Tag Archives: cftc

NFA Rule Compliance Rule 2-45 Approved

CPOs Prohibited From Taking Loans From Commodity Hedge Funds

The CFTC just recently approved a new NFA compliance rule which prohibits commodity pool operators (CPOs) from taking loans from the commodity pools which they manage. Additionally, if a CPO currently has some sort of a loan arrangement with their fund, such CPO will have until October 22, 2009 to notify the NFA of the arrangement and surrounding facts and circumstances.

With regard to this new rule, we urge CPOs to take the following notes:

  • If you currently have a loan arrangement with your fund, please contact an attorney immediately. If you have such an arrangement and do not disclose this to the NFA within the allowed time frame, you will be subject to significant action in the future if it is found that you did not comply with this requirement.
  • CPOs should think about updating their commodity pool offering documents to include a discussion of this new prohibition (if it is not already discussed in the pool offering documents).
  • CPOs should update their compliance manuals and procedures to specifically address this issue – it is likely that this will be a specific examination item in the near future and a well prepared CPO should have procedures in place to ensure compliance.

Below we have reprinted the notice announcing the new rule as well as the interpretive release which provides color on the new rule. If you have any questions on this new rule and its applicability to you CPO or your commodity pool, please contact us.  Related article:

****

Notice I-09-17

September 22, 2009

Effective Date of NFA Requirements Prohibiting Loans by Commodity Pools to CPOs and Related Entities

NFA has received notice that the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) has approved new NFA Compliance Rule 2-45. This Rule and its accompanying Interpretive Notice, which both became effective September 11, 2009, prohibit commodity pools from making direct or indirect loans or advances of pool assets to the CPO or any other affiliated person or entity.

CPOs that currently have existing loan or advance arrangements between their pools and the CPO, the CPO’s principals, or related entities must notify NFA of these arrangements by October 22, 2009. The written notification to NFA should describe the reason for the loan or advance; indicate the interest the CPO is paying, if any; provide evidence that the loan or advance is secured by marketable, liquid assets; explain arrangements the CPO has made to pay back the loan or advance, if any; and include an executed copy of the loan or advance agreement. In addition, the CPO must provide NFA with written evidence that pool participants were informed about the loan or advance through a disclosure contained in the disclosure document, offering memorandum or other correspondence.

NFA will review the information provided to ensure, among other things, that participants received a full disclosure of the arrangements and that the loans and advances are secured by marketable liquid assets. Depending on the results of the review, NFA will determine if a CPO needs to take any additional steps regarding a particular loan or advance. NFA may also recommend disciplinary action if warranted by our review of the circumstances.

More information about NFA Compliance Rule 2-45, and the accompanying Interpretive Notice, can be found in NFA’s August 26, 2009 Submission Letter to the CFTC. Questions concerning these changes should be directed to Mary McHenry, Senior Manager, Compliance ([email protected] or 312-781-1420) or Tracey Hunt, Senior Manager, Compliance ([email protected] or 312-781-1284).

****

August 26, 2009

Via Federal Express

Mr. David A. Stawick
Office of the Secretariat
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20581

Re: National Futures Association: Prohibition of Loans by Pools to Commodity Pool Operators and Related Parties – Proposed Adoption of Compliance Rule 2-45 and Interpretive Notice*

Dear Mr. Stawick:

On May 27, 2009, National Futures Association (“NFA”) submitted proposed new Compliance Rule 2-45 to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC” or “Commission”) for its review and approval. NFA hereby withdraws that submission and, pursuant to Section 17(j) of the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended, hereby resubmits the proposed Compliance Rule 2-45 and related Interpretive regarding prohibition of loans by pools to CPOs and related parties.

Compliance Rule 2-45 was approved by NFA’s Board of Directors (“Board”) on May 21, 2009, and the Interpretive Notice was approved by the Board on August 20, 2009. NFA is invoking the “ten-day” provision of Section 17(j) of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) and will make these proposals effective ten days after receipt of this submission by the Commission unless the Commission notifies NFA that the Commission has determined to review the proposals for approval.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
(additions are underscored)
COMPLIANCE RULES

* * *
PART 2 – RULES GOVERNING THE BUSINESS CONDUCT OF MEMBERS REGISTERED WITH THE COMMISSION
* * *

RULE 2-45. PROHIBITION OF LOANS BY COMMODITY POOLS TO CPOS AND AFFILIATED ENTITIES.

No Member CPO may permit a commodity pool to use any means to make a direct or indirect loan or advance of pool assets to the CPO or any other affiliated person or entity.

* * *
INTERPRETIVE NOTICES
* * *

COMPLIANCE RULE 2-45: PROHIBITION OF LOANS BY COMMODITY POOLS TO CPOS AND RELATED ENTITIES

NFA has recently taken a number of Member Responsibility Actions (MRAs) against commodity pool operators (CPOs) and CPO principals who directly or indirectly loaned or advanced pool assets to themselves or an affiliated person or entity. Many of these arrangements were used by these principals to purchase luxury items, while others went to related entities that did not have sufficient assets to repay the loans. In each case, the transaction resulted in significant losses to participants’ funds.

The Board of Directors has determined that direct or indirect loans or advances from pools to their CPOs, the CPO’s principals, or related entities should be prohibited. Therefore, NFA Compliance Rule 2-45 prohibits CPOs from permitting a commodity pool to use any means to make a direct or indirect loan or advance of pool assets to the CPO or any other affiliated person or entity.

NFA understands that a few pools may have made these types of loan or advance arrangements prior to Compliance Rule 2-45’s effective date. These CPOs are required to notify NFA of these existing arrangements within thirty (30) days of Compliance Rule 2-45’s effective date.

These arrangements violate NFA’s existing compliance rules if the arrangements are not consistent with the pool’s current disclosure document or offering materials and both the loan(s) or advance(s) and the conflict of interest are not fully disclosed to participants. Existing arrangements also violate NFA’s rules if the loan or advance is not secured by marketable, liquid assets (e.g. a CPO participant’s pro-rata interest in the pool’s liquid assets) and, therefore, the arrangement could have a material effect upon the pool’s ability to meet its obligations to participants.

EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

In February, NFA took two Member Responsibility Actions (“MRAs”) against three NFA Member commodity pool operators (“CPOs”). Although the basis of both MRAs was the CPOs’ failure to cooperate with NFA in an investigation, the limited investigation that NFA was able to perform revealed that the CPOs had misappropriated pool funds through improper loans from pools to the CPOs or related entities. The CFTC charged all three of the CPOs with misappropriating pool assets through improper loans, and all three were charged criminally with fraud.

These two matters are not the first instances of CPOs misappropriating pool participant funds through direct or indirect loans from a pool to the CPO or a related entity. Over the years, there have been a number of regulatory actions involving this type of fraud. Given the significant losses suffered by pool participants as a result of these improper loans, NFA is proposing to prohibit direct or indirect loans from commodity pools to the CPO or any affiliated person or entity.

NFA staff discussed this matter with NFA’s CPO/CTA Advisory Committee, which supported prohibiting loans because it believes that absent extraordinary circumstances there is no legitimate reason for a pool to make a direct or indirect loan to its CPO or a related party.

At its May 2009 meeting, the Board approved Compliance Rule 2-45. Although the rule provides for a complete prohibition, the Board was somewhat concerned that there might be some unforeseen very limited circumstances where a carve-out to this prohibition would be appropriate. As a result, the Board instructed staff to handle these situations on a case-by-case basis, with the CPO seeking no-action relief from NFA.

After NFA submitted the proposed rule to the Commission for approval, Commission staff informed NFA that although they supported the overall concept, they had concerns regarding NFA’s granting of no-action relief. In light of the Commission’s concerns and the fact that there are few, if any, foreseeable situations in which NFA should permit a loan arrangement, the Board reconsidered its original position regarding no-action relief.

Nonetheless, the Board recognizes that there are a few loan arrangements currently in place that have been fully disclosed and are adequately collateralized. Therefore, the Interpretive Notice provides that CPOs will not be required to immediately sell other assets to repay these existing loans. CPOs will, however, be required to notify NFA of any such current arrangements within 30 days of Compliance Rule 2-45’s effective date. NFA will review these arrangements to ensure, among other things, that participants were provided with full disclosure of the arrangements and that the loans are secured by marketable, liquid assets. Moreover, as NFA has done in several recent MRAs, we will not hesitate to recommend disciplinary action if we find those loans involve fraud, inadequate disclosure or are not properly collateralized.

As mentioned earlier, NFA is invoking the “ten-day” provision of Section 17(j) of the Commodity Exchange Act. NFA intends to make proposed Compliance Rule 2-45 and the related Interpretive Notice regarding the prohibition of loans by pools to CPOs and related parties effective ten days after receipt of this submission by the Commission, unless the Commission notifies NFA that the Commission has determined to review the proposal for approval.

Respectfully submitted,

Thomas W. Sexton
Senior Vice President and
General Counsel
_________
* The proposed adoption of Compliance Rule 2-45 and Interpretive Notice became effective September 11, 2009.

****

Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, or if you have questions about the CPO or CTA registration process, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

SEC Budget to Double Under Schumer Proposal

Embarrassed Agency Would Get Much Needed Funding

“The SEC’s failure to catch Bernie Madoff shows a level of incompetence unseen since FEMA’s handling of Hurricane Katrina” — Charles Schumer

To say that the SEC is or should be embarrassed about the Madoff scandal is an understatement (please see our most recent discussion on the SEC and Madoff).  However, we have to recognize that the SEC has always been (and potentially always will be) hampered by a limited government budget.  Budget size affects the ability of the SEC to be an effective enforcer in a number of key ways – not the least of which is the SEC’s (in)ability to train and retain staff who are able to understand the nuance and intricacies of the investment management industry.  The budget issue may soon become a non-issue if a proposal by Democratic Senator Charles Schumer makes its way through congress.  The Schumer proposal would provide the SEC with badly needed additional funding by allowing the agency to collect fees from the institutions it oversees.  According to Schumer’s press release, reprinted in full below, “In 2007, though the SEC brought in $1.54 billion in fees, it secured just $881.6 million in funding. Had the agency simply been able to hold onto all the fees it collected, it would have represented a 75 percent increase over the budget it was allotted through the appropriations process.”

We fully stand behind the Schumer proposal and believe that the SEC needs significantly more funding (than it currently receives) in order to do its job effectively.  Additional funding is also needed because of the likely increase of the scope of the SEC’s oversight responsibilities.  As we have reported before President Obama is calling for increased financial regulation and members of the Senate and Congress have been quick to propose a handful of bills which would completely burden the SEC if it was not appropriated more funds.  We also would like to point out that the CFTC has similar budget concerns and should also be appropratiated more funds.

We urge Congress to move forward with the Schumer proposal and to pass a similar bill for the benefit of the CFTC.

****

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
September 3, 2009

IN WAKE OF EXPLOSIVE REPORT ON FAILURE TO CATCH MADOFF… SCHUMER PROPOSES ALLOWING SEC TO KEEP ALL FEES IT COLLECTS IN ORDER TO AFFORD BETTER-TRAINED PERSONNEL—LEGISLATION COULD RESULT IN NEAR-DOUBLING OF AGENCY BUDGET

Yesterday’s Inspector General Report Faulted SEC
Staff’s Lack of Expertise and Experience For Failure To Discover Madoff Ponzi Scheme

Schumer’s Proposal Would Give SEC Access To Millions In Badly-Needed Funds To Recruit And Retain Higher-Caliber Examiners

Schumer Bill Would Treat Investor Protection Agency Like Fed and FDIC, Which are Already Allowed To Keep Fees They Collect

On the heels of an explosive independent report that blamed the failure to catch Bernie Madoff’s fraud scheme on widespread incompetence at the Securities and Exchange Commission, U.S. Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) announced Thursday that he is drafting legislation to allow the agency to keep all of the fees it collects so it can afford to recruit and retain better-trained personnel.

Schumer’s proposal, to be introduced when Congress returns to session next week, would, on average, bolster the SEC’s budget by hundreds of millions on an annual basis, enabling the agency to attract professionals with the expertise required to uncover complex financial fraud. In recent years, the size of the financial markets has grown rapidly while the SEC’s budget has remained essentially flat. The new funding scheme Schumer is proposing would treat the SEC in the same way as Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, both of which are funded through fees it collects from institutions it oversees.

SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has already signaled her support for Schumer’s proposal.

“The SEC’s failure to catch Bernie Madoff shows a level of incompetence unseen since FEMA’s handling of Hurricane Katrina. It is clear the SEC needs a bigger, more reliable funding stream so it can retain and recruit the top talent that has fled the agency of late,” Schumer said. “Under the current system, the agency’s rank-and-file personnel are struggling to keep up with the more sophisticated actors in the market. We cannot keep starving the SEC’s budget or the agency will remain a shadow of its former self.”

Schumer’s proposal comes after the SEC released a damning report by the Inspector General yesterday. According to a summary of the report, the SEC had enough evidence against Madoff to merit an investigation into the dealings of his investment firm, but the agency simply didn’t see what was happening right in front of them. The report repeatedly cites the lack of experience and expertise of the SEC personnel assigned to investigate Madoff, finding that they “failed to appreciate the significance of the analysis” in the complaints about Madoff and “failed to follow up on inconsistencies.”

Schumer said the agency’s ability to retain experienced personnel is an ongoing problem since Wall Street firms are increasingly able to lure the agency’s experts with higher salaries. Schumer said the SEC’s chronic under-funding must be addressed in a comprehensive way. Currently, the SEC raises millions more dollars every year in registration and transaction fees (not including enforcement penalties or settlements) than it is allocated through the appropriations process, but its budget is limited to the amount approved by Congress.  In 2007, though the SEC brought in $1.54 billion in fees, it secured just $881.6 million in funding. Had the agency simply been able to hold onto all the fees it collected, it would have represented a 75 percent increase over the budget it was allotted through the appropriations process.

The SEC is one of only two financial regulators in the U.S. that must go through the annual Congressional appropriations process.  U.S. banking regulators such as the Federal Reserve and the FDIC, on the other hand, can use what they collect in fees, deposit insurance and interest income to fund their operations.

Under Schumer’s proposal, the SEC will fund its own operations by using the transaction and registration fees it collects in place of a Congressionally-mandated budget.  Self-funding will give the SEC access to millions more than is allocated through the Congressional appropriations process. Shapiro has suggested that hiring hundreds of new employees over the next few years for the Division of Enforcement and the Office of Compliance, Inspection, and Examination will give the SEC the human and technological resources it needs to keep up with a vast and expanding market.

The SEC’s staff of approximately 3,650 oversees 35,000 entities.  Securities trading volume has increased 261% between 2003 and 2008, but the SEC staff grew only 15% over that period of time.  The number of registered investment advisors has grown by 47%, and the assets they manage have increased by 105%.  Meanwhile, the SEC examination staff charged with overseeing this portion of the financial system has grown by only 13% in that same time.  The number of tips and complaints received by the SEC has increased by 146%, but the enforcement staff has expanded by only 23%.  The SEC does not have the technology to track such a large market with so many players, and currently the SEC has limited capabilities to analyze data and identify market and trading risk.
###

****

Other hedge fund law articles related to increased hedge fund regulation:

Outstanding Congressional Bills increasing financial regulation:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

Commodity Pool Operators Scrambling After Surprise CFTC Decision

CFTC Withdraws Two No-Action Letters

In a surprise move the CFTC has withdrawn two no-action letters which is had just recently issued.  Under the new Chairman Gary Gensler, the CFTC has made an about face on this issue with regard to two commodity pool operators who were relying on the no-action letters issued in 2006.  Under the no-action letters, the CFTC provided no-action relief to the CPOs from certain speculative position limits.  According to the release reprinted below, the reason for the change is because Chairman Gensler “believe[s] that position limits should be consistently applied and vigorously enforced.”  While we generally believe that rules should be applied uniformly, we also believe that the governmental agencies (the CFTC and the SEC) should not make it a practice of revoking previously issued no-action letters.  We also believe that the CFTC and the SEC should not be in the business of express politicking, which may have been the case here – it sets a horrible precedent for new/changing administrations.  Additionally, we believe that the same “tough line” on position limits could have been effected in a less onerous manner.

The release states that the CFTC will work with the affected CPOs, but the damage has been done – how are businesses supposed to operate when these governmental agencies are constantly moving the target?

The no-action letters can be found here:

****

Release: 5695-09
For Release: August 19, 2009

CFTC Withdraws Two No-Action Letters Granting Relief from Federal Speculative Position Limits on Soybeans, Corn and Wheat Contracts

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission today announced that it is withdrawing two no-action letters that provided relief from federal agricultural speculative positions limits set forth in CFTC regulations (17 C.F.R §150.2).

“I believe that position limits should be consistently applied and vigorously enforced,” CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler said. “Position limits promote market integrity by guarding against concentrated positions.”

In CFTC Letter 06-09 (May 5, 2006), the agency’s Division of Market Oversight (DMO) granted no-action relief to DB Commodity Services LLC, a commodity pool operator (CPO) and commodity trading advisor (CTA), permitting the DB Commodity Index Tracking Master Fund to take positions in corn and wheat futures that exceed federal speculative position limits set forth in CFTC Regulation 150.2. Subsequently, in CFTC Letter 06-19 (September 6, 2006), DMO granted similar no-action relief to a CPO/CTA employing a proprietary commodity investment strategy that includes positions in Chicago Board of Trade corn, soybeans and wheat futures contracts. Among other things, DMO’s no-action position in both cases stated that any change in circumstances or conditions could result in a different conclusion. DMO has previously stated that the trading strategies employed by these entities would not qualify for a bona fide hedge exemption under the Commission’s regulations.

DMO will work with each of these entities as they transition to positions within current federal speculative limits. The withdrawal of these no-action positions is very specific and limited and does not affect any other no-action or regulatory positions taken by the CFTC or its staff with regard to these entities or other market participants.

Last Updated: August 19, 2009

****

Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, or if you have questions about becoming registered as a CPO or CTA, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009

Obama Administration to Regulate Derivatives Markets

Today the Treasury announced that the Obama Administration proposed a bill named the “Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009”.  The bill proposes to amend a number of the securities laws (including the Commodity Exchange Act, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), to regulate the OTC derivatives markets.  A summary of the release is reprinted below.  For the full legislation, please see Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009.

****

August 11, 2009
TG-261

Administration’s Regulatory Reform Agenda Reaches New Milestone: Final Piece of Legislative Language Delivered to Capitol Hill

For the legislative language, visit link.

Acting on its commitment to restoring stability in our financial system, the Administration delivered legislative language to Capitol Hill today focusing on the regulatory reform of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. One of the most significant changes in the world of finance in recent decades has been the explosive growth and rapid innovation in the markets for credit default swaps (CDS) and other OTC derivatives.  These markets have largely gone unregulated since their inception.  Enormous risks built up in these markets – substantially out of the view or control of regulators – and these risks contributed to the collapse of major financial firms in the past year and severe stress throughout the financial system.

Under the Administration’s legislation, the OTC derivative markets will be comprehensively regulated for the first time.  The legislation will provide for regulation and transparency for all OTC derivative transactions; strong prudential and business conduct regulation of all OTC derivative dealers and other major participants in the OTC derivative markets; and improved regulatory and enforcement tools to prevent manipulation, fraud, and other abuses in these markets.

Today’s delivery marks an important new milestone, as the Administration has now delivered a comprehensive package of financial regulatory reform legislation to Capitol Hill.  Less than two months since the release of its white paper, “Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation,” on June 17, the Administration has successfully translated all of its proposals into detailed legislative text – a remarkable effort in both speed and scope.  The Administration looks forward to working with Congress to pass a comprehensive regulatory reform bill by the end of the year.

As part of the Administration’s proposed legislation, credit default swap markets and all other OTC derivative markets will be subject to comprehensive regulation in order to:

  • Guard against activities in those markets posing excessive risk to the financial system
  • Promote the transparency and efficiency of those markets
  • Prevent market manipulation, fraud, insider trading, and other market abuses
  • Block OTC derivatives from being marketed inappropriately to unsophisticated parties

These goals will be reached through comprehensive regulation that includes:

  • Regulation of OTC derivative markets
  • Regulation of all OTC Derivative dealers and other major market participants
  • Preventing market manipulation, fraud, insider trading, and other market abuses
  • Protecting unsophisticated investors

Regulation of OTC Derivative Markets

Require Central Clearing and Trading of Standardized OTC Derivatives:

  • To reduce risks to financial stability that arise from the web of bilateral connections among major financial institutions, the legislation will require standardized OTC derivatives to be centrally cleared by a derivatives clearing organization regulated by the CFTC or a securities clearing agency regulated by the SEC.
  • To improve transparency and price discovery, standardized OTC derivatives will be required to be traded on a CFTC- or SEC-regulated exchange or a CFTC- or SEC-regulated alternative swap execution facility.

Move More OTC Derivatives into Central Clearing and Exchange Trading:

  • Through higher capital requirements and higher margin requirements for non-standardized derivatives, the legislation will encourage substantially greater use of standardized derivatives and thereby will facilitate substantial migration of OTC derivatives onto central clearinghouses and exchanges.
  • The legislation proposes a broad definition of a standardized OTC derivative that will be capable of evolving with the markets.

o An OTC derivative that is accepted for clearing by any regulated central clearinghouse will be presumed to be standardized.
o The CFTC and SEC will be given clear authority to prevent attempts by market participants to use spurious customization to avoid central clearing and exchange trading.

Require Transparency for All OTC Derivative Markets:

  • Accordingly, all relevant federal financial regulatory agencies will have access on a confidential basis to the OTC derivative transactions and related open positions of individual market participants.
  • In addition, the public will have access to aggregated data on open positions and trading volumes.

Regulation of All OTC Derivative Dealers and Other Major Market Participants

Extend the Scope of Regulation to Cover all OTC Derivative Dealers and other Major Participants in the OTC Derivative Markets:

  • Our legislation will require, for the first time, the federal supervision and regulation of any firm that deals in OTC derivatives and any other firm that takes large positions in OTC derivatives.

Bring Robust and Comprehensive Prudential Regulation to all OTC Derivative Dealers and other Major Participants in the OTC Derivative Markets:

  • Under the legislation, OTC derivative dealers and major market participants that are banks will be regulated by the federal banking agencies.  OTC derivative dealers and major market participants that are not banks will be regulated by the CFTC or SEC.
  • The federal banking agencies, CFTC, and SEC will be required to provide robust and comprehensive prudential supervision and regulation – including strict capital and margin requirements – for all OTC derivative dealers and major market participants.
  • The CFTC and SEC will be required to issue and enforce strong business conduct, reporting, and recordkeeping (including audit trail) rules for all OTC derivative dealers and major market participants.

Preventing Market Manipulation, Fraud, and other Market Abuses

Provide the CFTC and SEC with the Tools and Information Necessary to Prevent Manipulation, Fraud, and Abuse:

  • The legislation gives the CFTC and SEC clear, unimpeded authority to deter market manipulation, fraud, insider trading, and other abuses in the OTC derivative markets.
  • The CFTC and SEC will be given the authority to set position limits and large trader reporting requirements for OTC derivatives that perform or affect a significant price discovery function with respect to regulated markets.
  • The full regulatory transparency that the legislation will bring to the OTC derivative markets will assist regulators in detecting and deterring manipulation, fraud, insider trading, and other abuses.

Protecting Unsophisticated Investors

Better Protect Unsophisticated Investors from Abuse in the OTC Derivative Markets:

  • The legislation will tighten the definition of eligible investors that are able to engage in OTC derivative transactions to better protect individuals and small municipalities.

###

Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, or if you have questions about investment adviser registration with the SEC or state securities commission, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009

As part of the new Obama financial regulation plan, which includes potentially the registration of hedge fund managers with the SEC, the Whitehouse has sent a draft to congress of the new Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 (CFPAA of 2009).  The act would create a new government agency which would have some interaction with both the SEC and the CFTC.  A full version of the draft can be found here: Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009.  Additionally, you can find President Obama’s statement with regard to this new agency reprinted below.  For more information, please also see Jim Hamilton’s website.

More posts about this new act and what it will mean to hedge funds will be forthcoming.

****

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
EMBARGOED UNTIL 6:00 AM ET,

SATURDAY, June 20, 2009

WEEKLY ADDRESS: President Obama Highlights Tough New Consumer Protections

WASHINGTON – In his weekly address, President Barack Obama explained the necessity of his proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency.  It is clear that one of the major causes of the current economic crisis was a breakdown of oversight leading to widespread abuses in the financial world.  The Consumer Financial Protection Agency will have the sole job of looking out for the financial interests of ordinary Americans by banning unfair practices and enforcing the rules.  This is the type of reform that will attack the causes of the current crisis and prevent further crises from taking place.

The audio and video will be available at 6:00am Saturday, June 20, 2009 at www.whitehouse.gov.

Prepared Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
June 20, 2009

As we continue to recover from an historic economic crisis, it is clear to everyone that one of its major causes was a breakdown in oversight that led to widespread abuses in the financial system. An epidemic of irresponsibility took hold from Wall Street to Washington to Main Street.  And the consequences have been disastrous. Millions of Americans have seen their life savings erode; families have been devastated by job losses; businesses large and small have closed their doors.

In response, this week, my administration proposed a set of major reforms to the rules that govern our financial system; to attack the causes of this crisis and to prevent future crises from taking place; to ensure that our markets can work fairly and freely for businesses and consumers alike.

We are going to promote markets that work for those who play by the rules. We’re going to stand up for a system in which fair dealing and honest competition are the only way to win. We’re going to level the playing field for consumers. And we’re going to have the kinds of rules that encourage innovations that make our economy stronger – not those that allow insiders to exploit its weaknesses for their own gain.

And one of the most important proposals is a new oversight agency called the Consumer Financial Protection Agency. It’s charged with just one job: looking out for the interests of ordinary Americans in the financial system. This is essential, for this crisis may have started on Wall Street.  But its impacts have been felt by ordinary Americans who rely on credit cards, home loans, and other financial instruments.

It is true that this crisis was caused in part by Americans who took on too much debt and took out loans they simply could not afford. But there are also millions of Americans who signed contracts they did not always understand offered by lenders who did not always tell the truth. Today, folks signing up for a mortgage, student loan, or credit card face a bewildering array of incomprehensible options. Companies compete not by offering better products, but more complicated ones – with more fine print and hidden terms.  It’s no coincidence that the lack of strong consumer protections led to abuses against consumers; the lack of rules to stop deceptive lending practices led to abuses against borrowers.

This new agency will have the responsibility to change that. It will have the power to set tough new rules so that companies compete by offering innovative products that consumers actually want – and actually understand. Those ridiculous contracts – pages of fine print that no one can figure out – will be a thing of the past. You’ll be able to compare products – with descriptions in plain language – to see what is best for you.  The most unfair practices will be banned. The rules will be enforced.

Some argue that these changes – and the many others we’ve called for – go too far. And I welcome a debate about how we can make sure our regulations work for businesses and consumers. But what I will not accept – what I will vigorously oppose – are those who do not argue in good faith. Those who would defend the status quo at any cost. Those who put their narrow interests ahead of the interests of ordinary Americans. We’ve already begun to see special interests mobilizing against change.

That’s not surprising. That’s Washington.

For these are interests that have benefited from a system which allowed ordinary Americans to be exploited. These interests argue against reform even as millions of people are facing the consequences of this crisis in their own lives. These interests defend business-as-usual even though we know that it was business-as-usual that allowed this crisis to take place.

Well, the American people did not send me to Washington to give in to the special interests; the American people sent me to Washington to stand up for their interests.  And while I’m not spoiling for a fight, I’m ready for one. The most important thing we can do to put this era of irresponsibility in the past is to take responsibility now. That is why my administration will accept no less than real and lasting change to the way business is done – on Wall Street and in Washington. We will do what is necessary to end this crisis – and we will do what it takes to prevent this kind of crisis from ever happening again.

Thank you.

****

Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to  learn how to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

CFTC Chairman Speaks to MFA

Chairman Gary Gensler Discusses Over-the-Counter Derivatives Regulation and Hedge Funds

CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has been busy lately testifying before Congress and now speaking to the Managed Futures Association.  His remarks to the MFA, which can be found here and which are reprinted in full below, mirror his earlier statements to the Congress regarding the regulation of OTC derivates and hedge fund registration (see Congress and Regulators Discuss OTC Derivatives).  Gensler’s comments are generally seen as reasonable but aggressive and we are seeing an increase in the political power of the CFTC in general and vis-a-vis the SEC (with respect to certain issues at least).  I am very interested in how these issues will play out in the political process over the next few month.

****

Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Office of External Affairs
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street, NW
Washington, DC 20581
202.418.5080

Remarks of Chairman Gary Gensler Before the Managed Funds Association, Chicago, Illinois

June 24, 2009

Thank you for that introduction, Richard. I greatly appreciate the invitation to speak to the Managed Funds Association at this critical time in our nation’s economy. The last time the two of us were together with a crowd of this size, I was testifying as an Undersecretary at the Department of the Treasury before your Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives. Once again, we’re together discussing challenges facing our financial system and possible solutions.

As President Obama announced exactly one week ago, we must urgently enact broad regulatory reforms of our financial system. The President’s proposal offers bold reforms seeking to prevent the financial breakdowns that led to our current crisis. It is sweeping in scope, cutting across the financial system to provide greater oversight, transparency and accountability.

Today I would like to focus on two key areas: regulation of over-the-counter derivatives and hedge funds.

Over-the-Counter Derivatives

We must establish a regulatory regime to cover the entire over-the-counter derivatives marketplace.
This will help the American public by: One – lowering systemic risk. Two – providing transparency and efficiency in markets. Three – ensuring market integrity by preventing fraud, manipulation, and other abuses. And four – protecting the retail public.

This new regime should govern 100% of OTC derivatives no matter who is trading them or what type of derivative is traded, standardized or customized. That includes interest rate swaps, currency swaps, commodity swaps, equity swaps, credit default swaps or those which cannot yet be foreseen.

I envision this will require two complementary regimes — one for regulation of the dealers and one for regulation of the market functions. Together, with both of these, we will ensure that the entire derivatives marketplace is subject to comprehensive regulation.

The current financial crisis has taught us that the derivatives trading activities of a single firm can threaten the entire financial system. The costs to the public from the failure of these firms has been staggering, $180 Billion of American taxpayer financial support for AIG alone. The AIG subsidiary that dealt in derivatives – AIG Financial Products –was not subject to any effective federal regulation. Nor were the derivatives dealers affiliated with Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and other investment banks. As such, all derivatives dealers need to be subject to robust federal regulation.

Regulation of the dealers should set capital standards and margin requirements to lower risk. We also must set business conduct standards. These standards would guard against fraud, manipulation, and other market abuses. Additionally, they would lower risk by setting important back office standards for timely and accurate confirmation, processing, netting, documentation, and valuation of all transactions. Lastly, we must also mandate recordkeeping and reporting to promote transparency and to allow the CFTC and SEC to vigorously enforce market integrity.

By fully regulating the institutions that trade or hold themselves out to the public as derivative dealers we ensure that all OTC products, both standardized and customized, are subject to robust oversight. Particular care should be given to ensure that no gaps exist between the regulation of standardized and customized products. Customized derivatives, though allowed, would be subject to capital, margin, business conduct and reporting standards. Customized derivatives, however, are by their nature less standard, less liquid and less transparent. Therefore, I believe that higher capital and margin requirements for customized products are justified.

Beyond regulating the dealers, I believe that we must mandate the use of central clearing and exchange venues for all standardized derivatives. Derivatives that can be moved into central clearing should be cleared through regulated central clearing houses and brought onto regulated exchanges or regulated transparent electronic trading systems.

Requiring clearing will promote market integrity and lower risks. Individual firms will become less interconnected as OTC transactions are netted out through centralized clearing. Furthermore, mandated clearing will bring the discipline of daily valuation of transactions and the posting of collateral.

I also would like to highlight three essential features for OTC central clearinghouses:

  • Governance arrangements should be transparent and incorporate a broad range of viewpoints from members and other market participants,
  • Central counterparties should be required to have fair and open access criteria that allow any firm that meets objective, prudent standards to participate regardless of whether it is a dealer or a trading firm, and
  • Finally, in order to promote clearing and achieve market efficiency through competition, OTC derivatives should be fungible and able to be transferred between one exchange or electronic trading system to another.

Market transparency and efficiency would be further improved by requiring the standardized part of the OTC markets onto fully regulated exchanges and fully regulated transparent electronic trading systems. Experience has shown that President Franklin Roosevelt’s approach is correct. To function well, markets must be properly-regulated and transparent. They simply cannot police themselves nor remain in the dark.

Regulated exchanges and regulated transparent trading systems will bring much needed transparency to OTC markets. Market participants should be able to see all of the bids and offers. A complete audit trail of all transactions on the exchanges or trade execution systems should be available to the regulators. Through a trade reporting system there should be timely public posting of the price, volume and key terms of completed transactions.

Market regulators should have authority to impose recordkeeping and reporting requirements and to police the operations of all exchanges and electronic trading systems to prevent fraud, manipulation and other abuses.

The CFTC should have the ability to impose position limits, including aggregate limits, on all persons trading OTC derivatives that perform or affect a significant price discovery function with respect to regulated markets that the CFTC oversees. Such position limit authority should clearly empower the CFTC to establish aggregate position limits across markets in order to ensure that traders are not able to avoid position limits in a market by moving to a related exchange or market, including international markets.

To fully achieve these objectives, we must enact both of these complementary regimes. Regulating both the traders and the markets will ensure that we cover both the actors and the stages that may create significant risks.

Hedge Funds

The second topic that I would like to discuss is regulation of hedge funds. President Obama has called for advisers to hedge funds and other investment funds to register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act. Advisers should be required to report information on the funds they manage that is sufficient to assess whether any fund poses a threat to financial stability.

The Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) currently provides that funds trading in the futures markets register as Commodity Pool Operators (CPO) and file annual financials with the CFTC. Over 1300 CPOs, including many of the largest hedge funds, are currently registered with and make annual filings to the CFTC. It will be important that the CFTC be able to maintain its enforcement authority over these entities as the SEC takes on important new responsibilities in this area.

This financial crisis also gave new meaning to the term “run on the bank”. Upon hearing those words, most of us would conjure up the image of the citizens of Bedford Falls standing outside George Bailey’s Savings and Loan in the movie It’s a Wonderful Life. Last year, we witnessed the modern version of this in a number of ways. A harsh lesson of the crisis occurred when a significant number of hedge funds sought to pull securities and funds from their prime brokers, contributing to uncertainty and the destabilization of the financial system.

You may be aware of proposals being discussed by the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) regarding the relationship between hedge funds and their prime brokerages and banks, which will require new oversight and rules of the road. Here at home, we should seriously consider similar principles to best guard against runs on liquidity by hedge funds.

In an effort to harmonize financial market oversight, the President requested the CFTC and SEC to provide a report to Congress by September 30, 2009. We will identify existing differences in statutes and regulations with respect to similar types of financial instruments, explain if differences are still appropriate, and make recommendations for changes. In developing recommendations for harmonization we will seek broad input from the public, other regulators, and market users.

Before closing, I would like to mention Chairman Levin’s report on wheat convergence released today by the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Chairman Levin’s report is a significant contribution to discussions regarding the potential effects of index trading in the wheat market and other commodity futures markets. As the Commission continues our own analysis and appropriate regulatory responses, Chairman Levin’s recommendations will be carefully considered.
I would like to thank you again for having me here today, and I am happy to take questions.

****

Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Congress and Regulators Discuss OTC Derivatives Regulation

Increased regulation looming as SEC and CFTC jockey for position

The  severe financial crisis that has unfolded over the last two years has revealed serious weaknesses in the structure of U.S. financial regulation, as well as the pressing need for a comprehensive regulatory framework.  Part of President Obama’s new financial regulation plan is to regulate the over the counter (OTC) derivatives markets.  On June 22nd, 2009, both the SEC and CFTC testified to congress regarding the regulation of these markets.

Chairman Mary Shapiro (SEC) and Chairman Gary Gensler (CTFC) each testified before Congress to address the existing gaps in regulatory oversight of these securities-related OTC derivatives, and propose a new framework that would provide expand regulatory authority of the CTFC and SEC to oversee the OTC markets. The primary goal of the proposed regulatory reform measures is to achieve the following four primary objectives:

  1. preventing activities in the OTC derivatives markets from posing risk to the financial system;
  2. promoting efficiency and transparency of those markets;
  3. preventing market manipulation, fraud, and other market abuses; and
  4. ensuring that OTC derivatives are not marketed inappropriately to unsophisticated parties.

I have reprinted the entire SEC testimony and CFTC testimony below.

****

Testimony Concerning Regulation of Over-The-Counter Derivatives
by Chairman Mary L. Schapiro

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
United States Senate
June 22, 2009

I. Introduction

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Bunning, and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the regulation of over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives. The severe financial crisis that has unfolded over the last two years has revealed serious weaknesses in the structure of U.S. financial regulation. One of these is the gap in regulation of OTC derivatives, which under current law are largely excluded or exempted from regulation. The SEC is committed to working closely with this Committee, the Congress, the Administration, and fellow regulatory agencies to close this gap and restore a sound structure for U.S. financial regulation.

My testimony today on the regulation of OTC derivatives will reflect the SEC’s perspective as the country’s capital markets regulator. First, I will give an overview of the OTC derivatives markets, with particular focus on those derivatives products that are directly related to or based on securities or issuers of securities and therefore directly connected with the SEC’s statutory mandate. Second, I will outline an approach that would address the existing gaps in regulatory oversight of these securities-related OTC derivatives.

I must tell you right at the start that, given the current limited regulation of OTC derivatives, no regulatory authority can give you a complete picture of OTC derivatives and how they have affected the regulated securities markets. One reason that we need legislation is that our sources of information about securities-related OTC derivatives products, participants, and trading are limited, particularly when contrasted with the tools we have to monitor the markets for other securities products subject to the federal securities laws.

The good news, however, is that the U.S. regulatory authorities have reached a broad consensus on the pressing need for a comprehensive regulatory framework for OTC derivatives. As reflected in Treasury Secretary Geithner’s letter to the Congressional leadership on May 13, 2009, this consensus covers all of the basics of sound financial regulation in the 21st century, including recordkeeping and reporting requirements, appropriate capital and margin requirements, transparent and efficient markets, clearing and settlement systems that monitor and manage risk, business conduct and disclosure standards to protect the interests of market participants, and vigorous enforcement against fraud and other wrongdoing.

One important aspect of a new regulatory framework will be well-regulated central counterparties (“CCPs”). CCPs address concerns about counterparty risk by substituting the creditworthiness and liquidity of the CCP for the creditworthiness and liquidity of counterparties. For this reason, CCPs contribute generally to the goal of market stability. Through uniform margining and other risk controls, including controls on market-wide concentrations that cannot be implemented effectively when counterparty risk management is decentralized, CCPs help protect the broader financial system. It is important to note that achieving standardization, a prerequisite for centralized clearing, may present significant challenges.

U.S. regulators agree on the objectives of a new regulatory framework for OTC derivatives that will protect the public interest, manage systemic risk, and promote capital formation and general economic welfare. Any new regulatory framework, however, should take into consideration the purposes that appropriately regulated derivatives can serve, including affording market participants the ability to hedge positions and effectively manage risk. My goal today is to assist the Congress as best I can in its efforts to craft legislation that empowers the respective regulatory authorities to do their jobs effectively in any new framework. I am confident that, working together, we will meet the challenge that is so important to the financial well-being of individual Americans.

II. Overview of Securities-Related OTC Derivatives

A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is based on the value of an underlying “reference” (e.g., an asset such as a commodity, bond, equity, or currency, or an index of such assets, or an event). For example, in exchange for $100 today, financial institution “A” will pay counterparty “B” $150 if “something” happens (something can be almost anything: Z company defaults on its debt payments; the S&P 500 falls 10%; the Dow rises 5%). A derivative is “OTC” when it is not traded on a regulated exchange. An OTC derivative is “securities-related” when the reference is to an entity that is an issuer of securities (such as a public company), to a security itself (or a related event such as a dividend payment), to a group or index of securities or issuers, or based on related aspects of a security or group or index of securities or issuers, such as price, yield, volatility, dividend payments, or value.

An OTC derivative is an incredibly flexible product that can, essentially, be engineered to achieve almost any financial purpose between two parties. Indeed, as I will discuss later, an OTC derivative can enable market participants to replicate the economics of either a purchase or sale of securities without purchasing or selling the securities themselves. Transactions occurring in the OTC derivatives markets can serve important economic purposes such as allowing market participants to hedge exposure and manage risk. When market participants engage in these types of transactions in the OTC derivatives markets, the transactions, which are substantially similar to traditional securities transactions, and the parties engaged in them, would fall outside the current reach of key provisions of the federal securities laws.

OTC derivatives are largely excluded from the securities regulatory framework by the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000.1 In a recent study on a type of securities-related OTC derivative known as a credit default swap, or CDS, the Government Accountability Office found that “comprehensive and consistent data on the overall market have not been readily available,” that “authoritative information about the actual size of the CDS market is generally not available,” and that regulators currently are unable “to monitor activities across the market.”

One source of information on OTC derivatives volume is the data collected by the Bank for International Settlements (“BIS”). BIS data cover the OTC derivatives exposure of major banks and dealers in the G10 countries. For all OTC derivatives in December 2008, BIS reported a notional amount outstanding of $592 trillion and a gross market value outstanding of $34 trillion. Interest rate contracts and foreign exchange contracts are the two largest sources of OTC derivatives volume. For those types of products that appear to be securities-related credit derivatives and equity derivatives in December 2008, BIS reported a notional amount outstanding of $48.4 trillion and a gross market value outstanding of $6.8 trillion. A notional amount of $70 trillion and a gross market value of $5 trillion are “unallocated” for December 2008. Clearly, this volume of largely unregulated financial activity is enormous, even when just considering the relatively small volume component that is securities-related.

Who are the major participants in the securities-related OTC derivatives markets? First, the markets are concentrated and appear to be almost exclusively “dealer-intermediated” — that is, one of a small number of major dealers is a party to almost all transactions, whether as a buyer or a seller. The customers of the dealers appear to be almost exclusively institutions. Many of these may be highly sophisticated, such as large hedge funds and other pooled short-term trading vehicles. As you know, many hedge funds have not been subject to direct regulation by the SEC and, accordingly, we have very little ability to obtain information concerning their trading activity at this point.

Other customers in the securities-related OTC derivatives markets have been institutions for which derivatives products may not be a suitable investment. In this regard, there is consensus among U.S. regulators reflected in Secretary Geithner’s letter is to ensure that OTC derivatives are not marketed inappropriately to unsophisticated parties. The SEC and CFTC staff, together with other financial regulators, currently are considering a tiered approach to regulation, with scaling that could be based in the first instance on indicia of sophistication and financial thresholds, with requirements for additional disclosure and standards of care with respect to the marketing of derivatives to less sophisticated counterparties. Implementation of such a regulatory approach would depend on a Congressional grant of authority in this area.

Finally, what are the purposes for which securities-related OTC derivatives may be used? One example of a useful purpose for securities-related OTC derivatives is to manage the risk associated with a particular securities position. An investor with a large position in the debt of a company may seek to reduce or hedge some of the risk associated with that investment by purchasing credit protection in the CDS market. In addition, market participants also may use a securities-related OTC derivative to establish a short position with respect to the debt of a specific company. In particular, a market participant that does not own a bond or other debt instrument of a company may purchase a CDS as a way to short that company’s debt.

Market participants take positions in a wide range of exchange-traded and OTC instruments. It is a market participant’s overall (or net) economic exposure that plays a role in determining the risks to which it is exposed. Because OTC derivatives can be customized, a market participant could take a long position in an index — such as the S&P 100 index — through a securities-related OTC derivative and a short position through another OTC derivative on a subset of the securities in the S&P 100 index. The flexibility to tailor OTC derivative contracts allows a participant to create an economic exposure to as large or small a portion of the market it chooses through one or a combination of contracts. This flexibility allowed by OTC derivatives is one of these contracts’ strengths. Because of the link to regulated securities market, however, it is important that the SEC have the tools to see all related activity so that it is in the best position possible to detect and deter market abuses that can disrupt the integrity of the market.

III. Filling Regulatory Gaps in Oversight of Securities-Related OTC Derivatives

Secretary Geithner’s May 13 letter to the Congressional leadership outlined the Administration’s plan for establishing a comprehensive framework for regulating OTC derivatives. The framework is designed to achieve four broad objectives: (1) preventing activities in the OTC derivatives markets from posing risk to the financial system; (2) promoting efficiency and transparency of those markets; (3) preventing market manipulation, fraud, and other market abuses; and (4) ensuring that OTC derivatives are not marketed inappropriately to unsophisticated parties.

Secretary Geithner recognized that multiple federal regulatory agencies would play critical roles in implementing the proposed framework, including the SEC and the CFTC. He emphasized that the securities and commodities laws should be amended to ensure that the SEC and CFTC, consistent with their respective missions, have the necessary authority to achieve — together with the efforts of other regulators — the four policy objectives for OTC derivatives regulation.

The final part of my testimony today is intended to follow up on Secretary Geithner’s letter by recommending a straightforward and principled approach for achieving these policy objectives. Stated briefly, primary responsibility for “securities-related” OTC derivatives would be retained by the SEC, which is also responsible for oversight of markets affected by this subset of OTC derivatives. Primary responsibility for all other OTC derivatives, including derivatives related to interest rates, foreign exchange, commodities, energy, and metals, , would rest with the CFTC.

Under this functional and sensible approach to regulation, OTC derivatives markets that are interconnected with the regulated securities markets would be incorporated within a unified securities regulatory regime. The direct link between securities-related OTC derivatives and securities is such that SEC regulation of the former is essential to the effectiveness of the SEC’s statutory mission with respect to the securities markets. The securities regulatory regime is specifically designed to promote the Congressional objectives for capital markets, which include investor protection, the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, and the facilitation of capital formation. It is important that securities-related OTC derivatives be subject to the federal securities laws so that the risk of arbitrage and manipulation of interconnected markets is minimized.

Over the years, Congress has fashioned a broad and flexible regulatory regime for securities that long has accommodated a wide range of products and trading venues. The products include equities, debt, other fixed income securities, options on securities, exchange-traded funds and other investment companies, and many other types of derivative contracts on securities. Some of these securities products are among the most actively traded financial products in the world, with exchange-listed US equities currently trading approximately 11 billion shares per day. Many other securities products trade rarely, if at all. In addition, securities products trade in many different ways in a wide variety of venues, depending on the particular features of the product. These venues include 11 national securities exchanges with self-regulatory responsibilities, more than 70 alternative trading systems that execute OTC transactions, and hundreds of broker-dealers that execute OTC transactions. Finally, securities products are cleared and settled in a variety of ways depending on the particular characteristics of the product.

The current securities laws are broad and flexible enough to regulate appropriately all of these varied securities products and trading venues. The regulatory requirements are specifically tailored to reflect the particular nature of products and venues and to promote the Congressional objectives for capital markets. Accordingly, securities-related OTC derivatives could be brought under the same umbrella of oversight as the related, underlying securities markets in a relatively straightforward manner with little need to “reinvent the wheel.” Specifically, Congress could make a limited number of discrete amendments to the statutory definition of a security to cover securities-related OTC derivatives. With these definitional changes, securities-related OTC derivatives could be incorporated within an existing regulatory framework that is appropriate for these products.

The rest of my testimony will elaborate on this basic approach. I first will discuss the close relationship between the regulated securities markets and the markets for securities-related OTC derivatives and then sketch an overview of how oversight of such instruments could be integrated with the SEC’s existing oversight of the securities markets.

A. Relationship between the Securities Markets and Securities-Related OTC Derivatives

In fashioning a regulatory framework for OTC derivatives, it is crucial to recognize the close relationship between the regulated securities markets and the now mostly unregulated markets for securities-related OTC derivatives. Securities-related OTC derivatives can be used to establish either a synthetic “long” exposure to an underlying security or group of securities, or a synthetic “short” exposure to an underlying security or group of securities. In this way, market participants can replicate the economics of either a purchase or sale of securities without purchasing or selling the securities themselves.

For example, an equity swap on a single equity security or on an index, such as one of the Dow stocks or the Dow itself, would give the holder of the “long” position all of the economic exposure of owning the stock or index, without actual ownership of the stock or index. This would include exposure to price movements of the stock or index, as well as any dividends or other distributions. Similarly, credit default swaps (“CDS”) can be used as synthetic substitutes for the debt securities of one or more companies. Indeed, any exchange of cash for a security can be structured as an OTC derivatives contract.

Because market participants can readily use securities-related OTC derivatives to serve as synthetic substitutes for securities, the markets for these OTC derivatives directly and powerfully implicate the policy objectives for capital markets that Congress has set forth in the federal securities laws. These objectives include investor protection, the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, and the facilitation of capital formation.

1. Investor Protection

The current regulatory framework has permitted certain opaque securities-related OTC derivatives markets to develop outside of investor protection provisions of the securities laws. These provisions include requiring the disclosure of significant ownership provisions and recordkeeping and reporting (including those that serve as prophylactic measures against fraud, manipulation, or insider trading) that helps to promote enforcement of the securities laws.

The exclusion of certain securities-related OTC derivatives from most of the securities regulatory regime has detracted from the SEC’s ability to uphold its investor protection mandate. For example, in investigating possible market manipulation during the financial crisis, the SEC has used its anti-fraud authority over security-based swaps to gather information about transactions in OTC derivatives as well as in the underlying securities. Yet investigations of these OTC derivative transactions have been far more difficult and time-consuming than those involving cash equities and options. Audit trail data on OTC derivative transactions is not readily available and must be reconstructed manually, in contrast to the data available in the equity markets. The SEC’s enforcement efforts have been seriously complicated by the lack of a mechanism for promptly obtaining critical information — who traded, how much, and when — that is complete and accurate.

In addition, the SEC believes that it is important in the OTC derivatives market, as in the market for securities generally, that parties to transactions have access to financial information and other disclosures so they can evaluate the risks relating to a particular investment to make more informed investment decisions and can value and evaluate their OTC derivatives and their counterparty exposures. For example, this information assists market participants in performing adequate due diligence on their investments and in valuing their OTC derivatives and their other risks.

A basic tenet of functional regulation of securities markets is to have a regulatory regime under which similar products and activities should be subject to similar regulations and oversight. Currently, securities are subject to transparency, active enforcement, and appropriate regulation of business conduct. Whereas securities-related OTC derivatives, which are interconnected with the securities markets (and in some cases are economic substitutes for securities) are not subject to most of these investor protection requirements. The securities laws are uniquely designed to address these issues and should be extended to OTC derivatives.

2. Fair and Orderly Markets

Trading in securities-related OTC derivatives can directly affect trading in the securities markets. From an economic viewpoint, the interchangeability of securities and securities-related OTC derivatives means that they are driven by the same economic forces and are linked by common participants, trading strategies, and hedging activities.

For example, credit default swap, or CDS trading is closely related to trading in the underlying securities that compose the capital structure of the companies on which protection is written. Trading practices in the CDS market, whether legitimate or abusive, can affect the securities markets. The CDS market, however, lacks the level of transparency and other protections that characterize the regulated securities markets. As a result, the SEC has been unable to monitor effectively for trading abuses and whether purchasers of CDS protection on an issuer’s debt have sold short the equity securities of that company as a trading strategy, effectively linking activities and changes in the CDS market with those in the cash equity market. These activities in the CDS market could adversely impact the regulated securities markets. Any regulatory reform that maintained distinct regulatory regimes for securities markets and markets for securities-related OTC derivatives would suffer from this same limitation.

The SEC is considering whether reporting under the Exchange Act should apply to security-based OTC derivatives so that the ownership of and transactions in security-based derivatives would be considered ownership of and transactions in the underlying equity security. We are further evaluating whether persons using equity derivatives, such as an equity swap, should be subject to the beneficial ownership reporting provisions of the Exchange Act when accumulating substantial share positions in connection with change of control transactions.

3. Capital Formation

Facilitating capital formation depends on the existence of fair and efficient secondary markets for investors. Purchasers in the primary offering of a company are attracted by secondary markets that enable them to liquidate their positions readily. Less efficient markets can cause potential investors in companies either to find other uses for their funds or to demand a higher rate of return to compensate them for a less efficient secondary market. If a disparity in the regulatory requirements for securities and securities-related OTC derivatives cause securities markets to operate less efficiently, it will harm those companies that depend on the U.S. securities markets to access the capital that is essential for innovation and growth, as well as harming investors and the capital markets as a whole.

Because many securities-related OTC derivatives are allowed to trade outside of the securities regulatory regime, the SEC generally is unable to promote transparency in the trading of these products and efficiency in pricing. As noted above, companies whose securities are affected by the excluded products could suffer from the absence of transparency and efficiency. Moreover, manipulative activities in the markets for securities-related OTC derivatives can affect US issuers in the underlying equity market, thereby damaging the public perception of those companies and raising their cost of capital. To protect the integrity of the markets, trading in all securities-related OTC derivatives should be fully subject to the US regulatory regime designed to facilitate capital formation. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that derivatives transactions, including OTC derivatives transactions, allow parties to hedge and manage risk, which itself can promote capital formation. To the extent the ability to manage risk is inappropriately limited, it can discourage market participation, including by investors.

B. Regulatory Oversight of Securities-Related OTC Derivatives

To provide a unified, consistent framework for securities regulation, Congress should subject securities-related OTC derivatives to the federal securities laws. This result can be achieved simply by clarifying the definition of “security” to expressly include securities-related OTC derivatives, and removing the current express exclusion of swaps from that definition. The SEC then would have authority to regulate securities-related OTC derivatives regardless of how the products are traded, whether on an exchange or OTC, and regardless of how the products are cleared.

1. Definition of Securities-Related OTC Derivatives

OTC derivatives can be categorized generally as securities-related or non-securities-related, based on the different types of underlying assets, events, or interests to which they are related. Securities-related OTC derivatives would include equity derivatives and credit and other fixed income derivatives. Non-securities-related derivatives would include interest rate derivatives, foreign currency derivatives, and all non-financial derivatives. By including securities-related OTC derivatives under the umbrella of the federal securities laws, the SEC would have responsibility over the portion of the OTC derivatives market that is vital to promote its mission of investor protection, the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, and the facilitation of capital formation.

In addition, the SEC would continue to regulate those types of OTC derivatives that always have been considered securities, such as OTC security options, certain OTC notes (including equity-linked notes), and forward contracts on securities. These particular types of OTC derivatives always have been included in the definition of security and current law recognizes this fact by excluding these derivatives from the definition of “swap agreement” in Section 206A of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.

2.Regulation of OTC Derivatives Dealers and Major OTC Participants

Under our recommended approach, major participants in the OTC derivatives markets would be subject to oversight and supervision to ensure there are no gaps. To reduce duplication, OTC derivatives dealers that are banks would be subject to prudential supervision by their federal banking regulator. All other OTC derivatives dealers in securities-related OTC derivatives would be subject to supervision and regulation by the SEC. The SEC would have authority to set appropriate capital requirements for these OTC derivatives dealers. This approach would permit existing OTC derivatives dealers that are banks to continue to engage in OTC derivatives activities without being subject to the full panoply of broker-dealer regulation, while ensuring that all currently unregulated OTC derivatives dealers in securities-related OTC derivatives are subject to appropriate supervision and regulation. Should Congress establish a new systemic risk regulator or systemic risk council, that entity also could help monitor institutions that might present systemic risk.

In addition, the SEC would have authority to establish business conduct standards and recordkeeping and reporting requirements (including an audit trail) for all securities-related OTC derivatives dealers and other firms with large counterparty exposures in securities-related OTC derivatives (“Major OTC Participants”). This “umbrella” authority would help ensure that the SEC has the tools it needs to oversee the entire market for securities-related OTC derivatives. Major OTC Participants also would be required to meet appropriate standards for the segregation of customer funds and securities.

3. Trading Markets and Clearing Agencies

Trading markets and clearing organizations for securities-related OTC derivatives would be subject to registration requirements as exchanges and clearing agencies. Importantly, however, the conditional exemption from exchange registration the SEC provided under Regulation ATS would be available to trading systems for securities-related OTC derivatives. Among other things, Regulation ATS lowers barriers to entry for trading systems in securities because the systems need not assume the full self-regulatory responsibilities associated with being a national securities exchange. Both registered exchanges and ATSs are subject to important transparency requirements. Consequently, expanding the SEC’s authority over securities-related OTC derivatives would promote improved efficiency and transparency in the markets for securities-related OTC derivatives.

Similarly, the regulatory regime for securities clearing agencies would ensure that CCPs for securities-related OTC derivatives impose appropriate margin requirements and other necessary risk controls. The SEC’s historic regulation of clearing agencies under Section 17A of the Exchange Act has resulted in the most efficient, lowest cost clearing in the world. Indeed, the solid performance of securities clearing systems during the financial crisis bears out that they have the resilience to withstand difficult economic conditions. In addition, the regulation of securities clearance and settlement would directly affect market structure and competition in the trading markets for securities-related OTC derivatives. For example, the SEC’s statutory mandate governing clearing agencies prohibits clearing agencies from engaging in anti-competitive practices, such as imposing unreasonable limitations on access to services. Clearing agencies cannot exclude participants merely for executing their trades in a cleared product in a particular venue. This fair access requirement allows for multiple, competing markets, including OTC trading systems and OTC dealers, to trade the same securities and clear through a single clearing organization. The securities clearing system would support both the goal of having the greatest number of OTC derivatives centrally cleared, while retaining flexibility to allow variation in trading venues to meet the trading needs of different instruments and participants.

The SEC already has taken a number of actions to help further the centralized clearing for OTC derivatives, including exempting three CCPs from the requirement to register as securities clearing agencies. These exemptions were issued to speed the operation of central clearing for CDS. They are temporary and subject to conditions designed to ensure that important elements of Commission oversight apply, such as recordkeeping and Commission staff access to examine clearing facilities. In addition, to further the goal of transparency, each clearing agency is required to make publicly available on fair, reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory terms end-of-day settlement prices and any other pricing or valuation information that it publishes or distributes.

One important issue is how to deal with those OTC derivative contracts that may be ineligible for central clearing. OTC derivatives may be ineligible for clearing for a variety of reasons, including customized terms and an inability of CCPs to effectively manage the risks. In many cases, there are legitimate economic reasons to engage in customized transactions. Participants in individual transactions, however, should not be permitted to externalize the costs of their decisions, such as by creating additional systemic risk. Regulatory requirements often have costs, but they are costs incurred to protect the public interest and the general economic welfare. One way for regulators to help ensure market participants incorporate all the risks in the terms of a transaction would be to impose appropriate margin and capital requirements on the participants in customized transactions to reflect the risks they pose to market systems generally. This is an area in which the various functional regulators for particular entities could consult closely with any systemic risk agency that Congress might establish.

In addressing all of these issues with respect to OTC derivatives, moreover, the U.S. must coordinate its efforts with those of regulatory authorities abroad as they seek to address similar issues. The global financial crisis is a potent reminder of the extent to which economies around the world are linked by financial practices and market participants. A sound regulatory approach for managing the systemic risk of such practices and participants benefits from the implementation of complementary measures on an international basis.

V. Conclusion

Bringing securities-related OTC derivatives under the umbrella of the federal securities laws would be based on sound principles of functional regulation, would be relatively straightforward to implement, and would promote Congressional policy objectives for the capital markets. A clear delineation of primary regulatory responsibility for OTC derivatives also would help avoid regulatory gaps from arising in the future. Finally, integrating oversight of securities-related OTC derivatives with oversight of the related, underlying securities markets would minimize the extent of dislocation with respect to existing participants and current practices in the OTC derivatives markets, while still achieving the objectives for OTC derivatives regulation set forth in Secretary Geithner’s letter to the Congressional leadership.

Thank you for the opportunity to address issues of such importance for the strength and stability of the U.S. financial system, and the integrity of the U.S. capital markets. I would be pleased to answer your questions.

****

Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Office of External Affairs
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street, NW
Washington, DC 20581
202.418.5080

Testimony of Chairman Gary Gensler, Commodity Futures Trading Commission Before the Senate Banking Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment
June 22, 2009

Good morning Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Bunning, and Members of the Committee. I am here today testifying on behalf of the Commission.

The topic of today’s hearing, how to best modernize oversight of the over-the-counter derivatives markets, is of utmost importance during this crucial time for our economy. As President Obama laid out last week, we must urgently enact broad reforms in our financial regulatory structure in order to rebuild and restore confidence in our overall financial system.

Such reforms must comprehensively regulate both derivative dealers and the markets in which derivatives trade. I look forward to working with the Congress to ensure that the OTC derivatives markets are transparent and free from fraud, manipulation and other abuses.

This effort will require close coordination between the SEC and the CFTC to ensure the most appropriate regulation. I’m fortunate to have as a partner in this effort, SEC Chair Mary Schapiro. She brings invaluable expertise in both the security and commodity futures area, which gives me great confidence that we will be able to provide the Congress with a sound recommendation for comprehensive oversight of the OTC derivatives market. We also will work collaboratively on recommendations on how to best harmonize regulatory efforts between agencies as requested by President Obama. Comprehensive Regulatory Framework A comprehensive regulatory framework governing OTC derivative dealers and OTC derivative markets should apply to all dealers and all derivatives, no matter what type of derivative is traded or marketed. It should include interest rate swaps, currency swaps, commodity swaps, credit default swaps, and equity swaps. Further, it should apply to the dealers and derivatives no matter what type of swaps or other derivatives may be invented in the future. This framework should apply regardless of whether the derivatives are standardized or customized.

A new regulatory framework for OTC derivatives markets should be designed to achieve four key objectives:

  • Lower systemic risks;
  • Promote the transparency and efficiency of markets;
  • Promote market integrity by preventing fraud, manipulation, and other market abuses, and by setting position limits; and
  • Protect the public from improper marketing practices.

To best achieve these objectives, two complementary regulatory regimes must be implemented: one focused on the dealers that make the markets in derivatives and one focused on the markets themselves – including regulated exchanges, electronic trading systems and clearing houses. Only with these two complementary regimes will we ensure that federal regulators have full authority to bring transparency to the OTC derivatives world and to prevent fraud, manipulation, and other types of market abuses. These two regimes should apply no matter which type of firm, method of trading or type of derivative or swap is involved.

Regulating Derivatives Dealers:

I believe that institutions that deal in derivatives must be explicitly regulated. In addition, regulations should cover any other firms whose activities in these markets can create large exposures to counterparties. The current financial crisis has taught us that the derivatives trading activities of a single firm can threaten the entire financial system and that all such firms should be subject to robust Federal regulation. The AIG subsidiary that dealt in derivatives – AIG Financial Products – for example, was not subject to any effective regulation. The derivatives dealers affiliated with Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and other investment banks were not subject to mandatory regulation either. By fully regulating the institutions that trade or hold themselves out to the public as derivative dealers we can oversee and regulate the entire derivatives market. I believe that our laws should be amended to provide for the registration and regulation of all derivative dealers.

The full, mandatory regulation of all derivatives dealers would represent a dramatic change from the current system in which some dealers can operate with limited or no effective oversight. Specifically, all derivative dealers should be subject to capital requirements, initial margining requirements, business conduct rules, and reporting and recordkeeping requirements. Standards that already apply to some dealers, such as banking entities, should be strengthened and made consistent, regardless of the legal entity where the trading takes place.

Capital and Margin Requirements:

The Congress should explicitly require regulators to promulgate capital requirements for all derivatives dealers. Imposing prudent and conservative capital requirements, and initial margin requirements, on all transactions by these dealers will help prevent the types of systemic risks that AIG created. No longer would derivatives dealers or counterparties be able to amass large or highly leveraged risks outside the oversight and prudential safeguards of regulators.

Business Conduct and Transparency Requirements:

Business conduct standards should include measures to both protect the integrity of the market and lower the risk (both counterparty and operating) from OTC derivatives transactions. To promote market integrity, the business conduct standards should include prohibitions on fraud, manipulation and other abusive practices. For OTC derivatives that come under CFTC jurisdiction, these standards should require adherence to position limits when they perform or affect a significant price discovery function with respect to regulated markets.

Business conduct standards should ensure the timely and accurate confirmation, processing, netting, documentation, and valuation of all transactions. These standards for “back office” functions will help reduce risks by ensuring derivative dealers, their trading counterparties and regulators have complete, accurate and current knowledge of their outstanding risks.

Derivatives dealers also should be subject to recordkeeping and reporting requirements for all of their OTC derivatives positions and transactions. These requirements should include retaining a complete audit trail and mandated reporting of any trades that are not centrally cleared to a regulated trade repository. Trade repositories complement central clearing by providing a location where trades that are not centrally cleared can be recorded in a manner that allows the positions, transactions, and risks associated with those trades to be reported to regulators. To provide transparency of the entire OTC derivatives market, this information should be available to all relevant federal financial regulators. Additionally, there should be clear authority for regulating and setting standards for trade repositories and clearinghouses to ensure that the information recorded meets regulatory needs and that the repositories have strong business conduct practices.

The application of these business conduct standards and the transparency requirements will enable regulators to have timely and accurate knowledge of the risks and positions created by the dealers. It will provide authorities with the information and evidentiary record needed to take any appropriate action to address such risks and to protect and police market integrity. In this regard, the CFTC and SEC should have clear, unimpeded oversight and enforcement authority to prevent and punish fraud, manipulation and other market abuses.

Market transparency should be further enhanced by requiring that aggregated information on positions and trades be made available to the public. No longer should the public be in the dark about the extensive positions and trading in these markets. This public information will improve the price discovery process and market efficiency.

Regulating Derivatives Markets:

In addition to the significant benefits to be gained from broad regulation of derivatives dealers, I believe that additional safety and transparency must be afforded by regulating the derivative market functions as well. All derivatives that can be moved into central clearing should be required to be cleared through regulated central clearing houses and brought onto regulated exchanges or regulated transparent electronic trading systems.  Requiring clearing and trading on exchanges or through regulated electronic trading systems will promote transparency and market integrity and lower systemic risks. To fully achieve these objectives, both of these complementary regimes must be enacted.

Regulating both the traders and the trades will ensure that both the actors and the actions that may create significant risks are covered. Exchange-trading and central clearing are the two key and related components of well functioning markets. Ever since President Roosevelt called for the regulation of the commodities and securities markets in the early 1930s, the CFTC (and its predecessor) and the SEC have each regulated the clearing functions for the exchanges under their respective jurisdiction. The practice of having the agency which regulates an exchange or trade execution facility also regulate the clearing houses for that market has worked well and should continue as we extend regulations to cover the OTC derivatives market.

Central Clearing:

Central clearing should help reduce systemic risks in addition to the benefits derived from comprehensive regulation of derivatives dealers. Clearing reduces risks by facilitating the netting of transactions and by mutualizing credit risks. Currently, most of the contracts entered into in the OTC derivatives market are not cleared, and remain as bilateral contracts between individual buyers and sellers.

In contrast, when a contract between a buyer and seller is submitted to a clearinghouse for clearing, the contract is “novated” to the clearinghouse. This means that the clearinghouse is substituted as the counterparty to the contract and then stands between the buyer and the seller. Clearinghouses then guarantee the performance of each trade that is submitted for clearing. Clearinghouses use a variety of risk management practices to assure the fulfillment of this guarantee function. Foremost, derivatives clearinghouses would lower risk through the daily discipline of marking to market the value of each transaction. They also require the daily posting of margin to cover the daily changes in the value of positions and collect initial margin as extra protection against potential market changes that are not covered by the daily mark-to-market.

The regulations applicable to clearing should require that clearinghouses establish and maintain robust margin standards and other necessary risk controls and measures. It is important that we incorporate the lessons from the current crisis as well as the best practices reflected in international standards. Working with Congress, we should consider possible amendments to the CEA to expand and deepen the core principles that registered derivatives clearing organizations must meet to achieve these goals to both strengthen these systems and to reduce the possibility of regulatory arbitrage. Clearinghouses should have transparent governance arrangements that incorporate a broad range of viewpoints from members and other market participants.

Central counterparties should also be required to have fair and open access criteria that allow any firm that meets objective, prudent standards to participate regardless of whether it is a dealer or a trading firm. Additionally, central clearinghouses should implement rules that allow indirect participation in central clearing. By novating contracts to a central clearinghouse coupled with effective risk management practices, the failure of a single trader, like AIG, would no longer jeopardize all of the counterparties to its trades.

One of the lessons that emerged from this recent crisis was that institutions were not just “too big to fail,” but rather too interconnected as well. By mandating the use of central clearinghouses, institutions would become much less interconnected, mitigating risk and increasing transparency. Throughout this entire financial crisis, trades that were carried out through regulated exchanges and clearinghouses continued to be cleared and settled.

In implementing these responsibilities, it will be appropriate to consider possible additional oversight requirements that may be imposed by any systemic risk regulator that Congress may establish.  Under the Administration’s approach, the systemic regulator, would be charged with ensuring consistent and robust standards for all systemically important clearing, settlement and payment systems. For clearinghouses overseen comprehensively by the CFTC and SEC, the CFTC or SEC would remain the primary regulatory, but the systemic regulator would be able to request information from the primary regulator, participate in examinations led by the primary regulator, make recommendations on strengthening standards to the primary regulator and ultimately, after consulting with the primary regulator and the new Financial Services Oversight Council, use emergency authority to compel a clearinghouse to take actions to address financial risks. Exchange-trading. Beyond the significant transparency afforded the regulators and the public through the record keeping and reporting requirements of derivatives dealers, market transparency and efficiency would be further improved by moving the standardized part of the OTC markets onto regulated exchanges and regulated transparent electronic trading systems. I believe that this should be required of all standardized contracts.

Furthermore, a system for the timely reporting of trades and prompt dissemination of prices and other trade information to the public should be required. Both regulated exchanges and regulated transparent trading systems should allow market participants to see all of the bids and offers. A complete audit trail of all transactions on the exchanges or trade execution systems should be available to the regulators. Through a trade reporting system there should be timely public posting of the price, volume and key terms of completed transactions. The Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system currently required for timely reporting in the OTC corporate bond market may provide a model.

The CFTC and SEC also should have authority to impose recordkeeping and reporting requirements and to police the operations of all exchanges and electronic trading systems to prevent fraud, manipulation and other abuses.

In contrast to long established on-exchange futures and securities markets, there is a need to encourage the further development of exchanges and electronic trading systems for OTC derivatives. In order to promote this goal and achieve market efficiency through competition, there should be sufficient product standardization so OTC derivative trades and open positions are fungible and can be transferred between one exchange or electronic trading system to another.

Position Limits:

Position limits must be applied consistently across all markets, across all trading platforms, and exemptions to them must be limited and well defined. The CFTC should have the ability to impose position limits, including aggregate limits, on all persons trading OTC derivatives that perform or affect a significant price discovery function with respect to regulated markets that the CFTC oversees. Such position limit authority should clearly empower the CFTC to establish aggregate position limits across markets in order to ensure that traders are not able to avoid position limits in a market by moving to a related exchange or market, including international markets.

Standardized and Customized Derivatives:

It is important that tailored or customized swaps that are not able to be cleared or traded on an exchange be sufficiently regulated. Regulations should also ensure that customized derivatives are not used solely as a means to avoid the clearing and exchange requirements. This could be accomplished in two ways. First, regulators should be given full authority to prevent fraud, manipulation and other abuses and to impose recordkeeping and transparency requirements with respect to the trading of all swaps, including customized swaps. Second, we must ensure that dealers and traders cannot change just a few minor terms of a standardized swap to avoid clearing and the added transparency of exchanges and electronic trading systems.

One way to ensure this would be to establish objective criteria for regulators to determine whether, in fact, a swap is standardized. For example, there should be a presumption that if an instrument is accepted for clearing by a fully regulated clearinghouse, then it should be required to be cleared. Additional potential criteria for consideration in determining whether a contract should be considered to be a standardized swap contract could include:

  • The volume of transactions in the contract;
  • The similarity of the terms in the contract to terms in standardized contracts;
  • Whether any differences in terms from a standardized contract are of economic significance; and
  • The extent to which any of the terms in the contract, including price, are disseminated to third parties.

Criteria such as these could be helpful in ensuring that parties are not able to avoid the requirements applicable to standardized contracts by tweaking the terms of such contracts and then labeling them “customized.  Regardless of whether an instrument is standardized or customized, or traded on an exchange or on a transparent electronic trade execution system, regulators should have clear, unimpeded authority to impose recordkeeping and reporting requirements, impose margin requirements, and prevent and punish fraud, manipulation and other market abuses. No matter how the instrument is traded, the CFTC and SEC as appropriate also should have clear, unimpeded authority to impose position limits, including aggregate limits, to prevent excessive speculation. A full audit trail should be available to the CFTC, SEC and other Federal regulators.

Authority:

To achieve these goals, the Commodity Exchange Act and security laws should be amended to provide the CFTC and SEC with clear authority to regulate OTC derivatives. The term “OTC derivative” should be defined, and clear authority should be given over all such instruments regardless of the regulatory agency. To the extent that specific types of OTC derivatives might overlap agencies’ existing jurisdiction, care must be taken to avoid unnecessary duplication.

As we enact new laws and regulations, we should be careful not to call into question the enforceability of existing OTC derivatives contracts. New legislation and regulations should not provide excuses for traders to avoid performance under pre-existing, valid agreements or to nullify pre-existing contractual obligations.

Achieving the Four Key Objectives:

Overall, I believe the complimentary regimes of dealer and market regulation would best achieve the four objectives outlined earlier. As a summary, let me review how this would accomplish the measures applied to both the derivative dealers and the derivative markets.

Lower Systemic Risk:

This dual regime would lower systemic risk through the following four measures:

  • Setting capital requirements for derivative dealers;
  • Creating initial margin requirements for derivative dealers (whether dealing in standardized or customized swaps);
  • Requiring centralized clearing of standardized swaps; and
  • Requiring business conduct standards for dealers.

Promote Market Transparency and Efficiency:

This complementary regime would promote market transparency and efficiency by:

  • Requiring that all OTC transactions, both standardized and customized, be reported to a regulated trade repository or central clearinghouses;
  • Requiring clearinghouses and trade repositories to make aggregate data on open positions and trading volumes available to the public;
  • Requiring clearinghouses and trade repositories to make data on any individual counterparty’s trades and positions available on a confidential basis to regulators;
  • Requiring centralized clearing of standardized swaps;
  • Moving standardized products onto regulated exchanges and regulated, transparent trade execution systems; and
  • Requiring the timely reporting of trades and prompt dissemination of prices and other trade information;

Promote Market Integrity:

It would promote market integrity by:

  • Providing regulators with clear, unimpeded authority to impose reporting requirements and to prevent fraud, manipulation and other types of market abuses;
  • Providing regulators with authority to set position limits, including aggregate position limits;
  • Moving standardized products onto regulated exchanges and regulated, transparent trade execution systems; and
  • Requiring business conduct standards for dealers.

Protect Against Improper Marketing Practices:

It would ensure protection of the public from improper marketing practices by:

  • Business conduct standards applied to derivatives dealers regardless of the type of instrument involved; and
  • Amending the limitations on participating in the OTC derivatives market in current law to tighten them or to impose additional disclosure requirements, or standards of care (e.g. suitability or know your customer requirements) with respect to marketing of derivatives to institutions that infrequently trade in derivatives, such as small municipalities.

Conclusion:

The need for reform of our financial system today has many similarities to the situation facing the country in the 1930s. In 1934, President Roosevelt boldly proposed to the Congress “the enactment of legislation providing for the regulation by the Federal Government of the operation of exchanges dealing in securities and commodities for the protection of investors, for the safeguarding of values, and so far as it may be possible, for the elimination of unnecessary, unwise, and destructive speculation.” The Congress swiftly responded to the clear need for reform by enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Two years later it passed the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.

It is clear that we need the same type of comprehensive regulatory reform today. Today’s regulatory reform package should cover all types of OTC derivatives dealers and markets. It should provide regulators with full authority regarding OTC derivatives to lower risk; promote transparency, efficiency, and market integrity and to protect the American public.

Today’s complex financial markets are global and irreversibly interlinked. We must work with our partners in regulating markets around the world to promote consistent rigor in enforcing standards that we demand of our markets to prevent regulatory arbitrage.

These policies are consistent with what I laid out to this committee in February and the Administration’s objectives. I look forward to working with this Committee, and others in Congress, to accomplish these goals.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the Committee today. I look forward to answering any questions.

****

Please contact us if you have any questions of if you would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Obama’s New Hedge Fund Regulation Plan

Draft Speaks of IA Registration for Hedge Fund Managers

As you have probably heard by now, Obama will be presenting his plan for an overhaul of the financial system later today.  I have reviewed a copy of Obama’s Financial Regulation Proposal Draft and have reprinted some of the important aspects of the proposal below.  In general the most immediate impact for hedge fund managers is that they will be required to register with the SEC as investment advisors.  In addition to hedge fund managers, private equity fund managers and VC fund managers will also need to register.

While we understand that these are just proposals, Congress too is excited to get on the registration bandwagon although I think it unlikely for us to see any regulation passed before the end of this year.  Even so, hedge fund managers may want to start thinking about how they are going to register as investment advisors and what plans they will need to be putting in place (or plan to put in place in the future).

****

The plan’s main goals are:

  1. Promote robust supervision and regulation of financial firms.
  2. Establish comprehensive supervision and regulation of financial markets.
  3. Propose comprehensive regulation of all OTC derivatives.
  4. Protect customers and investors from financial abuse.
  5. Raise international regulatory standards and improve international cooperation.

Other Points Addressed

Regarding Hedge Funds

All advisers to hedge funds (and other private pools of capital, including private equity funds and venture capital funds) whose assets under management exceed some modest threshold should be required to register with the SEC under the Investment Advisers Act.  The advisers should be required to report financial information on the funds they manageme that is sufficient to assess whether any fund poses a threat to fiancnail stability.

Harmonize Futures and Securities Regulation

The CFTC and the SEC should make recommendations to Congress for changes to statutes and regulations that would harmonize regulation of futures and securities.

Strengthen Investor Protection

The SEC should be given new toold to increase fairness for investors by establishing a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers offering investment advice and harmonizing the regulation of investment advisers and broker-dealers.

Expand the Scope of Regulation

We urge national authorities to implement by the end of 2009 the G-20 commitment to require hedge funds or their managers to register and disclose appropriate information necessary to assess the systemic risk they pose individually or collectively.

Specifical goals with regard to Hedge Funds

  • Data collection
  • SEC should conduct regular, periodic examinations of hedge funds
  • Reporting AUM and other fund metrics to the SEC
  • SEC would have ability to assess whether the fund or fund family is so large, highly leveraged , or interconnected that it poses a threat to fiancial stability

****

Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

NFA Discusses Recent Forex Regulations

Answers Regarding Prohibition of Hedging Spot Forex Transactions

(www.hedgefundlawblog.com)  The NFA has certainly taken a lot of heat over its controversial rule to ban the practice of “hedging” in a single spot forex account.  Many retail investors have already begun establishing brokerage accounts offshore in order to utilize this trading strategy.  I recently talked with a compliance person at the NFA and they said that they are aware that US persons are going to offshore forex brokers in order to utilize this trading strategy.  We will see if in the future the NFA relents on this issue, but for now the NFA has provided guidance on some of the more technical aspects of the new Compliance Rule 2-43.

The NFA guidance is reprinted in full below and can also be found here.

****

NFA Compliance Rule 2-43 Q & A

NFA has received a number of inquiries regarding the application of new NFA Compliance Rule 2-43. This Q & A answers the most common questions.

CR 2-43(a), Price Adjustments[1]

Q. Section (a)(1)(i) of the rule provides an exception from the prohibition on price adjustments where the adjustment is favorable to the customer and is done as part of the settlement of a customer complaint. Does that mean a Forex Dealer Member (“FDM”) can’t make a favorable adjustment if the customer does not complain?

A. It depends on the circumstances. The intent of this provision is to ensure that FDMs can settle customer complaints before or after they end up in arbitration. It was not meant to prohibit FDMs from adjusting prices on customer orders that were adversely affected by a glitch in the FDM’s platform. A firm may not, however, adjust prices on customer orders that benefited from the error (except as provided in section (a)(1)(ii)). Furthermore, an FDM may not cherry-pick which accounts to adjust.

Q. An FDM operates several trading platforms. Two provide exclusively straight-through processing, but one does not. Can the FDM make section (a)(1)(ii) adjustments for trades placed on the two platforms that provide straight-through processing?

A. No. The Board intended to limit the relief to those firms that exclusively operate a straight-through processing business model, and the submission letter to the CFTC uses this language when explaining the rule’s intent. NFA recognizes, however, that the use of the word “platform” in the rule itself may be confusing, and we intend to ask the Board to eliminate that word at its August meeting.

Q. For price adjustments made under section (a)(1)(ii), the rule requires written notification to customers within fifteen minutes. If the liquidity provider informs an FDM of the price change twenty minutes after the orders are executed, can the FDM still make the adjustment?

A. No. The rule provides that customers must be notified within fifteen minutes after their orders are executed, and it was written that way intentionally. Since a customer’s subsequent trading decisions may be based on the customer’s belief that a particular trade was executed at a particular price, the rule provides a narrow window for price adjustments.

________________________________________
[1] For purposes of this discussion, the term “adjustment” also refers to cancellations.

CR 2-43(b), Offsetting Transactions

Q. CR 2-43(b) states that an FDM cannot carry offsetting positions. If a customer with a long position executes a sell order or a customer with a short position executes a buy order, does the FDM have to close the position immediately or can it wait until the end of the day?

A. The FDM may wait until the end of the day to offset the positions, but it must do so before applying roll fees.

Q. The rule provides that positions must be offset on a first-in-first-out (FIFO) basis. If the customer places a stop order on a newer likesize position and the stop is hit, may the FDM offset the executed stop against that position?

A. No. The only exception to the FIFO rule is where a customer directs the FDM to offset a same-size transaction, but even then the offset must be applied to the oldest transaction of that size.
Related Issues

Related Issues

Q. One of an FDM’s platforms is offered exclusively to eligible contract participants (ECPs). Does Rule 2-43 apply to transactions on that platform?

A. No. Rule 2-43 does not apply to transactions with ECPs.

Q. May an FDM transfer foreign customers to a foreign entity that allows customers to carry offsetting positions in a single account?

A. Yes. If done as a bulk transfer, however, the Interpretive Notice to NFA Compliance Rule 2-40 (located at ¶ 9058 of the NFA Manual) requires that the foreign entity must be an authorized counterparty under section 2(c) of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).

Q. May an FDM transfer U.S. customers to a foreign entity that allows customers to carry offsetting positions in a single account?

A. Only if the transactions are not off-exchange futures contracts or options. The legal status of “spot” OTC transactions that are continually rolled over and almost always closed through offset rather than delivery is currently unsettled. Therefore, if an FDM chooses to transfer U.S. customers to a foreign entity so they can continue “hedging,” it does so at its own risk. In any event, a bulk transfer can only be made to a counterparty authorized under the CEA.

Q. If the transactions are not futures or options, does that mean none of NFA’s rules apply?

A. Most of NFA’s forex rules do not depend on how the off-exchange transactions are classified. This includes Compliance Rule 2-36(b)(1), which prohibits deceptive behavior, and Compliance Rule 2-36(c), which requires FDMs to observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade. An FDM that misrepresents the characteristics of “hedging” transactions (e.g., by touting their “benefits”) or NFA’s purpose in banning them or that implies that transferring U.S. customers offshore will make the transactions legal violates those sections of CR 2-36. Furthermore, NFA Compliance Rule 2-39 applies these same requirements to solicitors and account managers.

****

Please feel free to contact us if you are interested in starting a forex hedge fund or a forex managed account.  Other related forex law and regulation articles include:

NFA Proposes New Amendments to Bylaw Governing NFA Membership

Proposes Amendments to Bylaw 301(a)(iii)

On June 9th, 2009, the National Futures Association (NFA)  submitted to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) proposed amendments to NFA’s Bylaw 301(a)(ii) regarding eligibility for membership.  The proposed addition states that if any member fails to have at least one principal that is registered as an “associated person”, the NFA shall deem that member’s failure to be a request to withdraw from NFA membership and shall notify that member accordingly. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that NFA has jurisdiction over at least one principal of every member, and the proposed amendment calls for an assumption of membership withdrawal for any member that terminates its last associated person or principal.

The full NFA proposal can be viewed below.

****

June 9, 2009

Via Federal Express
Mr. David A. Stawick
Office of the Secretariat
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Three Lafayette Centre
1155 21st Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20581

Re: National Futures Association: Eligibility for Membership: Proposed Amendments to NFA Bylaw 301(a)(iii)

Dear Mr. Stawick:

Pursuant to Section 17(j) of the Commodity Exchange Act (“Act”), as amended, National Futures Association (“NFA”) hereby submits to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC” or “Commission”) proposed amendments to NFA’s Bylaw 301(a)(iii) regarding eligibility for membership. This proposal was approved by NFA’s Board of Directors (“Board”) on August 21, 2008.

NFA is invoking the “ten-day” provision of Section 17(j) of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) and will make this proposal effective ten days after receipt of this submission by the Commission unless the Commission notifies NFA that the Commission has determined to review the proposal for approval.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
BYLAWS
CHAPTER 3
BYLAW 301. REQUIREMENTS AND RESTRICTIONS.

Mr. David A. Stawick June 9, 2009

(a) Eligibility for Membership

(iii) No person, unless eligible for membership in the contract market category, shall be eligible to become or remain a Member unless at least one of its principals is registered as an “associated person” under the Act and Commission Rules.

(1) If any Member fails to have at least one principal that is registered as an “associated person” NFA shall deem that Member’s failure to be a request to withdraw from NFA membership and shall notify that Member accordingly.

EXPLANATION OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

NFA Bylaws currently require that each NFA Member must have an associated person who is also a principal (“AP/Principal”). The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that NFA has jurisdiction over at least one principal of every Member. However, the Bylaws are silent regarding what should happen if, after NFA membership is granted, the Member no longer has an AP/Principal affiliated with it. To prevent the situation in which an approved Member no longer has a principal over whom NFA has jurisdiction, the proposed amendment to Bylaw 301(a)(iii) provides that any NFA Member that terminates its last AP/Principal will be deemed to have requested withdrawal of its NFA membership.

As mentioned earlier, NFA is invoking the “ten-day” provision of Section 17(j) of the Commodity Exchange Act. NFA intends to make the proposed amendments to NFA’s Bylaw 301(a)(iii) regarding eligibility for membership effective ten days after receipt of this submission by the Commission, unless the Commission notifies NFA that the Commission has determined to review the proposal for approval.

Respectfully submitted,

Thomas W. Sexton
Vice President and General Counsel

****

Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include: