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NFA sends request for financials to Commodity Hedge Funds

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Hedge fund managers which are licensed as commodity pool operators (CPOs) should have received an email from the NFA which requests certain financial information. While not disclosed on their website, the NFA sent a request on Friday to all of the CPO Members. Each member will need to make a filing which represents (i) the commodity pool has not suffered a drawdown of 25% or more since December 31, 2007 or (ii) the commodity pool’s actual drawdown numbers. CPOs will have until October 8 to make the filing. If you are a CPO and have not received this email request, you should contact the NFA immediately. If you did receive the request and have any questions, you should contact the NFA and/or your attorney immediately.

The NFA contact persons are:

Mary McHenry, Senior Manager, Compliance, ([email protected], or (312) 781-1420)

Tracey Hunt, Senior Manager, Compliance, ([email protected] or (312) 781-1284)

The request for information does not apply to pools which are exempt under CFTC Rule 4.13. For the whole email, please see below.

September 26, 2008

Important Request for CPOs

Due to current events in the global financial markets, NFA is requesting CPO Members to provide information by October 8, 2008 regarding the financial status of their pools. However, this request does not apply to any CFTC 4.13 exempt pools.

To see a list of the active pools NFA has on file for your firm, click on the following link and access the EasyFile system: https://www.nfa.futures.org/AppEntry/Redirect.aspx?app=EasyFilePool. (However, if you currently operate a pool that may be subject to this request, but it is not included in the EasyFile listing, you must notify one of the individuals listed at the end of this message.)

NFA is requesting certain financial information as of 9/30/2008 for each pool listed that has experienced a drawdown of 25% or more since December 31, 2007. For further instructions on completing the filing, see the information below regarding How to File.

For any pool that did not sustain such a drawdown, you must attest to this fact by deleting the filing request from the listing. For further instructions on deleting the request, see the information below under How to Delete a Request.

How to File: For each pool that has experienced a drawdown of 25% or more since December 31, 2007, you must use the EasyFile system to submit the pool’s key financial balances and Schedule of Investments, as well as a written representation on disclosure and withdrawal restrictions.

The key financial balances consist of the same summary categories you enter for year-end statements. The Schedule of Investments is an itemized listing of all investments that individually exceed 5% of NAV. NFA has created a standardized spreadsheet for this filing, which is available at https://www.nfa.futures.org/EASYFILE/Static/CPOSchedule.xls. Use this link to access the spreadsheet and then perform a “save as” to save the blank spreadsheet to your local computer. Once you complete the spreadsheet, upload it to NFA via the EasyFile system. Additionally, you must submit any written documentation your firm has provided to participants relating to any additional disclosure, including whether the firm has placed any restrictions on redemptions and, if so, a description of these restrictions. You should save this written documentation as a PDF file and then upload it to the EasyFile system as well.

How to Delete a Request: For any pool that does not meet the 25% threshold, you must delete the filing request in the EasyFile system. Detailed instructions on how to delete a filing request are included in the guide entitled “Help for Special 9/30/2008 Filing” on the initial Pool Index screen in the EasyFile system.
BY DELETING THE REQUEST, YOU ARE ATTESTING THAT THIS POOL DID NOT EXPERIENCE A DRAWDOWN OF 25% OR MORE SINCE DECEMBER 31, 2007. In addition, NFA will maintain a record of the deletion, as well as the user who performed it.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact one of the following individuals:

Mary McHenry, Senior Manager, Compliance, ([email protected], or (312) 781-1420) Tracey Hunt, Senior Manager, Compliance, ([email protected] or (312) 781-1284)

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Hedge Fund Redemptions and the Gate Provision

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It is no secret that many funds are hurting this year and that many investors are getting ready to, or have, pulled money from many hedge funds.  According to a New York Times article this morning, these redemptions are likely to cause managers to sell securities which may in turn further depress prices.  While the time period for hedge fund-of-funds redemptions has likely passed (FOFs usually require 95 days prior notice for redemption), redemption notices for normal hedge funds are due by tomorrow (assuming a 90-day notice period and end of year or quarter redemptions).

If your fund is feeling the pressure of quite a few redemptions, there are a couple of standard safeguards which are usually built into the hedge fund offering documents.  These provisions include the hedge fund gate provision and a general catch-all provision.  In general, the gate allows redemption requests to be reduced to a certain percentage of the fund’s total assets during any redemption period.  For example, if the fund has a gate of 15% and investors request redemptions which equal 20% of a fund’s NAV, then all redemption requests will be reduced pro rata until only 15% of the redemption requests are met.  The catch all provision allows a hedge fund manager to halt redemptions if certain catastrophic market events take place.  Depending on how the hedge fund offering documents are drafted, the current market situation may or may not apply and you should discuss this with your lawyer.

How to handle invoking a gate provision

In the next few days, managers will be getting a good idea of how much of the fund will be redeemed.  If a decision is made to invoke the gate provision, the manager should discuss this option with his attorney.   The attorney will help the manager decide the best course of action with regard to reducing the redemption amount, which will probably include writing a letter of explanation to the investors.  While each fund’s situation is different, that letter should probably include the expected amount of the reduction as well as a description of the authority (in the offering documents) for the reduction.  Additionally, you should also invite questions directly – it is during times like these when investors get scared and then start talking to their own attorneys.  It is much better to be candid and upfront than to receive a nasty letter from an attorney in the future.

Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

CFTC Fines Hedge Funds for Failure to File Annual Report with NFA

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Certain hedge funds which trade futures and/or commodities as part of their investment program are deemed to be commodity pools and the hedge fund management company must register with the NFA as a commodity pool operator (CPO).  Registered CPOs must file annual reports with the NFA and such reports must be sent to investors in the fund.  Generally this will need to be done within either 45 or 90 days after the end of the fund’s fiscal year.  If a CPO needs extra time to file the report, it can request an extension from the CFTC.

In the cases below, each of the CPOs had filed for and were granted extensions.  Even with these extensions, however, they were not able to file their reports.  The NFA evidently takes such an infraction very seriously as the fines were stiff – ranging from $75,000 to $135,000.  Such a potential monetary penalty should make CPOs especially eager to file the appropriate reports on time.

CFTC Rule 4.22 includes the following major provisions.

  • must distribute an Annual Report to each participant in each pool that it operates, and must electronically submit a copy of the Report and key financial balances from the Report to the National Futures Association pursuant to the electronic filing procedures of the National Futures Association
  • Annual Report must be sent to pool participants within 45 calendar days after the end of the fiscal year
  • financial statements in the Annual Report must be presented and computed in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles consistently applied and must be certified by an independent public accountant

If you are a hedge fund manager registered as a CPO you should make sure you understand this and other CFTC rules.  If you have any questions on the rules or other CPO requirements, including possible CPO exemptions, you should have a conversation with your attorney so that you know what needs to be filed and when so that you can avoid harsh fines like the ones below.

The CFTC release below can be found here.

Release: 5555-08
For Release: September 24, 2008

CFTC Sanctions Four Registered Commodity Pool Operators for Failing to File Timely Commodity Pool Reports with the National Futures Association

Mansur Capital Corp., Persistent Edge Management, LLC, Stillwater Capital Partners, Inc., and Stillwater Capital Partners, LLC Ordered to Pay a Total of $330,000 in Civil Monetary Penalties

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today simultaneously filed and settled charges against four registered commodity pool operators (CPOs), charging them with failing to distribute to investors and file with the National Futures Association (NFA) one or more of their respective commodity pools’ annual reports in a timely manner. Mansur Capital Corporation of Chicago, Persistent Edge Management, LLC of San Francisco, California, and Stillwater Capital Partners, Inc. and Stillwater Capital Partners, LLC, both of New York, were charged in the CFTC action.

The CFTC orders require the CPOs to pay civil monetary penalties in the following amounts: Mansur, $75,000; Persistent Edge, $120,000; and Stillwater I and Stillwater II to jointly and severally pay $135,000.

Under CFTC regulations, CPOs are required to file annual reports with the NFA and distribute them to each pool participant. This must be done within a prescribed period after the close of their pools’ fiscal years. An annual report is designed to “provide [pool] participants with the information necessary to assess the overall trading performance and financial condition of the pool.” (See Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors, Final Rules, 44 Fed. Reg. 1918 [CFTC Jan. 8, 1979], re the adoption of Rule 4.22.) According to the CFTC orders, without timely reporting, the CFTC’s goal of providing pool participants with complete and necessary data is hampered.

The CFTC orders find that each of the four CPOs operated one or more commodity pools, including pools that operated as funds-of-funds. While each of the CPOs had obtained extensions of the prescribed deadlines for various pools and reporting years, each failed to timely comply with its obligations, in violation of CFTC regulations.

The following CFTC Division of Enforcement staff are responsible for this case: Camille M. Arnold, Alan I. Edelman, Ava M. Gould, Susan J. Gradman, James H. Holl, III, Diane M. Romaniuk, Scott R. Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, Gretchen Lowe, and Richard B. Wagner.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

SEC brings fraud charges against investment advisor in connection with hedge fund investments

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Investment advisors who recommend hedge fund investments should be very careful to disclose all material agreements between the advisor and the hedge fund and hedge fund manager.  In the case below an investment advisor recommend hedge fund investments to its clients without disclosing to such clients that the advisor was receiving a part of the performance fees that were paid to the hedge fund manager.

Advisors should also take note to the following two issues:

SEC jurisdiction over state registered investment advisors

Even though the advisor was registered with the California Securities Regulation Division and not the SEC, the SEC was able to take action under Section 206 (the anti-fraud provisions) of the Investment Advisers Act.  Additionally the SEC was able to bring charges against the investment advisor under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).  This shows that the SEC’s has quite a few methods to assert jurisdiction over non-SEC registered advisors.

Potential violations of broker registration requirements?

Although I have not yet had a chance to read the unreleased complaint, I am wondering why the SEC did not charge this group with violating the broker registration requirements.  I think there is an argument that the investment advisory firm was acting as a broker.  I checked FINRA’s broker check and the firm did not come up as a registered broker.

Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act generally makes it unlawful for any broker or dealer to use the mails (or any other means of interstate commerce, such as the telephone, facsimiles, or the Internet) to “effect any transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security” unless that broker or dealer is registered with the Commission in accordance with Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act.

The release below can be found here.

U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Litigation Release No. 20737 / September 24, 2008

Securities and Exchange Commission v. WealthWise, LLC and Jeffrey A. Forrest, United States District Court for the Central District of California, Civil Action No. CV 08-06278 GAF (SSx)

SEC Charges California Investment Adviser With Committing Fraud While Recommending Hedge Fund to Clients

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a San Luis Obispo, Calif.-based investment adviser and its owner with fraud for failing to disclose a material conflict of interest when recommending that their clients invest in a hedge fund that made undisclosed subprime and other high-risk investments.

The SEC alleges that WealthWise LLC and its principal Jeffrey A. Forrest recommended that more than 60 of their clients invest approximately $40 million in Apex Equity Options Fund, a hedge fund managed by Salt Lake City-based Thompson Consulting, Inc. (TCI). According to the SEC’s complaint, WealthWise and Forrest failed to disclose a side agreement in which WealthWise received a portion of the performance fee that Apex paid TCI for all WealthWise assets invested in the hedge fund. From April 2005 to September 2007, WealthWise received more than $350,000 in performance fees from TCI. Apex collapsed in August 2007, and WealthWise clients lost nearly all of the money they invested.

The SEC’s complaint, filed in federal district court in Los Angeles, charges WealthWise and Forrest with violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The SEC seeks an injunction, an accounting of the total amount of performance fees WealthWise received from TCI, disgorgement of those fees, and financial penalties.

On March 4, 2008, the SEC filed a civil action in federal district court in Salt Lake City against TCI and three of its principals in connection with the collapse of Apex and another hedge fund.

Hedge fund performance fees – is it time to rethink the high watermark?

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There are many news stories out covering what may be a worst case scenario for many hedge funds – the distinct possibility of no performance fees this year.  This seems to be a major topic of conversation for many people within the industry and just yesterday I received the following comment with a link to a Wall Street Journal article discussing this issue.

The comment:

Regarding performance fees: the underlying hedge funds naturally also have high performance fees. But in the current climate, they aren’t making them. “Just one in 10 hedge funds is currently receiving performance fees from their funds.” See: http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/09/22/fee-slump-hits-hedge-funds/

Unfortunately, with the current market conditions, many funds are going to be feeling the pressure of little to no performance fees at the end of the year.  For many hedge fund managers, the problem is compounded by the fact that their asset management fee is simply not enough to keep the business going.  Many managers cannot keep operations going with only the management fee.  Without performance fees, hedge fund managers may have their operations disrupted for a number of reasons, including the fact that for some, the traders will be expecting bonuses no matter the performance of the fund as a whole.  If these traders don’t receive bonuses, then some hedge funds could see talent drain, to the extent that such traders thought they could receive greater compensation at other firms or by starting their own fund.

Still worse, managers who have negative performance numbers at the end of the year will have another issue to deal with – the high watermark.  The high watermark is a concept designed as an investor-friendly provision that essentially prevents a manager from taking a performance fee on the same gains more than once.  The high watermark is a similar concept to the clawback provision in a private equity fund.

When a fund suffers a significant drawdown during a performance fee period, the high watermark will actually create a perverse incentive for the investment manager – either take extra risk to generate higher returns so that there will be a performance fee in the next performance fee period or close down the fund and start again.  Both of these potential actions would be taken to the detriment of the investor, and the investor may only have the choice of making a redemption or letting the investment ride. 

If the manager does shut his doors, the investor is going to have his assets at risk as the hedge fund wind-down takes place.  Depending on the hedge fund’s strategy, the wind-down could subject the fund to a fire sale of its assets which will reduce the value of the investment even further.  If such investor was to move into another hedge fund, he would step into the new fund with a high watermark equal to his investment and would be subject to performance fees on those assets anyway. Because such a turn of events is detrimental to such an investor, it might make sense for such investors to allow for some sort of modification of the high watermark.

Some potential alternatives to the standard hedge fund highwatermark might include the following:

No high watermark – this is probably not a viable solution as it would afford investors absolutely no protection from paying two sets of performance fees on the “same” gains.  Additionally, without the threat of the high watermark, there would be little deterrent for a manager to improperly manage risk.  Additionally, because the highwatermark provision is one of the most uniform provisions in the hedge fund industry, it is unlikely to simply disappear.  (Although I have seen a couple of funds which actually did not have the provision.)

Modified high watermark – I have seen all types of variations within the performance fee structure and the withdrawal structure, but the high watermark is one provision which is generally resistant to modification. The high watermark could potentially be modified in many ways including the following:

Reset to zero – under certain circumstances, that if stated in the offering documents prior to investment, the investment manager can be given the ability to reset the high-watermark to zero.

Amortization – one potential way could be to “amortize” the losses over a 2- or 3-year period so that some performance fees can be earned on a going forward basis.  Additionally, if the investor chose to withdraw before the end of the high watermark amortization period, there could be some sort of clawback.

Rolling – the high watermark can be taken under certain circumstances over a rolling period.  The concept is that the high watermark will be determined for a certain window so a drawdown would in essence be erased after a certain amount of time has elapsed.  This might work better for those funds that have a monthly or quarterly performance fee period.

Resetting to zero and an amortization reduction method could be both potentially valuable to investors as it will keep a manager in the game and it will reduce the incentive for a manager to abandon risk management procedures. Also, management companies may be willing to decrease fees if investors agree to keep their investment in the fund for a certain amount of time after the reset or amortization.

[HFLB note: any new investors coming into a fund during a performance fee period will have an initial high watermark that is equal to the initial investment value; depending on the time of the contribution and when the fund made its losses, there may be some performance fees paid even during a down year for such incoming investors.]

Further Resources

Another good article and some good comments on the article can be found here.

For an interesting academic paper on this subject, please click here. The paper is by William N. Goetzmann, Yale School of Management.  The abstract for the paper states:

Incentive or performance fees for money managers are frequently accompanied by high-water mark provisions which condition the payment of the performance fee upon exceeding the maximum achieved share value. In this paper, we show that hedge fund performance fees are valuable to money managers, and conversely represent a claim on a significant proportion of investor wealth. The high-water mark provisions in these contracts limit the value of the performance fees. We provide a closed-form solution to the high-water mark contract under certain conditions. This solution shows that managers have an incentive to take risks. Our results provide a framework for valuation of a hedge fund management company.

We conjecture that the existence of high-water mark compensation is due to decreasing returns to scale in the industry. Empirical evidence on the relationship between fund return and net money flows into and out of funds suggest that successful managers, and large fund managers are less willing to take new money than small fund managers.

Hedge Fund Series 7 question

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As I’ve noted in many of my posts, I will try my best to answer your questions or point you to a post within the site which discusses the subject. Below is a common question for licensed brokers who are getting into the hedge fund industry.

Question: I currently hold a series 7 agent license as well as a series 65. I am employed with a broker dealer and soon will make a job change to a hedge fund as a marketer. Can the hedge fund maintain my licenses even though they are not a broker dealer and given the fact that I do not need to have a series 7 license to market the hedge fund? I do not want my license to lapse while in the employ of the hedge fund. I do know that FINRA will hold my license for 24 months before expiring. I would like to maintain my licenses and keep them current by fulfilling my continuing education responsibilities. Please advise.

Answer: No, unfortunately the hedge fund will not be able to “hold” your license if it (or a related entity) is not a broker-dealer. Only a FINRA licensed broker-dealer will be able to “hold” your license – and by “hold” we mean that you would be registered as a representative of the broker-dealer.

This should not be confused with “parking” a license with a broker-dealer which is illegal under FINRA rules. Parking a license basically means that you are registered with a broker-dealer for no business reason other than to keep your licenses current. In the situation above, as you noted, the series 7 designation will expire two years after a U-5 has been submitted by your employing broker-dealer.

One potential way to keep the license is to stay on with your broker dealer and conduct your hedge fund selling activities through the broker-dealer. This may not be possible for a number of business reasons and the broker-dealer may not have the proper compliance procedures in place to market and sell hedge fund interests to its customers. For this reason staying with a broker often is not a viable option and unfortunately I have not come across a good solution to this very common problem.

Hedge funds and ERISA

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Hedge fund managers have to be especially aware of the ERISA rules with regard to their hedge fund and the investors in the fund. ERISA stands for the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and it governs, among other things, pension investments into hedge funds.  The Department of Labor is the governmental agency which is in charge of promulgating regulations regarding ERISA.

There are many items to be aware of with regard to ERISA. The most important item for a hedge fund manager is the 25% ERISA threshold limitation for “benefit plans.” If investments into a hedge fund by “benefit plans” exceed the 25% threshold then the manager will become subject to certain ERISA rules. For these purposes the term “benefit plan” means both traditional pension plans and also Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).

Requirements for hedge fund managers subject to ERISA

The hedge fund manager who is subject to the ERISA rules will, most importantly, need to (i) be registered as an investment adviser with either the SEC or the state securities commission and (ii) maintain a fidelity bond (which usually costs a few thousand dollars a year).

Additionally, there are many other issues the hedge fund manager will need to be aware of and which he should discuss with his attorney including:

  • Performance Fees
  • Soft dollars and brokerage
  • Dealing with “Parties in interest”
  • Use of Affiliated Brokers
  • Cross Trades
  • Principal Transactions
  • Expenses
  • Information reporting and side-letters
  • Record retention

The 25% threshold

There are many intricacies to the 25% threshold and if you have any questions you should speak further with an attorney regarding the specific facts of you situation.  A couple of items to note about the 25% rule:

1. Investments by the manager and affiliates do not count toward determining the 25% threshold.

For example, if a hedge fund has shares outstanding with a total net asset value of $100M and the fund manager and its affiliates (e.g., portfolio managers, employees, etc.) hold a $20M investment in the fund, the 25% threshold would be 25% of $80M (i.e., $20M), rather than 25% of $100M (i.e., $25M).

2. You will need to test on a class basis.

For example if a hedge fund has two classes of interests, you will need to determine the 25% threshold for each class of interests. If Class A has $90M in assets and no “benefit plan” investments and Class B has $10M in assets and has a $5M investment by benefit plans, then the whole fund, not just the Class B, will be subject to ERISA because of the Class B investment.

Additionally, with the advent of new structures such as the Delaware Series LLC and the offshore Segregated Portfolio Company, the application of the test is likely to be at the series of segregated portfolio level, and not simply at the fund level. The last time we researched this question the issue was not definitively decided, but there may have been some definitive guidance since that time. If you are contemplating one of these structures you should discuss this issue with legal counsel. Also, the calculations may get a little get a little difficult with an offshore master-feeder structure.

3. Continuously monitor the 25% threshold.

Because hedge funds typically will allow additional capital contributions as well as withdrawals at regular intervals, the percentage of fund’s investments by benefit plans will change. If, because of a redemption of another investor, the 25% threshold is reached, the hedge fund manager will be subject to ERISA.

Only IRA investments – still subject to ERISA?

One items that always comes up is what happens if the fund exceeds the 25% threshold but only has IRA investments.  Although a fund which exceeds the 25% threshold will generally be subject to the ERISA rules, those rules only will apply to the pension plans and not the IRAs (although the manager will need to make sure to conform all actions to certain IRS requirements).  In this way a hedge fund manager which exceeds the 25% threshold and only has IRA money will not be subject to the registration and bonding requirements.  Many of our clients fall within this category.

Conclusion

ERISA is one of the more specialized parts of hedge fund law. If a manager is thinking of potentially being subject to ERISA the manager should thouroughly discuss the possibility with his hedge fund counsel. The manager should always make sure that the law firm he works with has an attorney which specializes in ERISA or works with an outside ERISA counsel on all ERISA issues.

While many managers will make sure that their fund is never subject to ERISA, I have seen many managers who have become subject to ERISA because of a significant investment by certain pension plans. Indeed in many situations it will make a lot of sense to become subject to ERISA and start up hedge fund managers should not automatically reject potential investments because they may become subject to ERISA. Our firm has worked with many managers who becomes subject to ERISA and it has worked out well – one suggestion I would make is to start the process early because investment advisor registration will be necessary.

What is a private equity fund?

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Question: What is a private equity fund?  What is the difference between a private equity fund and a hedge fund?

Answer: For many people who are not familiar with the alternative investment industry, hedge funds and private equity funds look like the same thing.  The distinction is not necessarily in the legal structure (which is similar), but in the investment style.  The GAO’s hedge fund and pension report, which I discussed recently, provided a great definition for private equity funds:

Like hedge funds, there is no legal or commonly accepted definition of private equity funds, but the term generally includes privately managed pools of capital that invest in companies, many of which are not listed on a stock exchange. Although there are some similarities in the structure of hedge funds and private equity funds, the investment strategies employed are different. Unlike many hedge funds, private equity funds typically make longer-term investments in private companies and seek to obtain financial returns not through particular trading strategies and techniques, but through long-term appreciation based on corporate stewardship, improved operating processes and financial restructuring of those companies, which may involve a merger or acquisition of companies. Private equity is generally considered to involve a substantially higher degree of risk than traditional investments, such as stocks and bonds, for a higher return.

While strategies of private equity funds vary, most funds target either venture capital or buy-out opportunities. Venture capital funds invest in young companies often developing a new product or technology. Private equity fund managers may provide expertise to a fledgling company to help it advance toward a position suitable for an initial public offering. Buyout funds generally invest in larger established companies in order to add value, in part, by increasing efficiencies and, in some cases, consolidating resources by merging complementary businesses or technologies. For both venture capital and buy-out strategies, investors hope to profit when the company is eventually sold, either when offered to the public or when sold to another investor or company. Each private equity fund generally focuses on only one type of investment opportunity, usually specializing in either venture capital or buyout and often
specializing further in terms of industry or geographical area. (Other less common types of private equity include mezzanine financing, in which investors provide a final round of financing to help carry the company through its initial public offering, and distressed debt investments, in which firms buy companies that have filed for bankruptcy or may do so and then typically liquidate the company.)

Investment in private equity has grown considerably over recent decades. According to a venture capital industry organization, the amount of capital raised by private equity funds grew from just over $2 billion in 1980 to about $207 billion in 2007; while the number of private equity funds grew from 56 to 432 funds over the same time period.

As with hedge funds, private equity funds operate as privately managed investment pools and have generally not been subject to Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) examinations. Pension plans typically invest in private equity through limited partnerships in which the general partner develops an investment strategy and limited partners provide the large majority of the capital. After creating a new fund and raising capital from the limited partners, the general partner begins to invest in companies that will make up the fund portfolio. Limited partners have both limited control over the underlying investments and also limited liability for potential debts incurred by the general partners through the fund.

SEC to hedge funds – show us your shorts

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In a time of unprecedented moves by the federal government, the SEC is halting short sales in certain financial stocks.  The SEC is also requiring large institutional investors, such as hedge funds, to show the world their short positions.  The press release can be found here.  The list of financial stocks which cannot be shorted by hedge funds can be found here.

SEC Halts Short Selling of Financial Stocks to Protect Investors and Markets
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2008-211
Commission Also Takes Steps to Increase Market Transparency and Liquidity

Washington, D.C., Sept. 19, 2008 — The Securities and Exchange Commission, acting in concert with the U.K. Financial Services Authority, today took temporary emergency action to prohibit short selling in financial companies to protect the integrity and quality of the securities market and strengthen investor confidence. The U.K. FSA took similar action yesterday.

The Commission’s action will apply to the securities of 799 financial companies. The action is immediately effective.

SEC Chairman Christopher Cox said, “The Commission is committed to using every weapon in its arsenal to combat market manipulation that threatens investors and capital markets. The emergency order temporarily banning short selling of financial stocks will restore equilibrium to markets. This action, which would not be necessary in a well-functioning market, is temporary in nature and part of the comprehensive set of steps being taken by the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and the Congress.”

Today’s decisive SEC action calls a time-out to aggressive short selling in financial institution stocks, because of the essential link between their stock price and confidence in the institution. The Commission will continue to consider measures to address short selling concerns in other publicly traded companies.

Under normal market conditions, short selling contributes to price efficiency and adds liquidity to the markets. At present, it appears that unbridled short selling is contributing to the recent, sudden price declines in the securities of financial institutions unrelated to true price valuation. Financial institutions are particularly vulnerable to this crisis of confidence and panic selling because they depend on the confidence of their trading counterparties in the conduct of their core business.

Given the importance of confidence in financial markets, today’s action halts short selling in 799 financial institutions. The SEC’s emergency order, pursuant to its authority in Section 12(k)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, will be immediately effective and will terminate at 11:59 p.m. ET on Oct. 2, 2008. The Commission may extend the order beyond 10 business days if it deems an extension necessary in the public interest and for the protection of investors, but will not extend the order for more than 30 calendar days in total duration.

The Commission notes today’s similar announcement by the U.K. FSA. The SEC and FSA are consulting on an ongoing basis with regard to short selling matters and will continue to cooperate in carrying out regulatory actions.

The Commission also has taken the following steps to address the recent market conditions:

  • Temporarily requiring that institutional money managers report their new short sales of certain publicly traded securities. These money managers are already required to report their long positions in these securities.
  • Temporarily easing restrictions on the ability of securities issuers to re-purchase their securities. This change will give issuers more flexibility to buy back their securities, and help restore liquidity during this period of unusual and extraordinary market volatility.

The Commission may consider additional steps as necessary to protect the integrity and quality of the securities markets and strengthen investor confidence.

What is a qualified purchaser?

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We have previously discussed the difference between a 3(c)(1) hedge fund and a 3(c)(7) hedge fund. Unlike a 3(c)(1) hedge fund where investors only generally need to be accredited investors and potentially qualified clients, all investors in a 3(c)(7) hedge fund must be “qualified purchasers.” A qualified purchaser is a greater requirement than an accredited investor and a qualified client. Generally only super high net worth individuals and institutional investors will fit within the definition of qualified purchaser. Because of this fact, there are fewer 3(c)(7) hedge funds than 3(c)(1) hedge funds. Also, most 3(c)(7) funds are going to be funds with greater intial investment requirements and will be marketed towards the institutional market. Because of this, 3(c)(7) hedge funds will tend to have greater assets than many 3(c)(1) hedge funds.

The definition of “qualified purchaser” is found in the Investment Company Act of 1940. The definition includes:

i. any natural person (including any person who holds a joint, community property, or other similar shared ownership interest in an issuer that is excepted under section 3(c)(7) with that person’s qualified purchaser spouse) who owns not less than $ 5,000,000 in investments, as defined below;

ii. any company that owns not less than $ 5,000,000 in investments and that is owned directly or indirectly by or for 2 or more natural persons who are related as siblings or spouse (including former spouses), or direct lineal descendants by birth or adoption, spouses of such persons, the estates of such persons, or foundations, charitable organizations, or trusts established by or for the benefit of such persons;

iii. any trust that is not covered by clause (ii) and that was not formed for the specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered, as to which the trustee or other person authorized to make decisions with respect to the trust, and each settlor or other person who has contributed assets to the trust, is a person described in clause (i), (ii), or (iv); or

iv. any person, acting for its own account or the accounts of other qualified purchasers, who in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis, not less than $ 25,000,000 in investments.

v. any qualified institutional buyer as defined in Rule 144A under the Securities Act, acting for its own account, the account of another qualified institutional buyer, or the account of a qualified purchaser, provided that (i) a dealer described in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of Rule 144A shall own and invest on a discretionary basis at least $25,000,000 in securities of issuers that are not affiliated persons of the dealer; and (ii) a plan referred to in paragraph (a)(1)(D) or (a)(1)(E) of Rule 144A, or a trust fund referred to in paragraph (a)(1)(F) of Rule 144A that holds the assets of such a plan, will not be deemed to be acting for its own account if investment decisions with respect to the plan are made by the beneficiaries of the plan, except with respect to investment decisions made solely by the fiduciary, trustee or sponsor of such plan;

vi. any company that, but for the exceptions provided for in Sections 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) under the ICA, would be an investment company (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as an “excepted investment company”), provided that all beneficial owners of its outstanding securities (other than short-term paper), determined in accordance with Section 3(c)(1)(A) thereunder, that acquired such securities on or before April 30, 1996 (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as “pre-amendment beneficial owners”), and all pre-amendment beneficial owners of the outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) or any excepted investment company that, directly or indirectly, owns any outstanding securities of such excepted investment company, have consented to its treatment as a qualified purchaser.

vii. any natural person who is deemed to be a “knowledgeable employee” of the [fund], as such term is defined in Rule 3c-5(4) of the ICA; or

viii. any person (“Transferee”) who acquires Interests from a person (“Transferor”) that is (or was) a qualified purchaser other than the [fund], provided that the Transferee is: (i) the estate of the Transferor; (ii) a person who acquires the Interests as a gift or bequest pursuant to an agreement relating to a legal separation or divorce; or (iii) a company established by the Transferor exclusively for the benefit of (or owned exclusively by) the Transferor and the persons specified in this paragraph.

ix. any company, if each beneficial owner of the company’s securities is a qualified purchaser.
For the purpsoes of above, the term Investments means:

(1) securities (as defined by section 2(a)(1)of the Securities Act of 1933), other than securities of an issuer that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, the prospective qualified purchaser that owns such securities, unless the issuer of such securities is: (i) an investment vehicle; (ii) a public company; or (iii) a company with shareholders’ equity of not less than $50 million (determined in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles) as reflected on the company’s most recent financial statements, provided that such financial statements present the information as of a date within 16 months preceding the date on which the prospective qualified purchaser acquires the securities of a Section 3(c)(7) Company;

(2) real estate held for investment purposes;

(3) commodity interests held for investment purposes;

(4) physical commodities held for investment purposes;

(5) to the extent not securities, financial contracts (as such term is defined in section 3(c)(2)(B)(ii) of the ICA entered into for investment purposes;

(6) in the case of a prospective qualified purchaser that is a Section 3(c)(7) Company, a company that would be an investment company but for the exclusion provided by section 3(c)(1) of the ICA, or a commodity pool, any amounts payable to such prospective qualified purchaser pursuant to a firm agreement or similar binding commitment pursuant to which a person has agreed to acquire an interest in, or make capital contributions to, the prospective qualified purchaser upon the demand of the prospective qualified purchaser; and

(7) cash and cash equivalents (including foreign currencies) held for investment purposes. For purposes of this section, cash and cash equivalents include: (i) bank deposits, certificates of deposit, bankers acceptances and similar bank instruments held for investment purposes; and (ii) the net cash surrender value of an insurance policy.