Category Archives: News and Commentary

Schwab Drops Hedge Fund Platform

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Self Directed IRA Investments in Funds Likely to Become Harder to Accomplish

In an earlier article about hedge fund IRA investments I discussed the general process which an investor will need to go through in order to invest their IRA assets in a hedge fund.  As a gross generalization the investor’s custodian will need to make the actual investment into the hedge fund.  In the past I have helped many clients navigate the hurdles which are sometimes involved in this process.  While the process is not exactly easy, it may become more difficult in the future based on anticipated regulatory changes.  These developments may make it harder for investors to invest in a hedge fund with their IRA assets.

In addition, Schwab has recently announced that they will no longer allow self-directed IRA investors to invest in alternative investments such as hedge funds.  This news comes as a big surprise to both advisors and investors.  Schwab was known for having a very good platform for self-directed IRAs.  In fact, out of all of the custodians that my clients have used for these transactions, Schwab was by far the best.  Their representatives were well versed in the mechanics of these investments where many other firms seemed to be learning on the job.  There was more than one time when a client’s investor had to switch IRA custodians in order to find a group which allowed a self-directed IRA investment into a hedge fund.

With Schwab exiting this space it may be more difficult for some investors to try to find good custodians who are able to process these transactions.  I have known at least a couple of well name groups who difficult to work with and lost business because of that.  The article I linked to above noted the backlash by RIAs and hopefully Schwab will reconsider based on the community support for their platform – I do believe that the reason for the backlash is because of good support which was provided to both the managers and customers.  So many times we face horrible customers service and it is always refreshing to find groups who do value the customer.

Hopefully we will be able to continue to rely on Schwab for these services in the future.

Other related hedge fund law articles include:

New Hedge Fund Laws Proposed in Connecticut

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State to Increase Regulation of Hedge Funds

(www.hedgefundlawblog.com)  Connecticut, home of many of the biggest hedge funds in the world, may begin regulating hedge funds in a heavy handed manner.  Recently state lawmakers have introduced three bills (Raised Bill No. 953, Raised Bill No. 6477 and Raised Bill No. 6480) which would greatly increase oversight of hedge funds which have a presence in Connecticut.   This article provides an overview of the three raised bills and provides reprints the actual text of these bills.

Raised Bill No. 953

The largest of the three bills, No. 953 has the following central features:

  • Definitions certain terms (including the term “Hedge Fund”) which are used throughout the bill.
  • Provides that, starting in 2011, hedge funds may not have individual investors  who do not have $2.5 million in “investment assets” (different than net worth)
  • Provides that, starting in 2011, hedge funds may not have institutional investors who do not have $5 million in “investment assets”
  • Provides that funds must disclose certain conflicts of interest of the manager
  • Provides that funds must disclose the existence of side letters
  • Requires an annual audit (beginning in 2010)

The above provisions would apply to those funds which have an office in Connecticut where employees regularly conduct business on behalf of the fund.   It is currently unclear whether there will be any sort of grandfathering provisions for those funds which currently have investors who do  not meet the “investment assets” threshold.   Another interesting part of the bill is that it defines a hedge fund with reference to Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act.  The recently proposed Hedge Fund Transparency Act would actually eliminate these sections and add new Section 6(a)(6) and Section 6(a)(7).

Raised Bill No. 6477

The next bill is No. 6477 which would require hedge funds to be regulated by the Connecticut Banking Commission.  The bill requires hedge funds to purchase a $500 license issued by the Connecticut Banking Commissioner prior to conducting business in Connecticut.  The license would need to be purchased each year.  The bill also provides the Banking Commission with authority to adopt regulations.

This bill is interesting because it is fundamentally different from most hedge fund regulations which seek to regulate the management company through investment advisor registration.  This bill regulates the fund entity (as opposed to the management company) and does so through the power of the state to regulate banking.   Right now it looks like this bill will apply to all hedge funds, even those who do not utilize leverage.  It is not currently clear why or how the Banking Commission has jurisdiction non-banking private pools of capital, especially for those funds which do not utilize any sort of leverage.

It is also interesting to note that No. 6477 would apply regardless of the registration status of the fund’s management company.  This means that a fund could be subject to SEC oversight and may also be subject to direct oversight by the Connecticut Department of Banking (“DOB”), which means the DOB could presumably conduct audits of the fund.  Of course, this could potentially greatly increase operational costs for hedge funds with an office in Connecticut.

Raised Bill No. 6480

The final bill is No. 6480 which would require Connecticut based hedge funds with Connecticut pension fund investors to disclose detailed portfolio information to such pension funds upon request.  It goes without saying that this bill is likely to receive a considerable amount of scrutiny from the Connecticut hedge fund community.

Conclusion

The hedge fund industry continues to be a major focus of both state and federal lawmakers who are anxious to start regulating these vehicles.  Unfortunately we are witnessing a patchwork approach to regulation where there is little communication between the states and the federal lawmakers.  If other states follow Connecticut’s lead then we face the potential situation where funds in each state will need to follow state specific laws enacted by quick-to-legislate, out-of-touch lawmakers.   Efficiency in the securities markets is undercut by overlapping and unnecessary regulations – both managers and investors would be better served by a comprehensive effort to revise the securities laws at the federal and state levels.

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Raised Bill No. 953
January Session, 2009

Referred to Committee on Banks
Introduced by: (BA)

AN ACT CONCERNING HEDGE FUNDS.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2009) (a) As used in this section:

(1) “Hedge fund” means any investment company, as defined in Section 3(a)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, located in this state (A) that claims an exemption under Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940; (B) whose offering of securities is exempt under the private offering safe harbor criteria in Rule 506 of Regulation D of the Securities Act; and (C) that meets any other criteria as may be established by the Banking Commissioner in regulations adopted under subsection (f) of this section. A hedge fund is located in this state if such fund has an office in Connecticut where employees regularly conduct business on behalf of the hedge fund;

(2) “Institutional investor” means an investor other than an individual investor including, but not limited to, a bank, savings and loan association, registered broker, dealer, investment company, licensed small business investment company, corporation or any other legal entity;

(3) “Investment assets” includes any security, real estate held for investment purposes, bank deposits, cash and cash equivalents, commodity interests held for investment purposes and such other forms of investment assets as may be established by the Banking Commissioner in regulations adopted under subsection (f) of this section;

(4) “Investor” means any holder of record of a class of equity security in a hedge fund;

(5) “Major litigation” means any legal proceeding in which the hedge fund is a party which if decided adversely against the hedge fund would require such fund to make material future expenditures or have a material adverse impact on the hedge fund’s financial position;

(6) “Manager” means an individual located in this state who has direct and personal responsibility for the operation and management of a hedge fund; and

(7) “Material” means, with respect to future expenditures or adverse impact on the hedge fund’s financial position, more than one per cent of the assets of the hedge fund.

(b) On or after January 1, 2011, no hedge fund shall consist of individual investors who, individually or jointly with a spouse, have less than two million five hundred thousand dollars in investment assets or institutional investors that have less than five million dollars in assets.

(c) The manager shall disclose to each investor or prospective investor in a hedge fund, not later than thirty days before any investment in the hedge fund, any financial or other interests the manager may have that conflict with or are likely to impair, the manager’s duties and responsibilities to the fund or its investors.

(d) The manager shall disclose, in writing, to each investor in a hedge fund (1) any material change in the investment strategy and philosophy of the fund and the departure of any individual employed by such fund who exercises significant control over the investment strategy or operation of the fund, (2) the existence of any side letters provided to investors in the fund, and (3) any major litigation involving the fund or governmental investigation of the fund.

(e) On January 1, 2010, and annually thereafter, the manager shall disclose, in writing, to each investor in a hedge fund (1) the fee schedule to be paid by the hedge fund including, but not limited to, management fees, brokerage fees and trading fees, and (2) a financial statement indicating the investor’s capital balance that has been audited by an independent auditing firm.

(f) The Banking Commissioner may adopt regulations, in accordance with chapter 54 of the general statutes, to implement the provisions of this section.\

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Raised Bill No. 6477
January Session, 2009

Referred to Committee on Banks
Introduced by: (BA)

AN ACT CONCERNING THE LICENSING OF HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE CAPITAL FUNDS.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2009) (a) No person shall establish or conduct business in this state as a hedge fund or private capital fund without a license issued by the Banking Commissioner. Applicants for such license shall apply to the Department of Banking on forms prescribed by the commissioner. Each application shall be accompanied by a fee of five hundred dollars. Such license shall be valid for one year and may be renewed upon payment of a fee of five hundred dollars and in accordance with the regulations adopted pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

(b) The Banking Commissioner shall adopt regulations in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54 of the general statutes for purposes of this section.

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Raised Bill No. 6480
January Session, 2009

Referred to Committee on Banks
Introduced by: (BA)

AN ACT REQUIRING THE DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION TO PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS IN HEDGE FUNDS AND PRIVATE CAPITAL FUNDS.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives in General Assembly convened:

Section 1. (NEW) (Effective October 1, 2009) Any hedge fund or private capital fund that is (1) domiciled in the state, and (2) receiving money from pension funds domiciled in the state shall disclose to each prospective pension investor in such funds, upon request, financial information including, but not limited to, detailed portfolio information relative to the assets and liabilities of such funds.

Hedge Fund Administrator Charity

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As described in the press release reprinted below a hedge fund administrator is providing reduced fees to clients who donate their set up fees to Hedge Funds Care, a charity which benefits abused children.  Hedge Funds Care puts on a number of events throughout the US.  The San Francisco Hedge Funds Care group will be putting on an event on March 11 – more on this event to be forthcoming.

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Hedge Fund Administrator Offers Discount Pricing to Emerging Hedge Fund Managers Who Donate Set-up Fees to Hedge Funds Care

NEW YORK, Feb. 17 /PRNewswire/ — Variman LLC, (www.variman.com) a boutique provider of hedge fund administration, middle and back office services, joins together with Hedge Funds Care (www.hedgefundscare.org) to increase awareness of child abuse and assist its efforts to prevent and treat child abuse.

Variman Fund Services will offer discounted monthly service fees to emerging managers who donate the standard set-up fee to Hedge Funds Care on behalf of Variman LLC for a limited time.
Given the difficult times our industry is currently facing, Variman Fund Services, in an effort to support both the needs of the marketplace and those of abused children, believes this initiative will be worthwhile and bring solid value to all involved.

For further information, please log on to www.variman.com and provide contact information as needed for a quick response. This is a limited time offer and applies to emerging hedge fund managers requiring hedge fund administration. All information will be held strictly confidential.

About Variman LLC

Variman LLC, headquartered in Short Hills, NJ, USA with offices in Dubai and India, brings a fresh perspective to Capital Markets Operations and Hedge Fund Administration with its unique service platform to provide complete visibility to all aspects of post-trade processing including liquidity management and collateral optimization

Variman Fund Services remains one of the few administrators to offer bespoke white glove services according to client requirements and budget. Variman Fund Services can efficiently deal with multiple brokers, global middle and back office operations and accounting functions across asset all classes and time zones.

About Hedge Funds Care

Founder Rob Davis established Hedge Funds Care in 1998 with the dream of helping to prevent and treat child abuse. With the encouragement and participation of his colleagues in the hedge fund industry, the first Open Your Heart to the Children Benefit took place in New York in February of 1999 and raised $542,000. What began as a single fundraiser has grown into an international nonprofit organization. Hedge Funds Care has distributed over $18 million through more than 500 grants. In 2009, annual benefits will take place in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, Atlanta, Boston, Denver, Toronto, London and the Cayman Islands. Through the ongoing generosity and commitment of hedge fund industry professionals, HFC continues its rapid expansion. We anticipate future growth to cities in the U.S. and abroad.

Another Massive Fraud Alledged in the Securities Industry

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The SEC release is below.  For more additional reading and insight into this story, please see the Standford SEC Memorandum of Law.

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SEC Charges R. Allen Stanford, Stanford International Bank for Multi-Billion Dollar Investment Scheme

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2009-26

Washington, D.C., Feb. 17, 2009 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Robert Allen Stanford and three of his companies for orchestrating a fraudulent, multi-billion dollar investment scheme centering on an $8 billion CD program.
Additional Materials

Stanford’s companies include Antiguan-based Stanford International Bank (SIB), Houston-based broker-dealer and investment adviser Stanford Group Company (SGC), and investment adviser Stanford Capital Management. The SEC also charged SIB chief financial officer James Davis as well as Laura Pendergest-Holt, chief investment officer of Stanford Financial Group (SFG), in the enforcement action.

Pursuant to the SEC’s request for emergency relief for the benefit of defrauded investors, U.S. District Judge Reed O’Connor entered a temporary restraining order, froze the defendants’ assets, and appointed a receiver to marshal those assets.

“As we allege in our complaint, Stanford and the close circle of family and friends with whom he runs his businesses perpetrated a massive fraud based on false promises and fabricated historical return data to prey on investors,” said Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “We are moving quickly and decisively in this enforcement action to stop this fraudulent conduct and preserve assets for investors.”

Rose Romero, Regional Director of the SEC’s Fort Worth Regional Office, added, “We are alleging a fraud of shocking magnitude that has spread its tentacles throughout the world.”

The SEC’s complaint, filed in federal court in Dallas, alleges that acting through a network of SGC financial advisers, SIB has sold approximately $8 billion of so-called “certificates of deposit” to investors by promising improbable and unsubstantiated high interest rates. These rates were supposedly earned through SIB’s unique investment strategy, which purportedly allowed the bank to achieve double-digit returns on its investments for the past 15 years.

According to the SEC’s complaint, the defendants have misrepresented to CD purchasers that their deposits are safe, falsely claiming that the bank re-invests client funds primarily in “liquid” financial instruments (the portfolio); monitors the portfolio through a team of 20-plus analysts; and is subject to yearly audits by Antiguan regulators. Recently, as the market absorbed the news of Bernard Madoff’s massive Ponzi scheme, SIB attempted to calm its own investors by falsely claiming the bank has no “direct or indirect” exposure to the Madoff scheme.

According to the SEC’s complaint, SIB is operated by a close circle of Stanford’s family and friends. SIB’s investment committee, responsible for the management of the bank’s multi-billion dollar portfolio of assets, is comprised of Stanford; Stanford’s father who resides in Mexia, Texas; another Mexia resident with business experience in cattle ranching and car sales; Pendergest-Holt, who prior to joining SFG had no financial services or securities industry experience; and Davis, who was Stanford’s college roommate.

The SEC’s complaint also alleges an additional scheme relating to $1.2 billion in sales by SGC advisers of a proprietary mutual fund wrap program, called Stanford Allocation Strategy (SAS), by using materially false historical performance data. According to the complaint, the false data helped SGC grow the SAS program from less than $10 million in 2004 to more than $1 billion, generating fees for SGC (and ultimately Stanford) of approximately $25 million in 2007 and 2008. The fraudulent SAS performance was used to recruit registered investment advisers with significant books of business, who were then heavily incentivized to reallocate their clients’ assets to SIB’s CD program.

The SEC’s complaint charges violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act, and registration provisions of the Investment Company Act. In addition to emergency and interim relief that has been obtained, the SEC seeks a final judgment permanently enjoining the defendants from future violations of the relevant provisions of the federal securities laws and ordering them to pay financial penalties and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains with prejudgment interest.

The Commission acknowledges the assistance and cooperation of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) in connection with this matter.

The SEC’s investigation is continuing. FINRA independently developed information through its examination and investigative processes that contributed significantly to the filing of this enforcement action.

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For more information, contact:

Rose Romero, Regional Director
Steve Korotash, Associate Regional Director, Enforcement
SEC’s Fort Worth Regional Office

Four CFTC Actions against CPOs and CTAs

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This past week and a half has proven to be a busy time for the CFTC’s enforcement divisions as a number of actions have been released to the public.  The four actions below showcase the unlawful and unsavory behavior of four groups.  Specifically, two of the actions below provide details of two more Ponzi schemes and the other two actions involve misrepresentations and lies.  As we’ve discussed before hedge fund investors have many tools to protect themselves from these sorts of actions.  Simple hedge fund due diligence will go a long way towards protecting an investment.

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Release: 5612-09
For Release: February 11, 2009

CFTC Orders Former Bank Trader and New York City Resident to Pay $360,000 Penalty in Connection with False Trading Reports Submitted to His Former Employer, Bank of America

Washington, DC — The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today settled charges against Michael Moster for submitting false reports to the Bank of America in Chicago, where he once worked as a trader, and ordered Moster to pay a $360,000 civil penalty.

The CFTC issued an order on February 11, 2009, which finds that, during a three-day period in January 2004, Moster, a former proprietary trader for the Bank of America, falsely reported to the bank that he purchased 4,000 Treasury futures contracts to conceal the risk associated with large unauthorized positions in Treasury bonds that he established over the same time period, by making it appear as if the long futures position hedged the Treasury bond risk. By the following week, the fictitious trades inflated the value of his trading book by over $12 million, the order finds. The sale of Moster’s unauthorized Treasury bond position resulted in a loss of approximately $12.2 million to the Bank of America.

Based upon the same conduct, Moster pled guilty on September 18, 2008, to a one-count violation of making false entry into the books and records of a bank in the Southern District of New York. Under the criminal sentencing guidelines, Moster will be required to make full restitution of the over $12 million loss he caused to the Bank of America. The CFTC’s order recognizes the restitution made in the context of the criminal case and provides that Moster must pay and satisfy any criminal restitution obligation before his payment of the CFTC civil monetary penalty.

The following CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members are responsible for this case: Ken Koh, Todd Kelly, Peter Haas, Paul Hayeck, and Joan Manley.

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Release: 5610-09
For Release: February 10, 2009

CFTC Seeks Freeze of Assets in Oklahoma Ponzi Scheme Involving Over $30 Million

Mark Trimble of Edmond, Oklahoma Posted Profits, While Losing Millions in Phidippides Capital Hedge Fund

Washington, DC – The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced that today it filed an enforcement action against Mark S. Trimble, of Edmond, Oklahoma, and his company, Phidippides Capital Management LLC (PCM), with offices in Oklahoma City. Trimble, who controlled Phidippides, also managed a private hedge fund named Phidippides Capital LP, which the CFTC’s complaint alleges was a Ponzi scheme.

CFTC Seeks Court Order Freezing Defendants’ Assets

In conjunction with the filing of the complaint today in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the CFTC is seeking a statutory restraining order freezing defendants’ assets and preserving records. Trimble has consented to the entry of an asset freeze order.

The CFTC’s complaint alleges that, from at least 2005 to the present, Trimble and PCM operated a $34 million hedge fund with approximately 60 investors and traded partly in the name of Phidippides Capital, a Delaware company incorporated by Trimble. Since at least October 2007, Trimble and PCM allegedly issued false account statements, failed to disclose the fund’s actual multi-million trading losses, and operated the fund as a Ponzi scheme, paying participant redemptions based on the fund’s fabricated profitability. Additionally, defendants allegedly received over $1 million in management fees based on false reports of trading profits.

Trimble Used Email to Notify Investors that He Had Not Been “Honest” About the Fund’s Trading Results

According to the complaint, Trimble’s activities were exposed in late January 2009, after Trimble provided the Federal Bureau of Investigation a fictitious 2008 year-end trading account showing millions of dollars in trading profits that did not square with actual trading statements issued by Trimble’s brokerage firm that disclosed millions of dollars in trading losses. Trimble subsequently stated in an email sent to his brokerage firm, and addressed to “Family, Friends, and Clients,” that he had not been “honest” about the hedge fund’s trading results, explaining: “The reason our balances are off is because I could not look myself in the mirror and face all of you and notify you that in the last quarter of 2008 we lost all the profits for the year and then some.”

Stephen J. Obie, CFTC Acting Director of the Division of Enforcement commented: “Through the swift action of CFTC staff, millions of dollars have been frozen, which ultimately we will seek to return to the victims Trimble deceived by his scheme. The CFTC continues to zealously prosecute these lecherous schemes, so that as many assets can be preserved as possible as we fulfill our vital mission to protect customers from fraud and abuse.”

The CFTC’s complaint seeks civil monetary penalties, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, restitution to defrauded customers, and injunctive relief, among other sanctions.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

The following CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members are responsible for this case: Rosemary Hollinger, Scott Williamson, Richard Wagner, and Ken Hampton. CFTC Auditors Thomas J. Bloom, Shauna Wright-Regas, and Lauren Corn also are working on this matter.

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Release: 5609-09
For Release: February 6, 2009

CFTC Obtains Judgment Against Albert E. Parish and Parish Economics LLC for Operating a Commodity Pool Scam in CFTC Anti-Fraud Action

Parish Currently Serving a Sentence of More than 24 years in Federal Prison for Related Criminal Violations

Washington, DC — The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) announced today that the Honorable David C. Norton of the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina entered an order settling charges alleging that Albert E. Parish and Parish Economics LLC, both of Charleston, South Carolina, lied to customers and misappropriated millions of dollars in customer funds (see CFTC Press Release 5320-07, April 19, 2007).

According to the order entered on February 2, 2009, between 1986 and March 2007, Parish and Parish Economics fraudulently solicited approximately $40 million in investments for their commodity futures pool. Parish and Parish Economics misrepresented to pool participants that funds would be invested in commodity futures when, in reality, Parish misappropriated the vast majority of funds for his personal use. Parish and Parish Economics also provided false futures account statements to pool participants and failed to provide required pool disclosure documents.

The order permanently bars Parish and Parish Economics from further violating certain provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act and the CFTC’s regulations and from engaging in any commodity-related activity. Parish is currently serving a sentence of more than 24 years in federal prison for related criminal violations. In lieu of an award of restitution and civil monetary penalties, the order recognizes that Parish will be subject to a criminal judgment restitution obligation in excess of $40 million.

The CFTC would like to thank James A. Rue of the Securities and Exchange Commission and John H. Douglas of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of South Carolina for their assistance in this matter.

The following CFTC Division of Enforcement staff members are responsible for this case: Jo Mettenburg, Jeff Le Riche, Charles Marvine, Donald Nash, Rick Glaser, and Richard Wagner.

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Release: 5608-09
For Release: February 5, 2009

CFTC Charges Minnesota Resident Charles “Chuck” E. Hays and His Company, Crossfire Trading, LLC, with Running a $5.5 Million Ponzi Scheme

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) filed an enforcement action today against Charles “Chuck” E. Hays and Crossfire Trading, LLC (Crossfire), both of Rosemount, Minnesota, charging them with fraud and misappropriation in connection with a commodity pool Ponzi scheme.

In conjunction with the filing of the complaint today in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, the CFTC is seeking a statutory restraining order freezing defendants’ assets and preserving records.

The CFTC’s complaint alleges that, from January 2006 to the present, Hays and his company, Crossfire, a purported commodity pool, fraudulently solicited and accepted more than $5.5 million from at least three individuals and a charitable foundation for the purpose of trading stock index and crude oil futures.

Hays, according to the complaint, convinced at least one person to invest in Crossfire by representing verbally and in fabricated account statements — issued on Crossfire’s letterhead — that Crossfire earned consistent profits trading commodity futures with no losing months. However, as charged in the complaint, Crossfire has never had an active commodity futures trading account. Additionally, in an attempt to alleviate at least two investors’ suspicions as to what Hays was actually doing with their money, Hays provided an account statement for the Crossfire pool fabricated to appear as if it were issued by a legitimate brokerage company by using that brokerage’s letterhead. This false account statement indicated that Crossfire maintained a trading account at the brokerage with over $37 million. As alleged, that account is nonexistent.

Furthermore, the complaint charges Hays with misappropriating investor funds to purchase a $4 million yacht, and for other purposes.

“Hays ran his Ponzi scheme from his yacht, but was grounded when the tide turned as Federal authorities exposed this egregious fraud,” said CFTC Acting Director of Enforcement Stephen J. Obie.

The CFTC complaint seeks orders requiring the defendants to provide the CFTC with continuing access to books and records and to make an accounting with information necessary to determine the actual amounts of net contributions and profits or losses. The CFTC also requests that the court issue orders of preliminary and permanent injunction against the defendants, a return of alleged ill-gotten gains, repayments to defrauded investors, monetary penalties, and other relief.

The CFTC appreciates the assistance of the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Minnesota, the Department of Justice, the United States Postal Inspection Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in this action. Hays was arrested this morning by Federal authorities.

The following CFTC Division of Enforcement staff is responsible for this case: Susan Gradman, Neville Hedley, Judith McCorkle, Venice Bickham, Scott Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, and Richard Wagner.

Grassley Clarifies Hedge Fund Registration Act

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Investors in Hedge Fund Won’t Need to Disclose Names and Addresses

As we have discussed in many posts, Senators Grassley and Levin have introduced legislation which would require hedge funds to be regulated under the Investment Company Act.  The legislation would also require hedge fund managers to be registered as investment advisors with the SEC under the Investment Advisors Act.  The name of the act is the Hedge Fund Transparency Act of 2009.

As I pointed out in this post, one of the more controversial parts of the bill was the requirement that the fund disclose the names and current addresses of each investors in the hedge fund.  The specific provision provides:

“The information form required…shall be filed at such time and in such manner as the Commission shall require, and shall…include… the name and current address of…each natural person who is a beneficial owner of the investment company.”  The information shall “be made available by the Commission to the public at no cost and in an electronic, searchable format.”  (See new Section 6(g)(2) of the Investment Company Act as described in Section 2(b) of the bill)

However, the plain words of the statue, apparently, aren’t what they mean.  Senator Grassley has recently stated that the disclosure of names and addresses only applies to the hedge fund managers.  The Wall Street Journal recently ran this piece which states:

“The bill requires disclosure of a hedge fund’s beneficial owners, who profit from the fees generated in operating the fund,” and not the names of outside clients, the senators said in a joint statement Thursday.

We disagree with this statement and we humbly recommend that the bill be amended if there was an intent which is different from the plain language meaning of the bill.  Additionally, there are other parts of the bill which deserve clarification if any re-writes occur.  Specifically we believe that new Section 6(g)(1), as described in Section 2(b) of the bill, would require the hedge fund itself to register as an investment advisor with the SEC.  We believe the intent is for the hedge fund management company, instead, to register with the SEC and accordingly Section 2(b) of the bill should be rewritten.

As an open note to Senators Grassley and Levin, we would be happy to provide input on future revisions of this bill.

Hedge Fund Fees | Discussion of Future Trends

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The following article is by Christopher Addy, President and CEO of Castle Hall Alternatives, a hedge fund due diligence firm.  We have published a number of pieces by Mr. Addy in the past (please see Hedge Fund Due Diligence Issues, Issues for Hedge Fund Administrators to Consider and ERISA vs. the Hedge Fund Industry).  The following post can be found here.

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Hedge Fund Fees: Is It Worth It To Pay For A Star Hedge Fund?

An article in the current week’s edition of the Economist asks whether one-and-ten will become the new two-and-twenty.

The discussion notes that there will be clear fee pressure on fund of funds.  We will return to the question of fund of funds in a later post: as a quick precis of our views, while Madoff has raised long overdue questions about whether fund of funds really complete due diligence (saying no always gets in the way of making money) we still see plenty of room for fund of funds who genuinely can serve as expert intermediaries.  Fund of funds as a provider of expertise rather than a provider of capacity, and, separately, fund of funds offering funds of managed accounts, both seem like valid models going forward.

For single strategy managers, the Economist makes several points in a single paragraph:

“Those funds with excellent records will manage to maintain their fee rates. Big diversified managers with mediocre performance will have to cut fees to hold on to their assets. Given the “high watermarks” in place, which require that losses be recouped before performance fees can be charged, they may struggle to retain top staff, although they should at least be able to stay in business. The real threat is to smaller operators—half of all hedge funds manage less than $100m. Lower management fees may not cover their fixed costs, such as salaries, accommodation and IT. The era of hedge-fund managers being unable to pay the rent may soon be dawning.”

While these points are valid, we remain very unconvinced by the argument that “those funds with excellent records will manage to maintain their fee rates.”  More precisely, we agree that the largest funds with good performance will likely keep their fee schedules: but we are unconvinced that those fees are worth it when they are above 2 and 20.

If 2008 has shown us anything, it’s that – as we noted in our last post – you can’t rely on a “best of the best” hedge fund to deliver guaranteed performance.

Plenty of articles have been published commenting on the relative performance of some of the industry’s largest funds – Bloomberg in this piece commented on a variety of funds: while there were winners such as Paulson, Brevan Howard and Winton, there were also plenty of losers, notably Citadel.  Another excellent Bloomberg article on Fortress noted that the firm’s Drawbridge Global Macro was down -26% while Drawbridge Special Opportunities lost 18%.  This article from early November commented on performance from a number of funds: it only got worse by year end.  Any hedge fund investor looking down their portfolio sees the same pattern of apparently random winners and losers among what were previously Top 100, star managers.

Ex post, therefore, some big funds funds have proved themselves to be worth their fees.  Plenty of them, however, have proved not to be.  Investors couldn’t predict the winners and losers beforehand during this market crisis: will they somehow be better at picking the big hedge funds that will be winners rather than losers when we have the next Black Swan event?  Why should investors pay, ex ante, excess fees to any hedge fund based solely on a historical track record?

This line of thinking raises some broader questions.  From our side, we have always been very skeptical of the largest hedge funds.  Indeed, back in early November 2007 we wrote a post called “People are spooked…so let’s invest in big hedge funds.  Is there really a flight to quality?” In that post, we wrote the following:

“This redirection of capital inflows [towards the biggest hedge funds] does seem to be driven by institutional investors.  If we were to ask ourselves, however, what are the three most important issues for institutions considering a hedge fund allocation, we expect the answer would be:

1) Transparency
2) Fees
3) Independent oversight

But…the Top 25 hedge funds now receiving such large allocations of institutional capital have the most restrictive transparency, the highest fees and no independent oversight (virtually all do not appoint an independent administrator, meaning that investors must rely on the manager to calculate each NAV and price all the assets with no third party check.)

We’re really puzzled by this paradox – there’s obviously a big difference between what institutions say they want, and what they are prepared to invest in.

Why is this?  Obviously, there’s strength in numbers, and it’s easy to justify an allocation to a firm if pretty much everyone else in the industry has already invested.  But, to point out the obvious again, the Bear Stearns funds were run by the Wall Street house with the reputation for the greatest expertise in mortgage and structured securities available in the industry.  Amaranth was one of the most sophisticated multi strategy funds available.  Sowood was formed by superstar managers from the Harvard Management Company.  Basis Capital in Australia had the highest possible, 5 star rating from Standard & Poors.  The list goes on, and on.

The lesson, therefore, is simple and obvious: do not to take anything for granted.  Certainly, asking hard questions – and being prepared to walk away – would have served potential investors in the above funds well.  This is not the last time hedge fund investors will learn this lesson.”

Well yes.

As we noted nearly 18 months ago, the biggest firms typically have the highest fees, have limited transparency and often don’t have independent oversight over their NAVs.  We would also add that it is typically the largest firms that ask for the longest lock ups: investors who signed up in ’06 and ’07 to 3 and 5 year lock classes must be pretty unhappy right now.  Moreover, the biggest firms usually have the tightest gates and most restrictive redemption provisions in their offering documents: 2008 has shown that many (most?) of the industry’s largest funds have chosen to suspend redemptions, impose involuntary restructurings etc.

Where does that leave investors?  We don’t deny that some of the largest hedge funds remain deeply resourced, highly skilled money managers.  On the other hand, our point is not to write off the small guy.

For many reasons, we believe that there is a real value in being a “bigger fish in a smaller sea”.  Thinking of operational issues, a larger investor in a smaller fund has so much more leverage:

  • Power to negotiate fees
  • Power to influence the terms of the offering document, and particularly to impact provisions related to gates, suspensions, side pockets etc.
  • Better operational transparency
  • Ability to engage in a constructive dialogue about operational controls: smaller funds are, for example, much more likely to have an administrator.  Smaller managers typically also give more information about their procedures, enabling investors to get a better understanding of key controls such as valuation.  Moreover, if a small firm needs to improve, they are much more likely to listen to a large, strategic investor – in fact, they are much more likely to listen full stop.

Investing in a smaller hedge fund – particularly now – gives the investor much better power to enter into that investment in a spirit of partnership.  It also provides more flexibility on the way in and on the way out.  That is massively different from going to a large multi strat and still facing an unappetizing menu of terms such as a 3 year lock class, a 8% rolling quarterly redemption provision, a 2 and 25, 3 and 30 fee structure et al et al.

One of the questions we always ask ourselves when we visit a hedge fund is about the culture of the manager.  Put simply, does it feel as if the manager thinks we are doing him a favor by giving him our capital, or is there a sense that the manager feels he is doing us a favor by letting us in.

Right now, we would always pay less for a receptive manager than pay more for a fund which still thinks that that we need them more than they need us.

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Hedge Fund Operational Due Diligence

Professor Coffee Testimony at Senate Madoff Hearing

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Yesterday the Senate Banking Committee held a hearing on the Madoff scandal.  Those present included: Senator Christopher J. Dodd; Professor John C. Coffee, Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School; Dr. Henry A. Backe, Orthopedic Surgeon; Ms. Lori Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; Ms. Linda Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; Mr. Stephen Luparello, Interim Chief Executive Officer, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority; and Mr. Stephen Harbeck, President and CEO, Securities Investor Protection Corporation.

We have reprinted below the testimony of John Coffee.  For other testimony, please see:

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Thomsen Testimony at Senate Madoff Hearing

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Yesterday the Senate Banking Committee held a hearing on the Madoff scandal.  Those present included: Senator Christopher J. Dodd; Professor John C. Coffee, Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School; Dr. Henry A. Backe, Orthopedic Surgeon; Ms. Lori Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; Ms. Linda Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission; Mr. Stephen Luparello, Interim Chief Executive Officer, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority; and Mr. Stephen Harbeck, President and CEO, Securities Investor Protection Corporation.

We have reprinted below the testimony of Linda Thomsen.  For other testimony, please see:

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