Category Archives: new hedge fund regulations

Series 79 Exam Approved

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SEC Approves  New Exam for “Limited Representative” Investment Bankers

The long anticipated Series 79 Examination has finally received approval by the SEC, and information will now be made available to the public regarding the content of the exam, the modifications to the original licensure rules, and the scope and intent of the new rule in establishing the new “limited representative” classification among investment brokers. Information recently released to the public regarding the Series 79 is copied in full below, and can also be found here.

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Regulatory Notice 09-41 – Investment Banking Representative
SEC Approves Rule Change Creating New Limited Representative – Investment Banker Registration

Category and Series 79 Investment Banking Exam
Effective Date: November 2, 2009

Notice Type

  • Rule Amendment

Suggested Routing

  • Compliance
  • Continuing Education
  • Investment Banking
  • Legal
  • Operations
  • Registration
  • Sales
  • SeniorManagement

Key Topic(s)

  • Continuing Education
  • Investment Banking
  • Qualification Examinations
  • Registration
  • Supervision

Referenced Rules & Notices

  • NASD Rule 1022
  • NASD Rule 1032

Executive Summary

Effective November 2, 2009, amendments to NASD Rules 1022 and 1032 require individuals whose activities are limited to investment banking and principals who supervise such activities to pass the new Limited Representative – Investment Banking Qualification Examination (Series 79 Exam). Individuals who are registered as a General Securities Representative (Series 7) and engage in the member firm’s investment banking business as described in NASD Rule 1032(i)may “opt in” to the new registration category by May 3, 2010 (within six months of the effective date).

Frequently asked questions about registration as an investment banking representative are listed in Attachment A. The text of the rule change is set forth in Attachment B. Questions concerning this Notice should be directed to:

  • Philip Shaikun, Associate Vice President and Associate General Counsel, at (202) 728-8451;
  • JoeMcDonald, Director, Qualifications and Examinations, at (240) 386-5065; or
  • Tina Freilicher, Director, Psychometrics and Qualifications, at (646) 315-8752.

Background and Discussion

NASD Rule 1032(i) requires an associated person to register with FINRA as a Limited Representative – Investment Banking (Investment Banking Representative) and pass a corresponding qualification examination if such person’s activities involve:

  1. Advising on or facilitating debt or equity securities offerings through a private placement or a public offering, including but not limited to origination, underwriting, marketing, structuring, syndication, and pricing of such securities and managing the allocation and stabilization activities of such offerings, or
  2. Advising on or facilitatingmergers and acquisitions, tender offers, financial restructurings, asset sales, divestitures or other corporate reorganizations or business combination transactions, including but not limited to rendering a fairness, solvency or similar opinion.

The registration category does not cover individuals whose investment banking work is limited to public (municipal) finance or direct participation programs as defined in NASD Rule 1022(e)(2).  Moreover, individuals whose investment banking work is limited to effecting private securities offerings as defined in NASD Rule 1032(h)(1)(A)may continue to function in such capacity by registering as a Limited Representative – Private Securities Offerings and passing the corresponding Series 82 exam. Individuals whose activities require registration as an Investment Banking Representative will be required to pass the Investment Banking Representative Qualification Examination (Series 79) or obtain a waiver. FINRA has developed this exam to provide amore targeted assessment of the job functions performed by the individuals that fall within the registration category.

The exam will be required in lieu of the current General Securities Representative (Series 7) exam or equivalent exams1 by the individuals who perform the job functions described in the new registration category. Any person whose activities go beyond those of the Investment Banking Representative registration category must separately qualify and register in the appropriate category or categories of registration attendant to such activities.

Transition “Opt-In” Period

Beginning on the effective date of NASD Rule 1032(i) and ending May 3, 2010, six months following implementation of these requirements, registered individuals as well as new applicants whose job functions are described in Rule 1032(i) will be able to register as an Investment Banking Representative as follows:

  1. Currently registered representatives who have passed the Series 7 or a Series 7-equivalent exam
    Investment bankers who hold the Series 7 registration, as well as those who have passed and are registered with a “Series 7-equivalent exam”may opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration,2 provided that, as of the date they opt in, such individuals are engaged in investment banking activities covered by Rule 1032(i).3 Those individuals who choose to opt in will retain their Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent registered representative registration in addition to the investment banking registration. After May 3, 2009, any person who wishes to engage in the specified investment banking activities will be required to pass the Series 79 Exam or obtain a waiver.
  2. New Investment Banking Representative Candidates
    During the six-month transition period, FINRA will permit new Limited Representative – Investment Banking candidates to take either the Series 7 Exam, Series 7-equivalent exam (if eligible) or Series 79 Exam. Those who choose to take and pass the Series 7 Exam or Series 7-equivalent exam may then opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration.

Training Program Exception

Rule 1032 provides an exception for member firms that operate training programs in which certain new employees are exposed to the firm’s various business lines by rotating among departments, including investment banking. Specifically, Rule 1032(i) does not require an employee placed in such program to register as an Investment Banking Representative for a period of up to six months from the time the employee first engages in activities that otherwise would trigger the requirement to register as an Investment Banking Representative. This exception is available for up to two years after the employee commences the training program. Firms that wish to avail themselves of this exception are required to maintain documents evidencing the details of the training program and identifying the program participants who engage in activities that otherwise would require registration as an Investment Banking Representative and the date on which such participants commenced such activities.

Principals

The Series 79 Exam will be added to the list of representative exams that satisfy the prerequisite requirement for the General Securities Principal exam (Series 24). Note that the scope of the general securities principal’s supervisory responsibility will be determined by the representative-level exam passed. Individuals who wish to act as a general securities principal for activities requiring registration under Rule 1032(i)must obtain the Investment Banking Representative registration—either by opting in or passing the Series 79 Exam—and also pass the General Securities Principal exam. Such individuals will be limited to acting as a general securities principal for the investment banking activities covered by Rule 1032(i). Individuals who wish to function in the capacity of general principal for broader securities-related activities must take another appropriate qualification examination, such as the Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent exam, in addition to the General Securities Principal exam.

Individuals currently functioning as a general securities principal supervising investment banking activities as described in Rule 1032(i) have the same six-month period during which they may opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration. Those individuals who choose to opt in will retain their Series 7 or Series 7- equivalent registered representative registration in addition to the Investment Banking Representative registration. After the end of the opt-in period, individuals who wish function as a general securities principal overseeing investment banking activities covered by the rule change will be required to pass the Series 79 Exam to function as a general securities principal supervising investment banking activities pursuant to Rules 1022 and 1032(i).

Exam Content

The qualification exam consists of 175 multiple-choice questions. Candidates are allowed 300minutes (five hours) to take the exam. Candidates will receive an informational breakdown of their performance on each section of the exam, along with their overall score and pass/fail status at the completion of the exam session.

A content outline that provides a comprehensive guide to the topics covered on the examination and is intended to familiarize candidates with the range of subjects covered by the examination is available at the FINRA website.

Firms may wish to use the content outline to structure or prepare training material, develop lecture notes and seminar programs, and as a training aide for the candidates.
The examination questions are distributed among four major functions reflecting the overall knowledge, skills and abilities required of an investment banker. Detail on the content of each of these four major job functions, the tasks associated with the job functions and the knowledge necessary to perform the tasks is included in the text of the content outline. The allocation of test questions among the four major functions is described below:

Section                                                  Description                                          Number of Questions

1                                                     Collection, Analysis and                                              75
Evaluation of Data

2                                                      Underwriting/New Financing                                   43
Transactions, Types of Offerings
and Registration Of Securities

3                                                 Mergers and Acquisitions, Tender                               34
Offers and Financial Restructuring
Transactions

4                                           General Securities Industry Regulations                        23

Total                                                                175

The questions used in the examination will be updated to reflect the most current interpretations of the rules and regulations on which they are based. Questions on new rules will be added to the pool of questions for this examination within a reasonable time period of the effective dates of those rules. Questions on rescinded rules will be deleted promptly from the pool of questions. Candidates will be asked questions only pertaining to rules that are effective at the time they take the exam.

The test is administered as a closed-book exam. Severe penalties are imposed on candidates who cheat on FINRA-administered examinations. The proctor will provide scratch paper, an exhibits book and a basic electronic calculator to candidates. These items must be returned to the proctor at the end of the session.

The Investment Banking Representative Qualification Examination will be administered at test centers operated by Pearson VUE and Prometric professional testing center networks. Appointments to take the examinations can be scheduled through either network:

  • Pearson Professional Centers: contact Pearson VUE Registration Center at (866) 396-6273 (toll free), or (952) 681-3873 (toll number).
  • Prometric Testing Centers: contact Prometric’s National Call Center at (800) 578-6273 (toll free).

Registration Procedures

A Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer Form(FormU4) must be submitted to FINRA via Web CRD in order to register an individual as an Investment Banking Representative. For persons already registered with a firm who currently hold the Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent registration and who are opting in to the Investment Banking Representative registration category, the firm need only submit an amended FormU4 to request the Limited Representative—Investment Banking registration.

For new employees, a firm must submit a full FormU4 application to request the registration and any other documents required for registration. The exam fee is $265; the registration fee for new applicants is $85.

For new Investment Banking Representative candidates who choose to first take the Series 7 Exam or Series 7-equivalent exam during the opt-in period and then opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration, the firm must first submit a Form U4 to request the General Securities Representative or Series 7-equivalent registration.
Once the candidate has passed the Series 7 Exam or Series 7-equivalent exam, the Firm may then submit an amended FormU4 to request the Limited Representative— Investment Banking Representative registration.

Effective Date

The registration and qualification requirements for Investment Banking Representatives will become effective November 2, 2009. The six-month opt-in period will begin November 2, 2009, and end May 3, 2010.

Endnotes

1. The “Series 7 equivalent exams” and registrations are the Limited Representative— Corporate Securities (Series 62), the United Kingdom (Series 17) or Canada (Series 37/38) Modules of the Series 7.

2 The Web CRD registration position code for individuals who pass the Investment Banking Representative Series 79 Exam is “IB. ”The registration position codes for individuals who pass the Limited Representative—Corporate Securities Series 62 exam, Limited Registered Representative Series 17 exam and Canada
Modules of the Series 7 exam Series 37/38 exams are “CS,” “IE” and “CD/CN,” respectively.

3 No associated persons of a firm will be eligible to opt in unless the firm’s current Form BD indicates that the firm engages in investment banking activities.

Attachment A

FAQ About Registration as an Investment Banking Representative
General

Q 1: If I currently hold a Series 7 registration and am engaged in investment banking activities, must I take the Series 79 Exam to engage in a member firm’s investment banking business?

A 1: No, provided you opt in by May 3, 2010. Current Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent registered representatives who function in the firm’s investment banking business as described in NASD Rule 1032(i)may opt in to the Investment Banking Representative position without having to take the Series 79 Exam for a period of six months after implementation of the registration category. Such persons also will be able to retain their Series 7 or Series 7 equivalent registration.

Q 2: How do I opt in to the new investment banker registration category?

A 2: For persons registered with a firm who currently hold the Series 7 or Series 7- equivalent registration and who function in the firm’s investment banking business as described in NASD Rule 1032(i), the person’s firm need only submit an amended FormU4 to request the Limited Representative – Investment Banking registration. The submission must be made during the six-month opt in period (November 2, 2009 –May 3, 2010). The FormU4 will not reflect the new registration category until the start of the opt-in period.

Q 3: My firm has not yet developed a training program for the Series 79 Exam. Will I have to take the Series 79 Exam once it is implemented in order to get the Investment Banking Representative registration?

A 3: No, during the six-month transition period (November 2, 2009 –May 3, 2010), new Investment Banking Representative candidates who are in the process of qualifying for the new Investment Banking Representative registration category can take either the Series 79, the Series 7 or a Series 7-equivalent exam. A candidate who takes and passes the Series 7 Exam or Series 7- equivalent exam could then opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration.

Q 4: I plan on taking the Series 79 Exam to qualify for the Investment Banking Representative registration. If in the future I move into a different position
Within my firm, such as retail sales, will I need to take the Series 7 Exam?

A 4: Yes. The Series 79 Exam will qualify an Investment Banking Representative for only those activities covered under Rule 1032(i). If the representative engages in activities not covered by the Investment Banking Representative registration, such as retail or institutional sales, the representative will need to take the appropriate qualification exam, such as the Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent exam.

Q 5: I currently have a Series 7 registration. If I do not opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration during the opt-in period, but subsequently decide to become an investment banker, must I take the Series 79 Exam to get the Investment Banking Representative registration?

A 5: Yes. FINRA is providing a grace period of six months for Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent representatives who function in the member firm’s investment banking business as described in NASD Rule 1032(i) to opt in to the Investment Banking Representative registration position. After May 3, 2010, persons who seek Investment Banking Representative registration will need to take and pass the Series 79 Exam, regardless of whether or not they have a Series 7 or Series 7-equivalent registration.

Q 6: I work at a small investment banking firm and engage in activities ranging From investment banking to institutional and retail sales. I have a Series 7 registration. How will this new exam and registration category affect me?

A 6: If you opt-in to the Investment Banking Representative registration position within the designated time period, you will have both the General Securities Representative and Investment Banking Representative registrations. Therefore, you would be able to engage in activities covered in both registration categories.

Q 7: I own a small investment banking firm and have employees that engage in activities ranging from investment banking to institutional and retail sales. These employees have a Series 7 registration. If I hire a new employee after the end of the opt-in period, how will this new exam and registration category affect this employee?

A 7: If the new employee engages in activities that fall into both the General Securities Representative and Investment Banking Representative registration categories, then he or she will need to take and pass both the Series 7 and Series 79 Exams.

Q 8: Will I be able to register as agent with a state after passing the Series 63 Exam if I have the Investment Banking Representative registration?

A 8: Yes (provided all of the other state requirements are met).

Q 9: Currently, for a candidate to qualify to register as agent and investment adviser with a state with the Series 66 Exam in lieu of the Series 63 and 65 Exams, the Series 7 Exam is required. Will the Series 79 Exam also allow me to qualify in those capacities with the Series 66 Exam?

A 9: No. States will continue to require the Series 7 Exam for use with the Series 66 Exam.

Test Administration

Q 10: Since the Series 79 Exam is a five-hour test, will I be allowed to take a break during the session?

A 10: The Series 79 Exam must be taken in one continuous, five-hour session. Candidates are permitted to take an unscheduled break during the exam session. However, the test clock will not stop while the candidate takes a break.

Q 11: Will I be allowed to use my own calculator during the exam session?

A 11: No. Series 79 Exam candidates are only allowed to use a basic electronic calculator provided by the testing center.

Principals

Q 12: I am currently a General Securities Principal supervising investment bankers. Do I need to opt in to the Investment Banking Representative position?

A 12: Yes. However, if you do not opt in prior to the end of the opt-in period, you will need to take and pass the Series 79 Exam in order to continue supervising Investment Banking Representatives.

Q 13: I plan on taking the Series 79 Exam. In the future, will I be able to qualify for the General Securities Principal registration category by taking and passing the Series 24 exam?

A 13: Yes, the Series 79 Exam will meet the prerequisite for taking the Series 24 Exam. However, such persons will be limited to acting as a general principal for investment banking-related activities and will need to take and pass another qualification examination, such as the Series 7 or Series 7 equivalent exam, to act as a general securities principal for broader securities-related activities.

Q 14: I am currently a General Securities Principal in a non-investment banking firm. If I do not opt in now and then move in five years to an investment banking Firm in which I will supervise investment bankers, will I need to take the Series 79 Exam?

A 14: Yes. The opt-in accommodation is available only to individuals who are currently functioning in a firm’s investment banking business. A General Securities Principal who qualifies via the Series 7 or Series 7 equivalent exam cannot act as a general principal for investment banking activities. Such person would need to take and pass the Series 79 Exam to do so.

Q 15: I currently hold a Series 7 registration and plan to opt in to the Investment Banking Representative position. If in the future I become a General Securities Principal by passing the Series 24 Exam, will I be able to supervise other securities-related activities including investment banking activities?

A 15: Yes. If you are eligible to opt in and do so, you will be able to supervise the firm’s investment banking activities upon passing the Series 24 Exam. In addition, because you also held the Series 7 position, you will be able to act as a general securities principal for broader securities-related activities.

Public Financing

Q 16: Are public finance offerings (municipals) covered on the Series 79 Exam?

A 16: No. Individuals who work on public finance offerings will continue to take the Series 7 or Series 52 Exams.

Q 17: I work on both corporate and public finance offerings. I have a Series 7 registration. How will this new exam and registration category affect me?

A 17: If you opt in to the Investment Banking Representative position by May 3, 2010, you can continue to engage in all activities without taking the Series 79 Exam.

Q 18: I plan on taking the Series 79 Exam to qualify for the Investment Banking Representative position. If in the future I want to work on public finance offerings, will I need to take the Series 7 or Series 52 Exams?

A 18: Yes. The Series 79 Exam will qualify you for only the Investment Banking
Representative position and activities covered under that registration position. If you begin to work on public finance offerings, you will need to take the Series 7 or Series 52 Exam.

Prerequisites

Q 19: Aside from satisfying the prerequisite for taking the Series 24 Exam, will the Series 79 Exam meet the prerequisite for any other exams that currently require either a Series 7 or Series 7 equivalent exam?

A 19: No. The Series 79 Exam will not fulfill the prerequisite requirement for the following exams:

Series 4 – Registered Options Principal
Series 9/10 – General Securities Sales Supervisor
Series 23 – General Securities Principal Sales Supervisor Module
Series 26 – Investment Company Products/Variable Contracts Principal
Series 39 – Direct Participation Program Principal
Series 42 – Registered Options Representative
Series 52 –Municipal Securities Principal
Series 55 – Equity Trader Limited Representative
Series 86/87 – Research Analyst/Research Principal

Continuing Education

Q 20: If I pass the Series 79 Exam and hold an Investment Banking Representative registration, will I still take the Regulatory Element S101 continuing education session?

A 20: Yes. A person holding an Investment Banking Representative registration will continue to take the Regulatory Element S101. However, in the future, FINRA is planning to modify the Regulatory Element to tailor it to certain types of job functions, such as investment banking.

Attachment B

Text of Amended Rule
New language is underlined; deletions are in brackets.

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1022. Categories of Principal Registration

(a) General Securities Principal
(1) Each person associated with a member who is included within the definition of principal in Rule 1021, and each person designated as a Chief Compliance Officer on Schedule A of Form BD, shall be required to register with the Association as a General Securities Principal and shall pass an appropriate Qualification Examination before such registration may become effective unless such person’s activities are so limited as to qualify such person for one or more of the limited categories of principal registration specified hereafter. A person whose activities in the investment banking or securities business are so limited is not, however, precluded from attempting to become qualified for registration as a General Securities Principal, and if qualified, may become so registered.

(A) Subject to paragraphs (a)(1)(B), (a)(2) and (a)(5), [E]each person seeking to register and qualify as a General Securities Principal must, prior to or concurrent with such registration, become registered, pursuant to the Rule 1030 Series, either as a General Securities Representative or [as] a Limited Representative-Corporate Securities.
(B) A person seeking to register and qualify as a General Securities Principal who will have supervisory responsibility over investment banking activities described in NASD Rule 1032(i)(1)must, prior to or concurrent with such registration, become registered as a Limited Representative– Investment Banking.
(C) A person who has been designated as a Chief Compliance Officer on Schedule A of Form BD for at least two years immediately prior to January 1, 2002, and who has not been subject within the last ten years to any statutory disqualification as defined in Section 3(a)(39) of the Act; a suspension; or the imposition of a fine of $5,000 or more for violation of any provision of any securities law or regulation, or any agreement with or rule or standard of conduct of any securities governmental agency, securities self-regulatory organization, or as imposed by any such regulatory or self-regulatory organization in connection with a disciplinary proceeding shall be required to register as a General Securities Principal, but shall be exempt from the requirement to pass the appropriate Qualification Examination. If such person has acted as a Chief Compliance Officer for a member whose business is limited to the solicitation, purchase and/or sale of “government securities,” as that term is defined in Section 3(a)(42)(A) of the Act, or the activities described in Rule 1022(d)(1)(A) or Rule 1022(e)(2), he or she shall be exempt from the requirement to pass the appropriate Qualification Examination only if he or she registers as a Government Securities Principal, or a Limited Principal pursuant to Rules 1022(d) or Rule 1022(e), as the case may be, and restricts his or her activities as required by such registration category. A Chief Compliance Officer who is subject to the Qualification Examination requirement shall be allowed a period of 90 calendar days following January 1, 2002, within which to pass the appropriate Qualification Examination for Principals.

(2) through (5) No change.
(b) through (h) No change.

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1032. Categories of Representative Registration

(a) through (h) No change.
(i) Limited Representative-Investment Banking

(1) Each person associated with a member who is included within the definition of a representative as defined in NASD Rule 1031 shall be required to register with FINRA as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking and pass a qualification examination as specified by the Board of Governors if such person’s activities involve:
(A) advising on or facilitating debt or equity securities offerings through a private placement or a public offering, including but not limited to origination, underwriting, marketing, structuring, syndication, and pricing of such securities and managing the allocation and stabilization activities of such offerings, or
(B) advising on or facilitating mergers and acquisitions, tender offers, financial restructurings, asset sales, divestitures or other corporate reorganizations or business combination transactions, including but not limited to rendering a fairness, solvency or similar opinion.

(2) Notwithstanding the foregoing, an associated person shall not be required to register as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking if such person’s activities described in paragraph (i)(1) are limited to:
(A) advising on or facilitating the placement of direct participation program securities as defined in NASD Rule 1022(e)(2);
(B) effecting private securities offerings as defined in paragraph
(h)(1)(A); or
(C) retail or institutional sales and trading activities.

(3) An associated person who participates in a new employee training Program conducted by a member shall not be required to register as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking for a period of up to six months from the time the associated person first engages within the program in activities described in paragraphs (i)(1)(A) or (B), but in no event more than two years after commencing participation in the training program. This exception is conditioned upon the member maintaining records that:
(A) evidence the existence and details of the training program, including but not limited to its scope, length, eligible participants and administrator; and
(B) identify those participants whose activities otherwise would require registration as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking and the date on which each participant commenced such activities.

(4) Any person qualified solely as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking shall not be qualified to function in any area not described in paragraph (i)(1) hereof, unless such person is separately qualified and registered in the appropriate category or categories of registration.

(5) Any person who was registered with FINRA as a Limited Representative-Corporate Securities or General Securities Representative (including persons who passed the UK (Series 17) or Canada (Series 37/38) Modules of the Series 7) prior to [effective date of the proposed rule change], shall be qualified to be registered as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking without first passing the qualification examination set forth in paragraph (i)(1), provided that such person requests registration as a Limited Representative-Investment Banking within the time period prescribed by FINRA.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, or if you have questions about the Series 79 or investment banking activities, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

SEC Announces New Short Sale Rules

One of the major regulatory pushes this year by the SEC has been to revamp the short sale rules.  Today the SEC announced some specific measures which are intended to curtail abusive short sales.  We will likely have more comments on this issue going forward and will publish hedge fund industry reaction.

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SEC Takes Steps to Curtail Abusive Short Sales and Increase Market Transparency
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2009-172

Washington, D.C., July 27, 2009 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced several actions that would protect against abusive short sales and make more short sale information available to the public.

“Today’s actions demonstrate the Commission’s determination to address short selling abuses while at the same time increasing public disclosure of short selling activities that affect our markets,” said SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro.

First, the Commission made permanent an interim final temporary rule, Rule 204T, that seeks to reduce the potential for abusive “naked” short selling in the securities market. The new rule, Rule 204, requires broker-dealers to promptly purchase or borrow securities to deliver on a short sale. The temporary rule, approved by the SEC in the fall of 2008, was set to expire on July 31.

Additional Materials

Rule 204: Amendments To Regulation SHO (Release No. 34-60388)

Second, the Commission and its staff are working together with several self-regulatory organizations (SRO) to make short sale volume and transaction data available through the SRO Web sites. This effort will result in a substantial increase over the amount of information presently required by another temporary rule, known as Temporary 10a-3T. That rule, which will expire on August 1, applies only to certain institutional money managers and does not require public disclosure.

Apart from these measures, the Commission is continuing to actively consider proposals on a short sale price test and circuit breaker restrictions.

Third, the Commission intends to hold a public roundtable on September 30 to discuss securities lending, pre-borrowing, and possible additional short sale disclosures. The roundtable will consider, among other topics, the potential impact of a program requiring short sellers to pre-borrow their securities, possibly on a pilot basis, and adding a short sale indicator to the tapes to which transactions are reported for exchange-listed securities.

Overview

Short selling often can play an important role in the market for a variety of reasons, including contributing to efficient price discovery, mitigating market bubbles, increasing market liquidity, promoting capital formation, facilitating hedging and other risk management activities, and importantly, limiting upward market manipulations. There are, however, circumstances in which short selling can be used as a tool to manipulate the market.

“Naked” Short Sales: In a “naked” short sale the investor sells shares “short” without first having borrowed them. Such a transaction is permitted because there is no legal requirement that a short seller actually borrow the shares before effecting a short sale.

But, before effecting a short sale, Rule 204T requires that the broker-dealer, as opposed to the seller, “locate” an entity that the broker reasonably believes can deliver the shares within three days after the trade — what’s known as T+3. Also, if reasonable, a broker-dealer may rely on a short seller’s assurance that the short seller has located his or her own lender that can deliver shares in time for settlement.

“Fails-to-deliver”: If an investor or its broker-dealer does not deliver shares by T+3, a “failure to deliver” occurs. Where an investor or its broker-dealer neither locates nor delivers shares, a “naked” short sale has occurred.

A “fail to deliver” can occur for legitimate reasons, such as mechanical errors or processing delays. Further, a “fail to deliver” could occur as a result of a long sale — that is the typical buy-sell transaction — as well as a short sale.

“Fails to deliver”, such as fails resulting from potentially abusive “naked” short selling, may have a negative effect on shareholders, potentially depriving them of the benefits of ownership such as voting and lending. They also may create a misleading impression of the market for an issuer’s securities.

Adopting Regulation SHO: Due to its concerns regarding persistent “fails to deliver” and potentially abusive “naked” short selling, the Commission adopted Regulation SHO, which became effective in early 2005. This regulation imposes, among other things, the requirement that broker-dealers locate a source of borrowable shares prior to selling short.

In addition, it requires that firms that clear and settle trades must purchase shares to close out these “fails to deliver” within a certain time frame, 13 days. This “close-out” requirement only applies to certain equity securities with large and persistent “fails to deliver,” known as threshold securities.

The requirement included two major exceptions: the so-called “grandfather” and “options market maker” exceptions. Both of these exceptions provided that certain “fails to deliver” in threshold securities never had to be closed out. The Commission eliminated both exceptions in August 2007 and September 2008, respectively.

Making Permanent A Rule to Curtail Naked Short Selling

Adopting Rule 204: The Commission has made permanent a temporary rule that was approved in 2008 in response to continuing concerns regarding “fails to deliver” and potentially abusive “naked” short selling. In particular, temporary Rule 204T made it a violation of Regulation SHO and imposes penalties if a clearing firm:

  • does not purchase or borrow shares to close-out a “fail to deliver”
  • resulting from a short sale in any equity security
  • by no later than the beginning of trading on the day after the fail first occurs (T+4).

Cutting Down Failures to Deliver: An analysis conducted by the SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis, which followed the adoption of the close-out requirement of Rule 204T and the elimination of the “options market maker” exception, showed the number of “fails” declined significantly.

For example, since the fall of 2008, fails to deliver in all equity securities has decreased by approximately 57 percent and the average daily number of threshold list securities has declined from a high of approximately 582 securities in July 2008 to 63 in March 2009.

Due to the success of these measures in furthering the Commission’s goals of reducing fails to deliver and addressing potentially abusive “naked” short selling, the Commission has made permanent the requirements of Rule 204T with only limited modifications to address commenters’ operational concerns.

Increasing Transparency Around Short Sales

In the fall of 2008, the Commission also adopted a short sale reporting interim rule, Rule 10a-3T. The rule requires certain market participants to provide short sale and short position information to the Commission.

The Commission made the rule temporary so that it could evaluate whether the benefits from the data justified the costs associated with the rule.

Instead of renewing the rule, the Commission and its staff, together with SROs, are working to substantially increase the public availability of short sale-related information through a series of other actions. These actions should provide a wealth of information to the Commission, other regulators, investors, analysts, academics, and the media.

Specifically, the Commission and its staff are working together with several SROs in the following areas:

  • Daily Publication of Short Sale Volume Information. It is expected in the next few weeks that the SROs will begin publishing on their Web sites the aggregate short selling volume in each individual equity security for that day.
  • Disclosure of Short Sale Transaction Information. It is expected in the next few weeks that the SROs will begin publishing on their Web sites on a one-month delayed basis information regarding individual short sale transactions in all exchange-listed equity securities.
  • Twice Monthly Disclosure of Fails Data. It is expected in the next few weeks that the Commission will enhance the publication on its Web site of fails to deliver data so that fails to deliver information is provided twice per month and for all equity securities, regardless of the fails level. For current fails to deliver information, see http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/failsdata.htm.

Hosting a Roundtable

Finally, the Commission also is examining whether additional measures are needed to further enhance market quality and transparency, as well as address short selling abuses.

As part of its examination, the Commission intends to hold a public roundtable on Sept. 30, 2009, to solicit the views of investors, issuers, financial services firms, self-regulatory organizations and the academic community regarding a variety of trading and market related practices. The roundtable will focus on issues related to securities lending, pre-borrowing, and possible additional short sale disclosures.

The roundtable panelists will consider, among other things, additional means to foster transparency, such as adding a short sale indicator to the tapes to which transactions are reported for exchange-listed securities, and requiring public disclosure of individual large short positions. Panelists will also consider whether it would be appropriate to impose a pre-borrow or enhanced “locate” requirement on short sellers, potentially on a pilot basis. Additionally, panelists will discuss issues related to securities lending such as compensation arrangements, disclosure practices, and methods of collateral and cash-reinvestment.

# # #

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-172.htm

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Other related hedge fund law articles:

SEC Supports Private Funds Transparency Act of 2009

Testimony Concerning Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Pools

The SEC released a testimony from Andrew J. Donohue before the U.S. Senate about the regulation of hedge funds and other private investment pools.  According to Mr. Donohue’s statement, securities laws have not kept pace with the growth market and thus the SEC has very little oversight authority over these advisors and private funds with regards to conducting compliance examinations, obtaining material information, etc primarily because these requirements only apply to those advisors  and entities registered with the SEC.  Because advisors to private funds have the option to ‘opt out’ of registration, they can easily bypass any monitoring and oversight. The Commission strongly supports the enforcement of the new Private Funds Transparency Act of 2009,* which attempts to close this regulatory gap by requiring advisors to private funds to register under the Advisers Act if they have at least $30 million of assets under management.  The Commission also notes that in order to be effective, the new regulatory reform should acknowledge the differences in the business models pursued by different types of private fund advisers and should address in a proportionate manner the risks to investors and the markets raised by each.

The various compliance requirements on advisors to private funds as set forth by this new legislation is outlined in the testimony, reprinted in full below.

*Note: this testimony was given the same day that the Treasury announced the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009 which is very similar to the Private Funds Transparency Act of 2009.

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Testimony Concerning Regulating Hedge Funds and Other Private Investment Pools
by Andrew J. Donohue
Director, Division of Investment Management
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
July 15, 2009

Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Bunning and Members of the Subcommittee:

I. Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. My name is Andrew Donohue, and I am the Director of the Division of Investment Management at the Securities and Exchange Commission. I am pleased to testify on behalf of the Commission about regulating hedge funds and other private investment pools.1

Over the past two decades, private funds, including hedge, private equity and venture capital funds, have grown to play an increasingly significant role in our capital markets both as a source of capital and the investment vehicle of choice for many institutional investors. We estimate that advisers to hedge funds have almost $1.4 trillion under management. Since many hedge funds are very active and often leveraged traders, this amount understates their impact on our trading markets. Hedge funds reportedly account for 18-22 percent of all trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Venture capital funds manage about $257 billion of assets,2 and private equity funds raised about $256 billion last year.3

The securities laws have not kept pace with the growth and market significance of hedge funds and other private funds and, as a result, the Commission has very limited oversight authority over these vehicles. Sponsors of private funds—typically investment advisers—are able to organize their affairs in such a way as to avoid registration under the federal securities laws. The Commission only has authority to conduct compliance examinations of those funds and advisers that are registered under one of the statutes we administer. Consequently, advisers to private funds can “opt out” of Commission oversight.

Moreover, the Commission has incomplete information about the advisers and private funds that are participating in our markets. It is not uncommon that our first contact with a manager of a significant amount of assets is during an investigation by our Enforcement Division. The data that we are often requested to provide members of Congress (including the data we provide above) or other federal regulators are based on industry sources, which have proven over the years to be unreliable and inconsistent because neither the private funds nor their advisers are required to report even basic census-type information.

This presents a significant regulatory gap in need of closing. The Commission tried to close the gap in 2004—at least partially—by adopting a rule requiring all hedge fund advisers to register under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”).4 That rulemaking was overturned by an appellate court in the Goldstein decision in 2006.5 Since then, the Commission has continued to bring enforcement actions vigorously against private funds that violate the federal securities laws, and we have continued to conduct compliance examinations of the hedge fund advisers that remain registered under the Advisers Act. But we only see a slice of the private fund industry, and the Commission strongly believes that legislative action is needed at this time to enhance regulation in this area.

The Private Fund Transparency Act of 2009, which Chairman Reed recently introduced, would require advisers to private funds to register under the Advisers Act if they have at least $30 million of assets under management.6 This approach would provide the Commission with needed tools to provide oversight of this important industry in order to protect investors and the securities markets. Today, I wish to discuss how registration of advisers to private funds under the Advisers Act would greatly enhance the Commission’s ability to properly oversee the activities of private funds and their advisers. Although the Commission supports this approach, there are additional approaches available to that also would close the regulatory gap and provide the Commission with tools to better protect both investors and the health of our markets.

II. The Importance and Structure of Private Funds

Private funds are generally considered to be professionally managed pools of assets that are not subject to regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”). Private funds include, but are not limited to, hedge funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds.

Hedge funds pursue a wide variety of strategies that typically involve the active management of a liquid portfolio, and often utilize short selling and leverage.

Private equity funds generally invest in companies to which their advisers provide management or restructuring assistance and utilize strategies that include leveraged buyouts, mezzanine finance and distressed debt. Venture capital funds typically invest in earlier stage and start-up companies with the goal of either taking the company public or privately selling the company. Each type of private fund plays an important role in the capital markets. Hedge funds are thought to be active traders that contribute to market efficiency and enhance liquidity, while private equity and venture capital funds are seen as helping create new businesses, fostering innovation and assisting businesses in need of restructuring. Moreover, investing in these funds can serve to provide investors with portfolio diversification and returns that may be uncorrelated or less correlated to traditional securities indices.

Any regulatory reform should acknowledge the differences in the business models pursued by different types of private fund advisers and should address in a proportionate manner the risks to investors and the markets raised by each.

III. Current Regulatory Exemptions

Although hedge funds, private equity funds and venture capital funds reflect different approaches to investing, legally they are indistinguishable. They are all pools of investment capital organized to take advantage of various exemptions from registration. All but one of these exemptions were designed to achieve some purpose other than permitting private funds to avoid oversight.

A. Securities Act of 1933

Private funds typically avoid registration of their securities under the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) by conducting private placements under section 4(2) and Regulation D.7 As a consequence, these funds are sold primarily to “accredited investors,” the investors typically receive a “private placement memorandum” rather than a statutory prospectus, and the funds do not file periodic reports with the Commission. In other words, they lack the same degree of transparency required of publicly offered issuers.

B. Investment Company Act of 1940

Private funds seek to qualify for one of two exceptions from regulation under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Investment Company Act). They either limit themselves to 100 total investors (as provided in section 3(c)(1)) or permit only “qualified purchasers” to invest (as provided in section 3(c)(7)).8 As a result, the traditional safeguards designed to protect retail investors in the Investment Company Act are the subject of private contracts for investors in private funds. These safeguards include investor redemption rights, application of auditing standards, asset valuation, portfolio transparency and fund governance. They are typically included in private fund partnership documents, but are not required and vary significantly among funds.

C. Investment Advisers Act of 1940

The investment activities of a private fund are directed by its investment adviser, which is typically the fund’s general partner.9 Investment advisers to private funds often claim an exemption from registration under section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act, which is available to an adviser that has fewer than 15 clients and does not hold itself out generally to the public as an investment adviser.

Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act contains a de minimis provision that we believe originally was designed to cover advisers that were too small to warrant federal attention. This exemption now covers advisers with billions of dollars under management because each adviser is permitted to count a single fund as a “client.” The Commission recognized the incongruity of the purpose of the exemption with the counting rule, and adopted a new rule in 2004 that required hedge fund advisers to “look through” the fund to count the number of investors in the fund as clients for purposes of determining whether the adviser met the de minimis exemption. This was the rule overturned by the appellate court in the Goldstein decision. As a consequence, approximately 800 hedge fund advisers that had registered with the Commission under its 2004 rule subsequently withdrew their registration.

All advisers to private funds are subject to the anti-fraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act, including an anti-fraud rule the Commission adopted in response to the Goldstein decision that prohibits advisers from defrauding investors in pooled investment vehicles.10 Registered advisers, however, are also subject to periodic examination by Commission staff. They are required to submit (and keep current) registration statements providing the Commission with basic information, maintain business records for our examination, and comply with certain rules designed to prevent fraud or overreaching by advisers. For example, registered advisers are required to maintain compliance programs administered by a chief compliance officer.

IV. Options to Address the Private Funds Regulatory Gap11

As discussed below, though there are different regulatory approaches to private funds available to Congress, or a combination of approaches, no type of private fund should be excluded from any new oversight authority any particular type of private fund. The Commission’s 2004 rulemaking was limited to hedge fund advisers. However, since that time, the lines which may have once separated hedge funds from private equity and venture capital funds have blurred, and the distinctions are often unclear. The same adviser often manages funds pursuing different strategies and even individual private funds often defy precise categorization. Moreover, we are concerned that in order to escape Commission oversight, advisers may alter fund investment strategies or investment terms in ways that will create market inefficiencies.

A. Registration of Private Fund Investment Advisers

The Private Funds Transparency Act of 2009 would address the regulatory gap discussed above by eliminating Section 203(b)(3)’s de minimis exemption from the Advisers Act, resulting in investment advisers to private funds being required to register with the Commission. Investment adviser registration would be beneficial to investors and our markets in a several important ways.

1. Accurate, Reliable and Complete Information

Registration of private fund advisers would provide the Commission with the ability to collect data from advisers about their business operations and the private funds they manage. The Commission and Congress would thereby, for the first time have accurate, reliable and complete information about the sizable and important private fund industry which could be used to better protect investors and market integrity. Significantly, the information collected could include systemic risk data, which could then be shared with other regulators.12

2. Enforcement of Fiduciary Responsibilities

Advisers are fiduciaries to their clients. Advisers’ fiduciary duties are enforceable under the anti-fraud provisions of the Advisers Act. They require advisers to avoid conflicts of interest with their clients, or fully disclose the conflicts to their clients. Registration under the Advisers Act gives the Commission authority to conduct on-site compliance examinations of advisers designed, among other things, to identify conflicts of interest and determine whether the adviser has properly disclosed them. In the case of private funds, it gives us an opportunity to determine facts that most investors in private funds cannot discern for themselves. For example, investors often cannot determine whether fund assets are subject to appropriate safekeeping or whether the performance represented to them in an account statement is accurate. In this way, registration may also have a deterrent effect because it would increase an unscrupulous adviser’s risk of being discovered.

A grant of additional authority to obtain information from and perform on-site examinations of private fund advisers should be accompanied with additional resources so that the Commission can bring to bear the appropriate expertise and technological support to be effective.

3. Prevention of Market Abuses

Registration of private fund advisers under the Advisers Act would permit oversight of adviser trading activities to prevent market abuses such as insider trading and market manipulation, including improper short-selling.

4. Compliance Programs

Private fund advisers registered with the Commission are required to develop internal compliance programs administered by a chief compliance officer. Chief compliance officers help advisers manage conflicts of interest the adviser has with private funds. Our examination staff resources are limited, and we cannot be at the office of every adviser at all times. Compliance officers serve as the front-line watch for violations of securities laws, and provide protection against conflicts of interests.

5. Keeping Unfit Persons from Using Private Funds to Perpetrate Frauds

Registration with the Commission permits us to screen individuals associated with the adviser, and to deny registration if they have been convicted of a felony or engaged in securities fraud.

6. Scalable Regulation

In addition, many private fund advisers have small to medium size businesses, so it is important that any regulation take into account the resources available to those types of businesses. Fortunately, the Advisers Act has long been used to regulate both small and large businesses, so the existing rules and regulations already account for those considerations. In fact, roughly 69 percent of the investment advisers registered with the Commission have 10 or fewer employees.

7. Equal Treatment of Advisers Providing Same Services

Under the current law, an investment adviser with 15 or more individual clients and at least $30 million in assets under management must register with the Commission, while an adviser providing the same advisory services to the same individuals through a limited partnership could avoid registering with the Commission. Investment adviser registration in our view is appropriate for any investment adviser managing $30 million regardless of the form of its clients or the types of securities in which they invest.

B. Private Fund Registration

Another option to address the private fund regulatory gap might be to register the funds themselves under the Investment Company Act (in addition to registering their advisers under the Advisers Act). Alternatively, the Commission could be given stand-alone authority to impose requirements on unregistered funds. Through direct regulation of the funds, the Commission could impose, as appropriate, investment restrictions or diversification requirements designed to protect investors. The Commission could also regulate the structure of private funds to protect investors (such as requiring an independent board of directors) and could also regulate investment terms (such as protecting redemption rights).

C. Regulatory Flexibility through Rulemaking Authority

Finally, there is third option that in conjunction with advisers’ registration may be necessary to address the regulatory gap in this area. Because it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict today what rules will be required in the future to protect investors and obtain sufficient transparency, especially in an industry as dynamic and creative as private funds, an additional option might be to provide the Commission with the authority that allows for additional regulatory flexibility to act in this area. This could be done by providing rule-making authority to condition the use by a private fund of the exceptions provided by sections 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act. These conditions could impose those requirements that the Commission believes are necessary or appropriate to protect investors and enhance transparency.13 In many situations, it may be appropriate for these requirements to vary depending upon the type of fund involved. This would enable the Commission to better discharge its responsibilities and adapt to future market conditions without necessarily subjecting private funds to Investment Company Act registration and regulation.

V. Conclusion

The registration and oversight of private fund advisers would provide transparency and enhance Commission oversight of the capital markets. It would give regulators and Congress, for the first time, reliable and complete data about the impact of private funds on our securities markets. It would give the Commission access to information about the operation of hedge funds and other private funds through their advisers. It would permit private funds—which play an important role in our capital markets—to retain the current flexibility in their investment strategies.

The Commission supports the registration of private fund advisers under the Advisers Act. The other legislative options I discussed above, namely registration of private funds under the Investment Company Act and/or providing the Commission with rulemaking authority in the Investment Company Act exemptions on which private funds rely, should also be weighed and considered as the Subcommittee considers approaches to filling the gaps in regulation of pooled investment vehicles.

I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

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Endnotes:

1 Commissioner Paredes does not endorse this testimony.

2 The National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) estimates that 741 venture capital firms and 1,549 venture capital funds were in existence in 2007, with $257.1 billion in capital under management. NVCA, Yearbook 2008 at 9 (2008). In 2008, venture capital funds raised $28.2 billion down from $35.6 billion in 2007. Thomson Reuters & NVCA, News Release (Apr. 13 2009). In 2007, the average fund size was $166 million and the average firm size was $347 million. Id. at 9.

3 U.S. private equity funds raised $256.9 billion in 2008 (down from $325.2 billion in 2007). Private Equity Analyst, 2008 Review and 2009 Outlook at 9 (2009) (reporting Dow Jones LP Source data.

4 Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333 (Dec. 2, 2004).

5 See Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

6 Section 203A(a)(1) of the Act prohibits a state-regulated adviser to register under the Act if it has less than $25 million of assets under management. The Commission has adopted a rule increasing the $25 million threshold to $30 million. See Rule 203A-1 under the Advisers Act. The threshold does not apply to foreign advisers. Section 3 of the Private Fund Transparency Act would establish a parallel registration threshold for foreign advisers, which would prevent numerous smaller foreign advisers that today rely on the de minimis exception, which the Act would repeal, from being required to register with the Commission.

7 Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides an exemption from registration for transactions by the issuer of a security not involving a public offering. Rule 506 of Regulation D provides a voluntary “safe harbor” for transactions that are considered to come within the general statutory language of section 4(2).

8 “Qualified purchasers” generally are individuals or family partnerships with at least $5 million in investable assets and companies with at least $25 million. The section 3(c)(7) exception was added in 1996 and specifically anticipated use by private funds.

9 Private funds often are organized as limited partnerships with the fund’s investment adviser serving as the fund’s general partner. The fund’s investors are limited partners of the fund.

10 See Rule 206(4)-8 under the Advisers Act.

11 Commissioner Casey does not endorse the approaches discussed in sections IV. B and C.

12 The Private Fund Transparency Act includes some important although technical amendments to the Advisers Act that are critical to the Commission’s ability to collect information from advisers about private funds, including amendments to Section 204 of the Act permitting the Commission to keep information collected confidential, and amendments to Section 210 preventing advisers from keeping the identity of private fund clients from our examiners.

13 For example, private funds might be required to provide information directly to the Commission. These conditions could be included in an amendment to the Investment Company Act or could be in a separate statute.

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Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  Mallon P.C. helps hedge fund managers to register as investment advisors with the SEC or the state securities divisions.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund or register as an investment advisor, please contact us or call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009

Bart Mallon, Esq.
http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com

****UPDATE 10/27/2009****

The House Financial Services Committee voted on October 27, 2009 to pass the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009 as H.R. 3818 (full text of bill as passed – please note that it is different from the earlier version of the bill reprinted below).  The bill as passed by the committee required private equity fund managers to register but specifically excludes managers of venture capital funds from the registration requirements.  The House Committee released a press release discussing the bipartisan vote.

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Text of Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009

Today the Obama Administration released its proposed legislation which would require hedge fund managers to register with the SEC (as well as private equity fund and venture capital fund managers). The full text of the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009 has been copied below.

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TITLE IV—REGISTRATON OF ADVISERS TO PRIVATE FUNDS

SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009”.

SEC. 402. DEFINITIONS.

Section 202(a) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(29) The term ‘private fund’ means an investment fund that—

“(A) would be an investment company (as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3)), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(1) or 80a-3(c)(7)); and

“(B) either—

“(i) is organized or otherwise created under the laws of the United States or of a State; or

“(ii) has 10 percent or more of its outstanding securities owned by U.S. persons.

“(30) The term ‘foreign private adviser’ means any investment adviser who—

“(A) has no place of business in the United States;

“(B) during the preceding 12 months has had—

“(i) fewer than 15 clients in the United States; and

“(ii) assets under management attributable to clients in the United States of less than $25,000,000, or such higher amount as the Commission may, by rule, deem appropriate in accordance with the purposes of this title; and

“(C) neither holds itself out generally to the public in the United States as an investment adviser, nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, or a company which has elected to be a business development company pursuant to section 54 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-53), and has not withdrawn its election.”.

SEC. 403. ELIMINATION OF PRIVATE ADVISER EXEMPTION; LIMITED EXEMPTION FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE ADVISERS; LIMITED INTRASTATE EXEMPTION.

Section 203(b) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-3(b)) is amended—

(a) in paragraph (1), by inserting “, except an investment adviser who acts as an investment adviser to any private fund,” after “investment adviser” the first time it appears;

(b) by amending paragraph (3) to read as follows:

“(3) any investment adviser that is a foreign private adviser;”; and

(c) in paragraph (6)—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “or”;

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end and adding “; or”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(C) a private fund.”

SEC. 404. COLLECTION OF SYSTEMIC RISK DATA; REPORTS; EXAMINATIONS; DISCLOSURES.

Section 204 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-4) is amended—

(a) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d); and

(b) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):

“(b) RECORDS AND REPORTS OF PRIVATE FUNDS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission is authorized to require any investment adviser registered under this Act to maintain such records of and submit to the Commission such reports regarding private funds advised by the investment adviser as are necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the assessment of systemic risk by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Financial Services Oversight Council, and to provide or make available to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Financial Services Oversight Council those reports or records or the information contained therein. The records and reports of any private fund would be an investment company, to which any such investment adviser provides investment advice, maintained or filed by an investment adviser registered under this Act shall be deemed to be the records and reports of the investment adviser.

“(2) REQUIRED INFORMATION.—The records and reports required to be filed with the Commission under this subsection shall include but shall not be limited to the following information for each private fund advised by the investment adviser:

“(A) amount of assets under management, use of leverage (including off-balance sheet leverage), counterparty credit risk exposures, trading and

investment positions, and trading practices; and

“(B) such other information as the Commission, in consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.

“(3) MAINTENANCE OF RECORDS.—An investment adviser registered under this Act is required to maintain and keep such records of private funds advised by the investment adviser for such period or periods as the Commission, by rules and regulations, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.

“(4) EXAMINATION OF RECORDS.—

“(A) PERIODIC AND SPECIAL EXAMINATIONS.—All records of a private fund maintained by an investment adviser registered under this Act shall be subject at any time and from time to time to such periodic, special, and other examinations by the Commission, or any member or representative thereof, as the Commission may prescribe.

“(B) AVAILABILITY OF RECORDS.—An investment adviser registered under this Act shall make available to the Commission or its representatives any copies or extracts from such records as may be prepared without undue effort, expense or delay as the Commission or its representatives may reasonably request.

“(5) INFORMATION SHARING.— The Commission shall make available to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Financial Services Oversight Council copies of all reports, documents, records and information filed with or provided

to the Commission by an investment adviser under section 204(b) as the Board or the Council may consider necessary for the purpose of assessing the systemic risk of a private fund or assessing whether a private fund should be designated a Tier 1 financial holding company. All such reports, documents, records and information obtained by the Board or the Council from the Commission under this subsection shall be kept confidential.

“(6) DISCLOSURES BY PRIVATE FUND.—An investment adviser registered under this Act shall provide such reports, records and other documents to investors, prospective investors, counterparties, and creditors, of any private fund advised by the investment adviser as the Commission, by rules and regulations, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.

“(7) CONFIDENTIALITY OF REPORTS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Commission shall not be compelled to disclose any supervisory report or information contained therein required to be filed with the Commission under subsection (b). Nothing in this subsection shall authorize the Commission to withhold information from Congress or prevent the Commission from complying with a request for information from any other Federal department or agency or any self-regulatory organization requesting the report or information for purposes within the scope of its jurisdiction, or complying with an order of a court of the United States in an action brought by the United States or the Commission. For purposes of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, this subsection shall be considered a statute described in subsection (b)(3)(B) of such section 552.”.

SEC. 405. DISCLOSURE PROVISION ELIMINATED.

Section 210 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-10) is amended by striking subsection (c).

SEC. 406. CLARIFICATION OF RULEMAKING AUTHORITY.

Section 211 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-11) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking the second sentence; and

(B) by striking the period at the end of the first sentence and inserting the following:

“, including rules and regulations defining technical, trade, and other terms used in this title. For the purposes of its rules and regulations, the Commission may—

“(1) classify persons and matters within its jurisdiction and prescribe different requirements for different classes of persons or matters; and

“(2) ascribe different meanings to terms (including the term ‘client’) used in different sections of this title as the Commission determines necessary to effect the purposes of this title.”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(e) The Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall, after consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, within 6 months after the date of enactment of the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009, jointly promulgate rules to establish the form and content of the reports required to be filed with the Commission under subsection 204(b) and with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission by investment advisers that are registered both under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b et seq.) and the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a et seq.).”.

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Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  Mallon P.C. helps hedge fund managers to register as investment advisors with the SEC or the state securities divisions.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund or register as an investment advisor, please contact us or call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Obama Moves Forward with Hedge Fund Registration Legislation

Bart Mallon, Esq.
http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com

Treasury Announces New “Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009”

After much discussion in the press over the last 8 to 10 months abut the possibility for hedge fund registration, the Treasury today announced the Obama Administration’s bill which requires managers to “private funds” to register with the SEC.  This registration requirement would apply to managers of all funds relying on the Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) which includes managers to private equity and venture capital funds.  Additionally, all registered managers would need to provide the SEC with certain reports on the funds which they manage.

The Treasury release is below and can be found here.  We will post the text of the new act shortly.  [Update: we have just published the text of the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009.]

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Fact Sheet: Administration’s Regulatory Reform Agenda Moves Forward: Legislation for the Registration of Hedge Funds Delivered to Capitol Hill

Continuing its push to establish new rules of the road and make the financial system more fair across the board, the Administration today delivered proposed legislation to Capitol Hill to require all advisers to hedge funds and other private pools of capital, including private equity and venture capital funds, to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In recent years, the United States has seen explosive growth in a variety of privately-owned investment funds, including hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds. At various points in the financial crisis, de-leveraging by such funds contributed to the strain on financial markets.  Because these funds were not required to register with regulators, the government lacked the reliable, comprehensive data necessary to monitor funds’ activity and assess potential risks in the market.  The Administration’s legislation would help protect investors from fraud and abuse, provide increased transparency, and provide the information necessary to assess whether risks in the aggregate or risks in any particular fund pose a threat to our overall financial stability.

Protect Investors From Fraud And Abuse

Require Advisers To Private Investment Funds to Register With The SEC.  Although some advisers to hedge funds and other private investment funds are required to register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and some register voluntarily with the SEC, current law generally does not require private fund advisers to register with any federal financial regulator. The Administration’s legislation would, for the first time, require that all investment advisers with more than $30 million of assets under management to register with the SEC.  Once registered with the SEC, investment advisers to private funds will be subject to important requirements such as:

  • Substantial regulatory reporting requirements with respect to the assets, leverage, and off-balance sheet exposure of their advised private funds
  • Disclosure requirements to investors, creditors, and counterparties of their advised private funds
  • Strong conflict-of-interest and anti-fraud prohibitions
  • Robust SEC examination and enforcement authority and recordkeeping requirements
  • Requirements to establish a comprehensive compliance program

Require Increased Disclosure Requirements. The Administration’s legislation would require that all investment funds advised by an SEC-registered investment adviser be subject to recordkeeping requirements; requirements with respect to disclosures to investors, creditors, and counterparties; and regulatory reporting requirements.

Protect Financial System From Systemic Risk

Monitor Hedge Funds For Potential Systemic Risk. Under the Administration’s legislation, the regulatory requirements mentioned above would include confidential reporting of amount of assets under management, borrowings, off-balance sheet exposures, counterparty credit risk exposures, trading and investment positions, and other important information relevant to determining potential systemic risk and potential threats to our overall financial stability. The legislation would require the SEC to conduct regular examinations of such funds to monitor compliance with these requirements and assess potential risk. In addition, the SEC would share the disclosure reports received from funds with the Federal Reserve and the Financial Services Oversight Council. This information would help determine whether systemic risk is building up among hedge funds and other private pools of capital, and could be used if any of the funds or fund families are so large, highly leveraged, and interconnected that they pose a threat to our overall financial stability and should therefore be supervised and regulated as Tier 1 Financial Holding Companies.

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Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  Mallon P.C. helps hedge fund managers to register as investment advisors with the SEC or the state securities divisions.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund or register as an investment advisor, please contact us or call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Obama Administration Proposes New Regulatory Agency

Assistant Secretary Michael Barr Testifies Before House Committee Regarding President’s Proposal to Establish New Consumer Financial Protection Agency

On July 8th, 2009, Assistant Secretary Michael Barr delivered a statement before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce regarding the Administration’s recent proposal to establish a new financial regulatory agency designated with the sole task of protecting consumers across the financial services industry.   Per the proposal, the new Consumer Financial Protection Agency will set consistently high standards for financial service providers to protect consumers from abuse.  In his statement, Barr points out that the current system for consumer protection is inherently flawed due to various inadequacies, including the lack of unified leadership, federal supervision, and an enforceable system for accountability. He also cites that the root cause of these various setbacks is a ‘fragmented regulation’, in which one agency was responsible for enacting regulations while another agency was responsible for enforcement.  With a new singular agency in the marketplace dedicated to protecting consumers against regulatory arbitrage, the financial industry will once again be restored with the confidence and protections necessary to hopefully make regulatory arbitrate a thing of the past.

Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, a part of Obama’s new financial regulation plan, details the Administration’s initiative to create the new dedicated agency.  President Obama’s statement with regard to this new agency can be found here.

The full text of the related press release on this matter is reprinted below.

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July 8, 2009

Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Michael Barr before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection

Opening Statement – As Prepared for Delivery

Thank you, Chairman Rush and Ranking Member Radanovich, for providing me with this opportunity to testify about the Administration’s proposal to establish a new, strong financial regulatory agency charged with just one job: looking out for consumers across the financial services landscape.  Last week, the Administration sent legislative language to Congress to create the new agency, and in the coming weeks, we will continue to transmit legislation to implement other core proposals to strengthen regulation of financial institutions and markets and lay the foundation for a safer, more stable financial system.

As Secretary Geithner has said, protecting consumers is important in its own right and also central to safeguarding the system as a whole.  We must restore honesty and integrity to our financial system, in order to restore trust and confidence.  A key step to doing so is to establish clear federal accountability for protecting consumers and the authority necessary to carry out the job.

That is why the President is proposing the Consumer Financial Protection Agency.

We will have one agency for one marketplace with one mission – to protect consumers.  It will have the authority and resources it needs to set consistently high standards and a level playing field across the financial services sector–for banks and non-bank financial services providers alike.  Its market-wide jurisdiction will put an end to regulatory arbitrage and unregulated corners that inevitably weaken standards across the board.  Structures and mechanisms in our legislation will ensure the agency remains accountable for its mission, yet independent.  The Agency could choose from a wide range of tools to promote transparency, simplicity, and fairness.  The breadth and diversity of these tools will enable it to adopt the most effective and proportionate, and least costly, approach to any problem.  It will have the tools and resources to maintain expertise, and the incentives to act in a balanced manner that protects consumers from abuse while ensuring their access to innovative, responsible financial services.  At the same time, the Federal Trade Commission would retain key powers and gain new ones, including streamlined rulemaking procedures and heightened penalties for violations.

The Current System for Consumer Financial Protection Regulation is Fundamentally Flawed

A dedicated consumer protection agency for financial services is the only effective response to inherent weaknesses in our existing oversight regime.  The financial crisis revealed the alarming failure of this regime to protect responsible consumers – and keep the playing field level for responsible providers.  The federal government has failed in its most basic regulatory responsibility: to protect consumers.  And no provider should be forced to choose between keeping market share and treating consumers fairly.  The states do their best with limited resources but they look to the federal government for leadership, and there is no federal agency with the structure and authority to lead.

Instead of leadership and accountability, there is a fragmented system of regulation designed for failure.  Bank and non-bank financial service providers often compete vigorously in the same consumer markets but are subject to two different and uncoordinated federal regimes – one based on examinations and supervision, the other based on after-the-fact investigations and enforcement actions.  The lack of federal supervision of non-bank providers is an open invitation to the less responsible actors that seek darker corners to ply their dubious practices.  These actors are willing to gamble that the FTC and state agencies lack the resources to detect and investigate them.  This puts enormous pressure on banks, thrifts, and credit unions to lower their standards to compete – and on their regulators to let them.  Fragmentation of the supervision of banks and thrifts only makes this problem worse: a banking institution can choose the least restrictive among several different supervisory agencies.  Despite best intentions, “regulatory arbitrage” inevitably weakens protections for consumers and feeds bad practices.

This is precisely what happened in the mortgage market.  Independent mortgage companies and brokers grew apace with little oversight.  They peddled subprime and exotic mortgages – such as “option ARMs” with exploding payments and rising loan balances – in misleading ways to consumers least able to handle their complex terms and hidden, costly features.  The FTC and the states took enforcement actions, but their resources were no match for rapid market growth, and they could not set rules of the road for the whole industry or supervise institutions to prevent bad practices from spreading.  To compete over time, banks and thrifts and their affiliates came to offer the same risky products as their less regulated competitors and relaxed their standards for underwriting and sales.  Lenders of all types paid their mortgage brokers and loan officers more to bring in riskier and higher-priced loans, with predictable results.  Bank regulators were slow to recognize these problems, and even slower to act.  The consequences for homeowners were devastating, and our economy is still paying the price.

Our system allowed this to take place even entirely within the highly-regulated, closely-supervised world of banks and thrifts.  Take credit cards.  Some banks found they could boost fee and interest income with complex and opaque terms and features that most consumers would not notice or understand.  These tricks enabled banks to advertise seductively low annual percentage rates and grab market share.  Other banks found they could not compete if they offered fair credit cards with more transparent pricing.  So consumers got retroactive rate hikes, rate hikes without notice, and low-rate balance transfer offers that trapped them in high-rate purchase balances.  A major culprit, once again, was fragmented regulation: one agency held the pen on regulations, another supervised most of the major card issuers.  Each looked to the other to act, and neither acted until public outrage reached a crescendo.

The list goes on.  A wide range of credit products are offered–from payday loans to pawn shops, to auto loans and car title loans, many from large national chains–with little supervision or enforcement.  Closely regulated credit unions and community banks with straightforward credit products struggle to compete with  less scrupulous providers who appear to offer a good deal and then pull a switch on the consumer.   For instance, overdraft policies are a form of credit but are not disclosed or regulated as such.

The problem with our system is not just the gaps and overlaps between regulators.  Our federal agencies do not have missions, structures, and authorities suited to effective consumer protection in financial markets.  The FTC has a broad mission to protect consumers in all markets, of which the financial services market is just one; and it has no jurisdiction over banks.   The agency has brought important cases against some of the worst financial abusers, but these cases often take a long time and the damage is already done.  The agency does not have the supervisory and examination authority or expertise needed to detect and prevent problems before they spread throughout the market.

Bank regulators have supervisory powers over banks, but their primary mission is to ensure banks are safe and sound, not to protect consumers.  Consumer supervision does not fit comfortably within these agencies, and it will never share the front seat with safety and soundness.  Too often, consumer compliance supervision focused on “checking boxes” – is the annual percentage rate on this loan calculated as prescribed?  Is it displayed with a large enough type size?  That often meant missing the forest for the trees.

It was thought that supervising the banks for their effective management of “reputation risk” and “litigation risk” – aspects of a safe and sound institution — would ensure the banks treated their customers fairly.  It didn’t.  It did not prevent our major banks and thrifts from retroactively raising rates on credit cards as a matter of policy, or from selling exploding mortgages to unwitting consumers as a business expansion plan.  Managing a bank’s reputation and litigation risk does not and cannot protect consumers because this approach judges a bank’s conduct toward consumers by its effect on the bank, not its effect on consumers.

We Need One Agency for One Marketplace with One Mission – to Protect Consumers – and the Authority to Achieve It

Tinkering with the consumer protection mandates or authorities of our existing agencies cannot solve the fundamental problem that they are organizationally ill-designed to protect consumers, and too fragmented to maintain high and consistent standards across the consumer financial marketplace.  There is only one solution that can work.  We need one agency for one marketplace with one mission – to protect consumers of financial products and services – and the authority to achieve that mission.  A new agency with a focused mission, comprehensive jurisdiction, and broad authorities is also the only way to ensure consumers and providers high and consistent standards and a level playing field across the whole marketplace without regard to the form of a product – or the type of its provider.

That is the agency we are proposing to create.  The CFPA will have the sole mission of protecting consumers; it will be the agency that sees the world through their eyes.  It will write regulations, supervise institutions and providers for compliance, and lead enforcement efforts – for the whole marketplace.  The implications of our proposal for consumer protection and fair competition are enormous.  It will bring higher and more consistent standards; stronger, faster responses to problems; the end of regulatory arbitrage; a more level playing field for all providers; and more efficient regulation.

Let me start with rule writing.  The CFPA will be able to write rules for all consumer financial services and products and anyone who provides these products.  It will assume existing statutory authorities – such as the Truth in Lending Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act.  New authorities we propose – to require transparent disclosure, promote simple choices, and ensure fair terms and conditions and fair dealing – will enable the agency to fill gaps as markets change and to provide strong and consistent regulation across all types of consumer financial service providers.

For example, our proposal gives the CFPA the power to strengthen mortgage regulation by requiring lenders and brokers to clearly disclose major product risks, and offer simple, transparent products if they decide to offer exotic, complex products.  The CFPA will also be able to impose duties on salespeople and mortgage brokers to offer appropriate loans and meet a duty of best execution, and prevent lenders from paying “yield spread premiums” that pay brokers more if they deliver loans with higher rates than consumers qualify for.  Lenders and consumers would finally have an integrated mortgage disclosure: the CFPA will continue the work of the Federal Reserve and the Department of Housing and Urban Development to create and maintain a single, federal mortgage disclosure.

Comprehensive rule writing authority would improve other markets, too.   For example, the CFPA could adopt consistent regulations for short-term loans – establishing disclosure requirements and banning unfair practices – whether these loans come in the form of bank overdraft protection plans or payday loans or  car title loans from non-bank providers.  The agency also could adopt standards for licensing and monitoring check cashers and pawn brokers.

Combining these robust rule writing authorities with supervision and enforcement authorities in one agency will ensure faster and more effective rules.  For example, the CFPA will both implement the new Credit CARD Act of 2009 – to ban retroactive rate hikes and rate hikes without notice – and will supervise the credit card banks for compliance.  So the agency will have a feedback loop from the examiners of the banks to the staff who write the regulations, allowing staff to determine quickly how well the regulations are working in practice and whether they need to be tightened or adjusted.  That feedback loop is broken today because rule writing and supervision are divided between two agencies.  Consolidated supervisory authority would also allow faster action on mortgages to prevent irresponsible practices that undermine responsible lenders.  It took the federal banking agencies two years to reach final consensus on supervisory guidance on option ARMs and subprime mortgages after evidence of declining underwriting standards emerged publicly.  A single agency could act within months and save many more consumers and communities from significant harm.

Our proposal for comprehensive jurisdiction will also make regulatory arbitrage a thing of the past.  Providers will not have a choice of regulators.  So, by definition, they will not be able to choose a less restrictive regulator.  The CFPA will not have to fear losing “market share” because our legislation gives it authority over the whole market.  Ending arbitrage will prevent the vicious cycles that weaken standards across the market.

Consolidating consumer protection in an agency with comprehensive jurisdiction will also protect consumers no matter with whom they do business, and level the playing field for all institutions and providers.  Consumers do not care what legal form their service provider takes; nor should they.  A short-term loan can be made by a bank, a bank affiliate, a finance company, or a payday lender.  The CFPA could apply to non-bank providers the tools of supervision that regulators now apply to banks – including setting compliance standards, conducting compliance examinations, reviewing files, obtaining data, issuing supervisory guidance and entering into consent decrees or formal orders.  The CFPA would have the ability to send examiners into the large, fast-growing independent mortgage companies that caused most of the damage during the mortgage boom to review loan files and interview salespeople.  With these tools, the Agency would be able to identify problems before they spread, stop them before they cause serious injury, and relieve pressures on responsible providers to lower their standards.

The CFPA is not a new layer of regulation; it will consolidate existing regulators and authorities.  This will bring efficiencies for industry.  It will have a clear address for concerns about regulatory burden, and it can expect speedier responses to legitimate claims of unwarranted burdens.  Moreover, responsible industry actors will worry less about unfair competition from irresponsible actors, since all providers will be under this agency’s jurisdiction.

Of course, even with a strong supervisory and enforcement staff, no agency can oversee tens of thousands of financial service providers on its own.  The FTC and the states will continue to play critical roles.  The FTC will retain authority to investigate and prosecute financial-related frauds under its FTC Act authority to prevent unfair or deceptive practices.  The states will continue to license and bond non-bank service providers, with authority for the CFPA to set strong new federal standards and directly and forcefully to act, by sending in supervisors and examiners when risks are warranted.  The CFPA will be able to coordinate closely with the FTC and the states to share information and shore up weaknesses.

The CFPA Will be Held Accountable While Remaining Independent

The public deserves accountability for consumer protection, and creating the CFPA will, finally, give them that accountability.  Consumers and their elected representatives will have a place to bring their consumer protection concerns, and one agency to hold accountable for results.  Clear accountability will, therefore, produce better results.

Our legislation contains specific measures to help ensure better regulation and prevent agency inertia or backsliding.  The CFPA will maintain a unit to analyze consumer complaints across the full range of providers – banks and non-banks – and markets.  Its analysis will be published annually.  The agency also will maintain a research unit to track changes in markets, products, and consumer behavior and assess risks to consumers – and their understanding of these risks.  The agency will give particular consideration to monitoring fast-growing providers and products – such as independent mortgage companies and subprime loans during the housing boom – where risks are often higher.  The CFPA will publish significant findings of these monitoring activities at least once each year, and report annually to Congress on its regulatory, enforcement, and supervisory activities.

Accountability must be balanced with independence.  The agency will have a stable funding stream in the form of  appropriations and fee assessments akin to those regulators impose today.  Stable funding is a necessary, but not sufficient, ingredient for true independence.  Sustained independence also depends on expertise and respect.  The agency will be able to hire a top notch and diversified staff.  Our legislation would provide the agency’s attorneys, economists, finance experts, examiners, and other professionals the same salaries on average as professionals of the banking agencies.  The agency would absorb the banking agencies’ teams of consumer compliance examiners, and hire and train new examiners for non-bank providers.

The CFPA Will Be  Effective Because it will be Expert, and its Actions Will be Balanced and Proportionate

We are proposing the CFPA be given broad authorities.  Our legislation is designed to ensure the agency uses these authorities effectively and with expertise, balance, and proportion – qualities that will ensure the agency remains effective and independent.

Deep and sophisticated understanding.  Our legislation assures the CFPA will have the deep understanding of consumers, providers, and products it will need to write rules that are effective, balanced, and proportional.   As mentioned above, a research unit, consumer surveys and testing, complaint tracking and compliance examiners will help ensure that the CFPA is up-to-date with developments in the market.  As they do today, examiners for the largest and most complex institutions, whether banks or non-banks, will reside on-site so they fully understand products and operations.  These mechanisms will provide the agency critical information to craft effective, tailored regulations that do not impose unnecessary costs, and to determine when regulations should be expanded, modified, or eliminated.

Balanced regulations.  When it adopts and reviews regulations, the agency will be required to balance a range of competing objectives.  Its four-fold mission includes (1) protecting consumers from abusive or unfair practices; (2) ensuring that they have the information they need to make responsible choices; (3) ensuring markets are efficient and have ample room for innovation, and (4) promoting access to financial services.  The CFPA will have to balance these potentially competing goals.  Our legislation also explicitly requires the CFPA to consider the costs, not just the benefits, of regulations to consumers and financial institutions – including any potential reduction in consumers’ access to financial services.  Moreover, the agency will be able to adopt appropriate exemptions from its rules for providers or products where necessary to fulfill the four objectives.  Once it adopts a major regulation, the agency will have to review it within five years to make sure it remains consistent with these objectives

Flexible approaches and tailored solutions.  Comprehensive authority over the whole market will give the agency a range of options for setting standards so it can choose the most effective, least-cost option.  When flexibility is at a premium, the agency can issue supervisory guidance and use examination reports and other techniques to foster change.  Today, supervisory guidance usually must be agreed to by four or more federal agencies and fifty states, which causes considerable delays and dilutes effectiveness.  One agency for one market will make guidance a much more effective tool than it is today.  When a stricter approach is appropriate, the agency can adopt regulations and impose penalties for violations.

Moreover, diverse rule writing authorities will ensure the agency can tailor its regulations to the underlying problem with the least cost to consumers and institutions.  The agency will have ample authority to harness the benefits of market discipline by improving the quality of, and access to, information in the marketplace.  For example, it will have authority for principles-based, non-technical standards to ensure marketing materials and sales pitches are reasonable and include clear disclosure of product risks in balance with advertised benefits.  We have included authority for the agency to permit providers to pilot new disclosure approaches.  The agency will also be able to adopt new, more concrete disclosures that highlight for consumers the consequences of their decisions – akin to the minimum payment warning on credit card periodic statements under the Credit CARD Act of 2009.  Consumers, themselves, will be able to access their financial information in a usable, electronic format so they can conduct their own assessments of decisions they have made or are planning to make.  Increasing the quality and accessibility of product information will make it easier for consumers and providers alike to understand the marketplace and make better choices.

The agency will also be able to encourage providers to offer simple products to help comparison shopping.  For example, providers that offer exotic, complex, and riskier products would need to offer at least one standard, simple, less risky product.  In the mortgage market, a lender or broker that peddles mortgages with potentially exploding monthly payments, hidden fees and prepayment penalties, and growing loan balances – such as the “pay option ARMs” of recent years – might also be required to offer consumers 30-year, fixed-rate mortgages or ARMs with straightforward terms.  The point is to make it easier for consumers to choose simpler products, which should limit the need for costlier restrictions on terms and practices.

The agency will also have the ability to align incentives, which can sometimes be more effective than outlawing particular terms or practices and chasing down the inevitable circumventions.  It will have authority to impose duties on frontline salespeople and middle men and regulate the form, manner, or timing – but not amount – of their compensation as needed to promote fair dealing.  If they give financial advice and consumers reasonably rely on it, the agency will be able to ensure their advice meets a minimum standard of care.  The agency will also be able to ensure salespeople and middle men are not paid more to take advantage of consumers’ trust or inexperience.  For example, the agency might decide to prohibit mortgage lenders from paying salespeople or brokers higher bonuses for delivering loans with higher interest rates than borrowers qualify for, with hidden costly fees, since this creates a perverse incentive to mislead consumers into taking out costlier loans.

With a broad range of supervisory and regulatory tools, the agency will be able to choose the most effective, least costly solution for each problem.  Let me give you an example of how this might work.  In response to the strong protections of the Credit CARD Act of 2009, credit card issuers will substantially change their terms and practices.  New terms or practices may raise new questions of fairness.  If that happens, the CFPA will be able to proceed deliberately and in stages.  For example, it could begin by asking card issuers to produce evidence that consumers understand the new terms or practices and can avoid the risks they pose.  If this evidence seems inadequate, the agency could conduct its own testing with consumers.  If this testing showed widespread lack of consumer understanding, the agency could consider a range of options, from improving disclosure to providing stronger incentives to offer simpler products to further restricting unfair terms and practices.

Respect for safety and soundness.  When it uses these authorities, the CFPA will respect the safety-and-soundness imperatives of bank regulation.  When conflicts do arise, structures for compromise will facilitate resolution. A safety and soundness regulator will have one of five board seats, and the agency must consult with safety and soundness regulators before adopting rules.  In addition, the CFPA can work with the banking agencies to ensure bank consumer compliance examiners are trained to understand safety and soundness, as they are today.

In short, the comprehensive authority we propose will not increase regulatory burden or lead to unreasonable regulations.  It will do the opposite.  It will ensure the agency has a deep understanding of products and providers.  And it will enable the agency to choose from among a wide range of tools and authorities to find the most effective, least-cost solution.  This will save consumers – and financial service providers – significant costs over the long term.

Our Legislation Will Respect and Strengthen the Core Functions of the Federal Trade Commission

Our legislation does not affect the jurisdiction of the FTC over the vast array of non-financial markets and actually strengthens its ability to police those markets.  To increase the FTC’s ability to protect consumers, we propose that the FTC be able to (1) adopt rules to prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or practices with standard notice-and-comment rulemaking; (2) obtain civil penalties when companies use unfair or deceptive practices; and (3) pursue those who substantially aid and abet providers that commit unfair or deceptive practices.  The Administration also supports increased resources in the 2010 President’s Budget for the FTC so that consumers can be better protected across all markets.

As for financial markets, the FTC will continue to have authority under the FTC Act to pursue financial fraud without delay, including foreclosure rescue and loan modification scams.  The  FTC would simply be required to consult and coordinate with – but not refer these cases to – the CFPA.  The CFPA would also have authority under the proposed legislation to pursue fraud and deceptive practices by financial service providers.  The consultation requirement ensures there will be coordination, much like the coordination that occurs informally between the states and the FTC today in pursuing fraud.  The FTC will also retain authority for writing rules under the Telemarketing Sales Act and concurrent responsibility for enforcing them over financial products and services.

The CFPA will have substantial authority over mortgages under other statutes, so it will assume the rulemaking authority recently granted to the FTC over mortgage loans.  This assures consumers and providers a consistent and consolidated approach to regulating mortgages throughout the whole life of the loan, from sale and origination to payoff, modification, or foreclosure.

With respect to rules or statutes other than the FTC Act, the FTC will have “backstop” authority to enforce the same consumer credit statutes that it can enforce now.  Under that authority, if the FTC – or a bank regulator – becomes aware of a possible law violation of those statutes, it may send a written recommendation that the CFPA take action, stating its concerns, and proceed itself on the matter after 120 days if the CFPA does not take action.  The Administration is proposing to apply the same referral requirement to the bank regulators.  This requirement will help ensure a consistent federal approach to interpreting and enforcing consumer protection statutes such as the Truth in Lending Act, while leaving the FTC and the banking agencies the ability to act if the CFPA does not.  The approach is flexible enough to permit the agencies to agree to practical arrangements for referrals and appropriate use of the FTC’s backstop authority.

The FTC would retain primary authority in the area of data security for nonbank entities.  It would continue its current role of enforcing, as to nonbank financial service providers, Section 5 of the FTC Act as it applies to  data security practices and its Safeguards Rule, which implements Section 501(b) of the Gramm-Leach- Bliley Act. [1][1]  Consistent with the CFPA’s exclusive authority over consumer disclosure in other areas, however, the CFPA would have primary authority under the “front end” privacy provisions of GLBA (e.g. privacy notice and related provisions) for all financial institutions (banks and nonbanks), and as well as its own authority under the proposed legislation that parallels Section 5 of the FTC Act.

Conclusion

Our proposal will ensure the financial regulator community includes one agency with the single mission of protecting consumers.  It is time to put consumer protection responsibility in an agency with a focused mission and comprehensive jurisdiction over all financial services providers, banks and non-banks.  It is time for a level playing field for financial services competition based on strong rules, not based on exploiting consumer confusion.  It is time for an agency that consumers – and their elected representatives – can hold fully accountable.  And it is long past time for a stronger FTC.  The Administration’s legislation fulfills these needs.  Thank you for this opportunity to discuss our proposal, and I will be happy to answer any questions.

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Notes:
[1] Because of its relationship to data security, the FTC would also retain its rulemaking and enforcement authority for the Red Flags Rule under Section 615(e) and the Disposal Rule under Section 628 of the FCRA.   The remainder of rulemaking and enforcement authority under the FCRA would transfer to the CFPA.
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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Hedge Funds with $25MM of AUM to Register Under Commissioner Aguilar’s Plan

SEC Commissioner Aguilar Proposes Registration For Funds with as little as $25MM of AUM

Just today I had an opportunity to review the transcript of a speech by SEC Commissioner Aguilar in which he advocates that funds with as little as $25MM of AUM should register with the SEC.  Such a low threshold for registration is troubling in a number of ways.  Most importantly is the impact registration would have on the SEC immediately and in the future.  As we have seen most vividly over the past year, the SEC is overextended and underfunded.  The SEC’s ability to adequately deal with the 9,000 to 12,000 hedge funds which would come under its jurisdicition is suspect.  Registration aside, how will an agency which was not able to sniff out a Bernie Madoff be able to oversee such a large industry without making it cost prohibitive for funds to operate?  The money required to oversee these funds is likely to be substantial and will probably not be coming from Congress which means the cost of such a regulatory and oversight system will likely fall onto the managers themselves and then of course to the investors.

As we talk about regulation of the hedge fund industry, there is also the question of regulatory resources. Any future registration of hedge fund advisers and/or hedge funds will require that the SEC receive increased resources to provide effective oversight. We will need to hire staff and implementing new technology to effectively deal with a large and complex industry. To that end, I have previously called for Congress to pass legislation establishing the SEC as a self-funded agency, similar to the way other financial regulators are funded — such as the Federal Reserve Bank, the FDIC, OTS and OCC. This would help to solve the problem.

To the extent that funds are registering and reporting to the SEC, I encourage Congress to couple the authority increasing the SEC’s jurisdiction with the appropriate self-funding mechanism to allow us to provide effective oversight.

This is not to say I am not against reasonable, reasoned and fiscally responsible oversight and regulation.  I believe that systemic stability is critically important for the long term viability of the hedge fund industry as well as the capital markets.  In this vein, I think that Aguilar’s statement below represents the type of structures which would contribute to increased stability while minimizing regulation where it is not necessary.

Perhaps a tiered approach to registration, based on a fund’s potential to affect the market, would make sense. At the lowest tier would be small funds. These funds could be subject to a simple recordkeeping requirement as to positions and transactions, kept in a standardized format, to permit the SEC to efficiently oversee their activities. As funds grow in size, different standards may be appropriate.

While I do not agree with many of the points regarding regulation the Commissioner discussed in the speech reprinted below, I do believe that the Commissioner does a good job at identifying issues which should be discussed publicly as regulators and industry participants move towards creating a reasonable regulatory regime.

Please feel free to include your comments below.

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Speech by SEC Commissioner:
Hedge Fund Regulation on the Horizon — Don’t Shoot the Messenger
by

Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Spring 2009 Hedgeworld Fund Services Conference
New York, New York

June 18, 2009

Thank you for that kind introduction. I am pleased to be here with you at the Spring 2009 Hedgeworld Fund Services Conference. This conference is timely given the current discussion regarding potential regulation of the hedge fund industry. Let me say at the outset, as is customary, my remarks today are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of my fellow Commissioners or of the Commission staff.

My experience with the securities industry began in the late 1970’s. After three years with the SEC, I’ve spent the bulk of my 30 years as a lawyer focusing on the capital markets. Most of those years where in private practices in large law firms, although I spent most of the 90’s and the early part of this decade as General Counsel and Head of Compliance of a large global asset manager. While I’ve spent much of my professional career involved in capital formation though public and private offerings, a substantial portion has been spent working in the investment management industry, and I have worked with hedge funds.

As we all know, there has been much speculation about the impact of hedge fund activity on the broader capital markets. For example, there are questions about whether hedge funds may have contributed to the market turmoil and how hedge funds may have contributed to the demise of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and others. Additionally, it is also not clear whether the lack of oversight of the industry resulted in large amounts of risk to the market through the use of short sales and derivatives, such as credit default swaps.

This year’s conference takes place at a key moment in the history of hedge funds. While hedge funds have remained largely unregulated, this seems to be coming to an end. All over the world, legislators, regulators, investor groups, industry representatives and others are loudly calling for the industry to be regulated.

In the United States, the calls for regulation are motivated by concerns that market integrity has been harmed and that systemic risk arose as a result of the exemptions and exclusions from the federal securities laws that permitted a private market to thrive in ways that may have harmed the public markets. In fact, the market turmoil clearly demonstrated that the private fund market does impact the broader capital markets. This does not mean that all fund activity must be equally regulated, but hedge funds, especially large ones, are thought to require greater regulatory oversight.

My goal with my remarks today is to:

  • First, lay out a current state of affairs regarding the hedge fund industry;
  • Second, describe the calls for regulation of the industry; and
  • Third, discuss key considerations that need to be assessed as hedge fund regulation moves forward.

Multiple Voices Calling For Regulation

The hedge fund industry looks very different today than from where it started. Since the first hedge fund was organized by Alfred Jones in 1949 with $100,000, the industry has exponentially grown both in number of funds and in number of assets under management. In recent years, this growth has been fueled in part by institutional investors, such as endowments, foundations, insurance companies, and pension plans. To give you an idea of the growth, it is believed that the industry managed around $38 billion in 1990, $625 billion in 2002, and reached $1.9 trillion at the end of 2007, although that the number decreased to $1.3 trillion at the end of 2008. It is still incredible growth from the $100,000 start.

The industry’s growth, and the concerns over the impact of hedge funds on the marketplace, has created a renewed call for regulation in the U.S. and abroad. For example, the European Commission recently proposed to regulate the managers of hedge funds and all private equity funds with 100 million euros in assets under management. The proposed regulations would require extensive disclosure of risk management procedures and other aspects of fund governance.

In the U. S., a few years ago the SEC unsuccessfully attempted to regulate hedge funds. More recently, in March of this year, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner testified about his plan to more tightly oversee hedge funds. In addition, there recently have been at least a half-dozen bills introduced in Congress requiring regulation of the hedge fund industry. Just this past Tuesday, Senator Jack Reed introduced a bill that would require that advisers to hedge funds, and to certain other investment pools, to register with the SEC. And yesterday, of course, the Obama Administration released a draft white paper that, among other things, proposes that advisers to large hedge funds register with the SEC, and that very large advisers be subject to additional federal supervision by the Federal Reserve Board.

What are the concerns underlying the call for government oversight? I will tell you what we are hearing. The concerns touch on the classic financial regulatory interests: such as market integrity concerns, systemic risk concerns, and investor protection concerns. This state of affairs is what you would expect when markets are inextricably integrated and the impact of hedge funds is significant, but their actions and their risks are opaque. Simply stated, regulators, legislators and the public have little credible information as to who is out there and what they are doing.

Market Integrity Concerns

Let’s start with the SEC’s responsibility to maintain fair and orderly markets. One of the concerns about hedge funds involves how hedge fund operations impact upon the fairness and the integrity of the broader market. The lack of transparency and oversight over hedge funds gives rise to a number of concerns — for example, market integrity concerns about the nature and extent of counterparty risk, concerns about whether hedge funds engage in insider trading, and questions about how hedge funds drive the demand for derivatives, such as CDSs, as well as how they impact the demand for securitized products.

As a predicate for discussion, let’s be clear about the significant market activity of hedge funds. For example, hedge funds reportedly account for more than 85% of the distressed debt market, and more than 80% of certain derivatives markets. Moreover, although hedge funds represent just 5% of all U.S. assets under management, they account for about 30% of all U.S. equity trading volume. In 2006, there were estimates that hedge funds were responsible for as much as half of the daily trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange.

Because hedge funds are not subject to leverage or diversification requirements, hedge fund managers can more easily take concentrated positions that can impact the market. For example, an entire fund or even multiple funds advised by the same hedge fund manager can be invested in a single position.

In addition, hedge funds are major players in the capital markets for reasons other than trading activity. As this audience knows well, hedge funds have significant business relationships with the largest regulated commercial and investment banks — and act as trading counterparties for a wide range of OTC derivatives and other financing transactions.

Counterparty Risk Concerns

Clearly, for all these reasons and others, hedge funds are significant players in the capital markets. As significant players, hedge funds are one source of counterparty risk, and this risk can be amplified by their leverage and opacity.

Today, commercial banks and prime brokers are called upon to bear and manage the credit and counterparty risks that hedge fund leverage creates. Up until now, it has been assumed that market discipline would effectively prevent hedge funds from detrimentally impacting the capital markets or from posing systemic risk. A January 2008 GAO Report, however, identified several concerns with that theory.[1] For example, the report noted that hedge funds use multiple prime brokers and questioned whether any single prime broker has a complete picture of a hedge fund client’s total leverage. Accordingly, the stress tests and other tools that a prime broker uses to monitor a given counterparty’s risk profile only incorporate the positions known to that particular prime broker. Thus, no single prime broker has the whole picture.

The GAO Report also stated that some counterparties may lack the capacity to assess risk exposures because of the complex financial instruments and secret investment strategies that some hedge funds use.

Unfortunately, the GAO Report also indicates that counterparties facing these structural limitations may have also actively relaxed credit standards in order to attract and retain hedge fund clients in response to fierce competition.

In each of these instances, the risks of hedge funds are being externalized to the regulated market — prime brokers, banks, and their shareholders each were asked to bear the costs of managing hedge fund risks. A concrete example you may remember was when two Bear Stearns-sponsored hedge funds collapsed in 2007. Merrill Lynch, one of the prime brokers, had to absorb an enormous loss because it could only sell the funds’ collateral for a fraction of its purported value.

It’s been obvious that the regulatory oversight of hedge funds has not matched their level of market activity. This difference has led to other concerns affecting market integrity.

Risks of Insider Trading Create Market Wide Concerns

For example, in addition to concerns about counterparty risk, there have also been concerns about hedge funds engaging in insider trading. Clearly, there has been an increase in the number of insider trading cases brought by the Commission that have involved hedge funds. Admittedly, it is incredibly difficult for the Commission to assess the frequency of insider trading because of the opacity of hedge funds and the investments they make, especially in OTC derivatives. Moreover, when you couple this with the fragmented nature of the securities markets and the broad potential for hedge funds to obtain inside information, it is a tough oversight situation indeed. Hedge funds who participate in private placements, talk with trading desks, and maintain connections with the street are, in many cases, in a position to obtain inside information and to use it in a way that traditional surveillance may not detect. This potential for insider trading has been well publicized and public investors are concerned about the possible effects on market fairness and integrity.

Hedge Funds And The Demand For CDS and Securitized Products

Additionally, hedge funds were significant players in the exponential growth in the now much maligned credit default swaps market. As the market to create CDSs grew, there were funds that bought these instruments for reasons that made sense. For example, in 2005 there were hedge funds who noticed that the U.S. housing market was weakening and they bought CDS instruments on the protection buyer side. A logical move.

On the other hand, it is well known that the credit risk reflected by CDSs is equal to multiples of the actual credit risk of the underlying bond market. How did that happen? Many CDSs were heralded as hedging tools — they were supposed to transfer risk to parties that could bear it from parties that could not. Now we see only too clearly that this was not the case. Instead, many CDSs actually created risk, rather than hedged risk. Hedge funds that sought to create profits from leveraged risk may have played a crucial role driving the growth in these products.

Systemic Risks

The concerns about hedge funds and market integrity often go hand in hand with concerns about systemic risk. In their current form, hedge funds pose a systemic risk threat to our financial system in several ways. First, hedge funds have such significant assets under management that some fear that the loss of one or more large firms could potentially reverberate throughout the capital markets. In addition, if a counterparty fails to effectively withstand a hedge fund loss, then the failure of the counterparty could itself threaten market stability.

There is also the issue that can occur when several hedge funds take the same position, whether through coordination or simply through similar trading strategies. These funds can have a large impact on the market when they adjust their positions en masse.

Thus, the concerns that the lack of oversight over the hedge fund industry may present to market integrity and to systemic risks seem to be well founded.

Investor Protection

In addition to concerns about market integrity, the SEC is also responsible for investor protection. Given the increase in complaints from hedge fund investors this has taken on a more immediate importance.

One of the underlying principles behind the idea that hedge funds could operate with little to no regulatory requirements was that interests in the funds were only sold in private offerings to wealthy investors. These investors were thought to be sufficiently “sophisticated” to protect their interests, and to be able to engage in effective arms-length negotiation in order to achieve fair and equitable terms.

I firmly believe that truly sophisticated investors in private deals should be held accountable to the terms that they knowingly negotiate — and if an investment were to go bad, they should bear the loss.

However, with the recent market turmoil and the ongoing economic upheaval that has caused trillions in wealth to vanish, millions of jobs to disappear and the liquidation of over 1,500 hedge funds, serious concerns have been raised about whether these wealthy and sophisticated investors are truly able to protect their interests. There seems to be evidence that these “sophisticated investors” may not have fully appreciated the risks they were taking. Perhaps it may make sense for the definitions of who qualifies as “sophisticated” under our rules to be reconsidered. For example, maybe the criteria for sophistication should focus on more relevant attributes — such as focusing on actual investment experience.

In any case, recent events have challenged the assumption that investors and market discipline can be relied upon to control the risks of hedge funds. And this is not surprising. First, these investors are typically passive and there is no legal obligation for hedge fund investors to monitor hedge fund activity. Second, even if investors wanted to actively monitor the investment, the nature of hedge fund activity and the information available may not currently support such a role.

Valuation and Performance

For example, it may be impossible for an investor to know the actual value of a hedge fund’s portfolio. Hedge funds are not subject to reporting requirements and because many instruments held by a hedge fund are illiquid or opaquely-priced OTC products, any information that is reported could be hard to evaluate.

Related to the concern of how a fund values its assets, is a hedge fund’s performance information — another hard to evaluate metric for investors. Without regulation, the only performance information that hedge funds provide is voluntary.

This quote by Harry Liem, a pension consultant, seems to sum it up when he said “It’s like someone walking into a casino and saying ‘I want everyone to come forward and tell me how much you have won or lost.’ Probably only the winners will come forward . . .”[2]

Not Being Able to Redeem

There is also the issue of investors not being able to redeem their investments from a fund. In recent times, due to the large amount of redemption requests and the current lack of an ability to raise cash, there are hedge fund managers who have put up gates and have restricted investors’ ability to redeem their monies. Although gates can benefit investors by giving the manager more time to sell off portfolio positions, for some investors it appeared to be a surprise.

On top of that, several hedge fund managers froze funds but continued to charge management fees on money that investors cannot access. Orin Kramer, a hedge fund manager, described the situation by stating: “It’s like telling someone at a hotel that they can’t check out and then charging them for the privilege of staying.”[3]

Let me be clear. I’m not saying that these situations are per se illegal. To the extent that sophisticated and qualified investors agreed to provisions providing for gates and the ongoing charge of management fees, one could say that investors walked into these agreements with open eyes.

However, because for the most part hedge funds are not registered with the SEC, we are not able to adequately oversee how they are operating. Moreover, this lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess whether the relationship between an investor and the hedge funds adviser, is functioning in the manner that underlie the presumptions that led to the exemptions.

Some recent reports do tend to show that investors are beginning to take their own initiatives, and give some indication that what investors may be willing to agree to in the future may be different. For example, a recent memo from CalPERS stated that it would no longer partner with managers whose fee structures result in a clear misalignment of interest between managers and investors. Moreover, more investors are now asking that hedge funds run assets in “managed accounts,” where their money is held separately and the holdings are transparent.

As you may expect based on concerns including ones I have mentioned, hedge fund investors have been calling the Commission in unprecedented numbers

Increased Cases Involving Hedge Funds

In fact, the Commission has more investigations involving hedge funds than ever before, and the number of cases actually brought also is increasing. In the first 4 months of 2009, the Commission filed 25 cases related to hedge funds. In contrast, we brought 19 cases in all of 2008, 24 in all of 2007, and 16 in 2006. Our cases cover the waterfront, charging everything from offering fraud and insider trading, to misrepresentations about performance and to misrepresentations about the actual due diligence undertaken. We are also seeing more cases involving conflicts of interest and outright theft of assets

Nature of Regulation

I have just laid out for you some of the concerns that are generally driving the calls for greater regulation and oversight of the hedge fund industry. Maybe even more important, it appears that some of the assumptions justifying the industry’s exclusion from regulation and oversight may be on faulty ground. As a result, it seems certain that regulation of the hedge fund industry is coming. But here is the harder question — what should it look like?

There are a number of questions as to exactly how, and to what extent, hedge funds may have contributed to the economic crisis and how they contributed to the overall systemic risk of the financial markets. To that end, I applaud Congress and President Obama for providing for an independent, bi-partisan Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission. By investigating and analyzing what happened, we can better assess whether the regulatory proposals should move forward.

Since coming to the Commission, I have been a vocal advocate for the Commission’s mission to protect investors, provide for fair and orderly markets, and promote capital formation. All aspects of this mission guide my thoughts as we consider the appropriate framework to regulate hedge funds.

Because of the size, complexity and market-wide impact of the hedge funds industry, potential regulation would need to be both comprehensive and flexible. Something not always easy to achieve.

I believe that the SEC must be an active participant in this process. Please remember that the SEC has been overseeing industry participants — such as, investment companies, investment advisers and broker-dealers — for over 69 years. The Commission staff has unsurpassed expertise in this area. Congress should take advantage of this expertise by providing the Commission with a broad mandate to oversee hedge funds. The Commission could then scale its regulation in a flexible manner to deal with the regulatory concerns of market integrity, investor protection, and, in coordination with other regulators, systemic risk.

Working with hedge fund advisers and with hedge fund investors, I am confident that we can find an appropriate balance.

As you know, there has been a general discussion over whether hedge fund advisers and/or hedge funds should register. In my mind, hedge funds advisers with over $25 million in assets should register with the Commission, but that may not be enough. Many hedge fund advisers are currently registered with the SEC but we still lack a complete picture of what is going on in the industry. Some have suggested that hedge funds should also register. Others have suggested that it may be appropriate to apply limited concepts from within the Investment Company Act of 1940 to hedge funds — what some have called a “40 Act-lite” regime.

Perhaps a tiered approach to registration, based on a fund’s potential to affect the market, would make sense. At the lowest tier would be small funds. These funds could be subject to a simple recordkeeping requirement as to positions and transactions, kept in a standardized format, to permit the SEC to efficiently oversee their activities. As funds grow in size, different standards may be appropriate.

For funds that could significantly affect the market, it may be appropriate to require more than recordkeeping. For example, it may be appropriate to think through whether some of the risk limitation concepts built into the Investment Company Act make sense to apply to these hedge funds — such as imposing limits on leverage.

Of course, these are only a few suggestions. Many others have been made — and others will follow — as the discussion turns from “whether to regulate” to “how to regulate.” The nature of the business of hedge funds is trading, and this necessarily requires interaction with the public marketplace — and the larger the investment fund, the greater the potential impact on the overall capital markets. When the hedge industry has the ability to significantly impact the market or other market participants, the public interest needs to be protected. A lesson of this economic crisis is that the U.S. regulatory interest in hedge funds arises because of the impact of the funds on the financial market, regardless of the sophistication of its investors or the number of investors.

When discussing “how to regulate,” it is clear to me that regulation is more than the bare requirements of registering and reporting — it should also include inspection authority. To have a chance to prevent problems before they occur, the SEC has to be able to inspect all hedge fund advisers, and the funds that they manage, and otherwise engage in oversight through surveillance systems. The public expects nothing less.

Greater Resources to SEC to Provide Effective Oversight

As we talk about regulation of the hedge fund industry, there is also the question of regulatory resources. Any future registration of hedge fund advisers and/or hedge funds will require that the SEC receive increased resources to provide effective oversight. We will need to hire staff and implementing new technology to effectively deal with a large and complex industry. To that end, I have previously called for Congress to pass legislation establishing the SEC as a self-funded agency, similar to the way other financial regulators are funded — such as the Federal Reserve Bank, the FDIC, OTS and OCC. This would help to solve the problem.

To the extent that funds are registering and reporting to the SEC, I encourage Congress to couple the authority increasing the SEC’s jurisdiction with the appropriate self-funding mechanism to allow us to provide effective oversight.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I am confident that regulation of the hedge fund industry can be done right — in a way that balances the needs of the industry with the needs of investors and the needs of the market. And if it is, it will be a good thing for all of us. The Congressional Oversight Panel’s Special Report on Regulatory Reform4 said it best with the following summary:

“By limiting the opportunities for deception and allowing for the necessary trust to develop between interconnected parties, regulation can enhance the vitality of the markets. Historically, new regulation has served that role.
For example, as the money manager Martin Whitman has observed, far from stifling the markets, the new regulations of the Investment Company Act enabled the targeted industry to flourish:

“’Without strict regulation, I doubt that our industry could have grown as it has grown, and also be as prosperous as it is for money managers. Because of the existence of strict regulation, the outside investor knows that money managers can be trusted. Without that trust, the industry likely would not have grown the way it had grown.’”[5]

The lack of transparency, potential imbalance of power between investors and managers, and impact on the entire capital market are driving the calls to regulate the hedge fund industry. The hedge fund industry has a lot to offer in determining how these calls are answered. Addressing these issues in an intelligent and rational manner is important, and ultimately will result in a stronger and more vibrant hedge fund industry. I welcome the ongoing discussion.

Thank you for inviting me here today.

Endnotes

[1] GAO Report: Regulators and Market Participants Are Taking Steps to Strengthen Market Discipline, but Continued Attention is Needed. January 2008. pg 27.

[2] Why people love to hate those risky hedge funds; An investment option that only the super rich can afford, by Naomi Rovnick. South China Morning Post Ltd. March 1, 2009.

[3] Hedge Funds, Unhinged by Louise Story. New York Times. January 18, 2009.

[4] Congressional Oversight Panel’s Special Report on Regulatory Reform: Modernizing the American Financial Regulatory System: Recommendations for Improving Oversight, Protecting Consumers, and Ensuring Stability. January 2009. pgs 18-19

[5] Letter from Third Avenue Funds Chairman of the Board Martin J. Whitman to Sharheolders, at 6 (Oct. 31, 2005) (online at www.thirdavenuefunds.com/ta/documents/sl/shareholderletters-05Q4.pdf).

http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061809laa.htm

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to  learn how to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009

As part of the new Obama financial regulation plan, which includes potentially the registration of hedge fund managers with the SEC, the Whitehouse has sent a draft to congress of the new Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009 (CFPAA of 2009).  The act would create a new government agency which would have some interaction with both the SEC and the CFTC.  A full version of the draft can be found here: Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009.  Additionally, you can find President Obama’s statement with regard to this new agency reprinted below.  For more information, please also see Jim Hamilton’s website.

More posts about this new act and what it will mean to hedge funds will be forthcoming.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
EMBARGOED UNTIL 6:00 AM ET,

SATURDAY, June 20, 2009

WEEKLY ADDRESS: President Obama Highlights Tough New Consumer Protections

WASHINGTON – In his weekly address, President Barack Obama explained the necessity of his proposed Consumer Financial Protection Agency.  It is clear that one of the major causes of the current economic crisis was a breakdown of oversight leading to widespread abuses in the financial world.  The Consumer Financial Protection Agency will have the sole job of looking out for the financial interests of ordinary Americans by banning unfair practices and enforcing the rules.  This is the type of reform that will attack the causes of the current crisis and prevent further crises from taking place.

The audio and video will be available at 6:00am Saturday, June 20, 2009 at www.whitehouse.gov.

Prepared Remarks of President Barack Obama
Weekly Address
June 20, 2009

As we continue to recover from an historic economic crisis, it is clear to everyone that one of its major causes was a breakdown in oversight that led to widespread abuses in the financial system. An epidemic of irresponsibility took hold from Wall Street to Washington to Main Street.  And the consequences have been disastrous. Millions of Americans have seen their life savings erode; families have been devastated by job losses; businesses large and small have closed their doors.

In response, this week, my administration proposed a set of major reforms to the rules that govern our financial system; to attack the causes of this crisis and to prevent future crises from taking place; to ensure that our markets can work fairly and freely for businesses and consumers alike.

We are going to promote markets that work for those who play by the rules. We’re going to stand up for a system in which fair dealing and honest competition are the only way to win. We’re going to level the playing field for consumers. And we’re going to have the kinds of rules that encourage innovations that make our economy stronger – not those that allow insiders to exploit its weaknesses for their own gain.

And one of the most important proposals is a new oversight agency called the Consumer Financial Protection Agency. It’s charged with just one job: looking out for the interests of ordinary Americans in the financial system. This is essential, for this crisis may have started on Wall Street.  But its impacts have been felt by ordinary Americans who rely on credit cards, home loans, and other financial instruments.

It is true that this crisis was caused in part by Americans who took on too much debt and took out loans they simply could not afford. But there are also millions of Americans who signed contracts they did not always understand offered by lenders who did not always tell the truth. Today, folks signing up for a mortgage, student loan, or credit card face a bewildering array of incomprehensible options. Companies compete not by offering better products, but more complicated ones – with more fine print and hidden terms.  It’s no coincidence that the lack of strong consumer protections led to abuses against consumers; the lack of rules to stop deceptive lending practices led to abuses against borrowers.

This new agency will have the responsibility to change that. It will have the power to set tough new rules so that companies compete by offering innovative products that consumers actually want – and actually understand. Those ridiculous contracts – pages of fine print that no one can figure out – will be a thing of the past. You’ll be able to compare products – with descriptions in plain language – to see what is best for you.  The most unfair practices will be banned. The rules will be enforced.

Some argue that these changes – and the many others we’ve called for – go too far. And I welcome a debate about how we can make sure our regulations work for businesses and consumers. But what I will not accept – what I will vigorously oppose – are those who do not argue in good faith. Those who would defend the status quo at any cost. Those who put their narrow interests ahead of the interests of ordinary Americans. We’ve already begun to see special interests mobilizing against change.

That’s not surprising. That’s Washington.

For these are interests that have benefited from a system which allowed ordinary Americans to be exploited. These interests argue against reform even as millions of people are facing the consequences of this crisis in their own lives. These interests defend business-as-usual even though we know that it was business-as-usual that allowed this crisis to take place.

Well, the American people did not send me to Washington to give in to the special interests; the American people sent me to Washington to stand up for their interests.  And while I’m not spoiling for a fight, I’m ready for one. The most important thing we can do to put this era of irresponsibility in the past is to take responsibility now. That is why my administration will accept no less than real and lasting change to the way business is done – on Wall Street and in Washington. We will do what is necessary to end this crisis – and we will do what it takes to prevent this kind of crisis from ever happening again.

Thank you.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to  learn how to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

Hedge Fund Regulation Principles

IOSCO Pushes Securities Regulators to Adopt Registration Provisions

Over the past few months we have been highlighting the Congressional attempts to regulate and/or register hedge funds and more recently have discussed the Obama hedge fund registration plan.  However, we have not discussed what is happening internationally.  Like the in the US, other major financial centers around the world have suffered from the economic downturn and have begun looking towards greater regulation of the financial system – this of course means greater regulation of hedge funds and registration for hedge fund managers.

There has been much discussion, both in the US and abroad, about world-wide principles for regulation.  There would be obvious benefits for some sort of international standards for all parts of the financial system, but there would need to be an unprecedented amount of cooperation between the various financial regulatory agencies which seems like an insurmountable task.  However, one group, the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO), is doing its best to act as a sort of communicator of best practices that financial regulatory systems should integrate into new regulations which are expected to be proposed in many jurisdictions.

Below I have published a press release announcing the IOSCO’s report on hedge fund oversight.  The full 26 page report, IOSCO Hedge Fund Regulation Report, tackles some of the high level issues which regulatory bodies should consider when drafting new hedge fund regulations.  It will be interesting to see how this report is received in the different jurisdictions throughout the world.

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IOSCO/MR/12/2009
Madrid, 22 June 2009

IOSCO publishes principles for hedge funds regulation

The International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) Technical Committee has today published Hedge Funds Oversight: Final Report which contains six high level principles that will enable securities regulators to address, in a collective and effective way, the regulatory and systemic risks posed by hedge funds in their own jurisdictions while supporting a globally consistent approach.

The report, which was prepared by the Task Force on Unregulated Entities (Task Force), recommends that all securities regulators apply the principles in their regulatory approaches.

The six high level principles are:

  1. Hedge funds and/or hedge fund managers/advisers should be subject to mandatory registration;
  2. Hedge fund managers/advisers which are required to register should also be subject to appropriate ongoing regulatory requirements relating to:
    1. Organisational and operational standards;
    2. Conflicts of interest and other conduct of business rules;
    3. Disclosure to investors; and
    4. Prudential regulation.
  3. Prime brokers and banks which provide funding to hedge funds should be subject to mandatory registration/regulation and supervision. They should have in place appropriate risk management systems and controls to monitor their counterparty credit risk exposures to hedge funds;
  4. Hedge fund managers/advisers and prime brokers should provide to the relevant regulator information for systemic risk purposes (including the identification, analysis and mitigation of systemic risks);
  5. Regulators should encourage and take account of the development, implementation and convergence of industry good practices, where appropriate;
  6. Regulators should have the authority to co-operate and share information, where appropriate, with each other, in order to facilitate efficient and effective oversight of globally active managers/advisers and/or funds and to help identify systemic risks, market integrity and other risks arising from the activities or exposures of hedge funds with a view to mitigating such risks across borders.

Kathleen Casey, Chairman of the Technical Committee, said:

“Securities regulators recognise that the current crisis in financial markets is not a hedge fund driven event. Hedge funds contribute to market liquidity, price efficiency, risk distribution and global market integration. Nevertheless the crisis has given regulators the opportunity to consider the systemic role hedge funds may play and the way in which we deal with the regulatory risks they may pose to the oversight of markets and protection of investors.

“The application of these principles, in a collective, cooperative and efficient way, can provide regulators with the tools to obtain sufficient, relevant information in order to address the regulatory and systemic risks posed by hedge funds.”

The Task Force was chaired by the CONSOB of Italy and the Financial Services Authority of the United Kingdom. It was established in November 2008 to support the initiatives undertaken by the G-20 to restore global growth and achieve reforms in the world’s financial systems.

The Task Force will continue to work to support the implementation of these standards by its members and to deal with future regulatory issues that may arise in relation to hedge funds. It will act as the contact point with prudential regulators and banking standards setters, as well as other regulatory bodies such as the Joint Forum and the hedge fund industry in relation to the development and implementation of industry standards of best practice.

NOTES FOR EDITORS

1. Hedge Funds Oversight – Final Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO is available on IOSCO’s website.

2. Hedge Funds Oversight – Consultation Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO was published on 30 April 2009.

3. IOSCO is recognized as the leading international policy forum for securities regulators. The organization’s wide membership regulates more than 95% of the world’s securities markets and IOSCO is the international cooperative forum for securities regulatory agencies. IOSCO members regulate more than one hundred jurisdictions and its membership is steadily growing.

4. The Technical Committee, a specialised working group established by IOSCO’s Executive Committee, is made up of eighteen agencies that regulate some of the worlds larger, more developed and internationalized markets. Its objective is to review major regulatory issues related to international securities and futures transactions and to coordinate practical responses to these concerns. Ms. Kathleen Casey, Commissioner of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission is the Chairman of the Technical Committee. The members of the Technical Committee are the securities regulatory authorities of Australia, Brazil, China, France, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Ontario, Quebec, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States.

5. IOSCO aims through its permanent structures:

  • to cooperate together to promote high standards of regulation in order to maintain just, efficient and sound markets;
  • to exchange information on their respective experiences in order to promote the development of domestic markets;
  • to unite their efforts to establish standards and an effective surveillance of international securities transactions;
  • to provide mutual assistance to promote the integrity of the markets by a rigorous application of the standards and by effective enforcement against offenses.

MEDIA ENQUIRIES
Greg Tanzer
Direct Line + 34 91 417 5549
Email: [email protected]
Website: www.iosco.org

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Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Hedge Fund Fraud Discussion

With all of the talk lately of new hedge fund regulations proposed by Obama and the likelihood of investment adviser registration for hedge fund managers, the focus has remained squarely on how to avoid hedge fund fraud situations and another Madoff.  The following post is from the blog by Rick Bookstaber who is a very well decorated author within the investment management industry.  Please feel free to leave your comments on this post below.

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The 7 Habits of Highly Suspicious Funds

Note: This post will appear in The Journal of Investment Management

You’ve heard this story before: A trader at a bank is knocking the cover off the ball. His success garners political power within the bank. He creates a fiefdom that insulates him from the rest of the firm; his trading group explodes in size. He lives a conspicuous, extravagant lifestyle. His ego alienates the management and intimidates the support staff. Then the trader hits a rough patch. He uses all the tricks in the book to keep his poor results under wraps while he tries to find a way to recoup. Everyone is gunning for him, so he has to get back into the black, and fast.

How does he try to do that? He ratchets up his risk. He knows he won’t be able to turn it around fast enough if he plays it prudently, whereas there is some chance to stay in the game if he bets it all on 00, or better yet, if he levers up as much as he can, borrows all the money he can get his hands on, and then bets all of that on 00. If he loses, well, he was going to be gone anyway, so he may as well try for the big time.

That is one of the reasons there are risk managers. Risk managers know to put extra focus on traders who are struggling and, for that matter, on traders who seem to have an eerily hot hand. Especially if those traders have the ability to lever and to obscure their risk through the use of sophisticated instruments.

This story is now primed to play out in the hedge fund space. How many hedge funds do you know that more or less fit this description: A hedge fund manager had a run of great returns. His fund has grown by leaps and bounds. He has doubled his staff year after year in anticipation of even greater things to come. He has enjoyed a Page Six lifestyle; he is the belle of the ball, his dance card always filled. But now his kingdom is under siege. Assets under management have dropped precipitously due to redemptions layered on top of poor trading results. The investors that remain are demanding reductions in management fees. Incentive fees are gone until he scales the wall to get back to high water mark. With the way his operation has ballooned, he realizes that if he doesn’t make serious returns over the next few years, he will be crushed under the costs and the dwindling asset base.

What does he do? If he follows the same course as the trader at the bank, he will try to find ways to take on more risk. Of course, any investment fund might face the same temptation, but hedge funds have more tools at their disposal to make good on the try. Hedge funds can lever, delve into wide-ranging and risky markets and readily employ the so-called innovative securities to increase risk in ways that are difficult to discern. And unlike the trader at the bank, the hedge fund can operate without anyone seeing what it is doing. No one is looking over its shoulder at the trading positions each night.

Is the risk management in place to deal with this scenario? Here are seven “habits” that an investor should look out for:

1. No independent risk reporting.

One lesson that has been driven home from Madoff is not to trust the numbers coming out of any fund. Or, at least, trust but verify. If things go wrong and that is what you relied on, you will look like a fool, or worse. The risk numbers must come from having a third party getting the fund’s positions and doing the analysis.

The risk reporting must go beyond the VaR numbers to include measures of leverage, concentration, degree of diversification and size in markets (to assess liquidity risk). Again, all independently provided.

The diversification and concentration are necessary because, as we now know all too well, the relationships between markets can change. These risk measures cannot be calculated simply by knowing how many markets the fund is trading. It is critical to know how linked the markets are; how concentrated positions are when aggregated across similar markets. With globalization, diversification opportunities aren’t what they used to be. And in any case, it isn’t much value to be active in twenty markets if two-thirds of the positions are in three or four markets that are closely related.

2. A change for the worse in the critical risk numbers.

When you get independent reporting, don’t stop with looking at these numbers as they stand today. Demand to know what they have been over the past years. Have the risk statistics changed for the worse? Have they been different than what was represented by the fund’s own, internally generated reports? For example, is the third-party view of leverage, liquidity or diversification as favorable as has been represented by the fund itself, both now and historically?

3. Increased use of derivatives.

In my recent Senate testimony, I said that derivatives are the weapon of choice for gaming the system. Among other things, derivatives can be used to hide increases in leverage. Their complexity and difficulty in marking means that they also can more easily hide losses. There should be extra concern if the fund has only recently decided to start using derivatives and swaps.

4. High level of secrecy.

Does the fund have a monolithic, scripted presence to outside investors? Does it obscure its approach with secret formulas and strategies? Does it invoke its need for secrecy to justify limiting access to essential risk information and to its production staff? If so, you might want to get ready for a Madoff moment.

5. Growth in headcount and lifestyle.

This is the firm’s equivalent of the trader’s lifestyle. The fund’s principles can stretch the envelope in terms of personal lifestyle, and, unlike their banker cousins, their firm is their own domain. They can get an “edifice complex”. If a firm has become bloated, if it has a growing cost base that forces it to be impatient, then it will be more desperate to swing for the fences.

6. Decline in assets under management.

This speaks to motive. The more assets have declined – or are projected to decline with expected redemptions – the greater the stress for the fund, and the more tempting to ratchet up the risk.

Related to this, is the fund far below high water mark? Hedge funds make money from fixed management fees based on assets under management and incentive fees based on the return they generate for their clients. Most hedge funds only start collecting the incentive fees after they get back to high water mark. If a hedge fund is thirty percent below high water market, it may need years of strong returns before any money starts ringing up in the incentive fee register.

7. Lackluster performance in recent years.

Most everyone was lackluster this past year. So you should look back at the recent performance before the 2008 debacle. A comparison of the performance over the past three to five years versus the performance in the more distant past can be an indicator of a failure of the fund’s inherent strategy. It could be that the space has become too crowded and competitive, that the fund has become too large to take advantage of inefficiencies, or that the inefficiencies the fund has focused on have closed down. This creates a pressure to reach. If things have been slowly petering out, if alpha has been diminishing, then more leverage and risk is needed to get back up to the target.

Or, in desperation, the fund might try something new. So a related phenomenon will be style drift or a move into new markets and strategies. Style drift can be an indication that the bread and butter strategy is not pulling its weight. Is there movement toward new markets, a.k.a. ‘new opportunities’. Is an equity fund hiring expertise to gear up in credit, is a macro fund starting to trade volatility?

Not everyone standing in the shadows is a mugger. And sometimes a cigar is just a cigar. Although “habits” like a lack of independent reporting are pretty obvious weaknesses, others, such as exploring new trading strategies, might be justifiable. But these are warning signs that justify deeper questioning and tighter oversight.

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