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Hedge Fund Audit Firms and Agreed Upon Procedures

Hedge Fund Due Diligence Firm Discusses “Agreed Upon Procedures”

We’ve published a number of thoughtful pieces on this blog from Chris Addy, president and CEO of Castle Hall Alternatives (see, for example, article on Hedge Fund Operational Issues and Failures). Today we are publishing a piece by Chris which discusses hard to value hedge fund assets (so called Level III assets). In certain situations hedge fund audit firms will be engaged to perform an “Agreed Upon Procedures” review of the pricing of these assets. As discussed in the article below, agreed upon procedures engagements do not provide hedge fund investors with a great deal of comfort with regard to the pricing of these assets. It is unclear whether in the future investors will push back with regard to such engagements and require more robust pricing audits. The problem with more robust procedures, obviously, is increased cost (because of increased liability for the audit firms).

Managers who are engaging audit firms pursuant to agreed upon procedures should be aware that they may face tougher questions from investors going forward.

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Agreed Upon Procedures

A number of our recent posts have focused on the challenges of the hedge fund administrator‘s role in relation to security valuation. We will, of course, return to this topic – but, in the meantime, wanted to focus on some of the alternatives to administrator pricing.

One of the more common comments from today’s administrators is that, while an admin may be able to price Level I and Level II securities, they do not necessarily have information to price Level III instruments. (To recap, the US accounting standard FAS 157 divides portfolios into three levels, being Level I, liquid instruments readily priced from a pricing feed (typically exchange traded); Level II, instruments priced using inputs from “comparable” securities (essentially mark to model, albeit with mainstream models); and Level III, everything else.)

This leaves investors with a challenge – if administrators cannot price Level III instruments, who can? Moreover, to repeat one of our frequent comments, it is self evident that if a hedge fund manager wishes to deliberately mismark securities, they would most likely misprice a Level III instrument. It is, of course, very hard to fake the price of IBM common stock, but much easier to mismark emerging market private loans.

Two of the most common tools available to hedge fund managers looking for third party oversight over pricing for Level III instruments – assuming the administrator has washed their hands of the problem – are third party pricing agents and auditor agreed upon procedures, or “AUP”. We will return to the strengths and weaknesses of third party pricing agents in a subsequent post, but wanted to focus this discussion on AUP.

In an Agreed Upon Procedures engagement, the auditor completes specific procedures which have been dictated by the client. The procedures are specified and the auditor then prepares a report outlining the findings of that specific work.

We have two comments here: the first is to take a high level view as to the adequacy of these procedures, and the second is to dig a little more deeply into the actual audit guidance that covers this type of work.

Our first comment is, unfortunately, an Emporer Has No Clothes observation. The significant majority of hedge fund AUP engagements we have seen require the auditor to test a fund’s pricing on a quarterly basis. This usually involves (i) obtaining a portfolio list from the investment manager and (ii) testing the pricing support for those positions.

There are, however, generally two snags. Firstly, many AUP only test a sample of prices, not the whole portfolio. Sample testing clearly provides much less assurance than a price review of all positions: the administrator, for example, is usually expected to price the entire book (would any investor accept a NAV which has been priced on a “sample” basis???)

The bigger problem, however, is the type of testing completed by the auditor. In way, way too many cases, the auditor tests security prices back to the manager’s own pricing support and makes no attempt to obtain independent pricing information.

This type of work is, clearly, somewhere between minimal and absolutely no value for investors. If the auditor receives a spreadsheet from the manager showing the matrix of broker quotes received, how does the auditor know that the manager has not adjusted that spreadsheet to exclude quotes which were uncomfortably low? Even more importantly, if all the auditor does is to check prices back to pieces of paper in the manager’s own pricing file, how does the auditor know that those pieces of paper are genuine? As we have said before, and will keep on saying, it only costs $500 to buy a copy of Adobe Photoshop if you are of a mind to alter documentation.

When discussing this type of work, the manager typically notes that, if the auditor was to complete a full, independent pricing review, it would be too costly and too time consuming to be practical on a quarterly basis. A full, GAAP audit review is, of course, performed at year end – this does include independent pricing (although – investor fyi – auditors will still only sample test many portfolios.)

While these are fair points, it remains the case that this type of AUP provides minimal protection against pricing fraud. In the meantime, the manager gets the marketing benefit of being able to claim enhanced scrutiny and oversight from a Big 4 firm each quarter.

Which leads to our second point. Why would an auditor accept to complete agreed upon procedures when any reasonable accountant would rapidly conclude that the typical scope of these AUP provide pretty much nil controls assurance? Why does the auditor not insist that, if their name is to be associated to this work, then the procedures must be meaningful and sufficient to meet an actual control standard?

To this point, the actual audit standard applicable to AUP is available here. The standard states:

An agreed-upon procedures engagement is one in which a practitioner is engaged by a client to issue a report of findings based on specific procedures performed on subject matter. The client engages the practitioner to assist specified parties in evaluating subject matter or an assertion as a result of a need or needs of the specified parties. Because the specified parties require that findings be independently derived, the services of a practitioner are obtained to perform procedures and report his or her findings. The specified parties and the practitioner agree upon the procedures to be performed by the practitioner that the specified parties believe are appropriate. Because the needs of the specified parties may vary widely, the nature, timing, and extent of the agreed upon procedures may vary as well; consequently, the specified parties assume responsibility for the sufficiency of the procedures since they best understand their own needs. In an engagement performed under this section, the practitioner does not perform an examination or a review, as discussed in section 101, and does not provide an opinion or negative assurance. Instead, the practitioner’s report on agreed-upon procedures should be in the form of procedures and findings.

In practice, this all gets horribly circular. Per the standard, a client requests an auditor to complete AUP to assist “specified parties” to “evaluate subject matter or an assertion”. In our case, the assertion would be “are hard to value securities valued correctly at quarter end.”

However, the specified party is usually the manager itself, making the client and specified party the same person. The particular trick applied, in many cases, is for the auditor to seek to prevent the investor from actually seeing the AUP in the first place! However, if the investor is to have access to the AUP, the auditor universally requires the investor to sign a Catch 22 document which requires the investor to acknowledge that the AUP are “sufficient for their needs”. So, even if the investor believes that the AUP are not “sufficient for their needs” – which is hardly a long stretch – the investor has to sign that the procedures are sufficient if they are to even see the auditor’s work. With this magic piece of paper, the auditor has met its requirements and can sleep easy. Meanwhile, the auditor will send a bill to – guess who – the fund, meaning that investors have, once more, had to foot the bill.

As always, Caveat Emptor.

www.castlehallalternatives.com

Hedge Fund Operational Due Diligence

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Hedge Fund Administrator Completes SAS 70 Type II (Press Release)

Hedge Fund Service Providers Expanding During Market Turmoil

Hedge Fund Administrator Tests Prime Brokerage Waters

DOL tells ERISA plan to monitor hedge fund valuation practices

4 Replies

I came across this ERISA hedge fund article last night and found it to be very interesting. This article highlights an issue that is plaguing the hedge fund industry – how to value illiquid and other hard to value assets. This issue has come to the forefront over the last year as the bank and large hedge funds have posted huge losses due to improper valuation of assets. More to come on this issue. The orginal article can be found here: www.castlehallalternatives.com.

ERISA vs. the Hedge Fund Industry

According to Pensions and Investment, the Boston office of the US Department of Labor (the “DOL”) recently issued a letter to an (unidentified) US Pension Plan subject to ERISA (the Employee Retirement Income Security Act) stating that the plan was in violation of ERISA regulations. The DOL is responsible for monitoring – and sanctioning – ERISA plans and, in their letter, threatened legal action if the plan in question did not remedy the noted violations.

The problem?

When valuing hedge funds and other alternative assets for purposes of the Plan’s annual filing, the pension investor had apparently relied upon valuations provided by the underlying funds’ general partners and, in some cases, on audited financial statements for those funds.

This is, of course, standard practice for many hedge fund investors. It appears, however, that this approach could create a major roadblock for ERISA plans.

According to the DOL, “it is incumbent on the Plan Administrator to establish a process to evaluate the fair market value of any hard to value assets held by the Plan. Such a process would include a complete understanding of the underlying investments and the fund’s investment strategy. In addition, the Plan Administrator must have a thorough knowledge of the general partner’s valuation methodology to ensure that it comports with the fund’s written valuation provisions and reflects fair market value. A process which merely uses the general partner’s established value for all funds without additional analysis may not insure that the alternative investments are valued at fair market value.”

In other words, the entity which has to value all assets – and especially hard to value assets – is the pension investor subject to ERISA. There is no way of dodging this poison chalice – the ERISA investor cannot simply rely on the hedge fund’s own valuation.

This is an enormously challenging obligation, particularly in the context of the severe fiduciary standards set by ERISA. Indeed, the DOL position raises a broad question – is it even possible for ERISA plans (or indeed any hedge fund investor) to meet this duty of care?

We have three observations.

Firstly, very few hedge funds provide position level transparency. However, it is stating the obvious to say that, without position level transparency, it is impossible for an ERISA investor (or any other investor for that matter) to have a “complete” understanding of the underlying investments and the fund’s investment strategy. Moreover, even if managers do provide position information, how can investors ensure that it is timely and accurate? The best solution to the transparency issue is a managed account – as such, would one outcome of the DOL’s position, if enforced, be for ERISA plans to only invest through managed account structures?

Secondly, the DOL states that ERISA plans must have a “thorough knowledge of the general partner’s valuation methodology”. However, in practice, most hedge fund offering documents have deliberately vague and unspecific clauses as to valuation and calculation of the net asset value, especially in relation to hard to value instruments. To add salt to the wound, every prospectus we have ever read includes a final caveat along the lines of “notwithstanding the above policies, the general partner (or the Board of directors in “consultation” with the investment manager for an offshore fund) may elect any “alternative method” of fair valuation. “ There is hence very limited specificity as to valuation procedures in virtually all hedge fund offering materials, and certainly insufficient information to provide a “thorough knowledge” of the valuation methodology which will be applied.

If the prospectus gives an inadequate description of the valuation process, investors need to turn to supplementary information from the hedge fund manager. At this point, however, things get worse – many hedge fund managers have not developed any internal, written valuation policy at all. For those funds which do have a valuation document, there is no standardization, and many valuation policies remain uncomfortably vague and unspecific (although, in fairness, we congratulate the minority of managers who have some stepped up and do furnish investors with comprehensive valuation information.)

The worst case is when a manager does have a valuation document, but will not provide it to the investor. Ironically, the worst culprits in this situation are some of the industry’s largest and most well known hedge fund managers. The issue is liability: hedge fund lawyers now appear to advise managers that the more information provided to investors, the more the potential liability. (As an aside, we recently spoke with the CFO of a large hedge fund: he noted that the sight of the Bear Stearns hedge fund managers being led away in ‘cuffs had resulted in urgent calls from the firm’s lawyers, advising the manager to reduce the amount of information it provided to investors.)

The third area of concern is the ongoing assumption by many investors, including many ERISA plans, that third party administrators assume responsibility for valuing hedge fund portfolios. As such, the administrator, it is perceived, can provide the necessary independence in the valuation process.

Not so fast. As we have noted before, much of today’s administration industry is now emphatic that they perform only the services of a “calculation agent” not a “valuation agent”. This is a relatively mute point when dealing with exchange traded securities, but it is an enormous issue when looking at a hedge fund which trades hard to value instruments (it goes without saying that we need help to value exotic CDOs, not IBM stock).

As a “calculation agent”, many administrators have amended their legal contracts to retain the right to “consult with” the manager and, indeed, accept prices from the hedge fund manager without further verification. Again, we hate to make an “emperor has no clothes” comment, but this is obviously nonsense: taking prices from the manager is like a police officer issuing speeding tickets on the basis of asking drivers how fast they were going.

These issues, in our mind, share a common theme. In recent years, with an ever-accelerating pace, we have watched the legal pendulum which defines how investors and hedge fund managers transact drift ever further in favor of the manager at the expense of the investor. It is trite, but uncomfortably accurate, to say that, in today’s hedge fund industry, no-one wants to be responsible for anything. Everyone is instead seeking to be indemnified to the point of invulnerability.

And this is the disconnect between the hedge fund industry and DOL. ERISA establishes onerous standards of fiduciary responsibility, deliberately designed to make those responsible for ERISA plans accountable, responsible and liable for their actions. Today’s hedge funds, however, are increasingly structured to ensure the lowest possible degree of accountability and liability on the part of pretty much everyone involved.

Against this background, we will watch with great interest ongoing developments as the DOL monitors ERISA plans with material hedge fund portfolios. The question, of course, is whether investing in opaque, uncommunicative hedge funds (even when they are some of the largest in the world) is too close to pushing a square peg in a round hole for investors who do operate within a strict fiduciary framework.

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