required to register with FINRA as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking and pass a qualification examination as specified by the Board of Governors if such person’s activities involve:
(A) advising on or facilitating debt or equity securities offerings through a private placement or a public offering, including but not limited to origination, underwriting, marketing, structuring, syndication, and pricing of such securities and managing the allocation and stabilization activities of such offerings, or
(B) advising on or facilitating mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, financial restructurings, asset sales, divestitures or other corporate reorganizations or business combination transactions, including but not limited to rendering a fairness, solvency or similar opinion.

(2) Notwithstanding the foregoing, an associated person shall not be required to register as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking if such person’s activities described in paragraph (i)(1) are limited to:
(A) advising on or facilitating the placement of direct participation program securities as defined in NASD Rule 1022(e)(2);
(B) effecting private securities offerings as defined in paragraph
(h)(1)(A); or
(C) retail or institutional sales and trading activities.

(3) An associated person who participates in a new employee training Program conducted by a member shall not be required to register as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking for a period of up to six months from the time the associated person first engages within the program in activities described in paragraphs (i)(1)(A) or (B), but in no event more than two years after commencing participation in the training program. This exception is conditioned upon the member maintaining records that:
(A) evidence the existence and details of the training program, including but not limited to its scope, length, eligible participants and administrator; and
(B) identify those participants whose activities otherwise would require registration as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking and the date on which each participant commenced such activities.

(4) Any person qualified solely as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking shall not be qualified to function in any area not described in paragraph (i)(1) hereof, unless such person is separately qualified and registered in the appropriate category or categories of registration.

(5) Any person who was registered with FINRA as a Limited Representative-Corporate Securities or General Securities Representative (including persons who passed the UK (Series 17) or Canada (Series 37/38) Modules of the Series 7) prior to [effective date of the proposed rule change], shall be qualified to be registered as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking without first passing the qualification examination set forth in paragraph (i)(1), provided that such person requests registration as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking within the time period prescribed by FINRA.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, or if you have questions about the Series 79 or investment banking activities, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

SEC Announces New Short Sale Rules

One of the major regulatory pushes this year by the SEC has been to revamp the short sale rules.  Today the SEC announced some specific measures which are intended to curtail abusive short sales.  We will likely have more comments on this issue going forward and will publish hedge fund industry reaction.

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SEC Takes Steps to Curtail Abusive Short Sales and Increase Market Transparency
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2009-172

Washington, D.C., July 27, 2009 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced several actions that would protect against abusive short sales and make more short sale information available to the public.

“Today’s actions demonstrate the Commission’s determination to address short selling abuses while at the same time increasing public disclosure of short selling activities that affect our markets,” said SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro.

First, the Commission made permanent an interim final temporary rule, Rule 204T, that seeks to reduce the potential for abusive “naked” short selling in the securities market. The new rule, Rule 204, requires broker-dealers to promptly purchase or borrow securities to deliver on a short sale. The temporary rule, approved by the SEC in the fall of 2008, was set to expire on July 31.

Additional Materials

Rule 204: Amendments To Regulation SHO (Release No. 34-60388)

Second, the Commission and its staff are working together with several self-regulatory organizations (SRO) to make short sale volume and transaction data available through the SRO Web sites. This effort will result in a substantial increase over the amount of information presently required by another temporary rule, known as Temporary 10a-3T. That rule, which will expire on August 1, applies only to certain institutional money managers and does not require public disclosure.

Apart from these measures, the Commission is continuing to actively consider proposals on a short sale price test and circuit breaker restrictions.

Third, the Commission intends to hold a public roundtable on September 30 to discuss securities lending, pre-borrowing, and possible additional short sale disclosures. The roundtable will consider, among other topics, the potential impact of a program requiring short sellers to pre-borrow their securities, possibly on a pilot basis, and adding a short sale indicator to the tapes to which transactions are reported for exchange-listed securities.

Overview

Short selling often can play an important role in the market for a variety of reasons, including contributing to efficient price discovery, mitigating market bubbles, increasing market liquidity, promoting capital formation, facilitating hedging and other risk management activities, and importantly, limiting upward market manipulations. There are, however, circumstances in which short selling can be used as a tool to manipulate the market.

“Naked” Short Sales: In a “naked” short sale the investor sells shares “short” without first having borrowed them. Such a transaction is permitted because there is no legal requirement that a short seller actually borrow the shares before effecting a short sale.

But, before effecting a short sale, Rule 204T requires that the broker-dealer, as opposed to the seller, “locate” an entity that the broker reasonably believes can deliver the shares within three days after the trade — what’s known as T+3. Also, if reasonable, a broker-dealer may rely on a short seller’s assurance that the short seller has located his or her own lender that can deliver shares in time for settlement.

“Fails-to-deliver”: If an investor or its broker-dealer does not deliver shares by T+3, a “failure to deliver” occurs. Where an investor or its broker-dealer neither locates nor delivers shares, a “naked” short sale has occurred.

A “fail to deliver” can occur for legitimate reasons, such as mechanical errors or processing delays. Further, a “fail to deliver” could occur as a result of a long sale — that is the typical buy-sell transaction — as well as a short sale.

“Fails to deliver”, such as fails resulting from potentially abusive “naked” short selling, may have a negative effect on shareholders, potentially depriving them of the benefits of ownership such as voting and lending. They also may create a misleading impression of the market for an issuer’s securities.

Adopting Regulation SHO: Due to its concerns regarding persistent “fails to deliver” and potentially abusive “naked” short selling, the Commission adopted Regulation SHO, which became effective in early 2005. This regulation imposes, among other things, the requirement that broker-dealers locate a source of borrowable shares prior to selling short.

In addition, it requires that firms that clear and settle trades must purchase shares to close out these “fails to deliver” within a certain time frame, 13 days. This “close-out” requirement only applies to certain equity securities with large and persistent “fails to deliver,” known as threshold securities.

The requirement included two major exceptions: the so-called “grandfather” and “options market maker” exceptions. Both of these exceptions provided that certain “fails to deliver” in threshold securities never had to be closed out. The Commission eliminated both exceptions in August 2007 and September 2008, respectively.

Making Permanent A Rule to Curtail Naked Short Selling

Adopting Rule 204: The Commission has made permanent a temporary rule that was approved in 2008 in response to continuing concerns regarding “fails to deliver” and potentially abusive “naked” short selling. In particular, temporary Rule 204T made it a violation of Regulation SHO and imposes penalties if a clearing firm:

  • does not purchase or borrow shares to close-out a “fail to deliver”
  • resulting from a short sale in any equity security
  • by no later than the beginning of trading on the day after the fail first occurs (T+4).

Cutting Down Failures to Deliver: An analysis conducted by the SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis, which followed the adoption of the close-out requirement of Rule 204T and the elimination of the “options market maker” exception, showed the number of “fails” declined significantly.

For example, since the fall of 2008, fails to deliver in all equity securities has decreased by approximately 57 percent and the average daily number of threshold list securities has declined from a high of approximately 582 securities in July 2008 to 63 in March 2009.

Due to the success of these measures in furthering the Commission’s goals of reducing fails to deliver and addressing potentially abusive “naked” short selling, the Commission has made permanent the requirements of Rule 204T with only limited modifications to address commenters’ operational concerns.

Increasing Transparency Around Short Sales

In the fall of 2008, the Commission also adopted a short sale reporting interim rule, Rule 10a-3T. The rule requires certain market participants to provide short sale and short position information to the Commission.

The Commission made the rule temporary so that it could evaluate whether the benefits from the data justified the costs associated with the rule.

Instead of renewing the rule, the Commission and its staff, together with SROs, are working to substantially increase the public availability of short sale-related information through a series of other actions. These actions should provide a wealth of information to the Commission, other regulators, investors, analysts, academics, and the media.

Specifically, the Commission and its staff are working together with several SROs in the following areas:

  • Daily Publication of Short Sale Volume Information. It is expected in the next few weeks that the SROs will begin publishing on their Web sites the aggregate short selling volume in each individual equity security for that day.
  • Disclosure of Short Sale Transaction Information. It is expected in the next few weeks that the SROs will begin publishing on their Web sites on a one-month delayed basis information regarding individual short sale transactions in all exchange-listed equity securities.
  • Twice Monthly Disclosure of Fails Data. It is expected in the next few weeks that the Commission will enhance the publication on its Web site of fails to deliver data so that fails to deliver information is provided twice per month and for all equity securities, regardless of the fails level. For current fails to deliver information, see http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/failsdata.htm.

Hosting a Roundtable

Finally, the Commission also is examining whether additional measures are needed to further enhance market quality and transparency, as well as address short selling abuses.

As part of its examination, the Commission intends to hold a public roundtable on Sept. 30, 2009, to solicit the views of investors, issuers, financial services firms, self-regulatory organizations and the academic community regarding a variety of trading and market related practices. The roundtable will focus on issues related to securities lending, pre-borrowing, and possible additional short sale disclosures.

The roundtable panelists will consider, among other things, additional means to foster transparency, such as adding a short sale indicator to the tapes to which transactions are reported for exchange-listed securities, and requiring public disclosure of individual large short positions. Panelists will also consider whether it would be appropriate to impose a pre-borrow or enhanced “locate” requirement on short sellers, potentially on a pilot basis. Additionally, panelists will discuss issues related to securities lending such as compensation arrangements, disclosure practices, and methods of collateral and cash-reinvestment.

# # #

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-172.htm

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Other related hedge fund law articles:

SEC Supports Private Funds Transparency Act of 2009

Testimony Concerning Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Pools

The SEC released a testimony from Andrew J. Donohue before the U.S. Senate about the regulation of hedge funds and other private investment pools.  According to Mr. Donohue’s statement, securities laws have not kept pace with the growth market and thus the SEC has very little oversight authority over these advisors and private funds with regards to conducting compliance examinations, obtaining material information, etc primarily because these requirements only apply to those advisors  and entities registered with the SEC.  Because advisors to private funds have the option to ‘opt out’ of registration, they can easily bypass any monitoring and oversight. The Commission strongly supports the enforcement of the new Private Funds Transparency Act of 2009,* which attempts to close this regulatory gap by requiring advisors to private funds to register under the Advisers Act if they have at least $30 million of assets under management.  The Commission also notes that in order to be effective, the new regulatory reform should acknowledge the differences in the business models pursued by different types of private fund advisers and should address in a proportionate manner the risks to investors and the markets raised by each.

The various compliance requirements on advisors to private funds as set forth by this new legislation is outlined in the testimony, reprinted in full below.

*Note: this testimony was given the same day that the Treasury announced the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009 which is very similar to the Private Funds Transparency Act of 2009.

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Testimony Concerning Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Pools
by Andrew J. Donohue
Director, Division of Investment Management
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
July 15, 2009

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Bunning and Members of the Subcommittee:

I. Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name is Andrew Donohue, and I am the Director of the Division of Investment Management at the Securities and Exchange Commission. I am pleased to testify on behalf of the Commission about regulating hedge funds and other private investment pools.1

Over the past two decades, private funds, including hedge, private equity and venture capital funds, have grown to play an increasingly significant role in our capital markets both as a source of capital and the investment vehicle of choice for many institutional investors. We estimate that advisers to hedge funds have almost $1.4 trillion under management. Since many hedge funds are very active and often leveraged traders, this amount understates their impact on our trading markets. Hedge funds reportedly account for 18-22 percent of all trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Venture capital funds manage about $257 billion of assets,2 and private equity funds raised about $256 billion last year.3

The securities laws have not kept pace with the growth and market significance of hedge funds and other private funds and, as a result, the Commission has very limited oversight authority over these vehicles. Sponsors of private funds—typically investment advisers—are able to organize their affairs in such a way as to avoid registration under the federal securities laws. The Commission only has authority to conduct compliance examinations of those funds and advisers that are registered under one of the statutes we administer. Consequently, advisers to private funds can “opt out” of Commission oversight.

Moreover, the Commission has incomplete information about the advisers and private funds that are participating in our markets. It is not uncommon that our first contact with a manager of a significant amount of assets is during an investigation by our Enforcement Division. The data that we are often requested to provide members of Congress (including the data we provide above) or other federal regulators are based on industry sources, which have proven over the years to be unreliable and inconsistent because neither the private funds nor their advisers are required to report even basic census-type information.

This presents a significant regulatory gap in need of closing. The Commission tried to close the gap in 2004—at least partially—by adopting a rule requiring all hedge fund advisers to register under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”).4 That rulemaking was overturned by an appellate court in the Goldstein decision in 2006.5 Since then, the Commission has continued to bring enforcement actions vigorously against private funds that violate the federal securities laws, and we have continued to conduct compliance examinations of the hedge fund advisers that remain registered under the Advisers Act. But we only see a slice of the private fund industry, and the Commission strongly believes that legislative action is needed at this time to enhance regulation in this area.

The Private Fund Transparency Act of 2009, which Chairman Reed recently introduced, would require advisers to private funds to register under the Advisers Act if they have at least $30 million of assets under management.6 This approach would provide the Commission with needed tools to provide oversight of this important industry in order to protect investors and the securities markets. Today, I wish to discuss how registration of advisers to private funds under the Advisers Act would greatly enhance the Commission’s ability to properly oversee the activities of private funds and their advisers. Although the Commission supports this approach, there are additional approaches available to that also would close the regulatory gap and provide the Commission with tools to better protect both investors and the health of our markets.

II. The Importance and Structure of Private Funds

Private funds are generally considered to be professionally managed pools of assets that are not subject to regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”). Private funds include, but are not limited to, hedge funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds.

Hedge funds pursue a wide variety of strategies that typically involve the active management of a liquid portfolio, and often utilize short selling and leverage.

Private equity funds generally invest in companies to which their advisers provide management or restructuring assistance and utilize strategies that include leveraged buyouts, mezzanine finance and distressed debt. Venture capital funds typically invest in earlier stage and start-up companies with the goal of either taking the company public or privately selling the company. Each type of private fund plays an important role in the capital markets. Hedge funds are thought to be active traders that contribute to market efficiency and enhance liquidity, while private equity and venture capital funds are seen as helping create new businesses, fostering innovation and assisting businesses in need of restructuring. Moreover, investing in these funds can serve to provide investors with portfolio diversification and returns that may be uncorrelated or less correlated to traditional securities indices.

Any regulatory reform should acknowledge the differences in the business models pursued by different types of private fund advisers and should address in a proportionate manner the risks to investors and the markets raised by each.

III. Current Regulatory Exemptions

Although hedge funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds reflect different approaches to investing, legally they are indistinguishable. They are all pools of investment capital organized to take advantage of various exemptions from registration. All but one of these exemptions were designed to achieve some purpose other than permitting private funds to avoid oversight.

A. Securities Act of 1933

Private funds typically avoid registration of their securities under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) by conducting private placements under section 4(2) and Regulation D.7 As a consequence, these funds are sold primarily to “accredited investors,” the investors typically receive a “private placement memorandum” rather than a statutory prospectus, and the funds do not file periodic reports with the Commission. In other words, they lack the same degree of transparency required of publicly offered issuers.

B. Investment Company Act of 1940

Private funds seek to qualify for one of two exceptions from regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act). They either limit themselves to 100 total investors (as provided in section 3(c)(1)) or permit only “qualified purchasers” to invest (as provided in section 3(c)(7)).8 As a result, the traditional safeguards designed to protect retail investors in the Investment Company Act are the subject of private contracts for investors in private funds. These safeguards include investor redemption rights, application of auditing standards, asset valuation, portfolio transparency and fund governance. They are typically included in private fund partnership documents, but are not required and vary significantly among funds.

C. Investment Advisers Act of 1940

The investment activities of a private fund are directed by its investment adviser, which is typically the fund’s general partner.9 Investment advisers to private funds often claim an exemption from registration under section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, which is available to an adviser that has fewer than 15 clients and does not hold itself out generally to the public as an investment adviser.

Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act contains a de minimis provision that we believe originally was designed to cover advisers that were too small to warrant federal attention. This exemption now covers advisers with billions of dollars under management because each adviser is permitted to count a single fund as a “client.” The Commission recognized the incongruity of the purpose of the exemption with the counting rule, and adopted a new rule in 2004 that required hedge fund advisers to “look through” the fund to count the number of investors in the fund as clients for purposes of determining whether the adviser met the de minimis exemption. This was the rule overturned by the appellate court in the Goldstein decision. As a consequence, approximately 800 hedge fund advisers that had registered with the Commission under its 2004 rule subsequently withdrew their registration.

All advisers to private funds are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act, including an anti-fraud rule the Commission adopted in response to the Goldstein decision that prohibits advisers from defrauding investors in pooled investment vehicles.10 Registered advisers, however, are also subject to periodic examination by Commission staff. They are required to submit (and keep current) registration statements providing the Commission with basic information, maintain business records for our examination, and comply with certain rules designed to prevent fraud or overreaching by advisers. For example, registered advisers are required to maintain compliance programs administered by a chief compliance officer.

IV. Options to Address the Private Funds Regulatory Gap11

As discussed below, though there are different regulatory approaches to private funds available to Congress, or a combination of approaches, no type of private fund should be excluded from any new oversight authority any particular type of private fund. The Commission’s 2004 rulemaking was limited to hedge fund advisers. However, since that time, the lines which may have once separated hedge funds from private equity and venture capital funds have blurred, and the distinctions are often unclear. The same adviser often manages funds pursuing different strategies and even individual private funds often defy precise categorization. Moreover, we are concerned that in order to escape Commission oversight, advisers may alter fund investment strategies or investment terms in ways that will create market inefficiencies.

A. Registration of Private Fund Investment Advisers

The Private Funds Transparency Act of 2009 would address the regulatory gap discussed above by eliminating Section 203(b)(3)’s de minimis exemption from the Advisers Act, resulting in investment advisers to private funds being required to register with the Commission. Investment adviser registration would be beneficial to investors and our markets in a several important ways.

1. Accurate, Reliable and Complete Information

Registration of private fund advisers would provide the Commission with the ability to collect data from advisers about their business operations and the private funds they manage. The Commission and Congress would thereby, for the first time have accurate, reliable and complete information about the sizable and important private fund industry which could be used to better protect investors and market integrity. Significantly, the information collected could include systemic risk data, which could then be shared with other regulators.12

2. Enforcement of Fiduciary Responsibilities

Advisers are fiduciaries to their clients. Advisers’ fiduciary duties are enforceable under the anti-fraud provisions of the Advisers Act. They require advisers to avoid conflicts of interest with their clients, or fully disclose the conflicts to their clients. Registration under the Advisers Act gives the Commission authority to conduct on-site compliance examinations of advisers designed, among other things, to identify conflicts of interest and determine whether the adviser has properly disclosed them. In the case of private funds, it gives us an opportunity to determine facts that most investors in private funds cannot discern for themselves. For example, investors often cannot determine whether fund assets are subject to appropriate safekeeping or whether the performance represented to them in an account statement is accurate. In this way, registration may also have a deterrent effect because it would increase an unscrupulous adviser’s risk of being discovered.

A grant of additional authority to obtain information from and perform on-site examinations of private fund advisers should be accompanied with additional resources so that the Commission can bring to bear the appropriate expertise and technological support to be effective.

3. Prevention of Market Abuses

Registration of private fund advisers under the Advisers Act would permit oversight of adviser trading activities to prevent market abuses such as insider trading and market manipulation, including improper short-selling.

4. Compliance Programs

Private fund advisers registered with the Commission are required to develop internal compliance programs administered by a chief compliance officer. Chief compliance officers help advisers manage conflicts of interest the adviser has with private funds. Our examination staff resources are limited, and we cannot be at the office of every adviser at all times. Compliance officers serve as the front-line watch for violations of securities laws, and provide protection against conflicts of interests.

5. Keeping Unfit Persons from Using Private Funds to Perpetrate Frauds

Registration with the Commission permits us to screen individuals associated with the adviser, and to deny registration if they have been convicted of a felony or engaged in securities fraud.

6. Scalable Regulation

In addition, many private fund advisers have small to medium size businesses, so it is important that any regulation take into account the resources available to those types of businesses. Fortunately, the Advisers Act has long been used to regulate both small and large businesses, so the existing rules and regulations already account for those considerations. In fact, roughly 69 percent of the investment advisers registered with the Commission have 10 or fewer employees.

7. Equal Treatment of Advisers Providing Same Services

Under the current law, an investment adviser with 15 or more individual clients and at least $30 million in assets under management must register with the Commission, while an adviser providing the same advisory services to the same individuals through a limited partnership could avoid registering with the Commission. Investment adviser registration in our view is appropriate for any investment adviser managing $30 million regardless of the form of its clients or the types of securities in which they invest.

B. Private Fund Registration

Another option to address the private fund regulatory gap might be to register the funds themselves under the Investment Company Act (in addition to registering their advisers under the Advisers Act). Alternatively, the Commission could be given stand-alone authority to impose requirements on unregistered funds. Through direct regulation of the funds, the Commission could impose, as appropriate, investment restrictions or diversification requirements designed to protect investors. The Commission could also regulate the structure of private funds to protect investors (such as requiring an independent board of directors) and could also regulate investment terms (such as protecting redemption rights).

C. Regulatory Flexibility through Rulemaking Authority

Finally, there is third option that in conjunction with advisers’ registration may be necessary to address the regulatory gap in this area. Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict today what rules will be required in the future to protect investors and obtain sufficient transparency, especially in an industry as dynamic and creative as private funds, an additional option might be to provide the Commission with the authority that allows for additional regulatory flexibility to act in this area. This could be done by providing rule-making authority to condition the use by a private fund of the exceptions provided by sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act. These conditions could impose those requirements that the Commission believes are necessary or appropriate to protect investors and enhance transparency.13 In many situations, it may be appropriate for these requirements to vary depending upon the type of fund involved. This would enable the Commission to better discharge its responsibilities and adapt to future market conditions without necessarily subjecting private funds to Investment Company Act registration and regulation.

V. Conclusion

The registration and oversight of private fund advisers would provide transparency and enhance Commission oversight of the capital markets. It would give regulators and Congress, for the first time, reliable and complete data about the impact of private funds on our securities markets. It would give the Commission access to information about the operation of hedge funds and other private funds through their advisers. It would permit private funds—which play an important role in our capital markets—to retain the current flexibility in their investment strategies.

The Commission supports the registration of private fund advisers under the Advisers Act. The other legislative options I discussed above, namely registration of private funds under the Investment Company Act and/or providing the Commission with rulemaking authority in the Investment Company Act exemptions on which private funds rely, should also be weighed and considered as the Subcommittee considers approaches to filling the gaps in regulation of pooled investment vehicles.

I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

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Endnotes:

1 Commissioner Paredes does not endorse this testimony.

2 The National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) estimates that 741 venture capital firms and 1,549 venture capital funds were in existence in 2007, with $257.1 billion in capital under management. NVCA, Yearbook 2008 at 9 (2008). In 2008, venture capital funds raised $28.2 billion down from $35.6 billion in 2007. Thomson Reuters & NVCA, News Release (Apr. 13 2009). In 2007, the average fund size was $166 million and the average firm size was $347 million. Id. at 9.

3 U.S. private equity funds raised $256.9 billion in 2008 (down from $325.2 billion in 2007). Private Equity Analyst, 2008 Review and 2009 Outlook at 9 (2009) (reporting Dow Jones LP Source data.

4 Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333 (Dec. 2, 2004).

5 See Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

6 Section 203A(a)(1) of the Act prohibits a state-regulated adviser to register under the Act if it has less than $25 million of assets under management. The Commission has adopted a rule increasing the $25 million threshold to $30 million. See Rule 203A-1 under the Advisers Act. The threshold does not apply to foreign advisers. Section 3 of the Private Fund Transparency Act would establish a parallel registration threshold for foreign advisers, which would prevent numerous smaller foreign advisers that today rely on the de minimis exception, which the Act would repeal, from being required to register with the Commission.

7 Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides an exemption from registration for transactions by the issuer of a security not involving a public offering. Rule 506 of Regulation D provides a voluntary “safe harbor” for transactions that are considered to come within the general statutory language of section 4(2).

8 “Qualified purchasers” generally are individuals or family partnerships with at least $5 million in investable assets and companies with at least $25 million. The section 3(c)(7) exception was added in 1996 and specifically anticipated use by private funds.

9 Private funds often are organized as limited partnerships with the fund’s investment adviser serving as the fund’s general partner. The fund’s investors are limited partners of the fund.

10 See Rule 206(4)-8 under the Advisers Act.

11 Commissioner Casey does not endorse the approaches discussed in sections IV. B and C.

12 The Private Fund Transparency Act includes some important although technical amendments to the Advisers Act that are critical to the Commission’s ability to collect information from advisers about private funds, including amendments to Section 204 of the Act permitting the Commission to keep information collected confidential, and amendments to Section 210 preventing advisers from keeping the identity of private fund clients from our examiners.

13 For example, private funds might be required to provide information directly to the Commission. These conditions could be included in an amendment to the Investment Company Act or could be in a separate statute.

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Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  Mallon P.C. helps hedge fund managers to register as investment advisors with the SEC or the state securities divisions.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund or register as an investment advisor, please contact us or call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Series 79 Exam – Waiting for SEC Approval

Post courtesy of www.series79exam.com.

SEC to Shed Light on the New Series 79 Exam

Pursuant to a proposal set forth by FINRA in February of this year, it is anticipated that the Series 79 will be introduced as a simplified alternative exam for investment bankers. Prior to the introduction of this new exam, all registered representatives were required by NASD Rule 1032 to take the Series 7 exam. The proposal modified this Rule to condense the exam for those individuals whose activities are limited to investment banking. The primary reason behind the FINRA proposal for a new abridged exam was that the Series 7 exam covers a broad array of functions that do not pertain to the day-to-day activities of an investment banker.

On July 13, 2009 we contacted FINRA to determine what information, if any, has been released on the new Series 79 exam.  According to FINRA, the SEC has approved the proposal set forth by FINRA as of April of this year, but SEC approval on the content of the exam and related fees is still pending. Thus, there is limited information available to prospective exam takers regarding the proposed content of the exam, the timeline for required registration, the release of related study materials and/or course offerings, and related exam fees.  Once the SEC issues its approval, a formal press release will be issued to the public regarding the structure of the exam as well as an expected date as to when the modified NASD Rule 1032(i) will be enforced, thereby establishing the Series 79 as the new license requirement for investment bankers.

All information regarding the Series 79 Exam will be available on this site for prospective exam takers once it is formally approved by the SEC.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to  learn how to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

Hedge Funds with $25MM of AUM to Register Under Commissioner Aguilar’s Plan

SEC Commissioner Aguilar Proposes Registration For Funds with as little as $25MM of AUM

Just today I had an opportunity to review the transcript of a speech by SEC Commissioner Aguilar in which he advocates that funds with as little as $25MM of AUM should register with the SEC.  Such a low threshold for registration is troubling in a number of ways.  Most importantly is the impact registration would have on the SEC immediately and in the future.  As we have seen most vividly over the past year, the SEC is overextended and underfunded.  The SEC’s ability to adequately deal with the 9,000 to 12,000 hedge funds which would come under its jurisdicition is suspect.  Registration aside, how will an agency which was not able to sniff out a Bernie Madoff be able to oversee such a large industry without making it cost prohibitive for funds to operate?  The money required to oversee these funds is likely to be substantial and will probably not be coming from Congress which means the cost of such a regulatory and oversight system will likely fall onto the managers themselves and then of course to the investors.

As we talk about regulation of the hedge fund industry, there is also the question of regulatory resources. Any future registration of hedge fund advisers and/or hedge funds will require that the SEC receive increased resources to provide effective oversight. We will need to hire staff and implementing new technology to effectively deal with a large and complex industry. To that end, I have previously called for Congress to pass legislation establishing the SEC as a self-funded agency, similar to the way other financial regulators are funded — such as the Federal Reserve Bank, the FDIC, OTS and OCC. This would help to solve the problem.

To the extent that funds are registering and reporting to the SEC, I encourage Congress to couple the authority increasing the SEC’s jurisdiction with the appropriate self-funding mechanism to allow us to provide effective oversight.

This is not to say I am not against reasonable, reasoned and fiscally responsible oversight and regulation.  I believe that systemic stability is critically important for the long term viability of the hedge fund industry as well as the capital markets.  In this vein, I think that Aguilar’s statement below represents the type of structures which would contribute to increased stability while minimizing regulation where it is not necessary.

Perhaps a tiered approach to registration, based on a fund’s potential to affect the market, would make sense. At the lowest tier would be small funds. These funds could be subject to a simple recordkeeping requirement as to positions and transactions, kept in a standardized format, to permit the SEC to efficiently oversee their activities. As funds grow in size, different standards may be appropriate.

While I do not agree with many of the points regarding regulation the Commissioner discussed in the speech reprinted below, I do believe that the Commissioner does a good job at identifying issues which should be discussed publicly as regulators and industry participants move towards creating a reasonable regulatory regime.

Please feel free to include your comments below.

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Speech by SEC Commissioner:
Hedge Fund Regulation on the Horizon — Don’t Shoot the Messenger
by

Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Spring 2009 Hedgeworld Fund Services Conference
New York, New York

June 18, 2009

Thank you for that kind introduction. I am pleased to be here with you at the Spring 2009 Hedgeworld Fund Services Conference. This conference is timely given the current discussion regarding potential regulation of the hedge fund industry. Let me say at the outset, as is customary, my remarks today are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my fellow Commissioners or of the Commission staff.

My experience with the securities industry began in the late 1970’s. After three years with the SEC, I’ve spent the bulk of my 30 years as a lawyer focusing on the capital markets. Most of those years where in private practices in large law firms, although I spent most of the 90’s and the early part of this decade as General Counsel and Head of Compliance of a large global asset manager. While I’ve spent much of my professional career involved in capital formation though public and private offerings, a substantial portion has been spent working in the investment management industry, and I have worked with hedge funds.

As we all know, there has been much speculation about the impact of hedge fund activity on the broader capital markets. For example, there are questions about whether hedge funds may have contributed to the market turmoil and how hedge funds may have contributed to the demise of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and others. Additionally, it is also not clear whether the lack of oversight of the industry resulted in large amounts of risk to the market through the use of short sales and derivatives, such as credit default swaps.

This year’s conference takes place at a key moment in the history of hedge funds. While hedge funds have remained largely unregulated, this seems to be coming to an end. All over the world, legislators, regulators, investor groups, industry representatives and others are loudly calling for the industry to be regulated.

In the United States, the calls for regulation are motivated by concerns that market integrity has been harmed and that systemic risk arose as a result of the exemptions and exclusions from the federal securities laws that permitted a private market to thrive in ways that may have harmed the public markets. In fact, the market turmoil clearly demonstrated that the private fund market does impact the broader capital markets. This does not mean that all fund activity must be equally regulated, but hedge funds, especially large ones, are thought to require greater regulatory oversight.

My goal with my remarks today is to:

  • First, lay out a current state of affairs regarding the hedge fund industry;
  • Second, describe the calls for regulation of the industry; and
  • Third, discuss key considerations that need to be assessed as hedge fund regulation moves forward.

Multiple Voices Calling For Regulation

The hedge fund industry looks very different today than from where it started. Since the first hedge fund was organized by Alfred Jones in 1949 with $100,000, the industry has exponentially grown both in number of funds and in number of assets under management. In recent years, this growth has been fueled in part by institutional investors, such as endowments, foundations, insurance companies, and pension plans. To give you an idea of the growth, it is believed that the industry managed around $38 billion in 1990, $625 billion in 2002, and reached $1.9 trillion at the end of 2007, although that the number decreased to $1.3 trillion at the end of 2008. It is still incredible growth from the $100,000 start.

The industry’s growth, and the concerns over the impact of hedge funds on the marketplace, has created a renewed call for regulation in the U.S. and abroad. For example, the European Commission recently proposed to regulate the managers of hedge funds and all private equity funds with 100 million euros in assets under management. The proposed regulations would require extensive disclosure of risk management procedures and other aspects of fund governance.

In the U. S., a few years ago the SEC unsuccessfully attempted to regulate hedge funds. More recently, in March of this year, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner testified about his plan to more tightly oversee hedge funds. In addition, there recently have been at least a half-dozen bills introduced in Congress requiring regulation of the hedge fund industry. Just this past Tuesday, Senator Jack Reed introduced a bill that would require that advisers to hedge funds, and to certain other investment pools, to register with the SEC. And yesterday, of course, the Obama Administration released a draft white paper that, among other things, proposes that advisers to large hedge funds register with the SEC, and that very large advisers be subject to additional federal supervision by the Federal Reserve Board.

What are the concerns underlying the call for government oversight? I will tell you what we are hearing. The concerns touch on the classic financial regulatory interests: such as market integrity concerns, systemic risk concerns, and investor protection concerns. This state of affairs is what you would expect when markets are inextricably integrated and the impact of hedge funds is significant, but their actions and their risks are opaque. Simply stated, regulators, legislators and the public have little credible information as to who is out there and what they are doing.

Market Integrity Concerns

Let’s start with the SEC’s responsibility to maintain fair and orderly markets. One of the concerns about hedge funds involves how hedge fund operations impact upon the fairness and the integrity of the broader market. The lack of transparency and oversight over hedge funds gives rise to a number of concerns — for example, market integrity concerns about the nature and extent of counterparty risk, concerns about whether hedge funds engage in insider trading, and questions about how hedge funds drive the demand for derivatives, such as CDSs, as well as how they impact the demand for securitized products.

As a predicate for discussion, let’s be clear about the significant market activity of hedge funds. For example, hedge funds reportedly account for more than 85% of the distressed debt market, and more than 80% of certain derivatives markets. Moreover, although hedge funds represent just 5% of all U.S. assets under management, they account for about 30% of all U.S. equity trading volume. In 2006, there were estimates that hedge funds were responsible for as much as half of the daily trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange.

Because hedge funds are not subject to leverage or diversification requirements, hedge fund managers can more easily take concentrated positions that can impact the market. For example, an entire fund or even multiple funds advised by the same hedge fund manager can be invested in a single position.

In addition, hedge funds are major players in the capital markets for reasons other than trading activity. As this audience knows well, hedge funds have significant business relationships with the largest regulated commercial and investment banks — and act as trading counterparties for a wide range of OTC derivatives and other financing transactions.

Counterparty Risk Concerns

Clearly, for all these reasons and others, hedge funds are significant players in the capital markets. As significant players, hedge funds are one source of counterparty risk, and this risk can be amplified by their leverage and opacity.

Today, commercial banks and prime brokers are called upon to bear and manage the credit and counterparty risks that hedge fund leverage creates. Up until now, it has been assumed that market discipline would effectively prevent hedge funds from detrimentally impacting the capital markets or from posing systemic risk. A January 2008 GAO Report, however, identified several concerns with that theory.[1] For example, the report noted that hedge funds use multiple prime brokers and questioned whether any single prime broker has a complete picture of a hedge fund client’s total leverage. Accordingly, the stress tests and other tools that a prime broker uses to monitor a given counterparty’s risk profile only incorporate the positions known to that particular prime broker. Thus, no single prime broker has the whole picture.

The GAO Report also stated that some counterparties may lack the capacity to assess risk exposures because of the complex financial instruments and secret investment strategies that some hedge funds use.

Unfortunately, the GAO Report also indicates that counterparties facing these structural limitations may have also actively relaxed credit standards in order to attract and retain hedge fund clients in response to fierce competition.

In each of these instances, the risks of hedge funds are being externalized to the regulated market — prime brokers, banks, and their shareholders each were asked to bear the costs of managing hedge fund risks. A concrete example you may remember was when two Bear Stearns-sponsored hedge funds collapsed in 2007. Merrill Lynch, one of the prime brokers, had to absorb an enormous loss because it could only sell the funds’ collateral for a fraction of its purported value.

It’s been obvious that the regulatory oversight of hedge funds has not matched their level of market activity. This difference has led to other concerns affecting market integrity.

Risks of Insider Trading Create Market Wide Concerns

For example, in addition to concerns about counterparty risk, there have also been concerns about hedge funds engaging in insider trading. Clearly, there has been an increase in the number of insider trading cases brought by the Commission that have involved hedge funds. Admittedly, it is incredibly difficult for the Commission to assess the frequency of insider trading because of the opacity of hedge funds and the investments they make, especially in OTC derivatives. Moreover, when you couple this with the fragmented nature of the securities markets and the broad potential for hedge funds to obtain inside information, it is a tough oversight situation indeed. Hedge funds who participate in private placements, talk with trading desks, and maintain connections with the street are, in many cases, in a position to obtain inside information and to use it in a way that traditional surveillance may not detect. This potential for insider trading has been well publicized and public investors are concerned about the possible effects on market fairness and integrity.

Hedge Funds And The Demand For CDS and Securitized Products

Additionally, hedge funds were significant players in the exponential growth in the now much maligned credit default swaps market. As the market to create CDSs grew, there were funds that bought these instruments for reasons that made sense. For example, in 2005 there were hedge funds who noticed that the U.S. housing market was weakening and they bought CDS instruments on the protection buyer side. A logical move.

On the other hand, it is well known that the credit risk reflected by CDSs is equal to multiples of the actual credit risk of the underlying bond market. How did that happen? Many CDSs were heralded as hedging tools — they were supposed to transfer risk to parties that could bear it from parties that could not. Now we see only too clearly that this was not the case. Instead, many CDSs actually created risk, rather than hedged risk. Hedge funds that sought to create profits from leveraged risk may have played a crucial role driving the growth in these products.

Systemic Risks

The concerns about hedge funds and market integrity often go hand in hand with concerns about systemic risk. In their current form, hedge funds pose a systemic risk threat to our financial system in several ways. First, hedge funds have such significant assets under management that some fear that the loss of one or more large firms could potentially reverberate throughout the capital markets. In addition, if a counterparty fails to effectively withstand a hedge fund loss, then the failure of the counterparty could itself threaten market stability.

There is also the issue that can occur when several hedge funds take the same position, whether through coordination or simply through similar trading strategies. These funds can have a large impact on the market when they adjust their positions en masse.

Thus, the concerns that the lack of oversight over the hedge fund industry may present to market integrity and to systemic risks seem to be well founded.

Investor Protection

In addition to concerns about market integrity, the SEC is also responsible for investor protection. Given the increase in complaints from hedge fund investors this has taken on a more immediate importance.

One of the underlying principles behind the idea that hedge funds could operate with little to no regulatory requirements was that interests in the funds were only sold in private offerings to wealthy investors. These investors were thought to be sufficiently “sophisticated” to protect their interests, and to be able to engage in effective arms-length negotiation in order to achieve fair and equitable terms.

I firmly believe that truly sophisticated investors in private deals should be held accountable to the terms that they knowingly negotiate — and if an investment were to go bad, they should bear the loss.

However, with the recent market turmoil and the ongoing economic upheaval that has caused trillions in wealth to vanish, millions of jobs to disappear and the liquidation of over 1,500 hedge funds, serious concerns have been raised about whether these wealthy and sophisticated investors are truly able to protect their interests. There seems to be evidence that these “sophisticated investors” may not have fully appreciated the risks they were taking. Perhaps it may make sense for the definitions of who qualifies as “sophisticated” under our rules to be reconsidered. For example, maybe the criteria for sophistication should focus on more relevant attributes — such as focusing on actual investment experience.

In any case, recent events have challenged the assumption that investors and market discipline can be relied upon to control the risks of hedge funds. And this is not surprising. First, these investors are typically passive and there is no legal obligation for hedge fund investors to monitor hedge fund activity. Second, even if investors wanted to actively monitor the investment, the nature of hedge fund activity and the information available may not currently support such a role.

Valuation and Performance

For example, it may be impossible for an investor to know the actual value of a hedge fund’s portfolio. Hedge funds are not subject to reporting requirements and because many instruments held by a hedge fund are illiquid or opaquely-priced OTC products, any information that is reported could be hard to evaluate.

Related to the concern of how a fund values its assets, is a hedge fund’s performance information — another hard to evaluate metric for investors. Without regulation, the only performance information that hedge funds provide is voluntary.

This quote by Harry Liem, a pension consultant, seems to sum it up when he said “It’s like someone walking into a casino and saying ‘I want everyone to come forward and tell me how much you have won or lost.’ Probably only the winners will come forward . . .”[2]

Not Being Able to Redeem

There is also the issue of investors not being able to redeem their investments from a fund. In recent times, due to the large amount of redemption requests and the current lack of an ability to raise cash, there are hedge fund managers who have put up gates and have restricted investors’ ability to redeem their monies. Although gates can benefit investors by giving the manager more time to sell off portfolio positions, for some investors it appeared to be a surprise.

On top of that, several hedge fund managers froze funds but continued to charge management fees on money that investors cannot access. Orin Kramer, a hedge fund manager, described the situation by stating: “It’s like telling someone at a hotel that they can’t check out and then charging them for the privilege of staying.”[3]

Let me be clear. I’m not saying that these situations are per se illegal. To the extent that sophisticated and qualified investors agreed to provisions providing for gates and the ongoing charge of management fees, one could say that investors walked into these agreements with open eyes.

However, because for the most part hedge funds are not registered with the SEC, we are not able to adequately oversee how they are operating. Moreover, this lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess whether the relationship between an investor and the hedge funds adviser, is functioning in the manner that underlie the presumptions that led to the exemptions.

Some recent reports do tend to show that investors are beginning to take their own initiatives, and give some indication that what investors may be willing to agree to in the future may be different. For example, a recent memo from CalPERS stated that it would no longer partner with managers whose fee structures result in a clear misalignment of interest between managers and investors. Moreover, more investors are now asking that hedge funds run assets in “managed accounts,” where their money is held separately and the holdings are transparent.

As you may expect based on concerns including ones I have mentioned, hedge fund investors have been calling the Commission in unprecedented numbers

Increased Cases Involving Hedge Funds

In fact, the Commission has more investigations involving hedge funds than ever before, and the number of cases actually brought also is increasing. In the first 4 months of 2009, the Commission filed 25 cases related to hedge funds. In contrast, we brought 19 cases in all of 2008, 24 in all of 2007, and 16 in 2006. Our cases cover the waterfront, charging everything from offering fraud and insider trading, to misrepresentations about performance and to misrepresentations about the actual due diligence undertaken. We are also seeing more cases involving conflicts of interest and outright theft of assets

Nature of Regulation

I have just laid out for you some of the concerns that are generally driving the calls for greater regulation and oversight of the hedge fund industry. Maybe even more important, it appears that some of the assumptions justifying the industry’s exclusion from regulation and oversight may be on faulty ground. As a result, it seems certain that regulation of the hedge fund industry is coming. But here is the harder question — what should it look like?

There are a number of questions as to exactly how, and to what extent, hedge funds may have contributed to the economic crisis and how they contributed to the overall systemic risk of the financial markets. To that end, I applaud Congress and President Obama for providing for an independent, bi-partisan Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. By investigating and analyzing what happened, we can better assess whether the regulatory proposals should move forward.

Since coming to the Commission, I have been a vocal advocate for the Commission’s mission to protect investors, provide for fair and orderly markets, and promote capital formation. All aspects of this mission guide my thoughts as we consider the appropriate framework to regulate hedge funds.

Because of the size, complexity and market-wide impact of the hedge funds industry, potential regulation would need to be both comprehensive and flexible. Something not always easy to achieve.

I believe that the SEC must be an active participant in this process. Please remember that the SEC has been overseeing industry participants — such as, investment companies, investment advisers and broker-dealers — for over 69 years. The Commission staff has unsurpassed expertise in this area. Congress should take advantage of this expertise by providing the Commission with a broad mandate to oversee hedge funds. The Commission could then scale its regulation in a flexible manner to deal with the regulatory concerns of market integrity, investor protection, and, in coordination with other regulators, systemic risk.

Working with hedge fund advisers and with hedge fund investors, I am confident that we can find an appropriate balance.

As you know, there has been a general discussion over whether hedge fund advisers and/or hedge funds should register. In my mind, hedge funds advisers with over $25 million in assets should register with the Commission, but that may not be enough. Many hedge fund advisers are currently registered with the SEC but we still lack a complete picture of what is going on in the industry. Some have suggested that hedge funds should also register. Others have suggested that it may be appropriate to apply limited concepts from within the Investment Company Act of 1940 to hedge funds — what some have called a “40 Act-lite” regime.

Perhaps a tiered approach to registration, based on a fund’s potential to affect the market, would make sense. At the lowest tier would be small funds. These funds could be subject to a simple recordkeeping requirement as to positions and transactions, kept in a standardized format, to permit the SEC to efficiently oversee their activities. As funds grow in size, different standards may be appropriate.

For funds that could significantly affect the market, it may be appropriate to require more than recordkeeping. For example, it may be appropriate to think through whether some of the risk limitation concepts built into the Investment Company Act make sense to apply to these hedge funds — such as imposing limits on leverage.

Of course, these are only a few suggestions. Many others have been made — and others will follow — as the discussion turns from “whether to regulate” to “how to regulate.” The nature of the business of hedge funds is trading, and this necessarily requires interaction with the public marketplace — and the larger the investment fund, the greater the potential impact on the overall capital markets. When the hedge industry has the ability to significantly impact the market or other market participants, the public interest needs to be protected. A lesson of this economic crisis is that the U.S. regulatory interest in hedge funds arises because of the impact of the funds on the financial market, regardless of the sophistication of its investors or the number of investors.

When discussing “how to regulate,” it is clear to me that regulation is more than the bare requirements of registering and reporting — it should also include inspection authority. To have a chance to prevent problems before they occur, the SEC has to be able to inspect all hedge fund advisers, and the funds that they manage, and otherwise engage in oversight through surveillance systems. The public expects nothing less.

Greater Resources to SEC to Provide Effective Oversight

As we talk about regulation of the hedge fund industry, there is also the question of regulatory resources. Any future registration of hedge fund advisers and/or hedge funds will require that the SEC receive increased resources to provide effective oversight. We will need to hire staff and implementing new technology to effectively deal with a large and complex industry. To that end, I have previously called for Congress to pass legislation establishing the SEC as a self-funded agency, similar to the way other financial regulators are funded — such as the Federal Reserve Bank, the FDIC, OTS and OCC. This would help to solve the problem.

To the extent that funds are registering and reporting to the SEC, I encourage Congress to couple the authority increasing the SEC’s jurisdiction with the appropriate self-funding mechanism to allow us to provide effective oversight.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I am confident that regulation of the hedge fund industry can be done right — in a way that balances the needs of the industry with the needs of investors and the needs of the market. And if it is, it will be a good thing for all of us. The Congressional Oversight Panel’s Special Report on Regulatory Reform4 said it best with the following summary:

“By limiting the opportunities for deception and allowing for the necessary trust to develop between interconnected parties, regulation can enhance the vitality of the markets. Historically, new regulation has served that role.
For example, as the money manager Martin Whitman has observed, far from stifling the markets, the new regulations of the Investment Company Act enabled the targeted industry to flourish:

“’Without strict regulation, I doubt that our industry could have grown as it has grown, and also be as prosperous as it is for money managers. Because of the existence of strict regulation, the outside investor knows that money managers can be trusted. Without that trust, the industry likely would not have grown the way it had grown.’”[5]

The lack of transparency, potential imbalance of power between investors and managers, and impact on the entire capital market are driving the calls to regulate the hedge fund industry. The hedge fund industry has a lot to offer in determining how these calls are answered. Addressing these issues in an intelligent and rational manner is important, and ultimately will result in a stronger and more vibrant hedge fund industry. I welcome the ongoing discussion.

Thank you for inviting me here today.

Endnotes

[1] GAO Report: Regulators and Market Participants Are Taking Steps to Strengthen Market Discipline, but Continued Attention is Needed. January 2008. pg 27.

[2] Why people love to hate those risky hedge funds; An investment option that only the super rich can afford, by Naomi Rovnick. South China Morning Post Ltd. March 1, 2009.

[3] Hedge Funds, Unhinged by Louise Story. New York Times. January 18, 2009.

[4] Congressional Oversight Panel’s Special Report on Regulatory Reform: Modernizing the American Financial Regulatory System: Recommendations for Improving Oversight, Protecting Consumers, and Ensuring Stability. January 2009. pgs 18-19

[5] Letter from Third Avenue Funds Chairman of the Board Martin J. Whitman to Sharheolders, at 6 (Oct. 31, 2005) (online at www.thirdavenuefunds.com/ta/documents/sl/shareholderletters-05Q4.pdf).

http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061809laa.htm

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to  learn how to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009

As part of the new Obama financial regulation plan, which includes potentially the registration of hedge fund managers with the SEC, the Whitehouse has sent a draft to congress of the new Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 (CFPAA of 2009).  The act would create a new government agency which would have some interaction with both the SEC and the CFTC.  A full version of the draft can be found here: Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009.  Additionally, you can find President Obama’s statement with regard to this new agency reprinted below.  For more information, please also see Jim Hamilton’s website.

More posts about this new act and what it will mean to hedge funds will be forthcoming.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
EMBARGOED UNTIL 6:00 AM ET,

SATURDAY, June 20, 2009

WEEKLY ADDRESS: President Obama Highlights Tough New Consumer Protections

WASHINGTON – In his weekly address, President Barack Obama explained the necessity of his proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency.  It is clear that one of the major causes of the current economic crisis was a breakdown of oversight leading to widespread abuses in the financial world.  The Consumer Financial Protection Agency will have the sole job of looking out for the financial interests of ordinary Americans by banning unfair practices and enforcing the rules.  This is the type of reform that will attack the causes of the current crisis and prevent further crises from taking place.

The audio and video will be available at 6:00am Saturday, June 20, 2009 at www.whitehouse.gov.

Prepared Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
June 20, 2009

As we continue to recover from an historic economic crisis, it is clear to everyone that one of its major causes was a breakdown in oversight that led to widespread abuses in the financial system. An epidemic of irresponsibility took hold from Wall Street to Washington to Main Street.  And the consequences have been disastrous. Millions of Americans have seen their life savings erode; families have been devastated by job losses; businesses large and small have closed their doors.

In response, this week, my administration proposed a set of major reforms to the rules that govern our financial system; to attack the causes of this crisis and to prevent future crises from taking place; to ensure that our markets can work fairly and freely for businesses and consumers alike.

We are going to promote markets that work for those who play by the rules. We’re going to stand up for a system in which fair dealing and honest competition are the only way to win. We’re going to level the playing field for consumers. And we’re going to have the kinds of rules that encourage innovations that make our economy stronger – not those that allow insiders to exploit its weaknesses for their own gain.

And one of the most important proposals is a new oversight agency called the Consumer Financial Protection Agency. It’s charged with just one job: looking out for the interests of ordinary Americans in the financial system. This is essential, for this crisis may have started on Wall Street.  But its impacts have been felt by ordinary Americans who rely on credit cards, home loans, and other financial instruments.

It is true that this crisis was caused in part by Americans who took on too much debt and took out loans they simply could not afford. But there are also millions of Americans who signed contracts they did not always understand offered by lenders who did not always tell the truth. Today, folks signing up for a mortgage, student loan, or credit card face a bewildering array of incomprehensible options. Companies compete not by offering better products, but more complicated ones – with more fine print and hidden terms.  It’s no coincidence that the lack of strong consumer protections led to abuses against consumers; the lack of rules to stop deceptive lending practices led to abuses against borrowers.

This new agency will have the responsibility to change that. It will have the power to set tough new rules so that companies compete by offering innovative products that consumers actually want – and actually understand. Those ridiculous contracts – pages of fine print that no one can figure out – will be a thing of the past. You’ll be able to compare products – with descriptions in plain language – to see what is best for you.  The most unfair practices will be banned. The rules will be enforced.

Some argue that these changes – and the many others we’ve called for – go too far. And I welcome a debate about how we can make sure our regulations work for businesses and consumers. But what I will not accept – what I will vigorously oppose – are those who do not argue in good faith. Those who would defend the status quo at any cost. Those who put their narrow interests ahead of the interests of ordinary Americans. We’ve already begun to see special interests mobilizing against change.

That’s not surprising. That’s Washington.

For these are interests that have benefited from a system which allowed ordinary Americans to be exploited. These interests argue against reform even as millions of people are facing the consequences of this crisis in their own lives. These interests defend business-as-usual even though we know that it was business-as-usual that allowed this crisis to take place.

Well, the American people did not send me to Washington to give in to the special interests; the American people sent me to Washington to stand up for their interests.  And while I’m not spoiling for a fight, I’m ready for one. The most important thing we can do to put this era of irresponsibility in the past is to take responsibility now. That is why my administration will accept no less than real and lasting change to the way business is done – on Wall Street and in Washington. We will do what is necessary to end this crisis – and we will do what it takes to prevent this kind of crisis from ever happening again.

Thank you.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to  learn how to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

Form U4 and Form U5 | Information About the Uniform Registration Forms for Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisors

Purpose of the Forms and Discussion of Recently Approved Changes & Requirements

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), is the largest independent regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States, and is the entity designated as the filing depository by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for purposes of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.  There are currently six different Uniform Registration Forms that are used to file information with FINRA. The Form U4 (Uniform Application for Broker-Dealer Registration) and the Form U5 (Uniform Termination Notice for Security Industry Registration) are used by broker-dealers to register, and terminate the registrations of, associated persons with self-regulatory organizations (SROs), and jurisdictions.

Representatives of broker-dealers and investment advisers use Form U4 to register with the states and with self-regulatory organizations (e.g., FINRA). Forms are filed electronically by their employing firms using the Central Registration Depository (Web CRD or IARD). Broker-dealer agents and investment adviser representatives have an obligation to update previously filed Forms U4 with any new information required to be disclosed. FINRA makes information filed on Form U4 publicly available through its BrokerCheck program.

Broker-dealers and investment advisers use Form U5 to terminate a representative’s registration in a particular jurisdiction or with a particular self-regulatory organization. Firms terminating the registration of an associated person must respond to a series of disclosure questions. Firms also have the obligation to update previously filed Forms U5 if they become aware of new disclosure information.

As discussed above, Form U4 and Form U5 filings (initial applications. termination notices, and amendments) will generally be made electronically through Web CRD or IARD. However, some individuals may need to file the form on paper, including: agents of issuers, certain persons filing with stock exchanges, and certain investment adviser representatives. In addition, NASD Rule 1013 requires the submission of certain paper Forms U4 along with an initial membership application.

The SEC recently approved amendments to Forms U4 and U5 that were proposed by FINRA that call for significant changes to disclosure questions on the Forms, including the addition of questions about certain regulatory actions. The new  amendments to the Forms include:

  • New regulatory action questions that will enable FINRA and other regulators to identify more readily persons subject to a particular category of “statutory disqualification” under the federal securities laws and the FINRA By-Laws. Among the items that would cause a person to become subject to a statutory disqualification are “willful” violations of the federal securities laws, the Commodity Exchange Act, or the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. Under the proposed rule changes, both Forms U4 and U5 would be amended to add questions requiring disclosure of findings of “willful” violations.
  • New questions that require firms to report allegations of sales practice violations made against a registered person in an arbitration or litigation in which the registered person is not a named party. Under the new amendment, reporting would be required if the registered person was either named in or could reasonably be identified from the body of the arbitration claim or civil litigation as a registered person who was involved in one or more of the alleged sales practice violations.
  • An increase in the monetary threshold for reporting settlements of customer complaints, arbitrations or litigation from $10,000 to $15,000.
  • The clarification that the date to be provided by a firm in the “date of termination” field is the “date the firm terminated the individual’s association with the firm in a capacity for which registration is required.” Under the new amendment, a firm would be permitted to change the date of and reason for termination, but would be required to state a reason for the change.

The revised Forms were implemented in Web CRD on May 18, 2009. The effective date for most of these changes  is May 18, 2009 (the “release date”). The effective date for the new regulatory action disclosure questions will be 180 days from the release date, or November 14, 2009.

Key Items Regarding the Forms Changes:

Invalidation of Pending Form Filings Upon Web CRD System Shutdown:

  • Implementation of the revised “form versions” will cause all pending (in-process) Form U4 and U5 filings that are not submitted to Web CRD prior to system shutdown on Friday, May 15, 2009, to become invalidated (i.e., converted to a read-only mode). Firm users that still need to submit the information on those invalidated filings will need to recreate the filings using the new forms.

Form U4 Amendments Required:

  • All registered persons are required to answer new regulatory action disclosure summary questions the next time they file a Form U4 amendment or no later than 180 days following the release date.

Copies of the revised Forms and instructions are available here.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Congress and Regulators Discuss OTC Derivatives Regulation

Increased regulation looming as SEC and CFTC jockey for position

The  severe financial crisis that has unfolded over the last two years has revealed serious weaknesses in the structure of U.S. financial regulation, as well as the pressing need for a comprehensive regulatory framework.  Part of President Obama’s new financial regulation plan is to regulate the over the counter (OTC) derivatives markets.  On June 22nd, 2009, both the SEC and CFTC testified to congress regarding the regulation of these markets.

Chairman Mary Shapiro (SEC) and Chairman Gary Gensler (CTFC) each testified before Congress to address the existing gaps in regulatory oversight of these securities-related OTC derivatives, and propose a new framework that would provide expand regulatory authority of the CTFC and SEC to oversee the OTC markets. The primary goal of the proposed regulatory reform measures is to achieve the following four primary objectives:

  1. preventing activities in the OTC derivatives markets from posing risk to the financial system;
  2. promoting efficiency and transparency of those markets;
  3. preventing market manipulation, fraud, and other market abuses; and
  4. ensuring that OTC derivatives are not marketed inappropriately to unsophisticated parties.

I have reprinted the entire SEC testimony and CFTC testimony below.

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Testimony Concerning Regulation of Over-The-Counter Derivatives
by Chairman Mary L. Schapiro

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
United States Senate
June 22, 2009

I. Introduction

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Bunning, and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the regulation of over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives. The severe financial crisis that has unfolded over the last two years has revealed serious weaknesses in the structure of U.S. financial regulation. One of these is the gap in regulation of OTC derivatives, which under current law are largely excluded or exempted from regulation. The SEC is committed to working closely with this Committee, the Congress, the Administration, and fellow regulatory agencies to close this gap and restore a sound structure for U.S. financial regulation.

My testimony today on the regulation of OTC derivatives will reflect the SEC’s perspective as the country’s capital markets regulator. First, I will give an overview of the OTC derivatives markets, with particular focus on those derivatives products that are directly related to or based on securities or issuers of securities and therefore directly connected with the SEC’s statutory mandate. Second, I will outline an approach that would address the existing gaps in regulatory oversight of these securities-related OTC derivatives.

I must tell you right at the start that, given the current limited regulation of OTC derivatives, no regulatory authority can give you a complete picture of OTC derivatives and how they have affected the regulated securities markets. One reason that we need legislation is that our sources of information about securities-related OTC derivatives products, participants, and trading are limited, particularly when contrasted with the tools we have to monitor the markets for other securities products subject to the federal securities laws.

The good news, however, is that the U.S. regulatory authorities have reached a broad consensus on the pressing need for a comprehensive regulatory framework for OTC derivatives. As reflected in Treasury Secretary Geithner’s letter to the Congressional leadership on May 13, 2009, this consensus covers all of the basics of sound financial regulation in the 21st century, including recordkeeping and reporting requirements, appropriate capital and margin requirements, transparent and efficient markets, clearing and settlement systems that monitor and manage risk, business conduct and disclosure standards to protect the interests of market participants, and vigorous enforcement against fraud and other wrongdoing.

One important aspect of a new regulatory framework will be well-regulated central counterparties (“CCPs”). CCPs address concerns about counterparty risk by substituting the creditworthiness and liquidity of the CCP for the creditworthiness and liquidity of counterparties. For this reason, CCPs contribute generally to the goal of market stability. Through uniform margining and other risk controls, including controls on market-wide concentrations that cannot be implemented effectively when counterparty risk management is decentralized, CCPs help protect the broader financial system. It is important to note that achieving standardization, a prerequisite for centralized clearing, may present significant challenges.

U.S. regulators agree on the objectives of a new regulatory framework for OTC derivatives that will protect the public interest, manage systemic risk, and promote capital formation and general economic welfare. Any new regulatory framework, however, should take into consideration the purposes that appropriately regulated derivatives can serve, including affording market participants the ability to hedge positions and effectively manage risk. My goal today is to assist the Congress as best I can in its efforts to craft legislation that empowers the respective regulatory authorities to do their jobs effectively in any new framework. I am confident that, working together, we will meet the challenge that is so important to the financial well-being of individual Americans.

II. Overview of Securities-Related OTC Derivatives

A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is based on the value of an underlying “reference” (e.g., an asset such as a commodity, bond, equity, or currency, or an index of such assets, or an event). For example, in exchange for $100 today, financial institution “A” will pay counterparty “B” $150 if “something” happens (something can be almost anything: Z company defaults on its debt payments; the S&P 500 falls 10%; the Dow rises 5%). A derivative is “OTC” when it is not traded on a regulated exchange. An OTC derivative is “securities-related” when the reference is to an entity that is an issuer of securities (such as a public company), to a security itself (or a related event such as a dividend payment), to a group or index of securities or issuers, or based on related aspects of a security or group or index of securities or issuers, such as price, yield, volatility, dividend payments, or value.

An OTC derivative is an incredibly flexible product that can, essentially, be engineered to achieve almost any financial purpose between two parties. Indeed, as I will discuss later, an OTC derivative can enable market participants to replicate the economics of either a purchase or sale of securities without purchasing or selling the securities themselves. Transactions occurring in the OTC derivatives markets can serve important economic purposes such as allowing market participants to hedge exposure and manage risk. When market participants engage in these types of transactions in the OTC derivatives markets, the transactions, which are substantially similar to traditional securities transactions, and the parties engaged in them, would fall outside the current reach of key provisions of the federal securities laws.

OTC derivatives are largely excluded from the securities regulatory framework by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000.1 In a recent study on a type of securities-related OTC derivative known as a credit default swap, or CDS, the Government Accountability Office found that “comprehensive and consistent data on the overall market have not been readily available,” that “authoritative information about the actual size of the CDS market is generally not available,” and that regulators currently are unable “to monitor activities across the market.”

One source of information on OTC derivatives volume is the data collected by the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”). BIS data cover the OTC derivatives exposure of major banks and dealers in the G10 countries. For all OTC derivatives in December 2008, BIS reported a notional amount outstanding of $592 trillion and a gross market value outstanding of $34 trillion. Interest rate contracts and foreign exchange contracts are the two largest sources of OTC derivatives volume. For those types of products that appear to be securities-related credit derivatives and equity derivatives in December 2008, BIS reported a notional amount outstanding of $48.4 trillion and a gross market value outstanding of $6.8 trillion. A notional amount of $70 trillion and a gross market value of $5 trillion are “unallocated” for December 2008. Clearly, this volume of largely unregulated financial activity is enormous, even when just considering the relatively small volume component that is securities-related.

Who are the major participants in the securities-related OTC derivatives markets? First, the markets are concentrated and appear to be almost exclusively “dealer-intermediated” — that is, one of a small number of major dealers is a party to almost all transactions, whether as a buyer or a seller. The customers of the dealers appear to be almost exclusively institutions. Many of these may be highly sophisticated, such as large hedge funds and other pooled short-term trading vehicles. As you know, many hedge funds have not been subject to direct regulation by the SEC and, accordingly, we have very little ability to obtain information concerning their trading activity at this point.

Other customers in the securities-related OTC derivatives markets have been institutions for which derivatives products may not be a suitable investment. In this regard, there is consensus among U.S. regulators reflected in Secretary Geithner’s letter is to ensure that OTC derivatives are not marketed inappropriately to unsophisticated parties. The SEC and CFTC staff, together with other financial regulators, currently are considering a tiered approach to regulation, with scaling that could be based in the first instance on indicia of sophistication and financial thresholds, with requirements for additional disclosure and standards of care with respect to the marketing of derivatives to less sophisticated counterparties. Implementation of such a regulatory approach would depend on a Congressional grant of authority in this area.

Finally, what are the purposes for which securities-related OTC derivatives may be used? One example of a useful purpose for securities-related OTC derivatives is to manage the risk associated with a particular securities position. An investor with a large position in the debt of a company may seek to reduce or hedge some of the risk associated with that investment by purchasing credit protection in the CDS market. In addition, market participants also may use a securities-related OTC derivative to establish a short position with respect to the debt of a specific company. In particular, a market participant that does not own a bond or other debt instrument of a company may purchase a CDS as a way to short that company’s debt.

Market participants take positions in a wide range of exchange-traded and OTC instruments. It is a market participant’s overall (or net) economic exposure that plays a role in determining the risks to which it is exposed. Because OTC derivatives can be customized, a market participant could take a long position in an index — such as the S&P 100 index — through a securities-related OTC derivative and a short position through another OTC derivative on a subset of the securities in the S&P 100 index. The flexibility to tailor OTC derivative contracts allows a participant to create an economic exposure to as large or small a portion of the market it chooses through one or a combination of contracts. This flexibility allowed by OTC derivatives is one of these contracts’ strengths. Because of the link to regulated securities market, however, it is important that the SEC have the tools to see all related activity so that it is in the best position possible to detect and deter market abuses that can disrupt the integrity of the market.

III. Filling Regulatory Gaps in Oversight of Securities-Related OTC Derivatives

Secretary Geithner’s May 13 letter to the Congressional leadership outlined the Administration’s plan for establishing a comprehensive framework for regulating OTC derivatives. The framework is designed to achieve four broad objectives: (1) preventing activities in the OTC derivatives markets from posing risk to the financial system; (2) promoting efficiency and transparency of those markets; (3) preventing market manipulation, fraud, and other market abuses; and (4) ensuring that OTC derivatives are not marketed inappropriately to unsophisticated parties.

Secretary Geithner recognized that multiple federal regulatory agencies would play critical roles in implementing the proposed framework, including the SEC and the CFTC. He emphasized that the securities and commodities laws should be amended to ensure that the SEC and CFTC, consistent with their respective missions, have the necessary authority to achieve — together with the efforts of other regulators — the four policy objectives for OTC derivatives regulation.

The final part of my testimony today is intended to follow up on Secretary Geithner’s letter by recommending a straightforward and principled approach for achieving these policy objectives. Stated briefly, primary responsibility for “securities-related” OTC derivatives would be retained by the SEC, which is also responsible for oversight of markets affected by this subset of OTC derivatives. Primary responsibility for all other OTC derivatives, including derivatives related to interest rates, foreign exchange, commodities, energy, and metals, , would rest with the CFTC.

Under this functional and sensible approach to regulation, OTC derivatives markets that are interconnected with the regulated securities markets would be incorporated within a unified securities regulatory regime. The direct link between securities-related OTC derivatives and securities is such that SEC regulation of the former is essential to the effectiveness of the SEC’s statutory mission with respect to the securities markets. The securities regulatory regime is specifically designed to promote the Congressional objectives for capital markets, which include investor protection, the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, and the facilitation of capital formation. It is important that securities-related OTC derivatives be subject to the federal securities laws so that the risk of arbitrage and manipulation of interconnected markets is minimized.

Over the years, Congress has fashioned a broad and flexible regulatory regime for securities that long has accommodated a wide range of products and trading venues. The products include equities, debt, other fixed income securities, options on securities, exchange-traded funds and other investment companies, and many other types of derivative contracts on securities. Some of these securities products are among the most actively traded financial products in the world, with exchange-listed US equities currently trading approximately 11 billion shares per day. Many other securities products trade rarely, if at all. In addition, securities products trade in many different ways in a wide variety of venues, depending on the particular features of the product. These venues include 11 national securities exchanges with self-regulatory responsibilities, more than 70 alternative trading systems that execute OTC transactions, and hundreds of broker-dealers that execute OTC transactions. Finally, securities products are cleared and settled in a variety of ways depending on the particular characteristics of the product.

The current securities laws are broad and flexible enough to regulate appropriately all of these varied securities products and trading venues. The regulatory requirements are specifically tailored to reflect the particular nature of products and venues and to promote the Congressional objectives for capital markets. Accordingly, securities-related OTC derivatives could be brought under the same umbrella of oversight as the related, underlying securities markets in a relatively straightforward manner with little need to “reinvent the wheel.” Specifically, Congress could make a limited number of discrete amendments to the statutory definition of a security to cover securities-related OTC derivatives. With these definitional changes, securities-related OTC derivatives could be incorporated within an existing regulatory framework that is appropriate for these products.

The rest of my testimony will elaborate on this basic approach. I first will discuss the close relationship between the regulated securities markets and the markets for securities-related OTC derivatives and then sketch an overview of how oversight of such instruments could be integrated with the SEC’s existing oversight of the securities markets.

A. Relationship between the Securities Markets and Securities-Related OTC Derivatives

In fashioning a regulatory framework for OTC derivatives, it is crucial to recognize the close relationship between the regulated securities markets and the now mostly unregulated markets for securities-related OTC derivatives. Securities-related OTC derivatives can be used to establish either a synthetic “long” exposure to an underlying security or group of securities, or a synthetic “short” exposure to an underlying security or group of securities. In this way, market participants can replicate the economics of either a purchase or sale of securities without purchasing or selling the securities themselves.

For example, an equity swap on a single equity security or on an index, such as one of the Dow stocks or the Dow itself, would give the holder of the “long” position all of the economic exposure of owning the stock or index, without actual ownership of the stock or index. This would include exposure to price movements of the stock or index, as well as any dividends or other distributions. Similarly, credit default swaps (“CDS”) can be used as synthetic substitutes for the debt securities of one or more companies. Indeed, any exchange of cash for a security can be structured as an OTC derivatives contract.

Because market participants can readily use securities-related OTC derivatives to serve as synthetic substitutes for securities, the markets for these OTC derivatives directly and powerfully implicate the policy objectives for capital markets that Congress has set forth in the federal securities laws. These objectives include investor protection, the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, and the facilitation of capital formation.

1. Investor Protection

The current regulatory framework has permitted certain opaque securities-related OTC derivatives markets to develop outside of investor protection provisions of the securities laws. These provisions include requiring the disclosure of significant ownership provisions and recordkeeping and reporting (including those that serve as prophylactic measures against fraud, manipulation, or insider trading) that helps to promote enforcement of the securities laws.

The exclusion of certain securities-related OTC derivatives from most of the securities regulatory regime has detracted from the SEC’s ability to uphold its investor protection mandate. For example, in investigating possible market manipulation during the financial crisis, the SEC has used its anti-fraud authority over security-based swaps to gather information about transactions in OTC derivatives as well as in the underlying securities. Yet investigations of these OTC derivative transactions have been far more difficult and time-consuming than those involving cash equities and options. Audit trail data on OTC derivative transactions is not readily available and must be reconstructed manually, in contrast to the data available in the equity markets. The SEC’s enforcement efforts have been seriously complicated by the lack of a mechanism for promptly obtaining critical information — who traded, how much, and when — that is complete and accurate.

In addition, the SEC believes that it is important in the OTC derivatives market, as in the market for securities generally, that parties to transactions have access to financial information and other disclosures so they can evaluate the risks relating to a particular investment to make more informed investment decisions and can value and evaluate their OTC derivatives and their counterparty exposures. For example, this information assists market participants in performing adequate due diligence on their investments and in valuing their OTC derivatives and their other risks.

A basic tenet of functional regulation of securities markets is to have a regulatory regime under which similar products and activities should be subject to similar regulations and oversight. Currently, securities are subject to transparency, active enforcement, and appropriate regulation of business conduct. Whereas securities-related OTC derivatives, which are interconnected with the securities markets (and in some cases are economic substitutes for securities) are not subject to most of these investor protection requirements. The securities laws are uniquely designed to address these issues and should be extended to OTC derivatives.

2. Fair and Orderly Markets

Trading in securities-related OTC derivatives can directly affect trading in the securities markets. From an economic viewpoint, the interchangeability of securities and securities-related OTC derivatives means that they are driven by the same economic forces and are linked by common participants, trading strategies, and hedging activities.

For example, credit default swap, or CDS trading is closely related to trading in the underlying securities that compose the capital structure of the companies on which protection is written. Trading practices in the CDS market, whether legitimate or abusive, can affect the securities markets. The CDS market, however, lacks the level of transparency and other protections that characterize the regulated securities markets. As a result, the SEC has been unable to monitor effectively for trading abuses and whether purchasers of CDS protection on an issuer’s debt have sold short the equity securities of that company as a trading strategy, effectively linking activities and changes in the CDS market with those in the cash equity market. These activities in the CDS market could adversely impact the regulated securities markets. Any regulatory reform that maintained distinct regulatory regimes for securities markets and markets for securities-related OTC derivatives would suffer from this same limitation.

The SEC is considering whether reporting under the Exchange Act should apply to security-based OTC derivatives so that the ownership of and transactions in security-based derivatives would be considered ownership of and transactions in the underlying equity security. We are further evaluating whether persons using equity derivatives, such as an equity swap, should be subject to the beneficial ownership reporting provisions of the Exchange Act when accumulating substantial share positions in connection with change of control transactions.

3. Capital Formation

Facilitating capital formation depends on the existence of fair and efficient secondary markets for investors. Purchasers in the primary offering of a company are attracted by secondary markets that enable them to liquidate their positions readily. Less efficient markets can cause potential investors in companies either to find other uses for their funds or to demand a higher rate of return to compensate them for a less efficient secondary market. If a disparity in the regulatory requirements for securities and securities-related OTC derivatives cause securities markets to operate less efficiently, it will harm those companies that depend on the U.S. securities markets to access the capital that is essential for innovation and growth, as well as harming investors and the capital markets as a whole.

Because many securities-related OTC derivatives are allowed to trade outside of the securities regulatory regime, the SEC generally is unable to promote transparency in the trading of these products and efficiency in pricing. As noted above, companies whose securities are affected by the excluded products could suffer from the absence of transparency and efficiency. Moreover, manipulative activities in the markets for securities-related OTC derivatives can affect US issuers in the underlying equity market, thereby damaging the public perception of those companies and raising their cost of capital. To protect the integrity of the markets, trading in all securities-related OTC derivatives should be fully subject to the US regulatory regime designed to facilitate capital formation. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that derivatives transactions, including OTC derivatives transactions, allow parties to hedge and manage risk, which itself can promote capital formation. To the extent the ability to manage risk is inappropriately limited, it can discourage market participation, including by investors.

B. Regulatory Oversight of Securities-Related OTC Derivatives

To provide a unified, consistent framework for securities regulation, Congress should subject securities-related OTC derivatives to the federal securities laws. This result can be achieved simply by clarifying the definition of “security” to expressly include securities-related OTC derivatives, and removing the current express exclusion of swaps from that definition. The SEC then would have authority to regulate securities-related OTC derivatives regardless of how the products are traded, whether on an exchange or OTC, and regardless of how the products are cleared.

1. Definition of Securities-Related OTC Derivatives

OTC derivatives can be categorized generally as securities-related or non-securities-related, based on the different types of underlying assets, events, or interests to which they are related. Securities-related OTC derivatives would include equity derivatives and credit and other fixed income derivatives. Non-securities-related derivatives would include interest rate derivatives, foreign currency derivatives, and all non-financial derivatives. By including securities-related OTC derivatives under the umbrella of the federal securities laws, the SEC would have responsibility over the portion of the OTC derivatives market that is vital to promote its mission of investor protection, the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, and the facilitation of capital formation.

In addition, the SEC would continue to regulate those types of OTC derivatives that always have been considered securities, such as OTC security options, certain OTC notes (including equity-linked notes), and forward contracts on securities. These particular types of OTC derivatives always have been included in the definition of security and current law recognizes this fact by excluding these derivatives from the definition of “swap agreement” in Section 206A of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.

2.Regulation of OTC Derivatives Dealers and Major OTC Participants

Under our recommended approach, major participants in the OTC derivatives markets would be subject to oversight and supervision to ensure there are no gaps. To reduce duplication, OTC derivatives dealers that are banks would be subject to prudential supervision by their federal banking regulator. All other OTC derivatives dealers in securities-related OTC derivatives would be subject to supervision and regulation by the SEC. The SEC would have authority to set appropriate capital requirements for these OTC derivatives dealers. This approach would permit existing OTC derivatives dealers that are banks to continue to engage in OTC derivatives activities without being subject to the full panoply of broker-dealer regulation, while ensuring that all currently unregulated OTC derivatives dealers in securities-related OTC derivatives are subject to appropriate supervision and regulation. Should Congress establish a new systemic risk regulator or systemic risk council, that entity also could help monitor institutions that might present systemic risk.

In addition, the SEC would have authority to establish business conduct standards and recordkeeping and reporting requirements (including an audit trail) for all securities-related OTC derivatives dealers and other firms with large counterparty exposures in securities-related OTC derivatives (“Major OTC Participants”). This “umbrella” authority would help ensure that the SEC has the tools it needs to oversee the entire market for securities-related OTC derivatives. Major OTC Participants also would be required to meet appropriate standards for the segregation of customer funds and securities.

3. Trading Markets and Clearing Agencies

Trading markets and clearing organizations for securities-related OTC derivatives would be subject to registration requirements as exchanges and clearing agencies. Importantly, however, the conditional exemption from exchange registration the SEC provided under Regulation ATS would be available to trading systems for securities-related OTC derivatives. Among other things, Regulation ATS lowers barriers to entry for trading systems in securities because the systems need not assume the full self-regulatory responsibilities associated with being a national securities exchange. Both registered exchanges and ATSs are subject to important transparency requirements. Consequently, expanding the SEC’s authority over securities-related OTC derivatives would promote improved efficiency and transparency in the markets for securities-related OTC derivatives.

Similarly, the regulatory regime for securities clearing agencies would ensure that CCPs for securities-related OTC derivatives impose appropriate margin requirements and other necessary risk controls. The SEC’s historic regulation of clearing agencies under Section 17A of the Exchange Act has resulted in the most efficient, lowest cost clearing in the world. Indeed, the solid performance of securities clearing systems during the financial crisis bears out that they have the resilience to withstand difficult economic conditions. In addition, the regulation of securities clearance and settlement would directly affect market structure and competition in the trading markets for securities-related OTC derivatives. For example, the SEC’s statutory mandate governing clearing agencies prohibits clearing agencies from engaging in anti-competitive practices, such as imposing unreasonable limitations on access to services. Clearing agencies cannot exclude participants merely for executing their trades in a cleared product in a particular venue. This fair access requirement allows for multiple, competing markets, including OTC trading systems and OTC dealers, to trade the same securities and clear through a single clearing organization. The securities clearing system would support both the goal of having the greatest number of OTC derivatives centrally cleared, while retaining flexibility to allow variation in trading venues to meet the trading needs of different instruments and participants.

The SEC already has taken a number of actions to help further the centralized clearing for OTC derivatives, including exempting three CCPs from the requirement to register as securities clearing agencies. These exemptions were issued to speed the operation of central clearing for CDS. They are temporary and subject to conditions designed to ensure that important elements of Commission oversight apply, such as recordkeeping and Commission staff access to examine clearing facilities. In addition, to further the goal of transparency, each clearing agency is required to make publicly available on fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory terms end-of-day settlement prices and any other pricing or valuation information that it publishes or distributes.

One important issue is how to deal with those OTC derivative contracts that may be ineligible for central clearing. OTC derivatives may be ineligible for clearing for a variety of reasons, including customized terms and an inability of CCPs to effectively manage the risks. In many cases, there are legitimate economic reasons to engage in customized transactions. Participants in individual transactions, however, should not be permitted to externalize the costs of their decisions, such as by creating additional systemic risk. Regulatory requirements often have costs, but they are costs incurred to protect the public interest and the general economic welfare. One way for regulators to help ensure market participants incorporate all the risks in the terms of a transaction would be to impose appropriate margin and capital requirements on the participants in customized transactions to reflect the risks they pose to market systems generally. This is an area in which the various functional regulators for particular entities could consult closely with any systemic risk agency that Congress might establish.

In addressing all of these issues with respect to OTC derivatives, moreover, the U.S. must coordinate its efforts with those of regulatory authorities abroad as they seek to address similar issues. The global financial crisis is a potent reminder of the extent to which economies around the world are linked by financial practices and market participants. A sound regulatory approach for managing the systemic risk of such practices and participants benefits from the implementation of complementary measures on an international basis.

V. Conclusion

Bringing securities-related OTC derivatives under the umbrella of the federal securities laws would be based on sound principles of functional regulation, would be relatively straightforward to implement, and would promote Congressional policy objectives for the capital markets. A clear delineation of primary regulatory responsibility for OTC derivatives also would help avoid regulatory gaps from arising in the future. Finally, integrating oversight of securities-related OTC derivatives with oversight of the related, underlying securities markets would minimize the extent of dislocation with respect to existing participants and current practices in the OTC derivatives markets, while still achieving the objectives for OTC derivatives regulation set forth in Secretary Geithner’s letter to the Congressional leadership.

Thank you for the opportunity to address issues of such importance for the strength and stability of the U.S. financial system, and the integrity of the U.S. capital markets. I would be pleased to answer your questions.

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Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Office of External Affairs
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Testimony of Chairman Gary Gensler, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Before the Senate Banking Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment
June 22, 2009

Good morning Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Bunning, and Members of the Committee. I am here today testifying on behalf of the Commission.

The topic of today’s hearing, how to best modernize oversight of the over-the-counter derivatives markets, is of utmost importance during this crucial time for our economy. As President Obama laid out last week, we must urgently enact broad reforms in our financial regulatory structure in order to rebuild and restore confidence in our overall financial system.

Such reforms must comprehensively regulate both derivative dealers and the markets in which derivatives trade. I look forward to working with the Congress to ensure that the OTC derivatives markets are transparent and free from fraud, manipulation and other abuses.

This effort will require close coordination between the SEC and the CFTC to ensure the most appropriate regulation. I’m fortunate to have as a partner in this effort, SEC Chair Mary Schapiro. She brings invaluable expertise in both the security and commodity futures area, which gives me great confidence that we will be able to provide the Congress with a sound recommendation for comprehensive oversight of the OTC derivatives market. We also will work collaboratively on recommendations on how to best harmonize regulatory efforts between agencies as requested by President Obama. Comprehensive Regulatory Framework A comprehensive regulatory framework governing OTC derivative dealers and OTC derivative markets should apply to all dealers and all derivatives, no matter what type of derivative is traded or marketed. It should include interest rate swaps, currency swaps, commodity swaps, credit default swaps, and equity swaps. Further, it should apply to the dealers and derivatives no matter what type of swaps or other derivatives may be invented in the future. This framework should apply regardless of whether the derivatives are standardized or customized.

A new regulatory framework for OTC derivatives markets should be designed to achieve four key objectives:

  • Lower systemic risks;
  • Promote the transparency and efficiency of markets;
  • Promote market integrity by preventing fraud, manipulation, and other market abuses, and by setting position limits; and
  • Protect the public from improper marketing practices.

To best achieve these objectives, two complementary regulatory regimes must be implemented: one focused on the dealers that make the markets in derivatives and one focused on the markets themselves – including regulated exchanges, electronic trading systems and clearing houses. Only with these two complementary regimes will we ensure that federal regulators have full authority to bring transparency to the OTC derivatives world and to prevent fraud, manipulation, and other types of market abuses. These two regimes should apply no matter which type of firm, method of trading or type of derivative or swap is involved.

Regulating Derivatives Dealers:

I believe that institutions that deal in derivatives must be explicitly regulated. In addition, regulations should cover any other firms whose activities in these markets can create large exposures to counterparties. The current financial crisis has taught us that the derivatives trading activities of a single firm can threaten the entire financial system and that all such firms should be subject to robust Federal regulation. The AIG subsidiary that dealt in derivatives – AIG Financial Products – for example, was not subject to any effective regulation. The derivatives dealers affiliated with Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and other investment banks were not subject to mandatory regulation either. By fully regulating the institutions that trade or hold themselves out to the public as derivative dealers we can oversee and regulate the entire derivatives market. I believe that our laws should be amended to provide for the registration and regulation of all derivative dealers.

The full, mandatory regulation of all derivatives dealers would represent a dramatic change from the current system in which some dealers can operate with limited or no effective oversight. Specifically, all derivative dealers should be subject to capital requirements, initial margining requirements, business conduct rules, and reporting and recordkeeping requirements. Standards that already apply to some dealers, such as banking entities, should be strengthened and made consistent, regardless of the legal entity where the trading takes place.

Capital and Margin Requirements:

The Congress should explicitly require regulators to promulgate capital requirements for all derivatives dealers. Imposing prudent and conservative capital requirements, and initial margin requirements, on all transactions by these dealers will help prevent the types of systemic risks that AIG created. No longer would derivatives dealers or counterparties be able to amass large or highly leveraged risks outside the oversight and prudential safeguards of regulators.

Business Conduct and Transparency Requirements:

Business conduct standards should include measures to both protect the integrity of the market and lower the risk (both counterparty and operating) from OTC derivatives transactions. To promote market integrity, the business conduct standards should include prohibitions on fraud, manipulation and other abusive practices. For OTC derivatives that come under CFTC jurisdiction, these standards should require adherence to position limits when they perform or affect a significant price discovery function with respect to regulated markets.

Business conduct standards should ensure the timely and accurate confirmation, processing, netting, documentation, and valuation of all transactions. These standards for “back office” functions will help reduce risks by ensuring derivative dealers, their trading counterparties and regulators have complete, accurate and current knowledge of their outstanding risks.

Derivatives dealers also should be subject to recordkeeping and reporting requirements for all of their OTC derivatives positions and transactions. These requirements should include retaining a complete audit trail and mandated reporting of any trades that are not centrally cleared to a regulated trade repository. Trade repositories complement central clearing by providing a location where trades that are not centrally cleared can be recorded in a manner that allows the positions, transactions, and risks associated with those trades to be reported to regulators. To provide transparency of the entire OTC derivatives market, this information should be available to all relevant federal financial regulators. Additionally, there should be clear authority for regulating and setting standards for trade repositories and clearinghouses to ensure that the information recorded meets regulatory needs and that the repositories have strong business conduct practices.

The application of these business conduct standards and the transparency requirements will enable regulators to have timely and accurate knowledge of the risks and positions created by the dealers. It will provide authorities with the information and evidentiary record needed to take any appropriate action to address such risks and to protect and police market integrity. In this regard, the CFTC and SEC should have clear, unimpeded oversight and enforcement authority to prevent and punish fraud, manipulation and other market abuses.

Market transparency should be further enhanced by requiring that aggregated information on positions and trades be made available to the public. No longer should the public be in the dark about the extensive positions and trading in these markets. This public information will improve the price discovery process and market efficiency.

Regulating Derivatives Markets:

In addition to the significant benefits to be gained from broad regulation of derivatives dealers, I believe that additional safety and transparency must be afforded by regulating the derivative market functions as well. All derivatives that can be moved into central clearing should be required to be cleared through regulated central clearing houses and brought onto regulated exchanges or regulated transparent electronic trading systems.  Requiring clearing and trading on exchanges or through regulated electronic trading systems will promote transparency and market integrity and lower systemic risks. To fully achieve these objectives, both of these complementary regimes must be enacted.

Regulating both the traders and the trades will ensure that both the actors and the actions that may create significant risks are covered. Exchange-trading and central clearing are the two key and related components of well functioning markets. Ever since President Roosevelt called for the regulation of the commodities and securities markets in the early 1930s, the CFTC (and its predecessor) and the SEC have each regulated the clearing functions for the exchanges under their respective jurisdiction. The practice of having the agency which regulates an exchange or trade execution facility also regulate the clearing houses for that market has worked well and should continue as we extend regulations to cover the OTC derivatives market.

Central Clearing:

Central clearing should help reduce systemic risks in addition to the benefits derived from comprehensive regulation of derivatives dealers. Clearing reduces risks by facilitating the netting of transactions and by mutualizing credit risks. Currently, most of the contracts entered into in the OTC derivatives market are not cleared, and remain as bilateral contracts between individual buyers and sellers.

In contrast, when a contract between a buyer and seller is submitted to a clearinghouse for clearing, the contract is “novated” to the clearinghouse. This means that the clearinghouse is substituted as the counterparty to the contract and then stands between the buyer and the seller. Clearinghouses then guarantee the performance of each trade that is submitted for clearing. Clearinghouses use a variety of risk management practices to assure the fulfillment of this guarantee function. Foremost, derivatives clearinghouses would lower risk through the daily discipline of marking to market the value of each transaction. They also require the daily posting of margin to cover the daily changes in the value of positions and collect initial margin as extra protection against potential market changes that are not covered by the daily mark-to-market.

The regulations applicable to clearing should require that clearinghouses establish and maintain robust margin standards and other necessary risk controls and measures. It is important that we incorporate the lessons from the current crisis as well as the best practices reflected in international standards. Working with Congress, we should consider possible amendments to the CEA to expand and deepen the core principles that registered derivatives clearing organizations must meet to achieve these goals to both strengthen these systems and to reduce the possibility of regulatory arbitrage. Clearinghouses should have transparent governance arrangements that incorporate a broad range of viewpoints from members and other market participants.

Central counterparties should also be required to have fair and open access criteria that allow any firm that meets objective, prudent standards to participate regardless of whether it is a dealer or a trading firm. Additionally, central clearinghouses should implement rules that allow indirect participation in central clearing. By novating contracts to a central clearinghouse coupled with effective risk management practices, the failure of a single trader, like AIG, would no longer jeopardize all of the counterparties to its trades.

One of the lessons that emerged from this recent crisis was that institutions were not just “too big to fail,” but rather too interconnected as well. By mandating the use of central clearinghouses, institutions would become much less interconnected, mitigating risk and increasing transparency. Throughout this entire financial crisis, trades that were carried out through regulated exchanges and clearinghouses continued to be cleared and settled.

In implementing these responsibilities, it will be appropriate to consider possible additional oversight requirements that may be imposed by any systemic risk regulator that Congress may establish.  Under the Administration’s approach, the systemic regulator, would be charged with ensuring consistent and robust standards for all systemically important clearing, settlement and payment systems. For clearinghouses overseen comprehensively by the CFTC and SEC, the CFTC or SEC would remain the primary regulatory, but the systemic regulator would be able to request information from the primary regulator, participate in examinations led by the primary regulator, make recommendations on strengthening standards to the primary regulator and ultimately, after consulting with the primary regulator and the new Financial Services Oversight Council, use emergency authority to compel a clearinghouse to take actions to address financial risks. Exchange-trading. Beyond the significant transparency afforded the regulators and the public through the record keeping and reporting requirements of derivatives dealers, market transparency and efficiency would be further improved by moving the standardized part of the OTC markets onto regulated exchanges and regulated transparent electronic trading systems. I believe that this should be required of all standardized contracts.

Furthermore, a system for the timely reporting of trades and prompt dissemination of prices and other trade information to the public should be required. Both regulated exchanges and regulated transparent trading systems should allow market participants to see all of the bids and offers. A complete audit trail of all transactions on the exchanges or trade execution systems should be available to the regulators. Through a trade reporting system there should be timely public posting of the price, volume and key terms of completed transactions. The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system currently required for timely reporting in the OTC corporate bond market may provide a model.

The CFTC and SEC also should have authority to impose recordkeeping and reporting requirements and to police the operations of all exchanges and electronic trading systems to prevent fraud, manipulation and other abuses.

In contrast to long established on-exchange futures and securities markets, there is a need to encourage the further development of exchanges and electronic trading systems for OTC derivatives. In order to promote this goal and achieve market efficiency through competition, there should be sufficient product standardization so OTC derivative trades and open positions are fungible and can be transferred between one exchange or electronic trading system to another.

Position Limits:

Position limits must be applied consistently across all markets, across all trading platforms, and exemptions to them must be limited and well defined. The CFTC should have the ability to impose position limits, including aggregate limits, on all persons trading OTC derivatives that perform or affect a significant price discovery function with respect to regulated markets that the CFTC oversees. Such position limit authority should clearly empower the CFTC to establish aggregate position limits across markets in order to ensure that traders are not able to avoid position limits in a market by moving to a related exchange or market, including international markets.

Standardized and Customized Derivatives:

It is important that tailored or customized swaps that are not able to be cleared or traded on an exchange be sufficiently regulated. Regulations should also ensure that customized derivatives are not used solely as a means to avoid the clearing and exchange requirements. This could be accomplished in two ways. First, regulators should be given full authority to prevent fraud, manipulation and other abuses and to impose recordkeeping and transparency requirements with respect to the trading of all swaps, including customized swaps. Second, we must ensure that dealers and traders cannot change just a few minor terms of a standardized swap to avoid clearing and the added transparency of exchanges and electronic trading systems.

One way to ensure this would be to establish objective criteria for regulators to determine whether, in fact, a swap is standardized. For example, there should be a presumption that if an instrument is accepted for clearing by a fully regulated clearinghouse, then it should be required to be cleared. Additional potential criteria for consideration in determining whether a contract should be considered to be a standardized swap contract could include:

  • The volume of transactions in the contract;
  • The similarity of the terms in the contract to terms in standardized contracts;
  • Whether any differences in terms from a standardized contract are of economic significance; and
  • The extent to which any of the terms in the contract, including price, are disseminated to third parties.

Criteria such as these could be helpful in ensuring that parties are not able to avoid the requirements applicable to standardized contracts by tweaking the terms of such contracts and then labeling them “customized.  Regardless of whether an instrument is standardized or customized, or traded on an exchange or on a transparent electronic trade execution system, regulators should have clear, unimpeded authority to impose recordkeeping and reporting requirements, impose margin requirements, and prevent and punish fraud, manipulation and other market abuses. No matter how the instrument is traded, the CFTC and SEC as appropriate also should have clear, unimpeded authority to impose position limits, including aggregate limits, to prevent excessive speculation. A full audit trail should be available to the CFTC, SEC and other Federal regulators.

Authority:

To achieve these goals, the Commodity Exchange Act and security laws should be amended to provide the CFTC and SEC with clear authority to regulate OTC derivatives. The term “OTC derivative” should be defined, and clear authority should be given over all such instruments regardless of the regulatory agency. To the extent that specific types of OTC derivatives might overlap agencies’ existing jurisdiction, care must be taken to avoid unnecessary duplication.

As we enact new laws and regulations, we should be careful not to call into question the enforceability of existing OTC derivatives contracts. New legislation and regulations should not provide excuses for traders to avoid performance under pre-existing, valid agreements or to nullify pre-existing contractual obligations.

Achieving the Four Key Objectives:

Overall, I believe the complimentary regimes of dealer and market regulation would best achieve the four objectives outlined earlier. As a summary, let me review how this would accomplish the measures applied to both the derivative dealers and the derivative markets.

Lower Systemic Risk:

This dual regime would lower systemic risk through the following four measures:

  • Setting capital requirements for derivative dealers;
  • Creating initial margin requirements for derivative dealers (whether dealing in standardized or customized swaps);
  • Requiring centralized clearing of standardized swaps; and
  • Requiring business conduct standards for dealers.

Promote Market Transparency and Efficiency:

This complementary regime would promote market transparency and efficiency by:

  • Requiring that all OTC transactions, both standardized and customized, be reported to a regulated trade repository or central clearinghouses;
  • Requiring clearinghouses and trade repositories to make aggregate data on open positions and trading volumes available to the public;
  • Requiring clearinghouses and trade repositories to make data on any individual counterparty’s trades and positions available on a confidential basis to regulators;
  • Requiring centralized clearing of standardized swaps;
  • Moving standardized products onto regulated exchanges and regulated, transparent trade execution systems; and
  • Requiring the timely reporting of trades and prompt dissemination of prices and other trade information;

Promote Market Integrity:

It would promote market integrity by:

  • Providing regulators with clear, unimpeded authority to impose reporting requirements and to prevent fraud, manipulation and other types of market abuses;
  • Providing regulators with authority to set position limits, including aggregate position limits;
  • Moving standardized products onto regulated exchanges and regulated, transparent trade execution systems; and
  • Requiring business conduct standards for dealers.

Protect Against Improper Marketing Practices:

It would ensure protection of the public from improper marketing practices by:

  • Business conduct standards applied to derivatives dealers regardless of the type of instrument involved; and
  • Amending the limitations on participating in the OTC derivatives market in current law to tighten them or to impose additional disclosure requirements, or standards of care (e.g. suitability or know your customer requirements) with respect to marketing of derivatives to institutions that infrequently trade in derivatives, such as small municipalities.

Conclusion:

The need for reform of our financial system today has many similarities to the situation facing the country in the 1930s. In 1934, President Roosevelt boldly proposed to the Congress “the enactment of legislation providing for the regulation by the Federal Government of the operation of exchanges dealing in securities and commodities for the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of values, and so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and destructive speculation.” The Congress swiftly responded to the clear need for reform by enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Two years later it passed the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.

It is clear that we need the same type of comprehensive regulatory reform today. Today’s regulatory reform package should cover all types of OTC derivatives dealers and markets. It should provide regulators with full authority regarding OTC derivatives to lower risk; promote transparency, efficiency, and market integrity and to protect the American public.

Today’s complex financial markets are global and irreversibly interlinked. We must work with our partners in regulating markets around the world to promote consistent rigor in enforcing standards that we demand of our markets to prevent regulatory arbitrage.

These policies are consistent with what I laid out to this committee in February and the Administration’s objectives. I look forward to working with this Committee, and others in Congress, to accomplish these goals.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today. I look forward to answering any questions.

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Please contact us if you have any questions of if you would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Obama’s New Hedge Fund Regulation Plan

Draft Speaks of IA Registration for Hedge Fund Managers

As you have probably heard by now, Obama will be presenting his plan for an overhaul of the financial system later today.  I have reviewed a copy of Obama’s Financial Regulation Proposal Draft and have reprinted some of the important aspects of the proposal below.  In general the most immediate impact for hedge fund managers is that they will be required to register with the SEC as investment advisors.  In addition to hedge fund managers, private equity fund managers and VC fund managers will also need to register.

While we understand that these are just proposals, Congress too is excited to get on the registration bandwagon although I think it unlikely for us to see any regulation passed before the end of this year.  Even so, hedge fund managers may want to start thinking about how they are going to register as investment advisors and what plans they will need to be putting in place (or plan to put in place in the future).

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The plan’s main goals are:

  1. Promote robust supervision and regulation of financial firms.
  2. Establish comprehensive supervision and regulation of financial markets.
  3. Propose comprehensive regulation of all OTC derivatives.
  4. Protect customers and investors from financial abuse.
  5. Raise international regulatory standards and improve international cooperation.

Other Points Addressed

Regarding Hedge Funds

All advisers to hedge funds (and other private pools of capital, including private equity funds and venture capital funds) whose assets under management exceed some modest threshold should be required to register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act.  The advisers should be required to report financial information on the funds they manageme that is sufficient to assess whether any fund poses a threat to fiancnail stability.

Harmonize Futures and Securities Regulation

The CFTC and the SEC should make recommendations to Congress for changes to statutes and regulations that would harmonize regulation of futures and securities.

Strengthen Investor Protection

The SEC should be given new toold to increase fairness for investors by establishing a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers offering investment advice and harmonizing the regulation of investment advisers and broker-dealers.

Expand the Scope of Regulation

We urge national authorities to implement by the end of 2009 the G-20 commitment to require hedge funds or their managers to register and disclose appropriate information necessary to assess the systemic risk they pose individually or collectively.

Specifical goals with regard to Hedge Funds

  • Data collection
  • SEC should conduct regular, periodic examinations of hedge funds
  • Reporting AUM and other fund metrics to the SEC
  • SEC would have ability to assess whether the fund or fund family is so large, highly leveraged , or interconnected that it poses a threat to fiancial stability

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include: