Category Archives: Regulatory Actions

Hedge Fund Best Practices

Private Group Promulgates Hedge Fund Best Practices

Under direction from the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, a private sector group comprised of financial industry professionals and regulators released a finalized set of best practices for hedge funds and hedge fund investors.  Continue reading

Investment Advisor Barred From IA Industry For Matching Trade Fraud

Hedge fund managers should not match trades between commonly managed accounts in thinly traded (or illiquid) securities as this may pose potential problems under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940.  This holds true whether the hedge fund manager is registered or unregistered.  As the release below shows, the manager may be subject to fines and/or other penalties for such trading.  If a hedge fund manager does wish to engage in such trading, he should discuss this option with a hedge fund attorney.  Please contact us if you have any questions.  Continue reading

Fraudulent Commodity Pool Operator Issued Injunction

A commodity pool operator is issued an injunction for fraudulent behavior.  In classic fashion, this fraudster touted performance results which were grossly inaccurate.  The scheme ended earlier this year and investors lost almost $6 million dollars.  As we’ve noted before, hedge fund investors (including those investors in commodity and futures hedge funds) need to make sure to complete due diligence on the hedge fund and hedge fund manager.  The release below details the events and injunction.  Continue reading

Pooled Investment Vehicles – Non-Traditional Hedge Fund Strategies

The term “hedge fund” is really a misnomer as most hedge funds are not hedged.  A better term would be pooled investment vehicle.  Traditional types of pooled investment vehicle structures include hedge funds, private equity funds, venture capital funds, real estate funds, and “hybrid” funds (funds which combine components of the above).

This article is going to discuss other types of non-traditional hedge funds, that is hedge funds which do not fall within the typical types of hedge fund securities trading strategies (long/short equity, multi-strategy, global macro, fixed income, equity market neutral, managed futures, etc). As more people become familiar with hedge funds and become interested in investing in them, managers will begin to create funds to fit specific demographics.  The following are interesting projects which can be accomplished through the hedge fund (or pooled investment vehicle) structure:

Green Hedge Funds – in a vein similar to the Vice Fund*, hedge funds can concentrate their investments in any specific hot area. Green companies is currently a hot area and many people are already calling a bubble in “green” companies, at least in the private equity space.  According to this article by Richard Wilson, mandates at institutional level to invest in “green” hedge funds are expected to significantly increase in the coming years.

Horse Racing Hedge Funds – there are two ways that a fund like this would work.  First, the hedge fund can actually pool investor money and then the manager would place bets on various horses through various betting establishments.  With a fund like this the sponsor would need to make sure to disclose the exact nature of the program so that any legal or gambling issues could be vetted before the hedge fund launch.  Second, the hedge fund could buy racing horses and then race them for profit.  There are already these types of pooled vehicles out there and they are usually have a private equity structure with capital calls.

Gambling or Online Gambling Hedge Funds – with the rise in popularity of Texas Hold-em on television and the proliferation of online gambling there has been discussion of hedge funds devoted to making money from this phenomenon.  Basically this would be done through pooling money and then allocating to traders (live or online) who would then play with money.  With a fund like this there are many issues, not the least of which is the illegality of gambling in much of the US and online.  It is likely that a gambling attorney would need to be brought in to opine on the issue of the legality of such a fund.

Sports Betting Hedge Fund – like the gambling hedge fund, sports betting presents a very attractive opportunity for potential hedge fund managers.  A couple of years back Mark Cuban discussed the idea of a sports betting hedge fund on his blog (blog post).  While his fund never got off the ground, I have heard of other potential hedge fund sponsors trying to get a fund like this launched.  I have not yet heard of a successful fund like this, but I think it is just a matter of time.

Lottery Hedge Fund – about a year and a half ago I had the idea of starting a lottery hedge fund which would pool money to buy a large amount (or all possible number combinations) of number combinations at one of the very large lottery drawings.  While it is feasible to create a fund to do this, there are many technical issues which would need to be resolved if a fund like this was to launch.

Charitable Hedge Funds – while not necessarily having a different strategy from traditional hedge funds, these charitable hedge funds would take a portion of their profits and devote them to charitable causes.  Presumably the sponsor of a charitable hedge fund would create such a fund for his network of friends and family, all of whom would have similar views on the nature of the charitable donation.

Shariah Compliant Hedge Funds – such funds have become more over the past couple of years and are expected to continue such growth in the future.

Other Issues – in general, establishing a non-traditional hedge fund or pooled investment vehicle will involve the same basic steps as forming a hedge fund (see Start Up Hedge Fund Timeline).  The key issue is what type of assets the fund will buy and sell.  The nature of the assets will necessarily drive the structure.  These are they types of issues you would discuss with your attorney, include whether the manager will need to be registered as an investment advisor. Other articles of interest may include:

* The Vice Fund is a mutal fund which invests in domestic and foreign companies engaged in the aerospace and defense industries, owners and operators, gaming facilities as well as manufacturers of gaming equipment, manufactures of tobacco products and producers of alcoholic beverages.  The website can be found here.

Hedge Fund Analyst Fined for Insider PIPE Trading

According to a SEC litigation release, a hedge fund analyst was fined $317,000 for engaging in insider trading with regard to a PIPE investment.  PIPE transactions are subject to close scrutiny from the SEC.  In this instance the fund which the analyst worked for established a short position in a company which was completing a PIPE transaction.  Evidently the reason the fund established the short was because of inside information about the deal from the analyst.  The SEC release can be found here.

U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Litigation Release No. 20784 / October 20, 2008
SEC v. Brian D. Ladin et al., Civil Action No. 1:08-CV-01784 (RBW) (D.D.C.)

SEC Charges Former Hedge Fund Analyst with Improper Trading

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged Brian D. Ladin, a former analyst for Bonanza Master Fund Ltd. (“Bonanza”), a Dallas-based hedge fund, with improper trading in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Ladin, without admitting or denying the allegations in the Commission’s complaint, agreed to settle charges that he engaged in unlawful insider trading in connection with a 2004 “PIPE” (an acronym for private investment in public equity) offering conducted by Radyne Comstream Inc. As detailed below, Ladin agreed to entry of a final judgment imposing an injunction and ordering him to pay $330,427, consisting of $13,427 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and a $317,000 civil penalty.

The Commission’s complaint alleges, among other things, that Ladin accepted a duty to keep the offering information confidential. The Complaint further alleges that Ladin, on the basis of the material, non-public PIPE information, presented an investment in Radyne to Bonanza, resulting in Bonanza establishing a 100,000 share short position in Radyne stock. The Commission’s complaint further alleges that Ladin, in signing the offering’s stock purchase agreement on behalf of Bonanza, represented that Bonanza did not hold a short position in Radyne common stock when he knew, or was reckless or negligent in not knowing, that Bonanza held a short position in Radyne’s common stock.

Ladin consented to the entry of a final judgment (i) permanently enjoining him from future violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933; (ii) ordering him to pay $10,895 in disgorgement, along with $2,532 in prejudgment interest thereon; and (iii) ordering him to pay a $317,000 civil penalty. Bonanza and its investment adviser, Bonanza Capital, Ltd., consented to the entry of a final judgment ordering them, as relief defendants, to pay a total of $371,429 in ill-gotten gains derived from Ladin’s unlawful conduct (and prejudgment interest thereon).

For more information on this subject, please see:

  • Hedge Funds and PIPE Transactions

If you have any questions, please contact us.

NFA sends request for financials to Commodity Hedge Funds

Hedge fund managers which are licensed as commodity pool operators (CPOs) should have received an email from the NFA which requests certain financial information. While not disclosed on their website, the NFA sent a request on Friday to all of the CPO Members. Each member will need to make a filing which represents (i) the commodity pool has not suffered a drawdown of 25% or more since December 31, 2007 or (ii) the commodity pool’s actual drawdown numbers. CPOs will have until October 8 to make the filing. If you are a CPO and have not received this email request, you should contact the NFA immediately. If you did receive the request and have any questions, you should contact the NFA and/or your attorney immediately.

The NFA contact persons are:

Mary McHenry, Senior Manager, Compliance, ([email protected], or (312) 781-1420)

Tracey Hunt, Senior Manager, Compliance, ([email protected] or (312) 781-1284)

The request for information does not apply to pools which are exempt under CFTC Rule 4.13. For the whole email, please see below.

September 26, 2008

Important Request for CPOs

Due to current events in the global financial markets, NFA is requesting CPO Members to provide information by October 8, 2008 regarding the financial status of their pools. However, this request does not apply to any CFTC 4.13 exempt pools.

To see a list of the active pools NFA has on file for your firm, click on the following link and access the EasyFile system: https://www.nfa.futures.org/AppEntry/Redirect.aspx?app=EasyFilePool. (However, if you currently operate a pool that may be subject to this request, but it is not included in the EasyFile listing, you must notify one of the individuals listed at the end of this message.)

NFA is requesting certain financial information as of 9/30/2008 for each pool listed that has experienced a drawdown of 25% or more since December 31, 2007. For further instructions on completing the filing, see the information below regarding How to File.

For any pool that did not sustain such a drawdown, you must attest to this fact by deleting the filing request from the listing. For further instructions on deleting the request, see the information below under How to Delete a Request.

How to File: For each pool that has experienced a drawdown of 25% or more since December 31, 2007, you must use the EasyFile system to submit the pool’s key financial balances and Schedule of Investments, as well as a written representation on disclosure and withdrawal restrictions.

The key financial balances consist of the same summary categories you enter for year-end statements. The Schedule of Investments is an itemized listing of all investments that individually exceed 5% of NAV. NFA has created a standardized spreadsheet for this filing, which is available at https://www.nfa.futures.org/EASYFILE/Static/CPOSchedule.xls. Use this link to access the spreadsheet and then perform a “save as” to save the blank spreadsheet to your local computer. Once you complete the spreadsheet, upload it to NFA via the EasyFile system. Additionally, you must submit any written documentation your firm has provided to participants relating to any additional disclosure, including whether the firm has placed any restrictions on redemptions and, if so, a description of these restrictions. You should save this written documentation as a PDF file and then upload it to the EasyFile system as well.

How to Delete a Request: For any pool that does not meet the 25% threshold, you must delete the filing request in the EasyFile system. Detailed instructions on how to delete a filing request are included in the guide entitled “Help for Special 9/30/2008 Filing” on the initial Pool Index screen in the EasyFile system.
BY DELETING THE REQUEST, YOU ARE ATTESTING THAT THIS POOL DID NOT EXPERIENCE A DRAWDOWN OF 25% OR MORE SINCE DECEMBER 31, 2007. In addition, NFA will maintain a record of the deletion, as well as the user who performed it.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact one of the following individuals:

Mary McHenry, Senior Manager, Compliance, ([email protected], or (312) 781-1420) Tracey Hunt, Senior Manager, Compliance, ([email protected] or (312) 781-1284)

****

Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

SEC ends CSE program for investment banks

Last week Goldman and Merril announced that they were going to convert to bank holding companies.  A good article on  the conversion, including questions and answers, can be found here. An interesting consequence of the change is that the SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) program is no longer necessary.

The CSE was a unique program where the SEC would supervise the very large investment banking firms from the inside. While the program was voluntary, it was designed to identify potential issues in the devolpmental stage.  However, because the SEC really had no authority to recieve certain reports from the investment banks, the program could only do so much and as we’ve seen, the program failed to protect against the meltdown of both Bear and Lehman.

Chairman Cox will definately take some heat for what the CSE program did not accomplish (see this article), however, it is not presently clear whether he deserves the blame.  As his statement below indicates, the SEC had no explicit governmental oversignt of the major investment banks which would allow them to really act as a regulator for these entities.   What is scary about this is that, if congress listens to Cox, there may be a rush toward over-regulation – Cox is already calling for the regulation of the currently unregulated CDS market. If there is more regulation in the future it is unclear what governmental agency will be in charge of such regulation as the SEC is already overburdened and underfunded.

The statement by Cox below can be found here.


Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised Entities Program
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2008-230

Washington, D.C., Sept. 26, 2008 — Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox today announced a decision by the Division of Trading and Markets to end the Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) program, created in 2004 as a way for global investment bank conglomerates that lack a supervisor under law to voluntarily submit to regulation. Chairman Cox also described the agency’s plans for enhancing SEC oversight of the broker-dealer subsidiaries of bank holding companies regulated by the Federal Reserve, based on the recent Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the SEC and the Fed.

Chairman Cox made the following statement:

The last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work. When Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, it created a significant regulatory gap by failing to give to the SEC or any agency the authority to regulate large investment bank holding companies, like Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns.

Because of the lack of explicit statutory authority for the Commission to require these investment bank holding companies to report their capital, maintain liquidity, or submit to leverage requirements, the Commission in 2004 created a voluntary program, the Consolidated Supervised Entities program, in an effort to fill this regulatory gap.

As I have reported to the Congress multiple times in recent months, the CSE program was fundamentally flawed from the beginning, because investment banks could opt in or out of supervision voluntarily. The fact that investment bank holding companies could withdraw from this voluntary supervision at their discretion diminished the perceived mandate of the CSE program, and weakened its effectiveness.

The Inspector General of the SEC today released a report on the CSE program’s supervision of Bear Stearns, and that report validates and echoes the concerns I have expressed to Congress. The report’s major findings are ultimately derivative of the lack of specific legal authority for the SEC or any other agency to act as the regulator of these large investment bank holding companies.

With each of the major investment banks that had been part of the CSE program being reconstituted within a bank holding company, they will all be subject to statutory supervision by the Federal Reserve. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Federal Reserve has robust statutory authority to impose and enforce supervisory requirements on those entities. Thus, there is not currently a regulatory gap in this area.

The CSE program within the Division of Trading and Markets will now be ending.

Under the Memorandum of Understanding between the SEC and the Federal Reserve that was executed in July of this year, we will continue to work closely with the Fed, but focused even more clearly on our statutory obligation to regulate the broker-dealer subsidiaries of the banking conglomerates. The information from the bank holding company level that the SEC will continue to receive under the MOU will strengthen our ability to protect the customers of the broker-dealers and the integrity of the broker-dealer firms.

The Inspector General’s office also made 26 specific recommendations to improve the CSE program, which are comprehensive and worthy of support. Although the CSE program is ending, we will look closely at the applicability of those recommendations to other areas of the Commission’s work and move to aggressively implement them.

As we learned from the CSE experience, it is critical that Congress ensure there are no similar major gaps in our regulatory framework. Unfortunately, as I reported to Congress this week, a massive hole remains: the approximately $60 trillion credit default swap (CDS) market, which is regulated by no agency of government. Neither the SEC nor any regulator has authority even to require minimum disclosure. I urge Congress to take swift action to address this.

Finally, I would like to commend the extraordinary efforts of the SEC’s diligent staff, who for so many months have been working around the clock in the current market turmoil. Their dedication and commitment in behalf of investors and the American people are unequaled.

****

Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

CFTC Fines Hedge Funds for Failure to File Annual Report with NFA

Certain hedge funds which trade futures and/or commodities as part of their investment program are deemed to be commodity pools and the hedge fund management company must register with the NFA as a commodity pool operator (CPO).  Registered CPOs must file annual reports with the NFA and such reports must be sent to investors in the fund.  Generally this will need to be done within either 45 or 90 days after the end of the fund’s fiscal year.  If a CPO needs extra time to file the report, it can request an extension from the CFTC.

In the cases below, each of the CPOs had filed for and were granted extensions.  Even with these extensions, however, they were not able to file their reports.  The NFA evidently takes such an infraction very seriously as the fines were stiff – ranging from $75,000 to $135,000.  Such a potential monetary penalty should make CPOs especially eager to file the appropriate reports on time.

CFTC Rule 4.22 includes the following major provisions.

  • must distribute an Annual Report to each participant in each pool that it operates, and must electronically submit a copy of the Report and key financial balances from the Report to the National Futures Association pursuant to the electronic filing procedures of the National Futures Association
  • Annual Report must be sent to pool participants within 45 calendar days after the end of the fiscal year
  • financial statements in the Annual Report must be presented and computed in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles consistently applied and must be certified by an independent public accountant

If you are a hedge fund manager registered as a CPO you should make sure you understand this and other CFTC rules.  If you have any questions on the rules or other CPO requirements, including possible CPO exemptions, you should have a conversation with your attorney so that you know what needs to be filed and when so that you can avoid harsh fines like the ones below.

The CFTC release below can be found here.

Release: 5555-08
For Release: September 24, 2008

CFTC Sanctions Four Registered Commodity Pool Operators for Failing to File Timely Commodity Pool Reports with the National Futures Association

Mansur Capital Corp., Persistent Edge Management, LLC, Stillwater Capital Partners, Inc., and Stillwater Capital Partners, LLC Ordered to Pay a Total of $330,000 in Civil Monetary Penalties

Washington, DC – The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) today simultaneously filed and settled charges against four registered commodity pool operators (CPOs), charging them with failing to distribute to investors and file with the National Futures Association (NFA) one or more of their respective commodity pools’ annual reports in a timely manner. Mansur Capital Corporation of Chicago, Persistent Edge Management, LLC of San Francisco, California, and Stillwater Capital Partners, Inc. and Stillwater Capital Partners, LLC, both of New York, were charged in the CFTC action.

The CFTC orders require the CPOs to pay civil monetary penalties in the following amounts: Mansur, $75,000; Persistent Edge, $120,000; and Stillwater I and Stillwater II to jointly and severally pay $135,000.

Under CFTC regulations, CPOs are required to file annual reports with the NFA and distribute them to each pool participant. This must be done within a prescribed period after the close of their pools’ fiscal years. An annual report is designed to “provide [pool] participants with the information necessary to assess the overall trading performance and financial condition of the pool.” (See Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors, Final Rules, 44 Fed. Reg. 1918 [CFTC Jan. 8, 1979], re the adoption of Rule 4.22.) According to the CFTC orders, without timely reporting, the CFTC’s goal of providing pool participants with complete and necessary data is hampered.

The CFTC orders find that each of the four CPOs operated one or more commodity pools, including pools that operated as funds-of-funds. While each of the CPOs had obtained extensions of the prescribed deadlines for various pools and reporting years, each failed to timely comply with its obligations, in violation of CFTC regulations.

The following CFTC Division of Enforcement staff are responsible for this case: Camille M. Arnold, Alan I. Edelman, Ava M. Gould, Susan J. Gradman, James H. Holl, III, Diane M. Romaniuk, Scott R. Williamson, Rosemary Hollinger, Gretchen Lowe, and Richard B. Wagner.

****

Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

SEC Wins another Hedge Fund Fraud Case – Provides Insight to Hedge Fund Managers

Hedge fund fraud cases are important because they give some definition and life to the various investment advisor and hedge fund laws.  Much of the advice that hedge fund lawyers give to their clients is based on reasonableness and best guesses on how the securities laws will be implemented in the hedge fund context.  For many hedge fund issues there are not clear cut cases which give color to the securities laws.  One of my colleagues refers to this as the “square peg – round hole” dilemma by which he means it is hard to apply the archaic securities laws with the current state of the hedge fund and investment management industry.

When the SEC does bring cases, as practitioners we get to see how the SEC views the securities rules and how we should be advising clients. While many of the fraud cases represent completely unbelievable actions by unscrupulous people, there are still lessons which well-intentioned managers can learn from.

Specifically this case gives us an opportunity to examine five separate areas which invesment managers should be aware of:

1.    Make sure all statements in the hedge fund offering documents and collateral marketing materials is are accurate.

In this case the hedge fund offering documents contained many material misstatements including materially false and misleading statements in offering materials and newsletters about, among other things, the Funds’ holdings, performances, values and management backgrounds.  For example the complaint alledges:

Specifically, both PPMs represented that most investments made by Partners and Offshore would trade on “listed exchanges.” In truth, a majority of those funds’ investments were and are on unlisted exchanges such as the OTCBB or pink sheets. Furthermore, the Partners’ PPM stated that investors would receive yearly audited financials upon request. Partners has not obtained audited financials since the year ended 2000 and repeatedly refused at least one investor’s requests for audited financials for the year ended 2001.

2.    Make sure all appropriate disclosure relating to personnel are made.

Hedge fund attorneys will usually spend time with the manager discussing the employees of the management company and their backgrounds.  During this time the attorney will ask the manager, among other questions, whether any person who is part of the management company has been involved in any securities related offense.  In this case there were two specific items which the manager should have disclosed in the offering documents and other collateral material:

Failed to disclose that a “consultant” to the management company was enjoined, fined and also barred from serving as an officer or director of a public company for five years for his fraudulent conduct involving, among other things, misallocating to himself securities while serving as CFO and later president of a publicly traded company.

Failed to discloase a member of the fund’s board of directors was barred from associating with any broker or dealer for 9 years.

3.    Take care when going outside stated valuation policies.

Many hedge fund documents have stated valuation policies but then allow the manager to modify the valuation, in the manager’s discretion, to better reflect the true value of the securities.  However, when a manager uses this discretion, the manager should have a basis for the valuation.  Such valuation should not be based on an artificially inflated value of the asset.  To be safe managers should probably have some internal valuation policies which should be in line with generally accepted valuation standards for such assets.  I found the following paragraph from the SEC’s complaint particularly interesting (emphasis added):

II. Bogus Valuations

34. In order to obtain at least year end 2001 audited financials for Offshore, Lancer Management provided Offshore’s auditor with appraisals valuing certain of that fund’s holdings. These appraisals mirrored or closely approximated the values assigned to Offshore’s holdings by Defendants based on the manipulated closing prices at month end. These valuation reports were, however, fatally flawed and did not reflect the true values of Offshore’s holdings under the generally accepted Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice or American Society of Appraisers Business Valuation Standards. For example, the valuations were improperly based on unreliable market prices of thinly traded securities; unjustified prices of private transactions in thinly traded securities; unfounded, baseless and unrealistic projections; hypotheticals; and/or an averaging of various factors. Indeed, under accepted standards of valuing businesses, certain of the Funds’ holdings were and/or are essentially worthless.

4.    Do not engage in market manipulation.

Many of the securities in which this hedge fund invested were traded on the OTCBB.  The fund engaged in trading in these securities near valuation periods in order to artificially inflate the price of these very thinly traded securities.  Additionally, the complaint alleges many incidents of “marking the close.”  This goes without saying but a hedge fund manager should not engage in market manipulation.

5.    Always produce accurate portfolio statements.  Do not overstate earnings.  Always make sure that statements to investors are accurate.

Enough said.

While many of the examples above are so egregious they probably do not need to be listed on a “do not” list, you should make sure you do not engage in any of these activities. Additionally, if you do make some error or mistake (for example, if a valuation turns out to be incorrect or inaccurate), immediately contact your attorney to create a plan to inform investors about the incorrect or inaccurate statements.  A mistake can generally be cured, all out fraud cannot.

I have posted a full text version of the SEC’s case, SEC v. Lauer.  I have included the statement by the SEC below which can be found here.

—————–

SEC Wins Major Hedge Fund Fraud Case Against Michael Lauer, Head of Lancer Management Group

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2008-225

Washington, D.C., Sept. 24, 2008—The Securities and Exchange Commission announced that a district court judge today granted its motion for summary judgment against the architect of a massive billion-dollar hedge fund fraud.

Michael Lauer of Greenwich, Conn., was found liable for violating the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws. In a 67-page order, The Honorable Kenneth A. Marra, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, found that Lauer’s fraud as head of two Connecticut-based companies – Lancer Management Group and Lancer Management Group II – that managed investors’ money and acted as hedge fund advisers was “egregious, pervasive, premeditated and resulted in the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in investors’ funds.”

Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, said, “This case highlights the SEC’s ongoing efforts to combat hedge fund fraud and our dedicated work on behalf of investors to ensure that hedge fund managers are held accountable for any unlawful conduct.”
David Nelson, Director of the SEC’s Miami Regional Office, added, “We are particularly gratified at this decision, which resulted from several years of hard work to protect investors, starting when we successfully halted the fraud while it was still ongoing.”

Lauer raised more than $1.1 billion from investors and his fraudulent actions caused investor losses of approximately $500 million. The SEC initially won emergency temporary restraining orders and asset freezes against Lauer and his companies, which were placed under the control of a Court-appointed receiver after the SEC filed its enforcement action in 2003.

During the protracted litigation, the SEC successfully stopped Lauer from diverting or hiding millions of dollars of assets from the Court’s asset freeze.

The summary judgment order found that Lauer:

  • Materially overstated the hedge funds’ valuations for the years 1999 to 2002.
  • Manipulated the prices of seven securities that were a material portion of the funds’ portfolios from November 1999 through at least April 2003.
  • Failed to provide any basis to substantiate or explain the exorbitant valuations of the shell corporations that saturated the funds’ portfolios.
  • Hid or lied to investors about the Funds’ actual holdings by providing them with fake portfolio statements.
  • Falsely represented the funds’ holdings in newsletters.

The judge’s order entered a permanent injunction against Lauer against future violations of Sections 17(a)(1)-(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), and Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers Act). The order reserved ruling on the SEC’s claim for disgorgement with prejudgment interest against Lauer, and on the amount of a financial penalty Lauer must pay. The SEC is seeking a financial penalty and disgorgement of the more than $50 million Lauer received in ill-gotten gains from his fraudulent scheme.

SEC brings fraud charges against investment advisor in connection with hedge fund investments

Investment advisors who recommend hedge fund investments should be very careful to disclose all material agreements between the advisor and the hedge fund and hedge fund manager.  In the case below an investment advisor recommend hedge fund investments to its clients without disclosing to such clients that the advisor was receiving a part of the performance fees that were paid to the hedge fund manager.

Advisors should also take note to the following two issues:

SEC jurisdiction over state registered investment advisors

Even though the advisor was registered with the California Securities Regulation Division and not the SEC, the SEC was able to take action under Section 206 (the anti-fraud provisions) of the Investment Advisers Act.  Additionally the SEC was able to bring charges against the investment advisor under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”).  This shows that the SEC’s has quite a few methods to assert jurisdiction over non-SEC registered advisors.

Potential violations of broker registration requirements?

Although I have not yet had a chance to read the unreleased complaint, I am wondering why the SEC did not charge this group with violating the broker registration requirements.  I think there is an argument that the investment advisory firm was acting as a broker.  I checked FINRA’s broker check and the firm did not come up as a registered broker.

Section 15(a)(1) of the Exchange Act generally makes it unlawful for any broker or dealer to use the mails (or any other means of interstate commerce, such as the telephone, facsimiles, or the Internet) to “effect any transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security” unless that broker or dealer is registered with the Commission in accordance with Section 15(b) of the Exchange Act.

The release below can be found here.

U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Litigation Release No. 20737 / September 24, 2008

Securities and Exchange Commission v. WealthWise, LLC and Jeffrey A. Forrest, United States District Court for the Central District of California, Civil Action No. CV 08-06278 GAF (SSx)

SEC Charges California Investment Adviser With Committing Fraud While Recommending Hedge Fund to Clients

The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged a San Luis Obispo, Calif.-based investment adviser and its owner with fraud for failing to disclose a material conflict of interest when recommending that their clients invest in a hedge fund that made undisclosed subprime and other high-risk investments.

The SEC alleges that WealthWise LLC and its principal Jeffrey A. Forrest recommended that more than 60 of their clients invest approximately $40 million in Apex Equity Options Fund, a hedge fund managed by Salt Lake City-based Thompson Consulting, Inc. (TCI). According to the SEC’s complaint, WealthWise and Forrest failed to disclose a side agreement in which WealthWise received a portion of the performance fee that Apex paid TCI for all WealthWise assets invested in the hedge fund. From April 2005 to September 2007, WealthWise received more than $350,000 in performance fees from TCI. Apex collapsed in August 2007, and WealthWise clients lost nearly all of the money they invested.

The SEC’s complaint, filed in federal district court in Los Angeles, charges WealthWise and Forrest with violating Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. The SEC seeks an injunction, an accounting of the total amount of performance fees WealthWise received from TCI, disgorgement of those fees, and financial penalties.

On March 4, 2008, the SEC filed a civil action in federal district court in Salt Lake City against TCI and three of its principals in connection with the collapse of Apex and another hedge fund.