Category Archives: SEC

Hedge Fund Manager Registration to Cost Taxpayers $140 Million (at least)

CBO Calculates Cost of House Hedge Fund Bill

This past week the Congressional Budge Office (“CBO”) released a cost estimate of H.R. 3818, the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009.  In a number of private conversations I have had about hedge fund registration over the last 9-12 months one of the issues that was continually raised was appropriate funding for the SEC.  As we have seen recently (most notably from the Inspector General’s Madoff report), the SEC’s budget is not large enough to adequately fulfill their investor protection mandate.  Adding hedge fund registration would obviously further burden the cash-strapped agency (for more see Schumer Proposal to Double SEC Budget).  According to the CBO, and based on the SEC’s estimates that it will need to add 150 employees, the estimated outlays over four years will be equal to $140 million.

However, taxpayers should understand that this assumes that registration will only be required for those managers with at least $150 million in assets under management.   At the $150 million AUM level, the CBO expects that 1,300 hedge fund managers would be required to register.  The current draft of the Senate hedge fund registration bill calls for managers with $100 million in AUM to register – lowering the AUM exemption threshold will increase the amount of managers required to register.  Additionally, there are outstanding political issues.  First, it is unclear whether the final bill will require private equity fund managers and venture capital fund managers to register – we do not necessarily understand the arguably arbitrary carve-out for these industries.  Second, it is clear that a majority of the state securities commissions are unable and unwilling to be responsible for overseeing managers with up to $100 million in assets.  Hedge fund managers who would subject to state oversight would rightly want to be subject to SEC oversight (which does not say much for many state securities commissions).  These issues will continue to be addressed during the political sausage-making process.

Of additional interest – the CBO estimates that hedge fund registration is likely to cost around $30,000 per each SEC registrant which is welcome news to investment adviser compliance consultants and hedge fund lawyers!

For full report, please see full CBO Hedge Fund Cost Estimate.

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Bart Mallon, Esq. of Cole-Frieman & Mallon LLP runs the Hedge Fund Law Blog and provides hedge fund manager registration service through Cole-Frieman & Mallon LLP He can be reached directly at 415-868-5345.

Insider Trading Overview

In light of the recent focus on insider trading, we are publishing the SEC’s discussion on Insider Trading which can also be found here.  The information below contains a broad overview of some of the important aspects which hedge fund managers should understand about the insider trading prohibitions.

For a greater background discussion on the legal precedents which helped shaped the state of law today, please see Insider Trading—A U.S. Perspective, a speech by staff of the SEC.

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Insider Trading

“Insider trading” is a term that most investors have heard and usually associate with illegal conduct. But the term actually includes both legal and illegal conduct. The legal version is when corporate insiders—officers, directors, and employees—buy and sell stock in their own companies. When corporate insiders trade in their own securities, they must report their trades to the SEC. For more information about this type of insider trading and the reports insiders must file, please read “Forms 3, 4, 5” in our Fast Answers databank.

Illegal insider trading refers generally to buying or selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of material, nonpublic information about the security. Insider trading violations may also include “tipping” such information, securities trading by the person “tipped,” and securities trading by those who misappropriate such information.

Examples of insider trading cases that have been brought by the SEC are cases against:

  • Corporate officers, directors, and employees who traded the corporation’s securities after learning of significant, confidential corporate developments;
  • Friends, business associates, family members, and other “tippees” of such officers, directors, and employees, who traded the securities after receiving such information;
  • Employees of law, banking, brokerage and printing firms who were given such information to provide services to the corporation whose securities they traded;
  • Government employees who learned of such information because of their employment by the government; and
  • Other persons who misappropriated, and took advantage of, confidential information from their employers.

Because insider trading undermines investor confidence in the fairness and integrity of the securities markets, the SEC has treated the detection and prosecution of insider trading violations as one of its enforcement priorities.

The SEC adopted new Rules 10b5-1 and 10b5-2 to resolve two insider trading issues where the courts have disagreed. Rule 10b5-1 provides that a person trades on the basis of material nonpublic information if a trader is “aware” of the material nonpublic information when making the purchase or sale. The rule also sets forth several affirmative defenses or exceptions to liability. The rule permits persons to trade in certain specified circumstances where it is clear that the information they are aware of is not a factor in the decision to trade, such as pursuant to a pre-existing plan, contract, or instruction that was made in good faith.

Rule 10b5-2 clarifies how the misappropriation theory applies to certain non-business relationships. This rule provides that a person receiving confidential information under circumstances specified in the rule would owe a duty of trust or confidence and thus could be liable under the misappropriation theory.

For more information about insider trading, please read Insider Trading—A U.S. Perspective, a speech by staff of the SEC.

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Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. of Cole-Frieman & Mallon LLP runs the Hedge Fund Law Blog and the Series 79 exam website.  He can be reached directly at 415-868-5345.

House Committee Votes for Hedge Fund Registration

Bart Mallon, Esq. (http://www.hedgefundlawblog.com)

Private Equity Funds Not Excluded

Today the House Financial Services Committee voted to require hedge fund managers to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  While private equity firms are also required to register under the proposed bill, managers to venture capital funds are excluded from this registration requirement.

The bill will next be presented to the House of Representatives and if it passes there it will move onto the Senate and eventually to President Obama to sign into law.  The name of the bill is the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009.  For the full text please see H.R. 3818.

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For Immediate Release: October 27, 2009

Committee Approves Private Advisor Registration Bill with Bipartisan Support

Washington, DC – Today, the House Financial Services Committee passed H.R. 3818, the Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act, introduced by Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski (D-PA), Chairman of the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises.  The Committee passed H.R. 3818 with extensive bipartisan support by a vote of 67-1.  Tomorrow, the Committee is expected to vote on Chairman Kanjorski’s H.R. 3817, the Investor Protection Act and H.R. 3890, the Accountability and Transparency in Rating Agencies Act.

“The Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act, which passed today with wide-ranging bipartisanship support, will force many more financial providers to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission,” said Chairman Kanjorski.  “The past year has shown that the deregulation or in many cases, lack of regulation, of financial firms is an idea of the past.  Advisors to financial firms must receive government oversight and we must understand the assets of financial firms, including for hedge funds, private equity firms, and other private pools of capital.  Under this legislation, private investment funds would become subject to more scrutiny by the SEC and take more responsibility for their actions.  I look forward to moving this legislation to the House floor for a vote.”

A summary of H.R. 3818 follows:

  • Everyone Registers. Sunlight is the best disinfectant. By mandating the registration of private advisers to private pools of capital regulators will better understand exactly how those entities operate and whether their actions pose a threat to the financial system as a whole.
  • Better Regulatory Information. New recordkeeping and disclosure requirements for private advisers will give regulators the information needed to evaluate both individual firms and entire market segments that have until this time largely escaped any meaningful regulation, without posing undue burdens on those industries.
  • Level the Playing Field. The advisers to hedge funds, private equity firms, single-family offices, and other private pools of capital will have to obey some basic ground rules in order to continue to play in our capital markets. Regulators will have authority to examine the records of these previously secretive investment advisers.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or would like to start a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. of  Cole-Frieman & Mallon LLP runs Hedge Fund Law Blog and can be reached directly at 415-868-5345.

Hedge Fund Manager Charged with Insider Trading

SEC Brings Case Against Raj Rajaratnam

Below is another case of a hedge fund manager who was alledgedly engaged in insider trading. The SEC seems particularly excited about this cased because of the high profile nature of the manager who was involved. The major charge is against Raj Rajaratnam who reportedly has a net worth in excess of $1 billion and who is a member of the Forbes 400 richest persons in the world.

There will undoubtedly be continued press in this case which is not good news for the hedge fund industry. The industry has been subject to criticism and increased calls for regulation for the last year and high profile cases like this one only serve to rile up members of congress. The SEC seems to be particularly proud about this “catch” as the agency has itself been under increasing scrutiny as the details of the fumbled Madoff case have been made public.

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SEC Charges Billionaire Hedge Fund Manager Raj Rajaratnam with Insider Trading

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2009-221

High-Ranking Corporate Executives Also Charged in Scheme That Generated More Than $25 Million in Illicit Gains

Washington, D.C., Oct. 16, 2009 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today charged billionaire Raj Rajaratnam and his New York-based hedge fund advisory firm Galleon Management LP with engaging in a massive insider trading scheme that generated more than $25 million in illicit gains. The SEC also charged six others involved in the scheme, including senior executives at major companies IBM, Intel and McKinsey & Company.

The SEC’s complaint, filed in federal court in Manhattan, alleges that Rajaratnam tapped into his network of friends and close business associates to obtain insider tips and confidential information about corporate earnings or takeover activity at several companies, including Google, Hilton and Sun Microsystems. He then used the non-public information to illegally trade on behalf of Galleon.

“This complaint describes a web of fraud that has been unraveled,” said SEC Chairman Mary L. Schapiro.

“What we have uncovered in the trading activities of Raj Rajaratnam is that the secret of his success is not genius trading strategies. He is not the astute study of company fundamentals or marketplace trends that he is widely thought to be. Raj Rajaratnam is not a master of the universe, but rather a master of the rolodex,” said Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement. “He cultivated a network of high-ranking corporate executives and insiders, and then tapped into this ring to obtain confidential details about quarterly earnings and takeover activity.”

In addition to Rajaratnam and Galleon, the SEC’s complaint charges:

  • Danielle Chiesi of New York, N.Y. — a portfolio manager at New Castle Funds.
  • Rajiv Goel of Los Altos, Calif. — a managing director at Intel Capital, an Intel subsidiary.
  • Anil Kumar of Saratoga, Calif. — a director at McKinsey & Company.
  • Mark Kurland of Mount Kisco, N.Y. — a Senior Managing Director and General Partner at New Castle.
  • Robert Moffat of Ridgefield, Conn. — a senior vice president at IBM.
  • New Castle Funds LLC — a New York-based hedge fund

According to the SEC’s complaint, Rajaratnam and Galleon traded on inside information about the following events or transactions:

  • An unnamed source, identified in the SEC’s complaint as Tipper A, obtained inside information about earnings announcements at Polycom and Google, as well as a takeover announcement of Hilton. Tipper A then allegedly provided this information to Rajaratnam, who used it to trade on behalf of Galleon.
  • Goel provided inside information to Rajaratnam about certain Intel quarterly earnings and a pending joint venture concerning Clearwire Corp., in which Intel had invested. Rajaratnam then used this information to trade on behalf of Galleon. As payback for Goel’s tips, Rajaratnam, or someone acting on his behalf, executed trades in Goel’s personal brokerage account based on inside information concerning Hilton and PeopleSupport, which resulted in nearly $250,000 in illicit profits for Goel.
  • Kumar obtained inside information about pending transactions involving AMD and two Abu Dhabi-based sovereign entities, which he shared with Rajaratnam. Rajaratnam then traded on the basis of this information on behalf of Galleon.
  • Chiesi obtained inside information from an executive at Akamai Technologies and traded on the information on behalf of a New Castle fund, netting a profit of approximately $2.4 million. Chiesi also passed on the inside information to Rajaratnam, who then traded on behalf of Galleon.

The SEC also alleges that Moffat provided inside information to Chiesi about Sun Microsystems. Moffat obtained the information when IBM was contemplating acquiring Sun. Chiesi then allegedly traded on the basis of this information on behalf of New Castle, making approximately $1 million in profits.

The SEC’s complaint charges each of the defendants with violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and, except for Kumar and Moffat, violations of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 and. The complaint seeks a final judgment permanently enjoining the defendants from future violations of the above provisions of the federal securities laws, ordering them to disgorge their ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest, and ordering them to pay financial penalties. The complaint also seeks to permanently prohibit Goel, Kumar and Moffat from acting as an officer or director of any registered public company.

The SEC acknowledges the assistance and cooperation of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The SEC’s investigation is continuing.

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For more information, contact:
David Rosenfeld
Associate Director, SEC’s New York Regional Office
(212) 336-0153

Sanjay Wadhwa
Assistant Director, SEC’s New York Regional Office
(212) 336-0181

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-221.htm

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Other related hedge fund law articles:

Bart Mallon, Esq. of Cole-Frieman & Mallon LLP runs Hedge Fund Law Blog.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund or if you are a current hedge fund manager with questions about the securities laws, please contact us or call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-868-5345.

OTC Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 Passes House Committee Vote

CFTC Chairman Gensler Applauds “Historic Progress”

In a first step towards increased regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives markets, the House Financial Services Committee approved the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009.  The act is one of several initiatives to increase regulatory oversight of the financial markets and if passed by Congress would be signed into law by President Obama. Among other things the act would require Swap dealers and major swap participants to register with either the CFTC or the SEC.

Below I have reprinted press releases from both the House Financial Services Committee and the CFTC.

UPDATE: The Securities Industry Financial and Markets Association (SIFMA) just issued a press release reposted below as well.

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Financial Services Committee Approves Legislation to Regulate Derivatives

Committee completes work on a key element of President Obama’s plan to bring accountability and responsibility to Wall Street

Washington, DC – {The House Financial Services Committee today approved legislation that would, for the first time ever, require the comprehensive regulation of the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives marketplace. Today’s bill, which was approved by a vote of 43-26, represents a key part of a broader effort by Congress and President Obama to modernize America’s financial regulatory system in response to last year’s financial crisis.

Under the bill, all standardized swap transactions between dealers and large market participants, referred to as “major swap participants,” would have to be cleared and must be traded on an exchange or electronic platform. A major swap participant is defined as anyone that maintains a substantial net position in swaps, exclusive of hedging for commercial risk, or whose positions creates such significant exposure to others that it requires monitoring. OTC derivatives include swaps, which are contracts that call for an exchange of cash between two counterparties based on an underlying rate, index, credit event or the performance of an asset.

The legislation then sets out parallel regulatory frameworks for the regulation of swap markets, dealers, and major swap participants.  Rulemaking authority is held jointly by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which has jurisdiction over swaps, and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which has jurisdiction over security-based swaps.   The Treasury Department is given the authority to issue final rules if the CFTC and SEC cannot decide on a joint approach within 180 days. Subsequent interpretations of rules must be agreed to jointly by the Commissions.

Description of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009

Clearing

The legislation provides a mechanism to determine which swap transactions are sufficiently standardized that they must be submitted to a clearinghouse. For transactions that are clearable, clearing is a requirement when both counterparties are either dealers or major swap participants.  Clearing organizations must seek approval from the appropriate regulator—either the CFTC or the SEC—before a swap or class of swaps can be accepted for clearing.

Transactions in standardized swaps that involve end-users are not required to be cleared. Such customized transactions must, however, be reported to a trade repository.

Mandatory Trading on Exchange or Swap Execution Facility

A standardized and cleared swap transaction where both counterparties are either dealers or major swap participants must either be executed on a board of trade, a national securities exchange or a “swap execution facility”—as defined in the legislation.  If none of these venues makes a clearable swap available for trading, the trading requirement would not apply.  Counterparties would, however, have to comply with transaction reporting requirements established by the appropriate regulator.  The legislation also directs the regulators to eliminate unnecessary obstacles to trading on a board of trade or a national securities exchange.

Registration and Regulation of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants

Swap dealers and major swap participants must register with the appropriate Commission and dual registration is required in applicable cases.  Capital requirements for swap dealers’ and major swap participants’ positions in cleared swaps must be set at greater than zero.  Capital for non-cleared transaction must be set higher than for cleared transactions.  The prudential regulators will set capital for banks, while the Commissions will set capital for non-banks at a level that is “as strict or stricter” than that set by the prudential regulators.

The regulators are directed to set margin levels for counterparties in transactions that are not cleared.   The regulators are not required to set margin in transaction where one of the counterparties is not a dealer or major swap participant.  In cases where an end user is a counterparty to a transaction, any margin requirements must permit the use of non-cash collateral.

Reporting and Public Disclosure of Swap Transactions

Reporting and recordkeeping is required for all over-the-counter derivative transactions.  Clearing organizations must provide transaction information to the relevant Commission and a designated trade repository.   Swap transactions that are not cleared and for which no trade repository exists, must be reported directly to the relevant Commission.   The legislation also provides for public disclosure of aggregate data on swap trading volumes and positions—in a manner that does not disclose the business transactions or market position of any person.  Large positions in swaps must also be reported directly to regulators.

Swap Execution Facilities

Swap execution facilities, or facility for the trading of swaps that are not Boards of Trade or National Securities Exchanges, must register with the relevant regulator as a swap execution facility (SEF).  SEFs must also adhere to core regulatory principles relating to enforcement, anti-manipulation, monitoring, information collection and conflicts of interest, among others. The CFTC and SEC are required to prescribe joint rules governing the regulation of swap execution facilities.  A Commission may exempt a SEF from registration if it is subject to comparable, comprehensive supervision and regulation by another regulator.

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Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler on House Financial Services Committee Passage of OTC Derivatives Regulatory Reform Legislation

October 15, 2009

Washington, DC – U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman Gary Gensler today commented on the OTC Derivatives Markets Act of 2009, passed this morning by the House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services.

Chairman Gensler said:

“Today’s vote by the House Financial Services Committee represents historic progress toward comprehensive regulatory reform of the over-the-counter derivatives marketplace. The Committee’s bill is a significant step toward lowering risk and promoting transparency. Substantive challenges remain. I look forward to building on this Committee’s hard work with Chairman Frank, Chairman Peterson and others in the House and Senate to complete legislation that covers the entire marketplace without exception and to ensure that regulators have appropriate authorities to protect the public.”

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Release Date: October 15, 2009

Contact: Andrew DeSouza, (202) 962-7390, [email protected]

SIFMA’s Bentsen Statement on Committee Passage of Derivatives Regulation

October 15, 2009, Washington, DC—The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association today released a statement from Ken Bentsen, Executive Vice President, Public Policy and Advocacy in response to the House Financial Services Committee’s passage of the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets Act of 2009.

“Bringing greater regulatory transparency and oversight to derivatives markets and products is a key component of reforming our financial system. That oversight must also recognize the important role these risk management tools play for countless companies across the country and for our broader economy. Mandating particular transaction modes, as this bill does, could raise transaction costs while not necessarily reducing risk in a commensurate amount—results that we believe are contrary to our shared reform goals. As the legislative process continues we look forward to working with the Congress toward a bill that strikes a balance between the need for transparency and risk management efficiency.”

The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association brings together the shared interests of more than 550 securities firms, banks and asset managers. SIFMA’s mission is to promote policies and practices that work to expand and perfect markets, foster the development of new products and services and create efficiencies for member firms, while preserving and enhancing the public’s trust and confidence in the markets and the industry. SIFMA works to represent its members’ interests locally and globally. It has offices in New York, Washington D.C., and London and its associated firm, the Asia Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, is based in Hong Kong.

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Other related hedge fund law articles:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, or if you have questions about investment adviser registration with the SEC or state securities commission, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-868-5345.

Hedge Fund Investors to Sue SEC

SEC’s Madoff Failure Cited in Lawsuit

Just a quick note that the New York Times has written an article about two Madoff investors who are suing the SEC for not doing its job.  It will likely be a tough case for the investors/plaintiffs to prevail upon because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity (i.e. government agencies cannot be sued for actions made pursuant to their legislative mandate).  However, the inspector general’s Madoff report, which in no uncertain terms castigates the SEC, is likely to be the basis of many of the investors’ complaints.

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Hedge Funds and Insider Trading

Hedge Fund Manager/Trader Settles Charges with SEC

Insider trading cases pop up every now and again and most cases do not warrant highlighting – post-Boesky everyone in the securities industry is well aware that trading on inside information is illegal.  However, it warrants emphasis that the SEC will crack down on hedge fund managers or traders involved with insider trading and the penalties are harsh.  The individuals (including a hedge fund manager) involved in the action described in the SEC litigation release reprinted below were subject to fines and disgorgement, of course, but were also barred from the securities industry.  The severity of such a penalty underscores the importance of understanding and abiding by the insider trading rules.

As noted below, trading on insider information is illegal under both civil (Section 17(a) of the 1933 act, Section 10(b) of the 1934 act, and Rule 10b-5 thereunder) and criminal laws (generally securities fraud, but depending on the facts charges may also include wire fraud and commercial bribery).

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U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
Litigation Release No. 21244
October 8, 2009

SEC v. Mitchel S. Guttenberg, Erik R. Franklin, David M. Tavdy, Mark E. Lenowitz, Robert D. Babcock, Andrew A. Srebnik, Ken Okada, David A. Glass, Marc R. Jurman, Randi E. Collotta, Christopher K. Collotta, Q Capital Investment Partners, LP, DSJ International Resources Ltd. (d/b/a Chelsey Capital), and Jasper Capital LLC, C.A. No. 07 CV 1774 (S.D.N.Y) (PKC)

Three Defendants in Wall Street Insider Trading Ring Settle SEC Charges

The Securities and Exchange Commission announced today that on September 29, 2009, the Honorable P. Kevin Castel, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, entered final judgments against defendants Erik R. Franklin, Q Capital Investment Partners, LP (“Q Capital”), and David M. Tavdy, in SEC v. Guttenberg, et al., C.A. No. 07 CV 1774 (S.D.N.Y.), an insider trading case the Commission filed on March 1, 2007. The Commission’s complaint alleged illegal insider trading in connection with two related schemes in which Wall Street professionals serially traded on material, nonpublic information tipped by insiders at UBS Securities LLC (“UBS”) and Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc. (“Morgan Stanley”), in exchange for cash kickbacks.

The Commission’s complaint alleged that from 2001 through 2006, Mitchel S. Guttenberg, an executive director in the equity research department of UBS, illegally tipped material, nonpublic information concerning upcoming UBS analyst upgrades and downgrades to two Wall Street traders, Franklin and Tavdy, in exchange for sharing in the illicit profits from their trading on that information. The complaint also alleged that Franklin was a downstream tippee in another scheme in which, in 2005 and 2006, Randi Collotta, an attorney who worked in the global compliance department of Morgan Stanley, illegally tipped material, nonpublic information concerning upcoming corporate acquisitions involving Morgan Stanley’s investment banking clients.

The complaint alleged that Franklin illegally traded on the inside information for two hedge funds he managed, Lyford Cay Capital, LP and Q Capital, and in his personal accounts. Tavdy illegally traded on the inside information (i) for Andover Brokerage, LLC and Assent LLC, registered broker-dealers where Tavdy was a proprietary trader, (ii) in his own personal account, (iii) in the accounts of a relative and friend, and (iv) in the accounts of Jasper Capital LLC, a day-trading firm with which Tavdy was associated. Franklin and Tavdy also had downstream tippees who traded on the inside information. Without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint, Franklin, Q Capital, and Tavdy settled the Commission’s insider trading charges.

Franklin and Q Capital consented to the entry of a final judgment which (i) permanently enjoins them from violating Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”); and (ii) orders, on a joint and several liability basis, disgorgement of $5,400,000, with all but $290,000 waived based on a demonstrated inability to pay. In a related administrative proceeding, Franklin consented to the entry of a Commission order barring him from future association with any broker, dealer, or investment adviser. In a parallel criminal case, Franklin previously pled guilty to charges of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud and is awaiting sentencing. U.S. v. Erik Franklin, No. 1:07-CR-164 (S.D.N.Y.).

Tavdy consented to the entry of a final judgment which (i) permanently enjoins him from violating Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, Rule 10b-5 thereunder, and Section 17(a) of the Securities Act; and (ii) orders him to pay disgorgement of $10,300,000. In a related administrative proceeding, Tavdy consented to the entry of a Commission order barring him from future association with any broker or dealer. In a parallel criminal case, Tavdy previously pled guilty to charges of securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud, and was sentenced to 63 months in prison. U.S. v. Mitchel Guttenberg and David Tavdy, No. 1:07-CR-141 (S.D.N.Y.).

The Commission also announced that Samuel W. Childs, Jr., a former general securities principal at Assent LLC, consented to a Commission order barring him from future association with any broker or dealer, based on his criminal conviction for conspiracy to commit securities fraud, wire fraud and commercial bribery. U.S. v. Samuel W. Childs, Jr. and Laurence McKeever, No. 1:07-CR-142 (S.D.N.Y.). In that case, the criminal indictment alleged that Childs accepted bribes from traders at Assent LLC in exchange for not reporting their illegal trading to Assent management.

The Commission acknowledges the assistance and cooperation of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

For further information, see Litigation Release Nos. 20022 (March 1, 2007), 20367 (November 20, 2007), 20725 (September 18, 2008), and 21086 (June 16, 2009).

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Bart Mallon, Esq. of Cole-Frieman & Mallon LLP runs Hedge Fund Law Blog.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund or if you are a current hedge fund manager with questions about the securities laws, please contact us or call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-868-5345.  Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Section 13(d) Filings and Section 13(g) Filings

Section 13(d) of the Securities Act of 1934 requires any person who beneficially owns 5% or more of a class of equity securities of a publicly traded company to file a report with the SEC within 10 days of reaching the 5% ownership threshold.  SEC Rule 13d-1 provides more detailed guidance on the reporting requirements.

Generally those persons who are subject to this rule will need to file a Schedule 13D (discussed in greater detail below) with the SEC.  Because Schedule 13D is fairly detailed (the SEC estimates that it will take 14.5 hours to complete the form), the SEC has provided an alternate form and alternate reporting procedures for those persons who acquire 5% but who are generally not purchasing the securities with the purpose nor with the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer.

Schedule 13D

The following discussion is from the SEC website and can be found here.

Schedule 13D is commonly referred to as a “beneficial ownership report.” The term “beneficial owner” is defined under SEC rules. It includes any person who directly or indirectly shares voting power or investment power (the power to sell the security).

When a person or group of persons acquires beneficial ownership of more than 5% of a voting class of a company’s equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, they are required to file a Schedule 13D with the SEC. (Depending upon the facts and circumstances, the person or group of persons may be eligible to file the more abbreviated Schedule 13G in lieu of Schedule 13D.)

Schedule 13D reports the acquisition and other information within ten days after the purchase. The schedule is filed with the SEC and is provided to the company that issued the securities and each exchange where the security is traded. Any material changes in the facts contained in the schedule require a prompt amendment. The schedule is often filed in connection with a tender offer.

You can find the Schedules 13D for most publicly traded companies in the SEC’s EDGAR database. You can learn how to use EDGAR to find information about companies. You can find an HTML version of the Schedule and download a PDF version for easier printing.

Schedule 13G Filing Categories

As discussed above, there is an alternative to the Schedule D filing requirement if the hedge fund manager falls within certain categories desicribed below.  If the manager does fall within these categories, the manager can file the less onerous Schedule 13G.

Rule 13d-1(b) – provides that Schedule G can be filed, in lieu of filing Schedule D, within 45 days of the end of the calendar year in which the 5% threshold was exceeded if: (i) generally the person has not acquired the securities with any purpose, or with the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer and (ii) the person is one of a number of enumerated persons (i.e. broker-dealers, registered investment advisors, investment companies, etc).

Rule 13d-1(c) – provides that Schedule G can be filed, in lieu of filing Schedule D, within 10 days of the date which the 5% threshold was exceeded if: (i) generally the person has not acquired the securities with any purpose, or with the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer; (ii) the person is not a certain enumerated person; and (iii) the person does not directly or indirectly own 20% or more of the class of equity securities.

Rule 13d-1(d) – requires Schedule G be filed within 45 days after the end of the calendar year in which the 5% threshold was exceeded if the person meets certain requirements.

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Please contact us if you have any questions or if you are interested in starting a hedge fund. Other related hedge fund law articles include:

Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, or if you have questions about the Schedule D or Schedule G filing process, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.

Investment Adviser Pay to Play Rules

SEC Proposal Would Ban Third Party Solicitors from Seeking Public Monies

Back in July there was much discussion about new “pay to play” rules proposed by the SEC.  The proposed “pay to play” rules would limit the ability of investment managers (including hedge fund managers) to make political contributions and would also limit the ability of third party marketers to raise capital for managers from state and federal pension plans.

There have been many interesting comments on these proposed rules so far, and, as some have noted, it seems to me that these rules may hinder the first-amendment rights of these money managers.  The comment period ends October 6, 2009 and the SEC may choose to vote on the rule thereafter, but I would not expect for any rule to be finalized before the end of this year.  However, hedge fund managers may want to review their investment advisory compliance manual to make sure they have discussed this issue.  Hedge fund managers who are not yet registered with the SEC as investment advisers will likely deal with this issue when they register.

I have included below (i) a definition of pay to play below, (ii) the SEC press release announcing the proposal, and (iii) a discussion of pay to play from 1999, the last time the SEC had a proposal to regulate these activities.

Mallon P.C. will be commenting on the proposal so please let us know your opinions below.

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Pay to Play Definition (see old SEC release, reprinted below)

When I refer to pay-to-play, I am talking about the practice of requiring, either expressly or implicitly, municipal securities participants to make political contributions to municipal officials in order to be considered for an award of underwriting, advisory, or related business from the municipality. In most cases these practices do not amount to outright bribery – which is already prohibited under state and federal law, since there is no express quid pro quo – but it is simply an understanding that if you don’t give, you don’t get business.

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SEC Proposes Measures to Curtail “Pay to Play” Practices

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
2009-168

Washington, D.C., July 22, 2009 — The Securities and Exchange Commission today voted unanimously to propose measures intended to curtail “pay to play” practices by investment advisers that seek to manage money for state and local governments. The measures are designed to prevent an adviser from making political contributions or hidden payments to influence their selection by government officials.

The proposals relate to money managed by state and local governments under important public programs. Such programs include public pension plans that pay retirement benefits to government employees, retirement plans in which teachers and other government employees can invest money for their retirement, and 529 plans that allow families to invest money for college.

To help manage this money, state and local governments often hire outside investment advisers who may directly manage this money and provide advice about which investments they should make. In return for their advice, the investment advisers typically charge fees that come out of the assets of the pension funds for which the advice is provided. If the advisers manage mutual funds or other investments that are options in a plan, the advisers receive fees from the money in those investments.

Investment advisers are often selected by one or more trustees who are appointed by elected officials. While such a selection process is common, fairness can be undermined if advisers seeking to do business with state and local governments make political contributions to elected officials or candidates, hoping to influence the selection process.

The selection process also can be undermined if elected officials or their associates ask advisers for political contributions or otherwise make it understood that only advisers who make contributions will be considered for selection. Hence the term “pay to play.” Advisers and government officials who engage in pay to play practices may try to hide the true purpose of contributions or payments.

“Pay to play practices can result in public plans and their beneficiaries receiving sub-par advisory services at inflated prices,” said SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro. “Our proposal would significantly curtail the corrupting and distortive influence of pay to play practices.”

Andrew J. Donohue, Director of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management, added, “Pay to play serves the interests of advisers to public pension plans rather than the interests of the millions of pension plan beneficiaries who rely on their advice. The rule we are proposing today would help ensure that advisory contracts are awarded on professional competence, not political influence.”

The rule being proposed for public comment by the SEC includes prohibitions intended to capture not only direct political contributions by advisers, but other ways advisers may engage in pay to play arrangements.

Restricting Political Contributions

Under the proposed rule, an investment adviser who makes a political contribution to an elected official in a position to influence the selection of the adviser would be barred for two years from providing advisory services for compensation, either directly or through a fund.

The rule would apply to the investment adviser as well as certain executives and employees of the adviser. Additionally, the rule would apply to political incumbents as well as candidates for a position that can influence the selection of an adviser.

There is a de minimis provision that permits an executive or employee to make contributions of up to $250 per election per candidate if the contributor is entitled to vote for the candidate.

Banning Solicitation of Contributions

The proposed rule also would prohibit an adviser and certain of its executives and employees from coordinating, or asking another person or political action committee (PAC) to:
1. Make a contribution to an elected official (or candidate for the official’s position) who can influence the selection of the adviser.
2. Make a payment to a political party of the state or locality where the adviser is seeking to provide advisory services to the government.

Banning Third-Party Solicitors

The proposed rule also would prohibit an adviser and certain of its executives and employees from paying a third party, such as a solicitor or placement agent, to solicit a government client on behalf of the investment adviser.

Restricting Indirect Contributions and Solicitations

Finally, the proposed rule would prohibit an adviser and certain of its executives and employees from engaging in pay to play conduct indirectly, such as by directing or funding contributions through third parties such as spouses, lawyers or companies affiliated with the adviser, if that conduct would violate the rule if the adviser did it directly. This provision would prevent advisers from circumventing the rule by directing or funding contributions through third parties.

* * *

Public comments on today’s proposed rule must be received by the Commission within 60 days after their publication in the Federal Register.

The full text of the proposed rule will be posted to the SEC Web site as soon as possible.
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http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-168.htm

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U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Speech by SEC Staff:
Pay-To-Play and
Public Pension Plans
Remarks of
Robert E. Plaze
Associate Director, Division of Investment Management,
U. S. Securities and Exchange Commission

At the Annual Joint Legislative Meeting of
The National Association of State Retirement Administrators,
National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems and
The National Council on Teacher Retirement, Washington, D.C.

January 26, 1999

The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author’s colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.

Thank you for inviting me to address this meeting of the group of state pension administrators. My father was a state retiree and lived on his pension for a number of years. I know how the importance the security of a pension plan is to millions of persons like my Dad, and how important your jobs are.

I am a member of the staff of the Commission. But my remarks this afternoon are my own, and I am not speaking for the Commission or my colleagues on the staff.

When Arthur Levitt became Chairman almost six years ago, among his goals was the reform of the municipal securities markets. Since then, a series of initiatives have improved investor disclosure in the municipal securities markets. A second area of reform – and one most relevant to why you have invited me here today – has been the curbing of pay-to-play practices.

When I refer to pay-to-play, I am talking about the practice of requiring, either expressly or implicitly, municipal securities participants to make political contributions to municipal officials in order to be considered for an award of underwriting, advisory, or related business from the municipality. In most cases these practices do not amount to outright bribery – which is already prohibited under state and federal law, since there is no express quid pro quo – but it is simply an understanding that if you don’t give, you don’t get business.

Chairman Levitt, and several SEC officials have been involved in the municipal securities markets. They knew that pay-to-play practices had been pervasive and corrupting to the market for municipal securities. And if you ask them, they will tell you stories about checks left on the table at a dinner. They may even know the minimum required contributions in a particular jurisdiction to be eligible for public contracts.

Pay-to-play creates the impression that contracts for professional services are awarded on the basis of political influence rather than professional competence. It harms the citizens of the municipality and the investing public asked to purchase the securities. It brings discredit on the businesses and professionals who participate in the practice.

In 1993, the first in a series of steps to end pay-to-play practices began when a group of investment banks voluntarily agreed to swear off making contributions for the purpose of obtaining municipal business. In 1994, the SEC approved MSRB rule G-37 – which is known as the pay-to-play rule.1

G-37 prohibits municipal securities dealers from engaging in the municipal securities business with an issuer two years after contributions are made to an official of an issuer by the dealer or its employees engaged in municipal finance business. The prohibition applies equally to officials who are incumbents and those who are candidates. There is a de minimis exception, which permits contribution of up to $250 to candidates for whom they can vote.

The rule was met with howls of protest from some state and municipal officials. Some argued that it violated their First Amendment rights to make and solicit political contributions. These claims were soon tested in the federal courts, and in an important decision, a federal court of appeals held that G-37 was a constitutionally permissible restraint on free speech – because it serves a compelling governmental interest of rooting out corruption in the market for municipal securities.2

As we meet this afternoon, the American Bar Association is considering proposals to bar the practice of lawyers obtaining business through political contributions. Deans of 47 law schools across the country have joined Chairman Levitt in calling for an end to what the San Francisco Chronicle called “a sleazy practice that costs taxpayers.” 3 We hope that my profession will adopt a strong and effective ban.

Bringing an end to pay-to-play practices thus has been a step-by-step process.

Recently, Chairman Levitt has asked my Division to look into the question of whether the Commission needed to address pay-to-play in the public pension area. We are now in the fact-gathering stage of this project, which could very well lead to a rule proposal.

What have we found? So far, we see strong indicators that pay-to-play can be a powerful force in the selection of money managers of public pension plans. There are public reports of pay-to-pay problems with the management of public money in 12 states – and many of these are the largest states.

* In one small state a former state treasurer raised over $73,000 in campaign contributions, virtually all from contractors for the state retirement system 4

* The controller of a large state has raised $1.8 million from pension fund contractors, many of which are out-of-state 5

* In another state, a former state treasurer raised contributions from contractors, one of whom received a five-fold increase in the custody fees it charged. The treasurer’s candidate lost and the contract was terminated by the new treasurer.6

* The Executive Director of the MSRB has been quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying that “the conflicts of interest in the [public pension business] are as bad as anything we’ve seen in the muni-bond market.7

* An elected state official has told me that she thought that G-37 has resulted in the movement of some pay-to-play activity over to the public pension area. Phone calls from some advisers have confirmed this.

Claims that pay-to-play really isn’t a problem are refuted by the findings of states and plans that have taken on the issue. Vermont and Connecticut have enacted legislation.8 Both were concerned that awards of advisory contracts were being made on the basis of political favoritism rather than expertise. They concluded that even where no actual corruption occurred, the appearance of impropriety was intolerable.

CalPERS has acted in California, and the records of its rulemaking proceeding and subsequent litigation are particularly instructive about how pay-to-play works and its insidiousness.

It is heartening to see some of the plans and jurisdictions putting an end to the culture of pay-to-play. As you know, it takes two to tango, and it takes two to participate in these practices – the payer and the payee. Our concern is with the activities of the payers – investment advisers, whom we regulate under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.9

The Advisers Act imposes a federal fiduciary duty on advisers with respect to their clients and prospective clients.10

* When the process of the selection of an investment adviser is corrupted, the duties of an adviser to his client are compromised.

* When the selection process is corrupted and advisers are selected based not on their merit but on the amount or their political contributions, the ultimate clients of advisers – the pension pools they manage – are harmed and the benefits of retirees threatened.

A similar harm occurs when advisers are not chosen because they have not made the requisite amount of contributions.

We at the Commission believe that G-37 is working pretty well. And I have to believe, based on the evidence we have collected so far, that the burden will fall on those who argue that the Commission should not apply the core principles of G-37 to investment advisers and the public pension plan area.

We have spoken with your representatives from NASRA, and we have discussed the matter with some of your colleagues. They have described the difficult position in which a professional manager is placed when it becomes apparent that the decision-making process is being skewed by considerations of political contributions. You have a unique perspective from which to help us understand the issues.

I look forward to further discussions with you and look forward to hearing your views.

Thank you.

1 Self-Regulatory Organizations; Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-33868 (Apr. 7, 1994).

2Blount v. SEC , 61 F.3d 938 (1995), cert. denied , 517 U.S. 1119 (1996).

3A Sleazy Practice That Costs Taxpayers , San Francisco Chron., Aug. 1, 1997, at A26.

4See Office of Vermont State Treasurer James H. Douglas, If You Play, You Pay: New Campaign Finance Legislation Prohibits Contracts for Wall Street Firms Contributing to State Treasurer Races, a Provision Pushed by Douglas (06/16/97) http://www.state.vt.us/treasurer/press/pr970616.htm.

5 Clifford J. Leavy, Firms Handling N.Y. Pension Fund Are Donors to Comptroller , N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1998, at A16)

6See Steve Hemmerick, See You in Court,’ Bank Tells Its Client: State Street Sues over Custody Contract, Pens. & Inv., Feb. 23, 1998, at 2.

7 Charles Gasparino and Jonathan Axelrod, Political Money May Sway Business of Public Pensions , Wall St. J., Mar. 24, 1997, at C1.

8 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-333 o (1997); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 109 (1997).

9 15 U.S.C. 80b.

10SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. , 375 U.S. 180 (1963).

http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch2501.htm

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Bart Mallon, Esq. runs hedge fund law blog and has written most all of the articles which appear on this website.  Mr. Mallon’s legal practice is devoted to helping emerging and start up hedge fund managers successfully launch a hedge fund.  If you are a hedge fund manager who is looking to start a hedge fund, or if you have questions about investment adviser registration with the SEC or state securities commission, please call Mr. Mallon directly at 415-296-8510.