Hedge fund managers which are registered with their state of residence as investment advisors need to be very aware of their state investment advisory rules. While many state securities divisions do not pay attention to hedge funds, there are many states which are aware of hedge funds and understand how the state investment advisory rules apply to hedge funds. States which I have found particularly knowledgeable about hedge funds include: Colorado, Utah, California and Washington. There are other states which are basically on heightened alert for registration applications from hedge fund managers. Continue reading
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Conversion of a 3(c)(1) hedge fund to a 3(c)(7) hedge fund
Below is a question we received through the comment portion of this blog:
A fund we participate in converted in mid-2007 from a 3(c)(1) fund to a 3(c)(7) fund. Upon receipt of the K-1 for the year, there was a large realized short-term capital gain realized with a large corresponding unrealized capital loss. When I asked about what triggered the short-term gain, I was told that it related to the conversion to 3(c)(7) status. Is there anything within the conversion process which would inherently trigger recognition of a capital gain, especially short-term? Thanks for any insight you may be able to share with me on this.
First, let’s examine what it means to “convert” from a 3(c)(1) hedge fund to a 3(c)(7) hedge fund. There is no form that a hedge fund submits to the government or any agency which declares whether they are a 3(c)(1) hedge fund or a 3(c)(7) hedge fund. There is no sort of internal declaration like with certain IRS rules.
The 3(c)(1) structure limits the number of investors to 99, the 3(c)(7) structure does not limit the number of investors, but limits the type of investors. So, to “convert,” a hedge fund would just make sure that all of its investors were qualified purchasers and then have more than 99 of them. Therefore, when a hedge fund “converts” from a 3(c)(1) hedge fund to a 3(c)(7) hedge fund, the fund is basically informing investors that the number and “type” of investor in the hedge fund (a limited partnership or limited liability company) will be changing. (Please also note that a 3(c)(7) hedge fund with 99 or less investors would also be exempt from registration under the Investment Company Act as a 3(c)(1) hedge fund. )
When the conversion takes place, the fund would redeem those investors who are not qualified purchasers (the offering documents will typically provide managers with this unilateral authority). In order to have the cash on hand to mandatorily redeem the investors, the fund may have to liquidate some underlying positions. Based on the holding period of the underlying positions, the gain or loss may be long-term or short-term gain or loss, each of which has different tax consequences to investors in the hedge fund.
At the end of the year, the hedge fund accountant will prepare K-1s for all investors in the partnership which will include each investors allocation of gains and losses (realized and unrealized) during the year. The manner in which these gains and losses are allocated is generally dictated by the hedge fund’s offering documents, which generally allow the manager wide latitude in how to make allocations.
With regard to the specific situation above, I cannot answer this question because it depends on the facts. One thing an investor in this situation may want to do is review the audited financial statements from the hedge fund and then determine if an allocation was made which was incorrect – an accountant should be able to do this. If there is still a question on the allocation, the investor should discuss the issue with the hedge fund manager in conjunction with the manager’s auditor or accountant. From there the investor should be able to get further clarity on the issue.
Please note that the above is not legal advice and please read our disclaimer. Please also feel free to contact us if you have further questions. Other related HFLB articles include:
Pooled Investment Vehicles – Non-Traditional Hedge Fund Strategies
The term “hedge fund” is really a misnomer as most hedge funds are not hedged. A better term would be pooled investment vehicle. Traditional types of pooled investment vehicle structures include hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds, real estate funds, and “hybrid” funds (funds which combine components of the above).
This article is going to discuss other types of non-traditional hedge funds, that is hedge funds which do not fall within the typical types of hedge fund securities trading strategies (long/short equity, multi-strategy, global macro, fixed income, equity market neutral, managed futures, etc). As more people become familiar with hedge funds and become interested in investing in them, managers will begin to create funds to fit specific demographics. The following are interesting projects which can be accomplished through the hedge fund (or pooled investment vehicle) structure:
Green Hedge Funds – in a vein similar to the Vice Fund*, hedge funds can concentrate their investments in any specific hot area. Green companies is currently a hot area and many people are already calling a bubble in “green” companies, at least in the private equity space. According to this article by Richard Wilson, mandates at institutional level to invest in “green” hedge funds are expected to significantly increase in the coming years.
Horse Racing Hedge Funds – there are two ways that a fund like this would work. First, the hedge fund can actually pool investor money and then the manager would place bets on various horses through various betting establishments. With a fund like this the sponsor would need to make sure to disclose the exact nature of the program so that any legal or gambling issues could be vetted before the hedge fund launch. Second, the hedge fund could buy racing horses and then race them for profit. There are already these types of pooled vehicles out there and they are usually have a private equity structure with capital calls.
Gambling or Online Gambling Hedge Funds – with the rise in popularity of Texas Hold-em on television and the proliferation of online gambling there has been discussion of hedge funds devoted to making money from this phenomenon. Basically this would be done through pooling money and then allocating to traders (live or online) who would then play with money. With a fund like this there are many issues, not the least of which is the illegality of gambling in much of the US and online. It is likely that a gambling attorney would need to be brought in to opine on the issue of the legality of such a fund.
Sports Betting Hedge Fund – like the gambling hedge fund, sports betting presents a very attractive opportunity for potential hedge fund managers. A couple of years back Mark Cuban discussed the idea of a sports betting hedge fund on his blog (blog post). While his fund never got off the ground, I have heard of other potential hedge fund sponsors trying to get a fund like this launched. I have not yet heard of a successful fund like this, but I think it is just a matter of time.
Lottery Hedge Fund – about a year and a half ago I had the idea of starting a lottery hedge fund which would pool money to buy a large amount (or all possible number combinations) of number combinations at one of the very large lottery drawings. While it is feasible to create a fund to do this, there are many technical issues which would need to be resolved if a fund like this was to launch.
Charitable Hedge Funds – while not necessarily having a different strategy from traditional hedge funds, these charitable hedge funds would take a portion of their profits and devote them to charitable causes. Presumably the sponsor of a charitable hedge fund would create such a fund for his network of friends and family, all of whom would have similar views on the nature of the charitable donation.
Shariah Compliant Hedge Funds – such funds have become more over the past couple of years and are expected to continue such growth in the future.
Other Issues – in general, establishing a non-traditional hedge fund or pooled investment vehicle will involve the same basic steps as forming a hedge fund (see Start Up Hedge Fund Timeline). The key issue is what type of assets the fund will buy and sell. The nature of the assets will necessarily drive the structure. These are they types of issues you would discuss with your attorney, include whether the manager will need to be registered as an investment advisor. Other articles of interest may include:
- Hedge Fund Attorney
- Hedge Fund Offering Documents
- Asset Based Lending Hedge Funds
- Hedge Fund Manager
- Overview of Investment Advisor Registration
* The Vice Fund is a mutal fund which invests in domestic and foreign companies engaged in the aerospace and defense industries, owners and operators, gaming facilities as well as manufacturers of gaming equipment, manufactures of tobacco products and producers of alcoholic beverages. The website can be found here.
Third Party Marketing Press Release
Hedge Fund Third Party Marketing Firm, Agecroft Partners, Hires 5th Managing Director
Hedge fund third party marketing firm, Agecroft Partners which recently received the 2008 Third Party Marketer of the Year award, has hired its 5th Managing Director, Jarratt Ramsey. Jarratt spent the last 11 years at multi-billion dollar hedge fund Chesapeake Capital Management. Jarratt’s responsibilities will include: assisting with due diligence on potential hedge funds the firm may represent and introducing the firm’s hedge fund clients to large institutional investors located within the Northern region of the United States.
Richmond, VA (PRWEB) October 6, 2008 — Hedge fund third party marketing firm, Agecroft Partners which recently received the 2008 Third Party Marketer of the Year award, has hired its 5th Managing Director, Jarratt Ramsey. Jarratt spent the last 11 years at multi-billion hedge fund Chesapeake Capital Management. Jarratt’s responsibilities will include: assisting with due diligence on potential hedge funds the firm may represent and introducing the firm’s hedge fund clients to large institutional investors located within the Northern region of the United States.
“Jarratt is a wonderful addition to our firm. Our business model is to introduce large well established hedge funds in a consultative manner to institutional investors. It is imperative that the members of our firm are highly technically competent. Jarratt’s educational and professional experiences are very impressive. Furthermore, his knowledge of the hedge fund industry, and security markets should give him a lot of credibility with large institutional investors,” stated Agecroft Partners’ Managing Partner Don Steinbrugge.
Agecroft Partners is a global consulting and third party marketing firm for hedge funds. It was founded by Donald A Steinbrugge, CFA, a Founding Principal of Andor Capital Management when it was the 2nd largest hedge fund firm in the world. Don was also Head of Institutional Sales for Merrill Lynch Investment Managers. Agecroft Partners, LLC is a Member FINRA and SIPC.
Treasury Announces Method of Selecting Asset Managers
The U.S. Department of the Treasury (Treasury) will use the following procedures to select asset managers for the portfolio of troubled assets, pursuant to the authorities given to the Treasury in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Act).
Securities vs. Whole Loans. The Treasury will select asset managers of securities separately from asset managers of mortgage whole loans, but in each case these procedures will apply. Securities asset managers will handle Prime, Alt-A, and Subprime residential mortgage backed securities (MBS), commercial MBS, and MBS collateralized debt obligations, and possibly other types of securities acquired to promote market stability. Whole loan asset managers may handle a range of products, including residential first mortgages, home equity loans, second liens, commercial mortgage loans, and possibly other types of mortgage loans acquired to promote market stability.
Financial Agents. Asset managers will be financial agents of the United States, and not contractors. The Act authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) to designate “financial institutions as financial agents of the Federal Government, and such institutions shall perform all such reasonable duties related to this Act as financial agents of the Federal Government as may be required.” As financial agents, asset managers will have a fiduciary agent-principal relationship with the Treasury with a responsibility for protecting the interests of the United States.
Organizational Eligibility. Financial Institutions are eligible to be designated as financial agents of the United States. The Act defines “Financial Institution” to mean “any institution, including, but not limited to, any bank, savings association, credit union, security broker or dealer, or insurance company, established and regulated under the laws of the United States or any State, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, or the United States Virgin Islands, and having significant operations in the United States, but excluding any central bank of, or institution owned by, a foreign government.”
Open Notice. Prospective financial agents will be solicited through the issuance of a public notice, posted on the Treasury website, requesting that interested and qualified Financial Institutions submit a response. The notice will describe the asset management services sought by the Treasury, set forth the rules for submitting a response, and list the factors that will be considered in selecting Financial Institutions. The notice will also include minimum qualifications, such as years of experience and minimum assets under management, and eligibility requirements, such as a clean audit opinion. The Treasury will release one notice for securities asset managers, and a separate notice for whole loan asset managers.
Reviewing Responses and Second Phase. The Treasury will evaluate the initial responses from all interested and qualified Financial Institutions, and will invite certain candidates to continue to the second phase of the financial agent selection process. This second phase, and subsequent phases, may be conducted under confidentiality agreements to facilitate information exchange, but consistent with the public disclosure and transparency provisions of the Act. In the second phase, the prospective financial agents will provide additional information about their expertise, as well as asset management strategies, risk management, and performance measurement. This phase may include telephone conversations to allow questioning by and of the Treasury.
Final Phase and Selection. The Treasury will evaluate the responses from the second phase candidates, and will determine whether a candidate will continue to be considered. In this last stage, a Financial Institution may be required to conduct face-to-face discussions on portfolio scenarios, public policy goals, and statutory requirements, and to respond to interview questions to assess the capabilities of prospective individuals to be assigned to manage assets. Following any face-to-face meetings, the Treasury will make final selections of the Financial Institutions to be designated as asset managers.
Financial Agency Agreement. Financial Institutions selected to be asset managers must sign a Financial Agency Agreement with the Treasury, a copy of which will be provided for review during the second stage of the selection process. The Financial Institution’s willingness to enter into the standard Financial Agency Agreement, with the established terms and conditions currently applied to financial agents of the United States, will be among the factors used in evaluating the Financial Institution.
Evaluations and Decisions. At each stage in the selection process, personnel from the Offices of the Fiscal Assistant Secretary and the Assistant Secretary for Financial Markets, and possibly additional personnel within the Offices of Domestic Finance and Economic Policy, will evaluate the candidate submissions and make recommendations to the head of the Office of Financial Stability, who will make the final decision.
Multiple Managers. The Treasury expects to designate multiple asset managers and submanagers to obtain the proper expertise in different asset types and different segments of the mortgage credit market. However, the Treasury may not, in its discretion, select all asset managers at the same time, but rather in some sequence that matches the Treasury’s asset acquisition schedule and project plan for the portfolio. For example, an asset manager for whole loans may not be selected at the same time as an asset manager for MBS, or a primary manager may be selected prior to a sub-manager. Furthermore, as business requirements evolve, the Treasury may issue additional notices in the future to select more asset managers, consistent with the process set forth in this document.
Small and Minority- And Women-Owned Businesses. The Treasury will issue separate notices, consistent with these procedures, specifically to identify smaller and minority- and women-owned Financial Institutions that do not meet the minimum qualifications for current assets under management in the initial notices. Such Financial Institutions will be designated as sub-managers within the portfolio.
Urgency and Timeline. Given the urgent need to implement the Troubled Assets Relief Program quickly, the selection process for asset managers may involve extremely short deadlines for submitting information and for traveling to Washington, D.C. for meetings or interviews.
Costs of Applying. The Treasury will not reimburse or otherwise compensate a prospective asset manager for expenses or losses incurred in connection with the selection process.
Citibank to hedge funds – no bank accounts for you…
A client just informed me that Citibank will not consider opening a bank account for a hedge fund as of today. Evidently Citibank’s compliance department thinks that being associated with hedge funds, even if it is merely through a simple bank account, is not wise in this climate. I will be discussing this issue with some of my other banking contacts to see if this is the case at other institutions and will report back on this story.
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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.
Hedge fund performance fees – is it time to rethink the high watermark?
There are many news stories out covering what may be a worst case scenario for many hedge funds – the distinct possibility of no performance fees this year. This seems to be a major topic of conversation for many people within the industry and just yesterday I received the following comment with a link to a Wall Street Journal article discussing this issue.
The comment:
Regarding performance fees: the underlying hedge funds naturally also have high performance fees. But in the current climate, they aren’t making them. “Just one in 10 hedge funds is currently receiving performance fees from their funds.” See: http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2008/09/22/fee-slump-hits-hedge-funds/
Unfortunately, with the current market conditions, many funds are going to be feeling the pressure of little to no performance fees at the end of the year. For many hedge fund managers, the problem is compounded by the fact that their asset management fee is simply not enough to keep the business going. Many managers cannot keep operations going with only the management fee. Without performance fees, hedge fund managers may have their operations disrupted for a number of reasons, including the fact that for some, the traders will be expecting bonuses no matter the performance of the fund as a whole. If these traders don’t receive bonuses, then some hedge funds could see talent drain, to the extent that such traders thought they could receive greater compensation at other firms or by starting their own fund.
Still worse, managers who have negative performance numbers at the end of the year will have another issue to deal with – the high watermark. The high watermark is a concept designed as an investor-friendly provision that essentially prevents a manager from taking a performance fee on the same gains more than once. The high watermark is a similar concept to the clawback provision in a private equity fund.
When a fund suffers a significant drawdown during a performance fee period, the high watermark will actually create a perverse incentive for the investment manager – either take extra risk to generate higher returns so that there will be a performance fee in the next performance fee period or close down the fund and start again. Both of these potential actions would be taken to the detriment of the investor, and the investor may only have the choice of making a redemption or letting the investment ride.
If the manager does shut his doors, the investor is going to have his assets at risk as the hedge fund wind-down takes place. Depending on the hedge fund’s strategy, the wind-down could subject the fund to a fire sale of its assets which will reduce the value of the investment even further. If such investor was to move into another hedge fund, he would step into the new fund with a high watermark equal to his investment and would be subject to performance fees on those assets anyway. Because such a turn of events is detrimental to such an investor, it might make sense for such investors to allow for some sort of modification of the high watermark.
Some potential alternatives to the standard hedge fund highwatermark might include the following:
No high watermark – this is probably not a viable solution as it would afford investors absolutely no protection from paying two sets of performance fees on the “same” gains. Additionally, without the threat of the high watermark, there would be little deterrent for a manager to improperly manage risk. Additionally, because the highwatermark provision is one of the most uniform provisions in the hedge fund industry, it is unlikely to simply disappear. (Although I have seen a couple of funds which actually did not have the provision.)
Modified high watermark – I have seen all types of variations within the performance fee structure and the withdrawal structure, but the high watermark is one provision which is generally resistant to modification. The high watermark could potentially be modified in many ways including the following:
Reset to zero – under certain circumstances, that if stated in the offering documents prior to investment, the investment manager can be given the ability to reset the high-watermark to zero.
Amortization – one potential way could be to “amortize” the losses over a 2- or 3-year period so that some performance fees can be earned on a going forward basis. Additionally, if the investor chose to withdraw before the end of the high watermark amortization period, there could be some sort of clawback.
Rolling – the high watermark can be taken under certain circumstances over a rolling period. The concept is that the high watermark will be determined for a certain window so a drawdown would in essence be erased after a certain amount of time has elapsed. This might work better for those funds that have a monthly or quarterly performance fee period.
Resetting to zero and an amortization reduction method could be both potentially valuable to investors as it will keep a manager in the game and it will reduce the incentive for a manager to abandon risk management procedures. Also, management companies may be willing to decrease fees if investors agree to keep their investment in the fund for a certain amount of time after the reset or amortization.
[HFLB note: any new investors coming into a fund during a performance fee period will have an initial high watermark that is equal to the initial investment value; depending on the time of the contribution and when the fund made its losses, there may be some performance fees paid even during a down year for such incoming investors.]
Further Resources
Another good article and some good comments on the article can be found here.
For an interesting academic paper on this subject, please click here. The paper is by William N. Goetzmann, Yale School of Management. The abstract for the paper states:
Incentive or performance fees for money managers are frequently accompanied by high-water mark provisions which condition the payment of the performance fee upon exceeding the maximum achieved share value. In this paper, we show that hedge fund performance fees are valuable to money managers, and conversely represent a claim on a significant proportion of investor wealth. The high-water mark provisions in these contracts limit the value of the performance fees. We provide a closed-form solution to the high-water mark contract under certain conditions. This solution shows that managers have an incentive to take risks. Our results provide a framework for valuation of a hedge fund management company.
We conjecture that the existence of high-water mark compensation is due to decreasing returns to scale in the industry. Empirical evidence on the relationship between fund return and net money flows into and out of funds suggest that successful managers, and large fund managers are less willing to take new money than small fund managers.
Hedge Fund Series 7 question
As I’ve noted in many of my posts, I will try my best to answer your questions or point you to a post within the site which discusses the subject. Below is a common question for licensed brokers who are getting into the hedge fund industry.
Question: I currently hold a series 7 agent license as well as a series 65. I am employed with a broker dealer and soon will make a job change to a hedge fund as a marketer. Can the hedge fund maintain my licenses even though they are not a broker dealer and given the fact that I do not need to have a series 7 license to market the hedge fund? I do not want my license to lapse while in the employ of the hedge fund. I do know that FINRA will hold my license for 24 months before expiring. I would like to maintain my licenses and keep them current by fulfilling my continuing education responsibilities. Please advise.
Answer: No, unfortunately the hedge fund will not be able to “hold” your license if it (or a related entity) is not a broker-dealer. Only a FINRA licensed broker-dealer will be able to “hold” your license – and by “hold” we mean that you would be registered as a representative of the broker-dealer.
This should not be confused with “parking” a license with a broker-dealer which is illegal under FINRA rules. Parking a license basically means that you are registered with a broker-dealer for no business reason other than to keep your licenses current. In the situation above, as you noted, the series 7 designation will expire two years after a U-5 has been submitted by your employing broker-dealer.
One potential way to keep the license is to stay on with your broker dealer and conduct your hedge fund selling activities through the broker-dealer. This may not be possible for a number of business reasons and the broker-dealer may not have the proper compliance procedures in place to market and sell hedge fund interests to its customers. For this reason staying with a broker often is not a viable option and unfortunately I have not come across a good solution to this very common problem.
Paulson announces conservatorship of Fannie and Freddie
In an unprecedent move today, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson announced that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will be placed under Federal Housing Finance Agency conservatorship.
I expect that this will be huge news tomorrow and I look forward to any comments on how this will affect the hedge fund industry.
For questions and answers on the conservatorship, please see: fhfa_consrv_faq_090708hp1128
From the Treasury website:
September 7, 2008
hp-1129
Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers
Washington, DC– Good morning. I’m joined here by Jim Lockhart, Director of the new independent regulator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, FHFA.
In July, Congress granted the Treasury, the Federal Reserve and FHFA new authorities with respect to the GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Since that time, we have closely monitored financial market and business conditions and have analyzed in great detail the current financial condition of the GSEs – including the ability of the GSEs to weather a variety of market conditions going forward. As a result of this work, we have determined that it is necessary to take action.
Since this difficult period for the GSEs began, I have clearly stated three critical objectives: providing stability to financial markets, supporting the availability of mortgage finance, and protecting taxpayers – both by minimizing the near term costs to the taxpayer and by setting policymakers on a course to resolve the systemic risk created by the inherent conflict in the GSE structure.
Based on what we have learned about these institutions over the last four weeks – including what we learned about their capital requirements – and given the condition of financial markets today, I concluded that it would not have been in the best interest of the taxpayers for Treasury to simply make an equity investment in these enterprises in their current form.
The four steps we are announcing today are the result of detailed and thorough collaboration between FHFA, the U.S. Treasury, and the Federal Reserve.
We examined all options available, and determined that this comprehensive and complementary set of actions best meets our three objectives of market stability, mortgage availability and taxpayer protection.
Throughout this process we have been in close communication with the GSEs themselves. I have also consulted with Members of Congress from both parties and I appreciate their support as FHFA, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have moved to address this difficult issue.
Before I turn to Jim to discuss the action he is taking today, let me make clear that these two institutions are unique. They operate solely in the mortgage market and are therefore more exposed than other financial institutions to the housing correction. Their statutory capital requirements are thin and poorly defined as compared to other institutions. Nothing about our actions today in any way reflects a changed view of the housing correction or of the strength of other U.S. financial institutions.
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I support the Director’s decision as necessary and appropriate and had advised him that conservatorship was the only form in which I would commit taxpayer money to the GSEs.
I appreciate the productive cooperation we have received from the boards and the management of both GSEs. I attribute the need for today’s action primarily to the inherent conflict and flawed business model embedded in the GSE structure, and to the ongoing housing correction. GSE managements and their Boards are responsible for neither. New CEOs supported by new non-executive Chairmen have taken over management of the enterprises, and we hope and expect that the vast majority of key professionals will remain in their jobs. I am particularly pleased that the departing CEOs, Dan Mudd and Dick Syron, have agreed to stay on for a period to help with the transition.
I have long said that the housing correction poses the biggest risk to our economy. It is a drag on our economic growth, and at the heart of the turmoil and stress for our financial markets and financial institutions. Our economy and our markets will not recover until the bulk of this housing correction is behind us. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are critical to turning the corner on housing. Therefore, the primary mission of these enterprises now will be to proactively work to increase the availability of mortgage finance, including by examining the guaranty fee structure with an eye toward mortgage affordability.
To promote stability in the secondary mortgage market and lower the cost of funding, the GSEs will modestly increase their MBS portfolios through the end of 2009. Then, to address systemic risk, in 2010 their portfolios will begin to be gradually reduced at the rate of 10 percent per year, largely through natural run off, eventually stabilizing at a lower, less risky size.
Treasury has taken three additional steps to complement FHFA’s decision to place both enterprises in conservatorship. First, Treasury and FHFA have established Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, contractual agreements between the Treasury and the conserved entities. Under these agreements, Treasury will ensure that each company maintains a positive net worth. These agreements support market stability by providing additional security and clarity to GSE debt holders – senior and subordinated – and support mortgage availability by providing additional confidence to investors in GSE mortgage backed securities. This commitment will eliminate any mandatory triggering of receivership and will ensure that the conserved entities have the ability to fulfill their financial obligations. It is more efficient than a one-time equity injection, because it will be used only as needed and on terms that Treasury has set. With this agreement, Treasury receives senior preferred equity shares and warrants that protect taxpayers. Additionally, under the terms of the agreement, common and preferred shareholders bear losses ahead of the new government senior preferred shares.
These Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements were made necessary by the ambiguities in the GSE Congressional charters, which have been perceived to indicate government support for agency debt and guaranteed MBS. Our nation has tolerated these ambiguities for too long, and as a result GSE debt and MBS are held by central banks and investors throughout the United States and around the world who believe them to be virtually risk-free. Because the U.S. Government created these ambiguities, we have a responsibility to both avert and ultimately address the systemic risk now posed by the scale and breadth of the holdings of GSE debt and MBS.
Market discipline is best served when shareholders bear both the risk and the reward of their investment. While conservatorship does not eliminate the common stock, it does place common shareholders last in terms of claims on the assets of the enterprise.
Similarly, conservatorship does not eliminate the outstanding preferred stock, but does place preferred shareholders second, after the common shareholders, in absorbing losses. The federal banking agencies are assessing the exposures of banks and thrifts to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The agencies believe that, while many institutions hold common or preferred shares of these two GSEs, only a limited number of smaller institutions have holdings that are significant compared to their capital.
The agencies encourage depository institutions to contact their primary federal regulator if they believe that losses on their holdings of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac common or preferred shares, whether realized or unrealized, are likely to reduce their regulatory capital below “well capitalized.” The banking agencies are prepared to work with the affected institutions to develop capital restoration plans consistent with the capital regulations.
Preferred stock investors should recognize that the GSEs are unlike any other financial institutions and consequently GSE preferred stocks are not a good proxy for financial institution preferred stock more broadly. By stabilizing the GSEs so they can better perform their mission, today’s action should accelerate stabilization in the housing market, ultimately benefiting financial institutions. The broader market for preferred stock issuance should continue to remain available for well-capitalized institutions.
The second step Treasury is taking today is the establishment of a new secured lending credit facility which will be available to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks. Given the combination of actions we are taking, including the Preferred Share Purchase Agreements, we expect the GSEs to be in a stronger position to fund their regular business activities in the capital markets. This facility is intended to serve as an ultimate liquidity backstop, in essence, implementing the temporary liquidity backstop authority granted by Congress in July, and will be available until those authorities expire in December 2009.
Finally, to further support the availability of mortgage financing for millions of Americans, Treasury is initiating a temporary program to purchase GSE MBS. During this ongoing housing correction, the GSE portfolios have been constrained, both by their own capital situation and by regulatory efforts to address systemic risk. As the GSEs have grappled with their difficulties, we’ve seen mortgage rate spreads to Treasuries widen, making mortgages less affordable for homebuyers. While the GSEs are expected to moderately increase the size of their portfolios over the next 15 months through prudent mortgage purchases, complementary government efforts can aid mortgage affordability. Treasury will begin this new program later this month, investing in new GSE MBS. Additional purchases will be made as deemed appropriate. Given that Treasury can hold these securities to maturity, the spreads between Treasury issuances and GSE MBS indicate that there is no reason to expect taxpayer losses from this program, and, in fact, it could produce gains. This program will also expire with the Treasury’s temporary authorities in December 2009.
Together, this four part program is the best means of protecting our markets and the taxpayers from the systemic risk posed by the current financial condition of the GSEs. Because the GSEs are in conservatorship, they will no longer be managed with a strategy to maximize common shareholder returns, a strategy which historically encouraged risk-taking. The Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements minimize current cash outlays, and give taxpayers a large stake in the future value of these entities. In the end, the ultimate cost to the taxpayer will depend on the business results of the GSEs going forward. To that end, the steps we have taken to support the GSE debt and to support the mortgage market will together improve the housing market, the US economy and the GSEs’ business outlook.
Through the four actions we have taken today, FHFA and Treasury have acted on the responsibilities we have to protect the stability of the financial markets, including the mortgage market, and to protect the taxpayer to the maximum extent possible.
And let me make clear what today’s actions mean for Americans and their families. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are so large and so interwoven in our financial system that a failure of either of them would cause great turmoil in our financial markets here at home and around the globe. This turmoil would directly and negatively impact household wealth: from family budgets, to home values, to savings for college and retirement. A failure would affect the ability of Americans to get home loans, auto loans and other consumer credit and business finance. And a failure would be harmful to economic growth and job creation. That is why we have taken these actions today.
While we expect these four steps to provide greater stability and certainty to market participants and provide long-term clarity to investors in GSE debt and MBS securities, our collective work is not complete. At the end of next year, the Treasury temporary authorities will expire, the GSE portfolios will begin to gradually run off, and the GSEs will begin to pay the government a fee to compensate taxpayers for the on-going support provided by the Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements. Together, these factors should give momentum and urgency to the reform cause. Policymakers must view this next period as a “time out” where we have stabilized the GSEs while we decide their future role and structure.
Because the GSEs are Congressionally-chartered, only Congress can address the inherent conflict of attempting to serve both shareholders and a public mission. The new Congress and the next Administration must decide what role government in general, and these entities in particular, should play in the housing market. There is a consensus today that these enterprises pose a systemic risk and they cannot continue in their current form. Government support needs to be either explicit or non-existent, and structured to resolve the conflict between public and private purposes. And policymakers must address the issue of systemic risk. I recognize that there are strong differences of opinion over the role of government in supporting housing, but under any course policymakers choose, there are ways to structure these entities in order to address market stability in the transition and limit systemic risk and conflict of purposes for the long-term. We will make a grave error if we don’t use this time out to permanently address the structural issues presented by the GSEs.
In the weeks to come, I will describe my views on long term reform. I look forward to engaging in that timely and necessary debate.
MFA hires new lobbyist
MANAGED FUNDS ASSOCIATION HIRES ROGER M. HOLLINGSWORTH AS EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
MANAGING DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C., August 26, 2008 — Managed Funds Association (MFA), the
leading trade association of the hedge fund industry, announced today that Roger Hollingsworth has been named executive vice president and managing director, government relations, effective September 8, 2008. He will be responsible for the implementation of the Association’s political and government relations outreach before the Executive Branch, Congress and relevantregulatory agencies. Mr. Hollingsworth joins MFA from the United States Senate Banking Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, where he served as deputy staff director and senior policy advisor to Committee Chairman Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT).
Richard H. Baker, MFA President and CEO, said, “We are extremely pleased to have
Roger join MFA in this important capacity. His exceptional credentials and proven skills are ideal for our Association, and we are confident that his expertise will help us facilitate an important expansion of MFA’s agenda as we deepen our policy engagement in Washington.”
Mr. Hollingsworth will work directly with Mr. Baker to develop and coordinate MFA’s
legislative and regulatory priorities and initiatives.
As deputy staff director of the Senate Banking Committee, Mr. Hollingsworth coordinated
strategy for moving the Committee’s financial services legislative agenda through the 110th
Congress, including measures recently enacted in response to the ongoing crisis in global
mortgage, credit and capital markets. Before joining Chairman Dodd’s staff in January 2007, he served as vice president and director, federal government affairs for Securities Industry
Association (formerly SIA, now SIFMA). In that position, Mr. Hollingsworth was a senior lobbyist responsible for member relations and advocacy of SIA’s legislative and regulatory priorities. Mr. Hollingsworth has previously served as deputy chief of staff and legislative director for Senator Jon S. Corzine, (D-NJ) and as banking committee aide to Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY).
Mr. Hollingsworth received his B.A. in communications and finance from University at
Albany, State University of New York.
About Managed Funds Association
MFA is the voice of the global alternative investment industry. Its members are
professionals in hedge funds, funds of funds and managed futures funds, as well as industry
service providers. Established in 1991, MFA is the primary source of information for policy
makers and the media and the leading advocate for sound business practices and industry
growth. MFA members include the vast majority of the largest hedge fund groups in the world
who manage a substantial portion of the approximately $2 trillion invested in absolute return strategies. MFA is headquartered in Washington, D.C., with an office in New York. For more information, please visit: www.managedfunds.org.