Author Archives: Hedge Fund Lawyer

Mallon P.C. Comments on Proposed Investment Adviser Custody Rule

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In May we reported that the SEC was requesting comments on the new Proposed Investment Adviser Custody Rules.  The SEC’s comment period ended this past week with a flurry of activity before the submission deadline.  As we reported previously, there has been a general industry backlash against the rule because it does not provide any substantive protection for investors and creates significant additional costs for investment advisory firms – including the requirement of a surprise audit for those adviser which directly debit advisory fees from the client’s brokerage account.

Mallon P.C. participated in this discussion by submitting the following Comment on Proposed Investment Adviser Custody Rule.  Specifically we found that there would be no good reason to institute the rule as written and believe that it would harm small investment advisory firms disproportionately.  Additionally, we urged the SEC to consider alternatives to the proposed rule which would have more effective investor protections with less impact on the business aspects of the investment advisers who would be subject to the rule.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, or if you have questions about investment adviser registration with the SEC or state securities commission, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

SEC Announces New Short Sale Rules

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One of the major regulatory pushes this year by the SEC has been to revamp the short sale rules.  Today the SEC announced some specific measures which are intended to curtail abusive short sales.  We will likely have more comments on this issue going forward and will publish hedge fund industry reaction.

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SEC Takes Steps to Curtail Abusive Short Sales and Increase Market Transparency
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2009-172

Washington, D.C., July 27, 2009 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced several actions that would protect against abusive short sales and make more short sale information available to the public.

“Today’s actions demonstrate the Commission’s determination to address short selling abuses while at the same time increasing public disclosure of short selling activities that affect our markets,” said SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro.

First, the Commission made permanent an interim final temporary rule, Rule 204T, that seeks to reduce the potential for abusive “naked” short selling in the securities market. The new rule, Rule 204, requires broker-dealers to promptly purchase or borrow securities to deliver on a short sale. The temporary rule, approved by the SEC in the fall of 2008, was set to expire on July 31.

Additional Materials

Rule 204: Amendments To Regulation SHO (Release No. 34-60388)

Second, the Commission and its staff are working together with several self-regulatory organizations (SRO) to make short sale volume and transaction data available through the SRO Web sites. This effort will result in a substantial increase over the amount of information presently required by another temporary rule, known as Temporary 10a-3T. That rule, which will expire on August 1, applies only to certain institutional money managers and does not require public disclosure.

Apart from these measures, the Commission is continuing to actively consider proposals on a short sale price test and circuit breaker restrictions.

Third, the Commission intends to hold a public roundtable on September 30 to discuss securities lending, pre-borrowing, and possible additional short sale disclosures. The roundtable will consider, among other topics, the potential impact of a program requiring short sellers to pre-borrow their securities, possibly on a pilot basis, and adding a short sale indicator to the tapes to which transactions are reported for exchange-listed securities.

Overview

Short selling often can play an important role in the market for a variety of reasons, including contributing to efficient price discovery, mitigating market bubbles, increasing market liquidity, promoting capital formation, facilitating hedging and other risk management activities, and importantly, limiting upward market manipulations. There are, however, circumstances in which short selling can be used as a tool to manipulate the market.

“Naked” Short Sales: In a “naked” short sale the investor sells shares “short” without first having borrowed them. Such a transaction is permitted because there is no legal requirement that a short seller actually borrow the shares before effecting a short sale.

But, before effecting a short sale, Rule 204T requires that the broker-dealer, as opposed to the seller, “locate” an entity that the broker reasonably believes can deliver the shares within three days after the trade — what’s known as T+3. Also, if reasonable, a broker-dealer may rely on a short seller’s assurance that the short seller has located his or her own lender that can deliver shares in time for settlement.

“Fails-to-deliver”: If an investor or its broker-dealer does not deliver shares by T+3, a “failure to deliver” occurs. Where an investor or its broker-dealer neither locates nor delivers shares, a “naked” short sale has occurred.

A “fail to deliver” can occur for legitimate reasons, such as mechanical errors or processing delays. Further, a “fail to deliver” could occur as a result of a long sale — that is the typical buy-sell transaction — as well as a short sale.

“Fails to deliver”, such as fails resulting from potentially abusive “naked” short selling, may have a negative effect on shareholders, potentially depriving them of the benefits of ownership such as voting and lending. They also may create a misleading impression of the market for an issuer’s securities.

Adopting Regulation SHO: Due to its concerns regarding persistent “fails to deliver” and potentially abusive “naked” short selling, the Commission adopted Regulation SHO, which became effective in early 2005. This regulation imposes, among other things, the requirement that broker-dealers locate a source of borrowable shares prior to selling short.

In addition, it requires that firms that clear and settle trades must purchase shares to close out these “fails to deliver” within a certain time frame, 13 days. This “close-out” requirement only applies to certain equity securities with large and persistent “fails to deliver,” known as threshold securities.

The requirement included two major exceptions: the so-called “grandfather” and “options market maker” exceptions. Both of these exceptions provided that certain “fails to deliver” in threshold securities never had to be closed out. The Commission eliminated both exceptions in August 2007 and September 2008, respectively.

Making Permanent A Rule to Curtail Naked Short Selling

Adopting Rule 204: The Commission has made permanent a temporary rule that was approved in 2008 in response to continuing concerns regarding “fails to deliver” and potentially abusive “naked” short selling. In particular, temporary Rule 204T made it a violation of Regulation SHO and imposes penalties if a clearing firm:

  • does not purchase or borrow shares to close-out a “fail to deliver”
  • resulting from a short sale in any equity security
  • by no later than the beginning of trading on the day after the fail first occurs (T+4).

Cutting Down Failures to Deliver: An analysis conducted by the SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis, which followed the adoption of the close-out requirement of Rule 204T and the elimination of the “options market maker” exception, showed the number of “fails” declined significantly.

For example, since the fall of 2008, fails to deliver in all equity securities has decreased by approximately 57 percent and the average daily number of threshold list securities has declined from a high of approximately 582 securities in July 2008 to 63 in March 2009.

Due to the success of these measures in furthering the Commission’s goals of reducing fails to deliver and addressing potentially abusive “naked” short selling, the Commission has made permanent the requirements of Rule 204T with only limited modifications to address commenters’ operational concerns.

Increasing Transparency Around Short Sales

In the fall of 2008, the Commission also adopted a short sale reporting interim rule, Rule 10a-3T. The rule requires certain market participants to provide short sale and short position information to the Commission.

The Commission made the rule temporary so that it could evaluate whether the benefits from the data justified the costs associated with the rule.

Instead of renewing the rule, the Commission and its staff, together with SROs, are working to substantially increase the public availability of short sale-related information through a series of other actions. These actions should provide a wealth of information to the Commission, other regulators, investors, analysts, academics, and the media.

Specifically, the Commission and its staff are working together with several SROs in the following areas:

  • Daily Publication of Short Sale Volume Information. It is expected in the next few weeks that the SROs will begin publishing on their Web sites the aggregate short selling volume in each individual equity security for that day.
  • Disclosure of Short Sale Transaction Information. It is expected in the next few weeks that the SROs will begin publishing on their Web sites on a one-month delayed basis information regarding individual short sale transactions in all exchange-listed equity securities.
  • Twice Monthly Disclosure of Fails Data. It is expected in the next few weeks that the Commission will enhance the publication on its Web site of fails to deliver data so that fails to deliver information is provided twice per month and for all equity securities, regardless of the fails level. For current fails to deliver information, see http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/failsdata.htm.

Hosting a Roundtable

Finally, the Commission also is examining whether additional measures are needed to further enhance market quality and transparency, as well as address short selling abuses.

As part of its examination, the Commission intends to hold a public roundtable on Sept. 30, 2009, to solicit the views of investors, issuers, financial services firms, self-regulatory organizations and the academic community regarding a variety of trading and market related practices. The roundtable will focus on issues related to securities lending, pre-borrowing, and possible additional short sale disclosures.

The roundtable panelists will consider, among other things, additional means to foster transparency, such as adding a short sale indicator to the tapes to which transactions are reported for exchange-listed securities, and requiring public disclosure of individual large short positions. Panelists will also consider whether it would be appropriate to impose a pre-borrow or enhanced “locate” requirement on short sellers, potentially on a pilot basis. Additionally, panelists will discuss issues related to securities lending such as compensation arrangements, disclosure practices, and methods of collateral and cash-reinvestment.

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http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-172.htm

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Other related hedge fund law articles:

Prime Brokers, Margin Lock-ups & Hedge Funds

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Today we have another guest post from Karl Cole-Frieman who specializes in providing legal advice to hedge funds and other alternative asset managers.  Mr. Cole-Frieman specializes in Loan Trading and Distressed Debt Transactions, ISDAs, Soft Dollars and Commission Management arrangements, and Wage and Hour Law Matters among other legal matters which hedge fund managers face on a day to day basis.
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The Margin Lock-up Returns to Prime Brokerage
By Karl Cole-Frieman, www.colefrieman.com

In 2009, the problems affecting major banks have also impacted their prime brokerage units, and accordingly there is less appetite to extend credit to hedge funds.   As the banking industry recovers, however, credit terms are beginning to loosen up again.  As a result, we are beginning to see the return of the margin lock-up for larger prime brokerage clients, who may in fact be in a stronger bargaining position for such agreements than they were a year ago.

What is a Margin Lock-up or Term Commitment?

In the most basic terms, a “margin lock-up” or a “term commitment” is a credit facility extended by a prime broker to a hedge fund or other institutional client.  The terms are used interchangeably in the industry.  Margin lock-ups prevent the prime broker from changing margin rates, collateral requirements, and often from declining to clear the hedge fund’s trades during the term of the lock-up.  For large managers, they are often 90 days, but can range from 30 days to 120 days, and perhaps even longer for the largest hedge fund managers.  Practically speaking, the way the arrangement works is that if a prime broker wants to make a change covered by the margin lock-up, they will provide the manager with the requisite notice before doing so.

Margin Lock-ups and Prime Brokerage Agreements

A margin lock-up is negotiated separately from a prime brokerage agreement, but ideally the two agreements are negotiated at the same time.  Our experience has been that it is significantly more difficult to negotiate a margin lock-up after the prime brokerage relationship has been established, and that a fund’s greatest negotiating leverage is before signing the prime brokerage agreement.

Negotiating a Margin Lock-up

There are two significant points to negotiate in a margin lock-up: (1) the scope of the commitment (and exclusions), and (2) the termination events.  For the scope of the commitment, it is essential that the commitment includes clearing trades.  Remember that a prime brokerage arrangement is a demand facility, and the prime broker can normally decide to stop clearing a hedge fund’s trades at any time and for any reason.  This is potentially highly disruptive, and could result in significant losses for a fund.  If clearing trades are covered by the margin lock-up, the prime broker will have to provide the requisite notice, which will allow time to make alternative arrangements with other counterparties.

Termination Events and Margin Lock-ups

Termination events can be very contentious in a margin lock-up negotiation.  The termination events in a margin lock-up give the prime broker the right to terminate the margin lock-up if a certain event occurs.  The prime brokers will want to negotiate off of their templates, which will initially have so many termination events it would make the margin lock-up worthless.  Managers should be wary of a completely subjective termination event, and such provisions should be negotiated out of the agreement.  For example, some prime brokers will try to insist on including a provision that it will be a termination event if the prime broker determines that it would cause the prime broker reputational risk to continue to do business with the fund.   More typical termination events include NAV triggers and key person provisions.

Bilateral Termination Events are a Secondary Consideration

Some hedge fund lawyers advocate that the termination events in a margin lock-up should not be completely unilateral, meaning, for example, that the credit rating of the prime broker should be a termination event.  We view this as a secondary consideration, and not a point to get bogged down on in the negotiation.  If a manager is concerned about the credit rating of the prime broker, they can simply move their balances.  They don’t need to terminate the lock-up – leave it in place in case the fund restores balances with that prime broker.

To find out more about margin lock-ups and other topics relating to prime brokerage or custody, please contact Karl Cole-Frieman of Cole-Frieman & Mallon LLP (www.colefrieman.com) at 415-352-2300 or [email protected].

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If you are thinking of starting a hedge fund, please contact Mr. Bart Mallon, Esq. at 415-296-8510.  Other related hedge fund law and start up articles include:

Hedge Fund Auditors | Thought Piece From Castle Hall Alternatives

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The following article is by Christopher Addy, President and CEO of Castle Hall Alternatives, a hedge fund due diligence firm.  We have published a number of pieces by Mr. Addy in the past (please see Hedge Fund Fees, Hedge Fund Due Diligence Issues, Issues for Hedge Fund Administrators to Consider and ERISA vs. the Hedge Fund Industry).  The following post can be found here.

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And the auditors work for….

Audit opinions of a hedge fund’s financial statements are unlikely to make the New York Times bestseller list.  As a result, we can certainly understand if the auditor’s fine print is not exactly top of the list for investor attention.  However, not all audit opinions are the same and, over time, it seems that different audit firms are quietly introducing different standards of care and attention – and, of course, liability, which is always the 800 pound gorilla.

The issue is the addressee of the audit report – or, put more simply, who the auditor works for.  In a public company, the auditors report to both the shareholders and the Board of Directors.  A quick web search gives us a couple of examples – GE and Goldman Sachs (don’t laugh at the Level III assets, by the way).

In a hedge fund, however, sometimes the audit report mentions the shareholders, but sometimes it does not.  What seems to be a fine difference is actually very profound – exactly why would a hedge fund auditor report only to the Board of Directors and deliberately fail to address their report to the shareholders?  Adding insult to injury, of course, is the reality that the average Board of Caymanian rent-a-directors hardly acts with the same vigor and intervention as the non execs on the boards of GE and Goldman.

In our experience, certain audit firms appear to have taken a deliberate decision to direct their audit opinions, wherever possible, only to the directors.  This is a difference which applies across both US GAAP reports as well as audits completed under International Financial Reporting Standards.  Check 10 audit reports from different firms, and see what we mean.

The underlying issue – of course – is the lack of investor control.  Investors, if asked, would very likely have an opinion on this issue: but, needless to say, they are not asked.  Audit engagement letters are signed under cloak and dagger secrecy (usually because they include ever more expansive terms seeking to limit auditor liability under Caymanian law).  Thereafter, as investors and due diligence practitioners know to their ongoing annoyance, it proves incredibly difficult and pointlessly time consuming to get some auditors even to confirm that they are the auditor of record for the hedge fund in question.

In the short term, one answer would be for offshore jurisdictions such as the Cayman Islands to mandate that all audit reports filed for Caymanian hedge funds be addressed to the shareholders rather than just the Board.  If it’s good enough for GE, it should be good enough for any hedge fund.

In the bigger picture, however, this is just one question within the broad construct of Hedge Funds 2.0 post Madoff.  Unfortunately, it is only investor pressure which can enforce any change so that service providers – auditors, administrators, lawyers et al – take responsibility and recognize that their primary duty of care is to the investors that pay them.  Without that pressure, hedge funds will continue to be the asset class where everyone wants to get paid, but no-one wants to take responsibility.

www.castlehallalternatives.com
Hedge Fund Operational Due Diligence

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Other related hedge fund law and start up articles include:

Hedge Funds and Rehypothication

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Ongoing Legal Issues For Hedge Fund Managers

While many of the posts on this blog deal with start-up and regulatory issues that hedge fund managers face, we also are aware that there are many ongoing legal issues which affect the business of the fund.  Below is a guest post from Karl Cole-Frieman on hedge fund rehypothication and the prime brokerage relationship.

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What is Rehypothication?
By Karl Cole-Frieman, www.colefrieman.com

One of the most frequent questions that I am asked these days is to explain the term “rehypothication” in the context of a prime brokerage agreement.  The concept of rehypothication has been imbedded in the credit arrangements of prime brokerage agreements for years, but until 2008 and the collapse of Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, it was rarely discussed (except by certain lawyers who negotiate these agreements).  In the simplest terms, hypothication is the posting of securities or other collateral to a prime broker in exchange for credit or margin.  Rehypothication is the further pledging or lending by the prime broker of the already hypothecated securities or other collateral by the customer for its own purposes.

Prime Brokerage and Rehypothication

In modern prime brokerage, rehypothication is deeply ingrained in the business model of the major prime brokers.  Typically, hedge fund customer assets are rehypothicated to other banks to raise cash for the prime brokers.  Allowing the prime brokers to rehypothicate assets has historically kept down the cost of borrowing money for hedge fund managers.  In recent years, hedge funds have benefited from this arrangement by obtaining very cheap margin pricing.

Bankruptcy of a Prime Broker

The problem for hedge fund managers is that if there is a bankruptcy filing of their prime broker, hedge funds may have difficulty getting their rehypothicated assets back, particularly if these assets are held by the prime broker’s London affiliate, as the UK has more relaxed rules regarding rehypothication.  A number of highly successful managers had to literally shut their doors in September 2008 because their assets were tied up in Lehman Brothers’ London affiliate.  Lehman filed for bankruptcy in September 2008, and Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Lehman’s European administrator, currently estimates that assets may be returned to clients in the first quarter of 2010 – a year and a half later.

Hedge Fund Managers and Rehypothication

It is important for hedge fund managers to understand this concept of rehypothication for several reasons.  First, managers need to take ownership of their prime brokerage arrangements and understand them in general.  It has been my experience that many managers that take extreme care in making portfolio decisions pay absolutely no attention to their prime brokerage or custody arrangements.  As the events of 2008 demonstrated, they do so at their peril.  Imagine being up for the year, and then losing everything because the manager neglected to monitor their prime brokerage and custody arrangements.

Second, investors are asking about it.  The concept of rehypothication entered the hedge fund vernacular in 2008 and is here to stay.  Investors now frequently ask about rehypothication, and other prime brokerage concepts/arrangements, in due diligence, and there are a lot of misconceptions about the term.  Nevertheless, especially in the current environment, a lack of understanding about prime brokerage, custody, etc . . . can make the difference in receiving an allocation from an investor or cause a manager to fail operational due diligence.  Managers need to be prepared to discuss these concepts and be aware of the terms in their own prime brokerage agreements.

To find out more about rehypothication and other topics relating to prime brokerage or custody, please contact Karl Cole-Frieman of Cole-Frieman & Mallon LLP (www.colefrieman.com) at 415-352-2300 or [email protected].

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Other related hedge fund law and start up articles include:

Series 79 Exam – Waiting for SEC Approval

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Post courtesy of www.series79exam.com.

SEC to Shed Light on the New Series 79 Exam

Pursuant to a proposal set forth by FINRA in February of this year, it is anticipated that the Series 79 will be introduced as a simplified alternative exam for investment bankers. Prior to the introduction of this new exam, all registered representatives were required by NASD Rule 1032 to take the Series 7 exam. The proposal modified this Rule to condense the exam for those individuals whose activities are limited to investment banking. The primary reason behind the FINRA proposal for a new abridged exam was that the Series 7 exam covers a broad array of functions that do not pertain to the day-to-day activities of an investment banker.

On July 13, 2009 we contacted FINRA to determine what information, if any, has been released on the new Series 79 exam.  According to FINRA, the SEC has approved the proposal set forth by FINRA as of April of this year, but SEC approval on the content of the exam and related fees is still pending. Thus, there is limited information available to prospective exam takers regarding the proposed content of the exam, the timeline for required registration, the release of related study materials and/or course offerings, and related exam fees.  Once the SEC issues its approval, a formal press release will be issued to the public regarding the structure of the exam as well as an expected date as to when the modified NASD Rule 1032(i) will be enforced, thereby establishing the Series 79 as the new license requirement for investment bankers.

All information regarding the Series 79 Exam will be available on this site for prospective exam takers once it is formally approved by the SEC.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to  learn how to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009

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Bart Mallon, Esq.
http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com

****UPDATE 10/27/2009****

The House Financial Services Committee voted on October 27, 2009 to pass the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009 as H.R. 3818 (full text of bill as passed – please note that it is different from the earlier version of the bill reprinted below).  The bill as passed by the committee required private equity fund managers to register but specifically excludes managers of venture capital funds from the registration requirements.  The House Committee released a press release discussing the bipartisan vote.

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Text of Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009

Today the Obama Administration released its proposed legislation which would require hedge fund managers to register with the SEC (as well as private equity fund and venture capital fund managers). The full text of the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009 has been copied below.

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TITLE IV—REGISTRATON OF ADVISERS TO PRIVATE FUNDS

SEC. 401. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the “Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009”.

SEC. 402. DEFINITIONS.

Section 202(a) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-2(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:

“(29) The term ‘private fund’ means an investment fund that—

“(A) would be an investment company (as defined in section 3 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3)), but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-3(c)(1) or 80a-3(c)(7)); and

“(B) either—

“(i) is organized or otherwise created under the laws of the United States or of a State; or

“(ii) has 10 percent or more of its outstanding securities owned by U.S. persons.

“(30) The term ‘foreign private adviser’ means any investment adviser who—

“(A) has no place of business in the United States;

“(B) during the preceding 12 months has had—

“(i) fewer than 15 clients in the United States; and

“(ii) assets under management attributable to clients in the United States of less than $25,000,000, or such higher amount as the Commission may, by rule, deem appropriate in accordance with the purposes of this title; and

“(C) neither holds itself out generally to the public in the United States as an investment adviser, nor acts as an investment adviser to any investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940, or a company which has elected to be a business development company pursuant to section 54 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-53), and has not withdrawn its election.”.

SEC. 403. ELIMINATION OF PRIVATE ADVISER EXEMPTION; LIMITED EXEMPTION FOR FOREIGN PRIVATE ADVISERS; LIMITED INTRASTATE EXEMPTION.

Section 203(b) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-3(b)) is amended—

(a) in paragraph (1), by inserting “, except an investment adviser who acts as an investment adviser to any private fund,” after “investment adviser” the first time it appears;

(b) by amending paragraph (3) to read as follows:

“(3) any investment adviser that is a foreign private adviser;”; and

(c) in paragraph (6)—

(1) in subparagraph (A), by striking “or”;

(2) in subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end and adding “; or”; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

“(C) a private fund.”

SEC. 404. COLLECTION OF SYSTEMIC RISK DATA; REPORTS; EXAMINATIONS; DISCLOSURES.

Section 204 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-4) is amended—

(a) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections (c) and (d); and

(b) by inserting after subsection (a) the following new subsection (b):

“(b) RECORDS AND REPORTS OF PRIVATE FUNDS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The Commission is authorized to require any investment adviser registered under this Act to maintain such records of and submit to the Commission such reports regarding private funds advised by the investment adviser as are necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the assessment of systemic risk by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Financial Services Oversight Council, and to provide or make available to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Financial Services Oversight Council those reports or records or the information contained therein. The records and reports of any private fund would be an investment company, to which any such investment adviser provides investment advice, maintained or filed by an investment adviser registered under this Act shall be deemed to be the records and reports of the investment adviser.

“(2) REQUIRED INFORMATION.—The records and reports required to be filed with the Commission under this subsection shall include but shall not be limited to the following information for each private fund advised by the investment adviser:

“(A) amount of assets under management, use of leverage (including off-balance sheet leverage), counterparty credit risk exposures, trading and

investment positions, and trading practices; and

“(B) such other information as the Commission, in consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, determines necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.

“(3) MAINTENANCE OF RECORDS.—An investment adviser registered under this Act is required to maintain and keep such records of private funds advised by the investment adviser for such period or periods as the Commission, by rules and regulations, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.

“(4) EXAMINATION OF RECORDS.—

“(A) PERIODIC AND SPECIAL EXAMINATIONS.—All records of a private fund maintained by an investment adviser registered under this Act shall be subject at any time and from time to time to such periodic, special, and other examinations by the Commission, or any member or representative thereof, as the Commission may prescribe.

“(B) AVAILABILITY OF RECORDS.—An investment adviser registered under this Act shall make available to the Commission or its representatives any copies or extracts from such records as may be prepared without undue effort, expense or delay as the Commission or its representatives may reasonably request.

“(5) INFORMATION SHARING.— The Commission shall make available to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Financial Services Oversight Council copies of all reports, documents, records and information filed with or provided

to the Commission by an investment adviser under section 204(b) as the Board or the Council may consider necessary for the purpose of assessing the systemic risk of a private fund or assessing whether a private fund should be designated a Tier 1 financial holding company. All such reports, documents, records and information obtained by the Board or the Council from the Commission under this subsection shall be kept confidential.

“(6) DISCLOSURES BY PRIVATE FUND.—An investment adviser registered under this Act shall provide such reports, records and other documents to investors, prospective investors, counterparties, and creditors, of any private fund advised by the investment adviser as the Commission, by rules and regulations, may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest and for the protection of investors or for the assessment of systemic risk.

“(7) CONFIDENTIALITY OF REPORTS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Commission shall not be compelled to disclose any supervisory report or information contained therein required to be filed with the Commission under subsection (b). Nothing in this subsection shall authorize the Commission to withhold information from Congress or prevent the Commission from complying with a request for information from any other Federal department or agency or any self-regulatory organization requesting the report or information for purposes within the scope of its jurisdiction, or complying with an order of a court of the United States in an action brought by the United States or the Commission. For purposes of section 552 of title 5, United States Code, this subsection shall be considered a statute described in subsection (b)(3)(B) of such section 552.”.

SEC. 405. DISCLOSURE PROVISION ELIMINATED.

Section 210 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-10) is amended by striking subsection (c).

SEC. 406. CLARIFICATION OF RULEMAKING AUTHORITY.

Section 211 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b-11) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking the second sentence; and

(B) by striking the period at the end of the first sentence and inserting the following:

“, including rules and regulations defining technical, trade, and other terms used in this title. For the purposes of its rules and regulations, the Commission may—

“(1) classify persons and matters within its jurisdiction and prescribe different requirements for different classes of persons or matters; and

“(2) ascribe different meanings to terms (including the term ‘client’) used in different sections of this title as the Commission determines necessary to effect the purposes of this title.”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

“(e) The Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission shall, after consultation with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, within 6 months after the date of enactment of the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009, jointly promulgate rules to establish the form and content of the reports required to be filed with the Commission under subsection 204(b) and with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission by investment advisers that are registered both under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 80b et seq.) and the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 1a et seq.).”.

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Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  Mallon P.C. helps hedge fund managers to register as investment advisors with the SEC or the state securities divisions.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund or register as an investment advisor, please contact us or call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Obama Moves Forward with Hedge Fund Registration Legislation

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Bart Mallon, Esq.
http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com

Treasury Announces New “Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009”

After much discussion in the press over the last 8 to 10 months abut the possibility for hedge fund registration, the Treasury today announced the Obama Administration’s bill which requires managers to “private funds” to register with the SEC.  This registration requirement would apply to managers of all funds relying on the Section 3(c)(1) or Section 3(c)(7) which includes managers to private equity and venture capital funds.  Additionally, all registered managers would need to provide the SEC with certain reports on the funds which they manage.

The Treasury release is below and can be found here.  We will post the text of the new act shortly.  [Update: we have just published the text of the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009.]

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Fact Sheet: Administration’s Regulatory Reform Agenda Moves Forward: Legislation for the Registration of Hedge Funds Delivered to Capitol Hill

Continuing its push to establish new rules of the road and make the financial system more fair across the board, the Administration today delivered proposed legislation to Capitol Hill to require all advisers to hedge funds and other private pools of capital, including private equity and venture capital funds, to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In recent years, the United States has seen explosive growth in a variety of privately-owned investment funds, including hedge funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds. At various points in the financial crisis, de-leveraging by such funds contributed to the strain on financial markets.  Because these funds were not required to register with regulators, the government lacked the reliable, comprehensive data necessary to monitor funds’ activity and assess potential risks in the market.  The Administration’s legislation would help protect investors from fraud and abuse, provide increased transparency, and provide the information necessary to assess whether risks in the aggregate or risks in any particular fund pose a threat to our overall financial stability.

Protect Investors From Fraud And Abuse

Require Advisers To Private Investment Funds to Register With The SEC.  Although some advisers to hedge funds and other private investment funds are required to register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and some register voluntarily with the SEC, current law generally does not require private fund advisers to register with any federal financial regulator. The Administration’s legislation would, for the first time, require that all investment advisers with more than $30 million of assets under management to register with the SEC.  Once registered with the SEC, investment advisers to private funds will be subject to important requirements such as:

  • Substantial regulatory reporting requirements with respect to the assets, leverage, and off-balance sheet exposure of their advised private funds
  • Disclosure requirements to investors, creditors, and counterparties of their advised private funds
  • Strong conflict-of-interest and anti-fraud prohibitions
  • Robust SEC examination and enforcement authority and recordkeeping requirements
  • Requirements to establish a comprehensive compliance program

Require Increased Disclosure Requirements. The Administration’s legislation would require that all investment funds advised by an SEC-registered investment adviser be subject to recordkeeping requirements; requirements with respect to disclosures to investors, creditors, and counterparties; and regulatory reporting requirements.

Protect Financial System From Systemic Risk

Monitor Hedge Funds For Potential Systemic Risk. Under the Administration’s legislation, the regulatory requirements mentioned above would include confidential reporting of amount of assets under management, borrowings, off-balance sheet exposures, counterparty credit risk exposures, trading and investment positions, and other important information relevant to determining potential systemic risk and potential threats to our overall financial stability. The legislation would require the SEC to conduct regular examinations of such funds to monitor compliance with these requirements and assess potential risk. In addition, the SEC would share the disclosure reports received from funds with the Federal Reserve and the Financial Services Oversight Council. This information would help determine whether systemic risk is building up among hedge funds and other private pools of capital, and could be used if any of the funds or fund families are so large, highly leveraged, and interconnected that they pose a threat to our overall financial stability and should therefore be supervised and regulated as Tier 1 Financial Holding Companies.

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Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  Mallon P.C. helps hedge fund managers to register as investment advisors with the SEC or the state securities divisions.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund or register as an investment advisor, please contact us or call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Hedge Fund Compliance and Twitter

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Cat and Mouse Securities Compliance

It seems so many aspects of the securities industry is the cat and mouse game of regulate (government) and sneakily avoid (industry participants).  This is especially true when it comes to compliance and “what you can get away with.”  As the post below notes, many compliance rules (and other securities laws and regulations) are written fairly broadly – accordingly, registered individuals always need to be aware of the consequences of their actions.  The article reprinted below by Doug Cornelius of the Compliance Building blog examines the misconceptions of Twitter and compliance requirements.
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Twitter and Compliance

By Doug Cornelius

I was struck recently by the power and misconceptions around Twitter, the current press darling of Web 2.0. On one side is the enormous power of Twitter to crowdsource the news. The fallout of the Iran elections was better covered on Twitter than the mainstream media. At one point I watched CNN only to see the anchors reading from Twitter and displaying images posted to Twitter applications.

On the other side is the misconception that Twitter communications are not regulated by the SEC or FINRA. Everyone can acknowledge that the regulations have not caught up with the current tools of web 2.0. But the existing rules were drafted broad enough to cover all electronic communication. Twitter is clearly electronic communication.

Last week at at Jeff Pulver’s 140 Characters Conference in New York an attendee said “Twitter allows us to say f— you to the SEC!”  Earlier this week there was a quote in Forbes.com that “Since brokers have to save instant messages and e-mail, but thus far have no such mandate for tweets….”

The SEC and FINRA may have more pressing issues on its hands, but the existing rules cover the use of Twitter. Sure the rules could be more explicit. But ignore them at your peril.

If you are a registered representative, you should take a look at FINRA’s Guide to the Internet.  The features of Twitter could be considered an advertisement, sales literature, or correspondence. The direct message feature is correspondence. If your Twitter feed is unprotected, each twitter post would be considered an advertisement. If your Twitter feed is protected it would be considered sales literature.

The SEC’s Guidance on the use of web sites (SEC Release 34-58288) does not give the clearest guidance. But it is clear that the rules are independent of the platform and the technology.

Insider trading, wrongful public disclosure and fraud and prohibited regardless of the communication tool. That includes Twitter.

Companies that have to monitor electronic communications should add Twitter to the mix. As the Iran election showed us, blocking access is ineffective. You should adopt a policy for Twitter or a revise your existing policies to specifically include it.  Twitter has become too popular and powerful as a tool to ignore.

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Please feel free to leave us a comment below on this article.  You can also contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Hedge Funds and Investors: June 2009

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Overview of the Hedge Fund Industry in June

It is nice to have a chance to step back from the regulatory side to see the big picture of the hedge fund industry.  The article below discusses what is currently happening in the various hedge fund strategies and what investors are looking for from managers.  The article is written by Bryan Goh (First Avenue Partners) and addresses the issues related to the hedge fund industry in June of 2009.  Reprinted from Byan’s blog called Ten Seconds Into the Future.
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Hedge Funds: The State of the Craft: June 2009

By Bryan Goh

The fundamental picture:

The second quarter of 2009 witnessed a continuation of the rally in all risky assets from equities to credit to commodities and energy to illiquid Asian physical real estate. On the back of this reversal of the acute risk aversion that plagued the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, economists began to detect ‘green shoots’ of economic recovery. However, economic growth forecasts in the developed world continue to be depressed. The US for example is expected to show -2.8% growth in 2009 with a weak recovery in 2010 of 1.6%; the Euro zone is expected to shrink by 2.3% in 2009 and grow by an insipid 1.7% in 2010 with dire numbers from Germany (-5.5% 2009, +0.55% 2010), and Italy (-4.4% 2009, +0.4 2010). Emerging markets were widely expected to decouple, but thus far the incipient recovery is only evident in BRIC, with China growing +6.5% in 2009 and +7.3% in 2010, India growing +5.5% in 2009 and +6.4% in 2010, Brazil shrinking 1.5% in 2009 before growing 2.7% in 2010 and Russia shrinking 5% in 2009 and growing 2% in 2010. Outside of the BRIC, emerging markets’ highly export driven economies are severely impacted by the slowdown in the developed world,  the dearth of demand and the unavailability of trade finance.

Developed markets have been hobbled with historically high debt levels, distressed real estate prices, rising unemployment, weakening retail sales, shrinking industrial production and declining consumer and business confidence. Coupled with impaired sovereign balance sheets, the result of financial rescue packages, Keynesian fiscal reflationary policies, an ageing population’s impact on state pensions and healthcare, the outlook for developed market growth is not optimistic. The one area of potential respite is the external sector, which as a matter of mathematics has to and will adjust to reduce the scale of current account imbalances.

Emerging markets have somewhat healthier financial systems, sovereign balance sheets and private savings levels and are thus in a better position to implement fiscal reflationary policies and centrally influenced if not planned extension and allocation of credit. This, however, remains concentrated in the larger emerging markets such as BRIC where domestic diversification reduces the dependence on the external sector.

The expansion of the government in the economy is therefore more feasible in the BRIC. It has been moderately successful. China is a case in point where fixed capital formation in the form of infrastructure build has more than made up for the gap from a collapse of external trade and a moribund consumer sector.

These efforts provide a stay of execution. Time, however, is a healer, under the assumption of free markets. Protectionism and outright central planning has historically proven counter productive. It is interesting to note that while developed markets flirt with market interventionist policies, bend Chapter 11, and increasingly embrace quantitative easing, further emergency interest rate policy, flirting with protectionism, interfering with the banking system; emerging markets have by and large embraced free markets.

While policy makers continue to hold interest rates at low levels, the inflation deflation debate continues. Central banks with formal inflation targets may be more likely to tighten prematurely than central banks with a softer target or a more holistic mandate. Given the rate at which capacity utilization has fallen and the current levels at which it rests, it is unlikely that inflation will take hold. On the other hand, given the reflationary capacity of BRIC and competition for natural resources, deflation is unlikely to take hold either. Central banks are likely to be afforded the latitude to hold short rates lower for longer in their anti-recessionary campaigns. Long bond yields are likely to display news driven and data driven volatility as signs of inflation wax and wane.

Hedge Fund Performance:

Performance to May 2009:

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Hedge Fund Outlook:

Generally, the outlook for hedge fund strategies is very positive. There are a number of reasons for this. The period 2005 to 2007 saw a surge in equity capital employed in hedge fund strategies. With increasing volumes of arbitrage capital, return on gross capital employed compressed, as one would naturally expect. Hedge funds adaptively increased their leverage in order to maintain return on equity, a strategy feasible because interest rates were low and credit spreads were tight and thus leverage was cheap. The bankruptcy of Bear Stearns and then Lehman Brothers in 2008, triggered a massive deleveraging of the entire arbitrage industry from hedge funds to bank proprietary trading desks. Mark to market losses triggered large scale redemptions from hedge funds which left what in 2007 was a 2 trillion USD industry with an estimated paltry 1.2 trillion USD of assets under management. This together with the wholesale withdrawal of leverage from an average of 3.5 to 4 X to 1.5 to 2X, implies a 70% to 75% shrinkage in capital employed in arbitrage. The indiscriminate withdrawal of risk has created ubiquitous arbitrage and relative value opportunities.

Equities: Market sentiment went from monotonic risk aversion from the second half of 2009 into the first quarter of 2009. During this time, equity dispersion was explained not by earnings prospects but by news flow and macro implications on balance sheet integrity. And a great deal of simple panic. The very sharp rebound from mid March 2009 has similarly been driven not by earnings fundamentals but by a reversal of risk aversion and other dynamic factors. As market volatility settles, equity dispersion is expected to be increasingly driven by fundamentals once again. The opportunity set for equity long short managers is improved.

Event driven: In every distressed cycle, private equity buyouts dwindle and deal break risk is escalated due to buyers remorse. When coupled with a credit crisis, jurisdictions where committed financing is not a prerequisite to an approach and banks themselves in jeopardy also increase deal risk. Following this initial round of panic and disorder, the following period of calm usually witnesses deal flow on the basis of strategic alliance, self preservation, consolidation, asset disposals, and capital raising. This is the landscape facing the event driven merger arbitrageur today. The dearth of arbitrage capital has also resulted in slower convergence, more volatility of spread and a profitable environment for the strategy.

Macro and Fixed Income: Macro strategies did relatively well in 2008 as large and trivial trades presented themselves with the ebb and flow of capital driven by acute risk aversion and government reactionary policy. These trades have now receded into history. Going forward macro is likely to continue to perform well on the back of persistent volatility in fixed income markets driven by the cycles of central bank policy and investor prevarication between inflation and deflation. These same themes create interesting arbitrage opportunities in fixed income arbitrage as well as short rates react to policy and long rates to inflation expectations and sovereign credit risk. The reduction of capital in fixed income arbitrage also presents interesting arbitrage opportunities between cash, synthetic, futures, forwards, swap and repo markets.

Asset based investing / lending / Trade Finance: The global credit crisis and associated global economic recession has resulted in a dearth of credit. Providers of credit are therefore well rewarded. In trade finance, for example, a sharp fall in world trade of over a third in the final quarter of 2008 was only surpassed by the contraction of available trade finance. Banking consolidations also constrain credit further as obligor limits are exceeded in merged financial institutions. The result is wider spreads and tighter collateral terms. Hedge funds involved in lending are able to use non-traditional deal structures to secure their collateral while exacting competitive spreads.

Credit: A situation in credit markets exists akin to the one in equities. Systemic risk was high in 2008 and credit was systematically sold despite differentiated idiosyncratic issuer risk. The credit space is richer than equities, however, due to the richness of the capital structure, particularly in more mature developed markets like the US, representing excellent raw material for which to express capital structure dislocation trades. Differing natural investors or traders at different parts of the capital structure create arbitrage opportunities which barring unilateral regulatory or government intervention, represent true arbitrage.

Convertible arbitrage: Convertible arbitrage was one of the worst performing strategies in 2008 and one of the best performing strategies in 2009 to June. The losses came from a confluence of general risk aversion, deleveraging by banks and institutions, hedge fund redemptions and failures from over-levered portfolios, and a collapse in the funding mechanism of which the prime brokers were integral. With a normalization of market conditions convertible bond markets have recovered sharply. The crucial question is, to what extent is the current recovery in convert arbitrage funds purely a directional one, profiting from the rising tide lifting all boats. Convertible arbitrage, however, is a catch all for a suite of sub strategies of varying sophistication, direction and use. The current market is replete with less-directional opportunities. These arise from the diversity of pricing and valuation across the convertible space, as well as a revival in primary issuance. The credit elements of convertible arbitrage were highlighted in 2008 and will continue to be a key consideration in assessing convertible bonds. Directional expressions of fundamental views on companies can be very efficiently captured using convertibles as well. A fundamental view on a company need not be restricted to first order (levels) pricing but can extend to views about the pricing of the volatility of the company. Capital structure trades can also be expressed with convertibles for example in theoretical replications with bounded jump to default values for a range of recoveries.

Distressed Credit: When the credit crisis first broke in mid 2007 in the US sub prime real estate mortgage market, investors had already begun to seek opportunities in distressed debt. The distress has been concentrated mostly to the real estate backed securities market and latterly to consumer loan backed securities. Among corporate rated issuers default rates remained low. High yield default rates while accelerating sharply in 2008 had only reached 5.42% by 1Q 2009 according to S&P. S&P expects the default rate to climb to a peak of 14.3% in 2010. Distressed debt managers returns tend lag default rates and accelerate when default rates have peaked. A three to four year period of outperformance is usually measured from the peak of the distressed cycle. This is consistent with the bankruptcy processes of the developed markets such as Chapter 11 in the US. The risk remains that the economic recovery will be an insipid one and or that the economy may sink back into recession before it finds a stable trend path. Distressed debt managers also tend to be weakly correlated at the peak of the default cycle and maintain low correlation for about 3 years after which correlation creeps into their returns.

The events of 2008 have resulted in a peculiar situation where almost every hedge fund strategy is likely to perform well going forward. This is not to say that there is little or no risk. The choice before the investor remains the magnitude and the type of risk they are happy to assume. In liquid strategies such as equity long short, the risk is non-convergence, for there is often no functional relationship to bring relative value trades in line. For strong convergence, such as capital structure arbitrage strategies, convergence is less uncertain, at maturity or in default. However, under going concern assumptions, spreads can be volatile and can widen significantly and sometimes unpredictably. There is a trade off between market risk and liquidity risk.

At various times, the opportunity has shifted from asset class to asset class, from strategy to strategy, requiring a careful portfolio construction to capture the appropriate risk reward characteristics of each strategy, while achieving efficient portfolio diversification. Under current conditions, when risk reward properties of almost every strategy are favourable, the portfolio construction problem is significantly simplified.

Investor Risk Appetite:

In the first half of 2008 investors were content to be worried about their hedge fund allocations while remaining invested. Recall that for the year up till June 2008, hedge funds had turned in a moderately poor (-2.43%) performance. It was only when the losses accumulated and large regulated insurance companies and banks either went bankrupt or threatened to do so, did hedge fund investors decide to redeem in any size. The Madoff fraud further destroyed the trust between investors and their fund managers leading to the demonizing of the entire hedge fund industry not only within the industry but in the general medial as well. Redemptions crescendoed in March 2009 while hedge fund managers, some with liquidity mismatches or funding issues, began to restrict or suspend redemptions in an attempt to avoid disposing of assets at firesale prices.

Hedge fund investors’ reaction, quite understandable began with complacency in early 2008, to fear and panic in 3Q 2008 to despondency in 4Q 2008 and 1Q 2009. The rebound in markets and hedge fund performance took most investors by surprise.

As recently as April / May 2009, investors’ risk aversion remained acutely high. From early June 2009 this has changed somewhat as investors have begun to scout for opportunities in the hedge fund space. A number of things have changed since 2008. For one, investors will no longer tolerate liquidity mismatches, and while the immediate reaction has been to demand liquidity and favour liquid funds, a more discerning investor base is now analysing portfolio and strategy liquidity and requiring fund terms to better reflect the underlying liquidity.

The area of hedge fund fees has also come under scrutiny. While a number of funds have discounted their fees, it is unclear if there is any price elasticity. Price elasticity appears to be a weak factor compared with other factors such as manager quality, rational liquidity terms, transparency and operational integrity. In the area of fees, more sophisticated fees seem to be emerging which seek to better align investor and fund manager interests over a rolling investment horizon instead of the current annual fee crystallization which creates cyclicality in manager behaviour.

Transparency has become the most important issue for investors. Without transparency, due diligence and ongoing monitoring is blunted, style drift and frauds go undetected. Transparency goes beyond, and sometimes around, position level disclosure. More constructive forms of transparency include risk aggregation reports, sometimes sent by the fund administrator, periodic calls with the portfolio manager, periodic portfolio detail. The periodic preference for managed accounts has once again re-emerged. Quite whether it is sustained remains to be seen, but managed accounts while useful in some respects is no panacea.

As hedge funds react to investor needs, a stronger industry will arise, albeit initially a smaller one. It is hard to see growth rates regain their heights in 2007. However, given the relative outperformance of hedge funds versus long only equity, credit fixed income, commodities and real estate both in 2008 and over a 10 year period it is easy to underestimate the growth of the industry.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund.  Other related hedge fund articles include: