Tag Archives: hedge fund insider trading

Karl Cole-Frieman Quoted on Expert Networks

Insider Trading Remains Popular Topic in Hedge Fund Regulation

Insider trading by hedge funds and the use of expert networks has been a hot compliance topic in 2010 and 2011. The topic remains in the spotlight as Massachusetts recently passed new expert network regulations. Under the new regulations, registered investment advisers in Massachusetts will be required to maintain certain records with respect to transactions with expert network firms. [Note: we will be detailing these and other regulations recently adopted by Massachusetts which will become effective as of December 1, 2011.]

Karl Cole-Frieman was quoted by Law360.com in an article on the new Massachusetts expert network regulations (subscription required). In the article Karl is attributed with providing information on the effect the regulations may have on expert networking firms, how expert networking firms may respond to the Massachusetts regulations and how hedge fund managers may modify their compliance programs to adhere to Massachusetts (and potentially other state) regulations.

We expect to see more states come out with similar laws and we will provide updates and more information as appropriate.

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Karl Cole-Frieman is a managing partner at Cole-Frieman & Mallon LLP and he provides advice to fund managers with respect to insider trading and the use of expert network firms. He can be reached

at 415-352-2300 or through our contact form.

Massachusetts Proceeds Against Fund Manager Using Expert Networks

Revocation of Investment Adviser License & Disgorgement of Profits

Managers are becoming more aware of the various securities laws and compliance issues involved with the use of expert networks. While the SEC has recently been active in this area (both in the RR insider trading complaint and the recent expert network action), the states are also becoming more aware of the potential issues involved with expert networks. Recently the Massachusetts Securities Division instituted an administrative complaint against a Massachusetts state registered fund manager who utilized expert networks to gain inside information. This post will provide an overview of that compliant.

Overview

James Silverman was registered as an investment adviser representative for a Massachusetts registered IA firm which was managing the RRC Bio Fund, LP (“Fund”). The IA firm was subject to a routine announced examination by the Massachusetts Securities Division (“Division”). During that routine examination, the examiners found a number of violations of the various state securities laws including the fact that Silverman was trading on inside information obtained from an expert network firm.

The examiners found that Silverman started using the expert network firm after the Fund suffered a long period of losses. After utilizing the expert network firm, the Fund posted consecutive years of gains in excess of 50%. During the course of the relationship with the expert network firm, the Fund paid $80,000 a year to the firm so that Silverman could have access to certain consultants in the biotechnology industry. Many of these consultants were either insiders or otherwise bound to confidentiality agreements with respect to their activities in the industry. The expert network firm did not monitor their consultants in any way but, pursuant to the firm’s policies, the consultants’ had a duty to identify and avoid any disclosure that would violate a confidentiality agreement. The agreement that Silverman signed with the expert network fir

m provided that Silverman agreed not to elicit or otherwise obtain any “material nonpublic or otherwise confidential information” from the expert consultants.

In addition to the insider trading, Silverman and the IA firm engaged in either blatantly illegal or egregiously sloppy business practices, especially once the examination began. For example, the complaint states that Silverman did the following:

deleted notes containing study results prior to producing the notes to the Division in response to its subpoena
deleted certain documents and correspondence
failed to maintain required records
made false filings with the Division
violated minimum financial requirements
violated document retention requirements
improperly assessed performance fees
left client data vulnerable

The Order

The consequences for breaking the securities laws, whether at the state or federal level, are severe. The Enforcement Section of the Massachusetts Securities Division sought the following items in its action against Silverman:

accounting and disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains as a result of insider trading
disgorgement of direct and indirect remuneration from the insider trading
revocation of the IA registration for the firm and Silverman
enjoining Silverman from performing any investment advisory services for compensation on behalf of any person or entity within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
imposition of a fine

Protecting Your Firm – Developing Compliance Programs

This case and the earlier SEC actions do not mean that fund managers can no longer use expert network firms. However, managers need to be careful and the best practice is for managers to develop compliance policies for all interaction with expert network firms. These policies and procedures need to be tailored to the business practices of each manager and need to be followed consistently.

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Cole-Frieman & Mallon LLP is a boutique hedge fund law firm. We provide hedge fund compliance and registration services to SEC and state registered hedge fund managers. Bart Mallon can be reached directly at 415-868-5345.

Hedge Funds and Insider Trading after Galleon

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By Bart Mallon, Esq. (www.colefrieman.com)

High Profile Case Highlights Issues for Hedge Fund Managers to Consider

Insider trading is now an operational issue for hedge fund managers. The high profile insider trading case involving RR and the Galleon hedge fund has put the spotlight directly on hedge funds again and has also sparked a debate of sorts on the subject. Given the potential severity of penalties for insider trading, it is surprising that we still periodically hear about such cases, but nevertheless it is something that is always going to be there – human nature is not going to change.

As such hedge fund managers need to be prepared to deal with this issue internally (through their compliance procedures) and also will need to be able to communicate how they have addressed this issue to both the regulators and institutional investors. While managers always need to be vigilant in their enforcement of compliance policies and procedures, during this time of heightened insider trading awareness, managers need to be even more vigilant about protecting themselves. As the Galleon liquidation too vividly shows, a lapse in operational oversight can and will take down an entire organization.

Insider Trading Overview and Penalties

We have discussed insider trading before, but as a general matter insider trading refers to the practice of trading securities based on material, non-public information. Whether information is material depends on case law. In general information will be material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important” in making an investment decision (see TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). Information is non-public if it has not been disseminated in a manner making it available to investors generally. An insider is generally defined as officers, directors and employees of a company but it can also refer to a company’s business associates in certain circumstances (i.e. attorneys, accountants, consultants, and banks, and the employees of such organizations). Additionally, persons not considered to be insiders may nevertheless be charged with insider trading if they received tips from insiders – such persons generally are referred to as tippees and the insider is generally referred to as the tipper. [HFLB note: more information on insider trading generally can be found in the discussion of Regulation FD on the SEC website.]

The penalties for insider trading are potentially harsh – censures, cease and desist orders, fines, suspension and/or revocation of securities licenses are all potential penalties. Depending on the severity of the insider trading there may be criminal sanctions in addition to the listed civil penalties. Securities professionals (or other business professionals like an attorney or accountant) may jeopardize their ability to work in their industry if they are caught engaging in insider trading which, for most people, would be a large enough deterrent to engage in such activity.

Addressing Compliance Inside the Firm

Insider trading is usually addressed in the firm’s compliance policies and procedures. Indeed, Section 204A of the Investment Adviser Act of 1940 requires SEC registered investment advisers to maintainpolicies and procedures to detect against insider trading.

Usually such policies and procedures forbid employees from trading on material non-public information (as well as “tipping” others about material non-public information). Additionally, employees typically are required to disclose any non-public material information they receive to the chief compliance officer (“CCO”) of the firm. The employee is generally prohibited from discussing the matter with anyone inside or outside of the firm. The policies and procedures may require the CCO to take some sort of action on the matter. There are a number of different ways that the CCO can handle the situation including ordering a prohibition on trading in the security (including in options, rights and warrants on the security). The CCO may also initiate a review of the personal trading accounts of firm employees. Usually when the CCO is informed of such information the CCO would contact outside counsel to discuss the next course of action.

Dealing with Regulators

While many large hedge fund managers are registered as investment advisors with the SEC, many still remain unregistered in reliance on the exemption provided by Section 203(b)(3). With the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act likely to be passed within the next year, managers with a certain amount of AUM (either $100 million or $150 million as it now stands) will be forced to register with the SEC. Of course, this means that such managers will be subject to examination by the SEC and insider trading will be one of the first issues that a manager will likely deal with in an examination.

As we discussed in an earlier insider trading article, the SEC has unabashedly proclaimed war against insider trading and they will be aggressively pursuing any leads which may implicate managers.

Some compliance professionals believe that the SEC comes in with a view that the manager is guilty until proven innocent. While I do not necessarily subscribe to this blanket viewpoint, I do believe that managers, as a best practice, should be able to show the SEC the steps they have taken to ensure that compliance with insider trading prohibitions is a top priority of the firm. The firm and CCO should be prepared to describe their policies and structures that are in place to deal with this issue.

Institutional Standpoint

Potentially more important than how a firm deals with the SEC, is how a firm describes their internal compliance procedures to institutional investors. The question then becomes, how are institutional investors going to address this risk with regard to the managers they allocate to – what will change?

Right now it appears a bit unclear. Over the past week I have talked with a number of different groups who are involved hedge fund compliance, hedge fund consulting, and hedge fund due diligence and I seem to get different answers. Some groups think that institutional investors will be focusing on this issue (as many managers know, one of the important issues for institutional investors is the avoidance of “headline risk”); other groups seem to think that this is an issue that institutional groups are not going to focus on because there are other aspects of a manager’s investment program and operations which deserve more attention.

We tend to agree more with the second opinion, but we still believe that robust insider trading compliance policies and procedures are vital to the long term success of any asset management company. We also encourage groups to discuss their current procedures with their compliance consultant or hedge fund attorney.

Outsourcing and Technology solutions

Many large managers have implemented compliance programs which have technology solutions designed to track employee trading. Presumably there will be technology programs developed to address this concern for manager. Although I do not currently know of any specific outsourced or technology solutions which address this issue, I anticipate discussing this in greater depth in the future – perhaps there is some data warehousing solution. [HFLB note: please contact us if you would like to discuss such a solution with us.]

Final Thoughts

The Galleon insider trading case could not have happened at a worse time for the hedge fund industry which is trying to put its best face forward as Congress determines its future regulatory fate. However, increased awareness of this issue will force managers to address it from an operational standpoint which will only help these managers down the road. While the full effect of this case will not be understood for a while, in the short term it is likely to cost managers in terms of time and cost to review and implement increased operational awareness and procedures.

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Insider Trading Overview

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In light of the recent focus on insider trading, we are publishing the SEC’s discussion on Insider Trading which can also be found here. The information below contains a broad overview of some of the important aspects which hedge fund managers should understand about the insider trading prohibitions.

For a greater background discussion on the legal precedents which helped shaped the state of law today, please see Insider Trading—A U.S. Perspective, a speech by staff of the SEC.

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Insider Trading

“Insider trading” is a term that most investors have heard and usually associate with illegal conduct. But the term actually includes both legal and illegal conduct. The legal version is when corporate insiders—officers, directors, and employees—buy and sell stock in their own companies. When corporate insiders trade in their own securities, they must report their trades to the SEC. For more information about this type of insider trading and the reports insiders must file, please read “Forms 3, 4, 5” in our Fast Answers databank.

Illegal insider trading refers generally to buying or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of material, nonpublic information about the security. Insider trading violations may also include “tipping” such information, securities trading by the person “tipped,” and securities trading by those who misappropriate such information.

Examples of insider trading cases that have been brought by the SEC are cases against:

Corporate officers, directors, and employees who traded the corporation’s securities after learning of significant, confidential corporate developments;
Friends, business associates, family members, and other “tippees” of such officers, directors, and employees, who traded the securities after receiving such information;
Employees of law, banking, brokerage and printing firms who were given such information to provide services to the corporation whose securities they traded;
Government employees who learned of such information because of their employment by the government; and
Other persons who misappropriated, and took advantage of, confidential information from their employers.

Because insider trading undermines investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the securities markets, the SEC has treated the detection and prosecution of insider trading violations as one of its enforcement priorities.

The SEC adopted new Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 to resolve two insider trading issues where the courts have disagreed. Rule 10b5-1 provides that a person trades on the basis of material nonpublic information if a trader is “aware” of the material nonpublic information when making the purchase or sale. The rule also sets forth several affirmative defenses or exceptions to liability. The rule permits persons to trade in certain specified circumstances where it is clear that the information they are aware of is not a factor in the decision to trade, such as pursuant to a pre-existing plan, contract, or instruction that was made in good faith.

Rule 10b5-2 clarifies how the misappropriation theory applies to certain non-business relationships. This rule provides that a person receiving confidential information under circumstances specified in the rule would owe a duty of trust or confidence and thus could be liable under the misappropriation theory.

For more information about insider trading, please read Insider Trading—A U.S. Perspective, a speech by staff of the SEC.

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Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. of Cole-Frieman & Mallon LLP runs the Hedge Fund Law Blog and the Series 79 exam website. He can be reached directly at 415-868-5345.

Hedge Fund Manager Charged with Insider Trading

Hedge Funds and Insider Trading

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Hedge Fund Manager/Trader Settles Charges with SEC

Insider trading cases pop up every now and again and most cases do not warrant highlighting – post-Boesky everyone in the securities industry is well aware that trading on inside information is illegal. However, it warrants emphasis that the SEC will crack down on hedge fund managers or traders involved with insider trading and the penalties are harsh. The individuals (including a hedge fund manager) involved in the action described in the SEC litigation release reprinted below were subject to fines and disgorgement, of course, but were also barred from the securities industry. The severity of such a penalty underscores the importance of understanding and abiding by the insider trading rules.

As noted below, trading on insider information is illegal under both civil (Section 17(a) of the 1933 act, Section 10(b) of the 1934 act, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder) and criminal laws (generally securities fraud, but depending on the facts charges may also include wire fraud and commercial bribery).

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U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Litigation Release No. 21244
October 8, 2009

SEC v. Mitchel S. Guttenberg, Erik R. Franklin, David M. Tavdy, Mark E. Lenowitz, Robert D. Babcock, Andrew A. Srebnik, Ken Okada, David A. Glass, Marc R. Jurman, Randi E. Collotta, Christopher K. Collotta, Q Capital Investment Partners, LP, DSJ International Resources Ltd. (d/b/a Chelsey Capital), and Jasper Capital LLC, C.A. No. 07 CV 1774 (S.D.N.Y) (PKC)

Three Defendants in Wall Street Insider Trading Ring Settle SEC Charges

The Securities and Exchange Commission announced today that on September 29, 2009, the Honorable P. Kevin Castel, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, entered final judgments against defendants Erik R. Franklin, Q Capital Investment Partners, LP (“Q Capital”), and David M. Tavdy, in SEC v. Guttenberg, et al., C.A. No. 07 CV 1774 (S.D.N.Y.), an insider trading case the Commission filed on March 1, 2007. The Commission’s complaint alleged illegal insider trading in connection with two related schemes in which Wall Street professionals serially traded on material, nonpublic information tipped by insiders at UBS Securities LLC (“UBS”) and Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. (“Morgan Stanley”), in exchange for cash kickbacks.

The Commission’s complaint alleged that from 2001 through 2006, Mitchel S. Guttenberg, an executive director in the equity research department of UBS, illegally tipped material, nonpublic information concerning upcoming UBS analyst upgrades and downgrades to two Wall Street traders, Franklin and Tavdy, in exchange for sharing in the illicit profits from their trading on that information. The complaint also alleged that Franklin was a downstream tippee in another scheme in which, in 2005 and 2006, Randi Collotta, an attorney who worked in the global compliance department of Morgan Stanley, illegally tipped material, nonpublic information concerning upcoming corporate acquisitions involving Morgan Stanley’s investment banking clients.

The complaint alleged that Franklin illegally traded on the inside information for two hedge funds he managed, Lyford Cay Capital, LP and Q Capital, and in his personal accounts. Tavdy illegally traded on the inside information (i) for Andover Brokerage, LLC and Assent LLC, registered broker-dealers where Tavdy was a proprietary trader, (ii) in his own personal account, (iii) in the accounts of a relative and friend, and (iv) in the accounts of Jasper Capital LLC, a day-trading firm with which Tavdy was associated. Franklin and Tavdy also had downstream tippees who traded on the inside information. Without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint, Franklin, Q Capital, and Tavdy settled the Commission’s insider trading charges.

Franklin and Q Capital consented to the entry of a final judgment which (i) permanently enjoins them from violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”); and (ii) orders, on a joint and several liability basis, disgorgement of $5,400,000, with all but $290,000 waived based on a demonstrated inability to pay. In a related administrative proceeding, Franklin consented to the entry of a Commission order barring him from future association with any broker, dealer, or investment adviser. In a parallel criminal case, Franklin previously pled guilty to charges of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud and is awaiting sentencing. U.S. v. Erik Franklin, No. 1:07-CR-164 (S.D.N.Y.).

Tavdy consented to the entry of a final judgment which (i) permanently enjoins him from violating Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act; and (ii) orders him to pay disgorgement of $10,300,000. In a related administrative proceeding, Tavdy consented to the entry of a Commission order barring him from future association with any broker or dealer. In a parallel criminal case, Tavdy previously pled guilty to charges of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and was sentenced to 63 months in prison. U.S. v. Mitchel Guttenberg and David Tavdy, No. 1:07-CR-141 (S.D.N.Y.).

The Commission also announced that Samuel W. Childs, Jr., a former general securities principal at Assent LLC, consented to a Commission order barring him from future association with any broker or dealer, based on his criminal conviction for conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud and commercial bribery. U.S. v. Samuel W. Childs, Jr. and Laurence McKeever, No. 1:07-CR-142 (S.D.N.Y.). In that case, the criminal indictment alleged that Childs accepted bribes from traders at Assent LLC in exchange for not reporting their illegal trading to Assent management.

The Commission acknowledges the assistance and cooperation of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

For further information, see Litigation Release Nos. 20022 (March 1, 2007), 20367 (November 20, 2007), 20725 (September 18, 2008), and 21086 (June 16, 2009).

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